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DewDiligence

10/14/10 9:17 PM

#106353 RE: DewDiligence #106210

Why the Kneejerk Response to Buyout Offers is No

http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2010/10/14/in-ma-shareholders-win-may-be-ceos-loss

›In M&A, Shareholders’ Win May Be CEO’s Loss

October 14, 2010, 5:49 PM ET
By Gregory J. Millman

Many CEOs stand to come out losers if they sell their companies, even when shareholders would reap a substantial premium.

Only 14.5% of chief executives would do better selling their companies at a 25% premium than they would under their current pay packages, according to an analysis of compensation packages for CEOs of companies in the Standard & Poor’s 1500 index by compensation consulting firm Shareholder Value Advisors.

In many cases, the loss of expected future pay and the option time value would more than wipe out gains on equity and on the spread between the option exercise price and the take-out price.

Consider Genzyme CEO Henri Termeer. The board has twice rejected Sanofi-Aventis’s recent hostile $69-a-share offer as inadequate. The price is a 27% premium to Genzyme’s $54 closing price on July 22, the day before reports of Sanofi’s interest.

Though shareholders could pocket the premium, he would be a net loser, as the gain on his stock would be more than offset by the loss of future pay and the loss on time value of his options. Genzyme declined to comment.

Sanofi would have to offer $71 a share for Termeer to break even. To improve on his July 22 position by 25% Sanofi-Aventis would have to offer around $90–well above Genzyme’s roughly $80 historic high in January 2008.

Dow Jones Investment Banker asked Stephen O’Byrne of Shareholder Value Advisors to rank the CEOs of S&P 1500 companies by the answer to the question, “Would a target company CEO win or lose in an acquisition that brought target shareholders a 25% premium?” The analysis showed that only 14.5% of CEOs would be richer if they backed such an offer and departed the company.

The analysis covers 924 firms from the S&P 1500, based on the data from ExecuComp current as of December 2009. Excluded are companies that changed CEOs since then. Also excluded are CEOs whose tenures are too short to estimate future pay, and firms no longer in the S&P 1500. The 25% threshold is a rounding: The average premium over a preannouncement stock price for acquisitions of S&P 1500 targets in the last three years has been 27%. [The average for biotech buyouts during the past few years is higher than that—see #msg-55426176.] This Excel spreadsheet shows how far these CEOs’ interests may diverge from shareholders’ interests.

The CEO perhaps best positioned in a sale situation is Paul D. Finkelstein of Regis Corp., a hair salon franchiser with a roughly $1 billion market cap. The analysis indicates that Finkelstein’s wealth totals $27 million but would jump to $66 million if the company sold at a 25% premium. He is one of six CEOs who would at least double their wealth in such a sale. Regis didn’t return phone calls seeking comment.

The analysis also showed that most CEOs–729, or 78.9%–would be significantly worse off (more than a 5% loss) if their companies were acquired at a 25% premium, though shareholders likely would be better off. Of those CEOs, 428, or 46% of the full sample, would see their wealth fall by 50% or more in a sale that brought shareholders a 25% premium.

Another 61 (6.6%) CEOs would come out roughly even (within +/- 5%) with a sale at a 25% premium.

The analysis factors in three basic elements of compensation: equity (stock and options); the present value of expected future pay; and pension. The analysis is based on pretax numbers and assumes a retirement at 65. The analysis doesn’t factor in the possibility that the CEO of a target company might be retained by the new owners or find another job, mitigating any losses.

Termeer’s case shows how a CEO can come out a loser. Under Sanofi’s $69-a-share offer, the Genzyme CEO would show a profit of $8.5 million on his Genzyme options (which increase in value from $62.4 million to $70.9 million) and $9.6 million on his Genzyme stock. The 13.6% gain on the options—roughly half of the premium shareholders would pocket in the sale–comes because the higher stock price is offset by his loss of the time value of the options.

Termeer also would get a cash change-in-control payment of $11 million. So he would pocket $29 million if Genzyme accepts the $69-a-share offer. However, he would lose $38 million in the present value of three year’s future pay and so would end up $9 million in the hole.
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DewDiligence

10/18/10 5:30 PM

#106527 RE: DewDiligence #106210

Recent Biotech Buyouts

[Added STJ-AGAM (shown in red).]


Acquired Premium Deal iHub
Company Buyer to Market Value Date Reference

GNLB GSK 465% $57M 10/08 #msg-33209281
MEMY Roche 319% $50M 11/08 #msg-33787598
KOSN BMY 233% $190M 5/08 #msg-29647147
MGRM LH 171% $155M 6/09 #msg-38960958
COLY PFE 167% $165M 11/07 #msg-24600805
NTMD Deerfield 158%‡‡‡ $36M 1/09 #msg-35132470
EYE ABT 149% **$2.8B 1/09 #msg-34762429
IOMI Intercell 147% $190M 5/08 #msg-29232165
BTRX Stiefel 136% $150M 6/08 #msg-30201906
Tepnel GPRO 126% $132M 1/09 #msg-35221710
SGXP LLY 119% $64M 7/08 #msg-30547648
ENCY PFE 118% $350M 2/08 #msg-26978155
TRCA Ipsen 104% $660M 6/08 #msg-29795183
CRY.to MDT 97% $380M 9/08 #msg-32421462
Speedel NVS 94% $880M 7/08 #msg-30588524
MNT JNJ 92% $1.1B 11/08 #msg-33879830
MEDX BMY 90% $2.1B 7/09 #msg-39801273
SIRT GSK 85% $620M 4/08 #msg-28705020
ZGEN BMY 84% $885M 9/10 #msg-54152162
CVTX GILD *‡76% $1.4B 3/09 #msg-36225695
MOVET.BR Shire 74% $560M 8/10 #msg-52918245
IDEV ENDP *†74% *†$370M 1/09 #msg-34592416
LEVP VPHM ††73% ††$510M 7/08 #msg-30704409
TARG MDCO ***72% $42M 1/09 #msg-34774402
Ventana Roche 72% $3.4B 1/08 #msg-30912677
Jerini Shire *71% $520M 7/08 #msg-30452872
APNO Cell Bio 70% $20M 9/09 #msg-43348606
AAH.AX CEPH 69% $207M 2/09 #msg-35956544
OSTE MDT 65% $123M 8/10 #msg-53410183
TLCR Grifols 64% $3.4B 6/10 #msg-50961841
FACT ABT 64% $450M 3/10 #msg-47606240
Acambis SNY 64% $550M 7/08 #msg-30990498
JAV HSP 64% $141M 4/10 #msg-48881292
SCRX Shionogi 61% $1.4B 9/08 #msg-31859174
BFRM Merz 60% $253M 1/10 #msg-45071380
ASPM COV 56% $210M 9/09 #msg-43348479
OSIP Astellas 55% $4.0B 5/10 #msg-50234451
IDMI Takeda 55% $75M 5/09 #msg-37898204
BSMD MMSI 54% $96M 5/10 #msg-50161877
ATSI MDT 54% $370M 4/10 #msg-49617936
ALO KG ‡†54% $1.6B 11/08 #msg-33763449
MEDI AZN ‡‡53% $15.2B 4/07 #msg-19020387
MLNM Takeda 53% $8.8B 4/08 #msg-28365383
TRBN EBS ***52% $97M 8/10 #msg-53271836
PCOP LGND ***52% $75M 9/08 #msg-32404474
CLZR ELOS 51% $65M 9/09 #msg-41293512
OMRI JNJ ‡*51% $465M 11/08 #msg-33762745
IMCL LLY †††51% $6.5B 10/08 #msg-32662830
MYOG GILD 50% $2.5B 10/06 #msg-13712121
MIL Merck KGaA 50%*†* $7.2B 3/10 #msg-47249493
CRGN CLDX 50% $40M 5/09 #msg-38262967
PHRM CELG 46% $2.9B 11/07 #msg-24645394
BRL TEVA 42% **$9.0B 7/08 #msg-30792830
AGAM STJ 41% $1.3B 10/10 #msg-55673504

KG PFE 40% $3.6B 10/10 #msg-55425514
MOGN Eisai 39% $3.9B 12/07 #msg-25163775
SGP MRK 34% $41B 3/09 #msg-36140327
HTRN ENDP 34% $223M 5/10 #msg-49838813
SMTS COV 32% $250M 6/10 #msg-51344183
CGPI Galderma 30% $420M 2/08 #msg-28286522
WYE PFE 29% $68B 1/09 #msg-35077617
APPX Fresenius †29% $940M 7/08 #msg-30498388
SEPR Dainippon 28% $2.6B 9/09 #msg-41143301
Zentiva SNY ‡‡26% $2.6B 9/08 #msg-32327005
NOVN Hisamitsu 22% $428M 7/09 #msg-39515681
PPCO ENDP 19% $168M 8/10 #msg-53137069
EVVV COV 19% $2.6B 6/10 #msg-50797343
ABII CELG 17% $2.9B 6/10 #msg-51844360
ACL NVS *‡‡17% *‡‡$49.7B 1/10 #msg-45072999
CGRB JNJ 16% $970M 5/09 #msg-38039851
DNA Roche 16% †*$46.8B 3/09 #msg-36224175
ARI.to Roche ‡15% $190M 7/08 #msg-30904056
SENO BCR 14% $213M 5/10 #msg-49838776
CEGE BPAX 6% $38M 6/09 #msg-39163410
MEND JNJ 6% $480M 7/10 #msg-52176337
VXGN OXGN (4%) $33M 10/09 #msg-42578130
AVGN MNOV ***(7%) $38M 8/09 #msg-40769841
VRX BVF (7%) $3.9B 6/10 #msg-51505172
PGLA Avexa ® ® 12/08 #msg-34341452
NUVO ARCA ® ® 9/08 #msg-32420015
NOVC TSPT ® ® 9/08 #msg-31869987
VSGN IPC*†† ® ® 8/09 #msg-40603745

®Reverse merger with private or non-US company.

‡Number is misleading inasmuch as Arius announced in
May 2008 that it was pursued by an unnamed suitor.

‡‡Premium relative to commencement of bidding.

‡‡‡To be liquidated by Deerfield following failed merger with
Archemix; premium relative to 11/18/08 date of Archemix deal.

‡†Based on closing price 8/21/08, the day
before KG announced initial buyout offer.

‡*Based on 11/20/08 close.

†Premium reaches 63% if earn-out met.

††Premium and deal value based on 0.45/sh of contingent payments.

†††Premium relative to 7/30/08 close, the
day before BMY announced first buyout offer.

†*Price for 44% of DNA not already owned.

*199% premium to volume-weighted
price during preceding 3 months.

**Deal value includes assumption of debt.

***Premium and deal value exclude contingent payouts.

*‡Premium relative to 1/26/09, the day
before Astellas announced $16/sh offer.

*‡‡Price includes entire deal in three stages; 17% premium is the
blended avg price of NVS’ purchases ($164) relative to ACL’s market
price 4/4/08 immediately prior to announcement of first stage of deal.

*†Premium includes estimated value of contingent
payouts, but listed deal value excludes them.

*††IntelliPharmaCeutics.

*†*Relative to MIL’s price before announcement that co. was for sale.