[edited] Countryboy,
It is interesting that the word trustlet is used in your link:
SKDMARCS is a Constructive Key Management-based technology used in conjunction with PKI that will facilitate development of a smart card-enabled content dissemination system. This system that will allow members in allied-coalition enterprise environments to access information based on role and "cneed-to-know". Cadets will write smart card reader "trustlets" (written in C) that will allow smart card readers to authenticate multiple smartcards/tokens into the enterprise.
This implies a programmable reader that can swap and execute multiple trustlets that will be authenticated to the network. Here is an excerpt from a Wave PDF:
EMBASSY Secure Smart Card TerminalsThe EMBASSY secure smart card terminal is a key component of the EMBASSY Trust System (ETS) for solving complex security problems precipitated by the information age. Comprehensive security functions must be integrated into every end user device creating a network of trusted clients, and establishing multi-party trust between devices, application service providers, and end users. The EMBASSY secure smart card terminal is the device that is trusted to uphold the security of applications by executing EMBASSY trustlets. EMBASSY trustlets are extensions of an application’s secure functions that are executed within the terminal and never exposed to the PC or to the Internet.
Furthermore, doing a Google on "trustlet" returns only references to Wave's Embassy System or this DePaul seminar.
Even further, the smartcard reader does not authenticate anything. The reader is a hardware device that loads and executes services, that's it:
The EMBASSY secure smart card terminal is the first generation of EMBASSY Trusted Client devices and is one of the three fundamental elements of the ETS. It is complemented by the EMBASSY Executive firmware and a backend infrastructure called the Trust Assurance Network (TAN).
The reader needs the firmware and the TAN to authenticate. Reading further:
Trust Assurance Network (TAN) server authentication, establishing a protected execution environment and authenticated delivery of trustlets.
Read this last blurb *very* carefully. The work *establishing* is the key word, imo. It is the TAN that delivers the ability to have a secure execution environment. There is no trust without the server. The chip in the reader is merely a box with a door, but the TAN is what holds the keys to open that door securely. [edited] What good is a safe that can be opened by anyone at any time? The method of authentication with a server is key.
Again, just like Wave's CSP, which is the last link in communicating to the TSS and TPM from the end user, the TAN is the last link in communicating to the other party in a trust environment. Once the key to open that door is issued, everyone else can get involved.
Once authentication is involved, it involves Wave, imo.
This is why Larry Dudash and GregS just don't get it. They think trusted computing is just about chips. They are *wrong*!!!