I disagree with your assessment of the purpose of the clause, and therefore with your argument "for".
It will likely be more useful for the unit holders group and the LP to begin a discussion by talking about their purposes than only arguing about the precise mechanics that exist now... and if they agree on the purposes, the rest should be fairly easy.
I don't think the purpose of the LP is likely to be even close to that which has been postured here... and if that is correct, they won't mind addressing the purposes or making adjustments that obviate the concerns.
I also disagree with "the preferred bidder may not have significant resources available to it" being useful as a dodge. The structure in the design enables posturing exactly that... but, if the LP finds the bids received don't meet their expectations, they'll have time that will allow them to shop for a deal and partners they like better than what the other bidders have offered. That DOES impose constraints, still, that include elements of cost and timing, that make it less likely to happen as the best bid price approaches fair market value. If the best bid received is fair, and the LP isn't using its own resources, it will still have to be able to sell the deal to someone else at a higher price...
I guess we'll see what happens soon enough... on reaching agreements between the unit holders group and the LP, and then we'll see what the judge might add to it...
It is still possible, of course, that she also has things she won't agree with that include things other than the structure of the mechanics...
I'm not convinced, yet, that the proposed deal is going to happen... although I expect the deal they are talking about likely contains a lot more value for unitholders than the market seems to accept now... but, I also can't recall any other situations where the price of a unit was really an option on the outcome of an auction...
It appears to me the auction contains far less price risk than the path to trial...