Replies to post #331895 on Amarin Corp Plc (AMRN)

[marjac]

Mori and Kurabayashi are junk science to the extent that these studies are being relied upon by the Court and Defendants as clear and convincing proof of prima facie obviousness. While Mori and Kurabayashi might have some sort of value outside the context of the obviousness determination in this lawsuit, Mori and Kurabayashi have no value within the the context of the obviousness determination in the this lawsuit, as established by Curfman, Bhatt, Jarvis, and HK. This is where our Rule 60 application happily, belatedly, and confidently makes its stand.

[HinduKush]

Understanding Daubert
LTRO

You repeatedly refer to the court's gatekeeper function. I agree with that concept. But it does not typically refer to testimony per se but rather testimony about techniques or methods. Hence, under Daubert courts may exclude testimony about repressed memories, revelations under hypnosis, lie detector results, or testimony about only one test more than 50 years ago performed on whether the Kent cigarette filter in question released asbestos fibers. The junk science is the underlying techniques or theories. Not the testimony. Of course if the science is worthless than the testimony can have no value.

The science, in this case, is worthless (Mori) or was rendered worthless (Kurabayashi) by the gross misinterpretation of the science rendered by the application of invalid and grossly incorrect statistical methodology. It may be perfectly permissible to argue (as a qualified POSA) that 2 plus 2 equals 5 and have an opinion rendered in your favor as a result, but one must use valis scientific techniques to establish this OYW it reduces to junk science of the kind that Daubert calls upon for removal.

Haley v. Kolbe & Kolbe Millwork Co., 863 F.3d 600 (7th Cir. 2017)
The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which provides that a witness "qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education" may testify if:

(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and

(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.
IN THIS CASE, THE FLAGRANT MISUSE OF STATISTICS BY HEINECKE GOES AGAINST SUBSECTIONS (c) and (d)

GATEKEEPING ROLE
Fed. R. Evid. 702. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. , the Supreme Court explained that Rule 702 requires the district court to serve in a gatekeeping role and make "a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid." 509 U.S. 579, 592–93, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). To determine the admissibility of expert evidence, a district court looks at five factors:

(1) [W]hether the particular scientific theory "can be (and has been) tested"; (2) whether the theory "has been subjected to peer review and publication"; (3) the "known or potential rate of error"; (4) the "existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation"; and (5) whether the technique has achieved "general acceptance" in the relevant scientific or expert community.

THIS APPLIES BOTH TO THE CONTENT OF THE TESTIMONY AND THE SCIENCE INVOLVED IN ITS INTERPRETATION ipso facto the statistical analysis. In this case, the statistical methods employed by Heinecke would neither withstand peer review, nor publication nor for that matter achieve anything close to "general acceptance" in the relevant scientific community.
HK