I agree, North. This paper can be finessed into the record. If I was counsel, I would attach it to the Appendix on Reply, saying "Oh look here, this new scientific study not available to anyone prior to June 5 just came out, and here for the court's consideration is this irrefutable scientific analysis further destroying the lower court's misguided conclusion."
I would probably even send a copy to defense counsel advising them in advance that we intend to rely on this new study on Reply, so they could not claim prejudice.
I think the court would be receptive, as a trial is a search for the truth.
The central function of a trial is to discover the truth. Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 73, 120 S.Ct. 1119, 1127, 146 L.Ed.2d 47 (2000).
“Litigation is the pursuit of practical ends, not a game of chess.” Indianapolis v. Chase Nat. Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 69, 62 S.Ct. 15, 17, 86 L.Ed. 47 (1941) (Frankfurter, J.).
It is too late in the day and entirely contrary to the spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for decisions on the merits to be avoided on the basis of such mere technicalities. The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181-82, 83 S.Ct. 227, 230, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962).
If the underlying facts and circumstances may be the proper subject of relief, Plaintiffs ought to be afforded an opportunity to test their claims on the merits, as “the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 230, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962).
Moreover, “every right when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).
“A system of procedure is perverted from its proper function when it multiplies impediments to justice without the warrant of clear necessity. By the judgment about to be rendered, the respondent, caught in a mesh of procedural complexities, is told that there was only one way out of them, and this is a way he failed to follow. Because of that omission he is to be left ensnared in the web, the processes of the law, so it is said, being impotent to set him free. I think the paths to justice are not so few and narrow. A little of the liberality of method that has shaped the law of restitution in the past is still competent to find a way.”
Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191, 209-10, 52 S.Ct. 532, 537-38, 76 L.Ed. 1054 (1932) (Cardozo dissenting).