Dmdmd2020, now these are beautiful and solid facts. Thank you for bringing this to light again! As I have always said, follow the Big Money Players as they know how the game is played and where the billions in this have been and currently are.
Now let me back your facts up with more facts that came from a court transcript that I have coined The WaMu Holy Grail. Here, take another read as it feels really good!
Also One of My All-time Favorites – The WaMu “Holy Grail” – Your Honor, The Assets Will Still Be There – The EC Can Go After Them Later
2. Pages 70-72 of Transcript Link Below
We also have in there the part (b) of what is to be retained, and that is because in negotiations that we had with all of the settling parties, with the equity committee last week, with the FDIC, we did talk a great deal about the concept of the retained ASSETS.
Now, it's my position, Your Honor, that the examiner doesn't need to do much with theretained assets other than say the assets are retained and therefore the liquidating trustcan go ahead and pursue them.They will still be there; they can be carried through.But I understand that the equity committee is very interested in having a neutral third party do an investigation of those retained assets.
Nice post Dm, never saw that info before. What other Class 18 claims could they be referring to in the 2017 10K, most of which were settled for $15M, with the rest being deemed disputed claims and still to be litigated??? (See posts 545279 + 545281 for reference)
The “underwriters stipulation” dated as of March 28, 2013 stems from an indemnification claim against the debtor (WMI) where the underwriters wanted $96 million for legal fees and settlement costs regarding a class action suit against WMI and its underwriters which started in November 2007. That suit wasn’t resolved until June 30, 2011.
“Debt Security Underwriters Underwriters purchase debt securities, such as government bonds, corporate bonds, municipal bonds or preferred stock, from the issuing body (usually a company or government agency) in order to resell them for a profit. This profit is known as the "underwriting spread." An underwriter may resell debt securities either directly to the marketplace or to dealers, who will sell them to other buyers. When the issuance of a debt security requires more than one underwriter, the resulting group of underwriters is known as an underwriter syndicate.”
1) The underwriters (Morgan Stanley, Credit Suisse, Goldman Sachs), didn’t settle their claims (per the “underwriters stipulation” on March 28, 2013) until after POR7 was approved (March 19, 2012).
2) Per the the “underwriters stipulation” on March 28, 2013, the underwriters didn’t want Class 18 claims of $24 million. Instead, they settled for Class 19 claims of $72 million.
3) if the underwriters wanted cash, they would have opted for Class 18, which is paid before Class 19, and is more likely to be paid than Class 19 claims.
4) what the underwriters settled for was a Class 19 claim that is less likely to be paid than a Class 18, and they would have to wait a lot longer.
5) it’s obvious the underwriters know exactly the risk and probability of claims being paid out, and even a lower value of $24 million Class 18 claim is better than waiting for an unknown duration of time for a Class 19 claim.
6). IMO...These underwriters know exactly how long it will take the FDIC to unfreeze the bankruptcy remote assets (i.e. MBS Trusts) after the bankruptcy cases are closed. And the underwriters know exactly how much is waiting to be returned to Class 19 WMI Escrow Marker Holders from the MBS Trusts.
7). I believe that the underwriters probably know that Class 18 and Class 19 would probably get paid in close proximity of time from each other, if one knows the process and speed and magnitude of how much the FDIC will unfreeze in bankruptcy remote assets.
8. IMO...remember, these same underwriters have underwritten many other MBS Trusts for other failed banks in the past and they know the process, and know how to get paid from bankruptcy remote MBS Trusts.
1) fact: Underwriters settled for a $72 million Class 19 claim. Per the Stipulated Settlement as of March 28, 2013, the underwriters received 1.4 million shares of WMIH.
2) post reverse split : 1.4 million shares of WMIH / 12 = 116,666.66 shares of COOP
3) if the underwriters are to receive full value of their $72 million Class 19 claim, COOP would need to reach $617.14
$72 million / 116,666.66 shares of COOP = $617.14
4) if the underwriters also received WAMPQ WMI Escrow Shares, they would have received 73,684 shares of WAMPQ WMI Escrow Markers
If total WMI recoveries = $10 billion then
73,684 WAMPQ WMI Escrow Marker shares (WMI Class 19 P Markers) x $1,000 = $73,684,210
5) Ask yourselves, what’s easier to achieve?
a) COOP = $617.14
OR
b) WMI recoveries = $10 billion
IMO...my answer: since the Underwriters knew all the inside information regarding MBS Trusts (which they underwrote themselves), my WAG, the underwriters (if they received 73,684 WAMPQ WMI Escrow Markers) are expecting at least $10 billion in WMI recoveries.