Share-selling schemes take on many forms - they evolve in the market to circumvent the regulatory framework.
MMEX is a hybrid, which blends a number of fraudulent techniques, primarily organized to support the sale of conversion shares.
This is documented in one of the board stickies - but the general notion is a corporate insider, in the MMEX case, Mad J. takes out a series of floor-less convertible notes - generically known as toxic debt.
The "debt" originates in the form of gross proceeds, a portion of which goes back to the "lender," and the remainder to the debtor, Mad J./MMEX. The debt amounts vary, but they come nominally in $100K chunks, sometimes a little more, sometimes a little less. These notes are heavily discounted, and come with a ratchet-based conversion feature. After the debt-holder meets the SEC Rule 144 holding period requirement, the note can be converted to MMEX shares, based on a market priced formula - the ratchet.
At the last relevant filing, MMEX could account for only $641K in 'Refinery Start Up Costs,' out of more than $2-million in proceeds from toxic notes. At that time, it had no employees, no business operations, etc. Where is the remaining $1.4-million?
This "debt," which is essentially created from thin air, turns into shares of MMEX. In turn, these shares are liquidated into the market for cash - the proceeds go to the note holder, and possibly others, and to insider partners in the form of commissions, fees, etc. Since the converted shares were heavily discounted, 40% or more below what retail investors paid, the retail holders effectively pay for the transaction by being diluted.
In any given trading day, under current market structural changes, toxic note holders are on average liquidating between 1-million to as many as 4-million shares into the float. Prior to the clearing changes in the market, the impact was more obvious, and dramatic, but it has never ceased, and it never will - because there are literally billions of shares yet to convert.
In top undergraduate finance programs, and to a deeper level, in graduate programs in law and finance, we teach students all of the elements of these scams. They are obvious to any knowledgable person, or any sophisticated investor.
No legitimate company would partner with MMEX - because MMEX has nothing of value. CEO's with a documented background that include criminal fraud are just one reason why.
"Belief" is comical against cold hard fact. There are only a small handful being "rewarded," which include the toxic lenders, Mad J., and the inner circle of insiders perpetrating the fraud.