Here's why I want SFOR's Mobile Trust version 3 to get a chance at bat. When I chatted with the DOD/CIO's policy guy something he said shocked me! It was "I didn't know they (SFOR) existed" and "Yeah, this Mobile Trust looks interesting". He had brought up the SFOR site as we chatted. You & I both know that letters from the public seldom get to the intended reader in Government. How do I know. I did a Pentagon tour. At Treasury the Bureau of Engraving maintains the auto-pen machine that contains all official signatures. Members of the public get a vaguely worded reply so often signed by that machine without the intended reader ever seeing it. On the advice of a senior congressional staffer (a retired UNS CPO) I've been writing everyone I thought would have input on the DOD mobile device COMSEC issue. I did this in the hope at least ONE of my letters would get past the mail room and to the intended recipient. At least one did. On 1/20/17 there will be a new administration in charge that hopefully will get something & I don't even care if it's SFOR's Mobile Trust version 3 (longs please don't give me grief about this) on our troops mobile devices. My bottom line is that I don't want a Russian or Chinese targets intel office to be able to use the take from any of those (unclassified) issue I-Phones to do what I did. O.K.?
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