Replies to post #438035 on Mr Cooper Group Inc (COOP)

[deekshant]

Dismissal With Prejudice in Part or in Entirety?

STIPULATION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE
Pursuant to and subject to the provisions of that certain Second Amended and Restated Settlement Agreement, dated as February 7, 2011 (as amended, the “Settlement Agreement”), and the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Confirming Seventh Amended Joint Plan of Affiliated Debtors Pursuant to Chapter 11 of the United Stated Bankruptcy Code (the “Plan”), dated Feb 24, 2012, plaintiffs and counterclaim defendents Washinton Mutual Inc and WMI Investment Corp. (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”), defendent and counterclaim plaintiff FDIC, in its capacity as receiver for WMB(the “FDIC-receiver”), defendent FDIC in its corporate capacity (“FDIC-Corporate”), intervenor defendent and counterclaim defendent JPMC, and those holders of notes issued by WMB that have intervened as defendents in the action (the “Bank Bondholders”) hereby stipulate and agree that, the Effective Date of the Plan and Settlement Agreement having occured, all claims causes of action, and objections of any sort asserted in the above-captioned litigation shall be and hereby are dismissed with prejudice to refiling the same or any part thereof except to the extent any claim has been expressly preserved in the Settlement Agreement. Each of the Plaintiffs, the FDIC-Receiver, FDIC-Corporate, JPMC, the Bank Bondholders, and any of the other intervening parties shall be responsible for its own costs of court and attorneys’ fees
Dated: New York, New York
March 19, 2012
www.plainsite.org/dockets/download.html?id=33270727&z=bd530f06

...the DC Action dismissal was prejudiced to execution of the settlement claims to be completed per the Global Settlement Agreement on the Effective Date.

The DC Action dismissal was prejudiced to execution of the settlement claims to be completed per the GSA in part or in entirety? It is the parties who agreed to the above that was approved by the court. It wasn’t the court who made the determination. I don’t know if there is a difference between court ordered judgement as against a consent given by the court for the terms agreed to among the parties concerned. As per the GSA, “Released claims” page 361 draw out an exception and note has been highlighted by underlining the text.

“Released Claims” shall mean, collectively, (a) any and all WMI Released Claims, JPMC Released Claims, FDIC Released Claims, Settlement Note Released Claims and Creditors’ Committee Released Claims, (b) claims or causes of action that arise in, relate to or have been or could have been asserted (i) in the Chapter 11 Cases, the Receivership or the Related Actions, or (ii) by the Debtors (with respect to releases given by the Debtors) and by Creditors relating to Claims or holders of Equity Interests relating to Equity Interests, as the case may be, they have against the Debtors (with respect to releases given by Creditors or holders of Equity Interests, as the case may be), and (c) claims that otherwise arise from or relate to the Receivership, the Purchase and Assumption Agreement, the 363 Sale and Settlement, the Plan, this Agreement, and the negotiations and compromises set forth in this Agreement and the Plan, including, without limitation, in connection with or related to any of the Debtors, the Affiliated Banks, and their respective subsidiaries, assets, liabilities, operations, property or estates,the assets to be received by JPMC pursuant to this Agreement, the Debtors’ Claims, the JPMC Claims, the FDIC Claim, the WMI/WMB Intercompany Claims, any intercompany claims on the books of WMI or WMB related to the WaMu Pension Plan or the Lakeview Plan, or the Trust Preferred Securities (including, without limitation, the creation of the Trust Preferred Securities, the financing associated therewith, the requested assignment of the Trust Preferred Securities by the Office of Thrift Supervision and the transfer and the asserted assignment of the Trust Preferred Securities subsequent thereto); provided, however, that “Released Claims” does not include (1) any and all claims that the JPMC Entities, the Receivership, the FDIC Receiver and the FDIC Corporate are entitled to assert against each other or any other defenses thereto pursuant to the Purchase and Assumption Agreement, which claims and defenses shall continue to be governed by the Purchase and Assumption Agreement, (2) any and all claims held by entities against WMB, the Receivership and the FDIC Receiver solely with respect to the Receivership, and (3) any avoidance action or claim objection regarding an Excluded Party or the WMI Entities, WMB, each of the Debtors’ estates, the Reorganized Debtors and their respective Related Persons; and, provided, further, that “Released Claims” is not intended to release, nor shall it have the effect of releasing, any party from the performance of its obligations in accordance with this Agreement, the Confirmation Order or the Plan.
Page 361
www.kccllc.net/wamu/document/0812229120224000000000001

...so, unless one of the parties in interest believes that they were not treated appropriately upon execution of the terms of the Global Settlement Agreement (note, it has been over 3-years, nothing mentioned anywhere by anyone), that action is over.

Agree completely with one exception. Plaintiff cannot file a suit unless they want it denied prior to exhaustion of administrative remedies. Equity claims fall under Section 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(11) and the statute of limitations is 10 years.

While FIRREA does not provide “an explicit mandate for exhaustion of administrative remedies[,] [its] provisions are accepted by the cases and by Congress as having that meaning.” F.D.I.C. v. Lacentra Trucking, Inc., 157 F.3d 1292, 1294 (11th Cir.1998).Thus, for post-receivership claims—such as Interface's potential claim against the FDIC—the court has “no subject matter jurisdiction unless the claimant has exhausted the administrative remedies.” Damiano v. F.D.I.C., 104 F.3d 328, 333 (11th Cir.1997); see also Aguilar v. F.D.I.C., 63 F.3d 1059, 1061 (11th Cir.1995) (per curiam) (noting that "under FIRREA, federal courts generally lack the authority to decide claims against an institution in federal receivership until the claimant has exhausted his administrative remedies against the FDIC”). Because “FIRREA contains no provision granting federal jurisdiction to claims filed after a receiver is appointed but before administrative exhaustion,” Meliezer v. Resolution Trust Co., 952 F.2d 879, 882 (5th Cir.1992), and because it is undisputed that Interface has not submitted a claim against the FDIC through the FIRREA administrative claims process, the district court lacked jurisdiction to declare that Interface is not entitled to damages from the FDIC. Accordingly, this portion of the district court's judgment is also vacated. - See more at:
caselaw.findlaw.com/us-11th-circuit/1620601.html

Are claims time barred

FIRREA administrative exhaustion

Whether with a timely or untimely claim, “[a] claimant must . . . first complete the claims process before seeking judicial review.”

Whether a particular statute is intended to impose a mandatory duty is a question of interpretation for the courts. [Citation.] ‘Unless the Legislature clearly expresses a contrary intent, time limits are typically deemed directory.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 224-225.)

The Supreme Court has lately cautioned against too readily treating statutory preconditions to suit as jurisdictional requirements rather than nonjurisdictional claim-processing rules. See, e.g., Sebelius v. Auburn Reg'l Med. Ctr., 133 S.Ct. 817, 824 (2013); Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S.Ct. 641, 648 (2012); Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S.Ct. 1197, 1202–03 (2011); Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S.Ct. 1237, 1243–44 (2010); Union Pac. R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs & Trainmen Gen. Comm. of Adjustment, Cent. Region, 130 S.Ct. 584, 596 (2009); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 510–16 (2006); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 454–55 (2004). Claim-processing provisions establish “rules that seek to promote the orderly progress of litigation by requiring that the parties take certain procedural steps at certain specified times.” Henderson, 131 S.Ct. at 1203. - See more at:
caselaw.findlaw.com/us-7th-circuit/1653629.html

Our holding today that the 60–day time limit in § 1821(d)(6)(A) is jurisdictional should come as no surprise; we have said or assumed as much in earlier opinions, albeit with little or no discussion. See Maher v. FDIC, 441 F.3d 522, 525 (7th Cir.2006); Maher v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 75 F.3d 1182, 1190 (7th Cir.1996); Capitol Leasing, 999 F.2d at 192–93.3 Our recent opinion in Campbell v. FDIC, 676 F.3d 615 (7th Cir.2012), is not to the contrary. We said there that “[w]hile in the past we have referred to ‘[c]ompliance with the FIRREA process [as] a strict jurisdictional prerequisite,’ it is our belief that in light of the Supreme Court's more recent decisions, the proper characterization of FIRREA's rules for claims submission [is] as claims processing rules.” Campbell, 676 F.3d at 618 (first and second alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Maher, 75 F.3d at 1190). For that proposition we favorably cited the Second Circuit's decision in Carlyle Towers Condominium Ass'n v. FDIC, 170 F.3d 301 (2d Cir.1999).
But neither Campbell nor Carlyle Towers addressed the 60–day time limit in § 1821(d)(6)(A) for seeking additional administrative or judicial review of disallowed claims. Instead, both cases involved the FDIC's receivership-specific deadline for submitting claims to the agency, and the opinions addressed whether the failure to timely file deprived the district court of jurisdiction to entertain complaints seeking judicial review of the disallowed claims. The statutory provision at issue in Campbell and Carlyle Towers states simply that claims submitted after the deadline established by the FDIC “shall be disallowed and such disallowance shall be final.” 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(5)(C)(i). Unlike § 1821(d)(6)(A), it does not speak in jurisdictional terms. The Second Circuit explicitly recognized as much. Carlyle Towers, 170 F.3d at 307–08 (“Although the FIRREA makes exhaustion a jurisdictional requirement, it does not necessarily follow that compliance with time limits imposed by the FDIC have the same force· This provision contains no reference to jurisdiction, nor to the consequences of a failure to file within the time limits established by the FDIC.”).
- See more at: http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-7th-circuit/1653629.html#sthash.7dY5kXPX.dpuf

“In FIRREA, Congress enacted a comprehensive and mandatory statutory scheme to enable the RTC [the predecessor to the FDIC], when acting as receiver for a failed institution, to carry out its fundamental functions of conserving and preserving the assets of the failed institution, and ultimately making pro rata distributions of those assets to the creditors of the institutions. . . . [¶] The administrative claims process . . . provides a centralized mechanism for consideration and resolution of the bulk of claims against insolvent thrifts without the delay and expense of litigation, by requiring that all claims be submitted to the receiver within a finite time period, and by allowing the receiver the initial opportunity to review and resolve the claims.” (2947 Properties, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at pp. 876-877, fns. omitted.)
www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/archive/B246412.DOC

In addition there exist a De Novo argument for hearing. Wamu employee case touches on every single aspect in great detail.
www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/archive/B246412.DOC

...so, until a former equity shareholder actions a litigation and is granted standing, there simply is nothing but straws of discussion and speculation.

As per my understanding of the GSA, no former equity shareholder other than WMI/LT can file a claim against FDIC in its capacity as receiver. The claim can only be made by WMI/LT as a general unsecured creditor against FDIC in its capacity as reciever.

Are there other remedies available without a suit. "Yes", through Judicial Review

FIRREA - Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act

FIRREA, as codified in Title 12, United States Code, section 1821, sets out a mandatory administrative process for claims against failed lending entities and the entity that purchases a failed lending institution’s assets from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC") to allow the FDIC to quickly resolve many of the claims against failed financial institutions without unduly burdening the courts. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821(d)(3)-(13); see also Stamm v. Paul, 121 F.3d 635, 639 (11th Cir. 1997); Lazarre v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 780 F.Supp. 2d 1320, 1325 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Am. First Fed., Inc. v. Lake Forest Park, Inc., 198 F.3d 1259, 1263 n.3 (11th Cir.1999)).

FIRREA's effect on subject matter jurisdiction

Under FIRREA, no court has jurisdiction over these claims until the claimant exhausts this administrative process—section 1821 requires that claims against these entities first be submitted to the FDIC for administrative review and adjudication prior to judicial review in a court. See Stamm, 121 F.3d at 639 (“In enacting FIRREA, Congress anticipated that, as a receiver for failed lending entities, the [FDIC] would face numerous claims. . . . Accordingly, it sought to reduce the volume of formal litigation . . . by providing for administrative review of such claims by the [FDIC] before judicial proceedings could commence."). Specifically, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(D) provides:

Limitation on judicial review.

[N]o court shall have jurisdiction over . . . (ii) any claim relating to any act or omission of such [failed lending] institution or the [FDIC] as receiver.

12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(D) (emphasis added). Thus, the statute strips all courts of jurisdiction over claims made outside the administrative procedures of section 1821, and only after exhaustion of the administrative review procedures set forth in section 1821(d) may a party seek adjudication of a claim in court. See§§ 1821(d)(3)-(13)(D); see also Lazarre, 780 F.Supp. 2d at1325 (“Courts have construed section 1821(d)(13)(D) as an administrative exhaustion requirement.");Stamm, 121 F.3d at 639 (referring to section 1821(d)(13)(D) as a “statutory exhaustion requirement"); Gomez v. BankUnited, 2011 WL 114066, slip op. at *2 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 13, 2011) (holding dismissal proper for failure to exhaust administrative remedies).

www.avvo.com/legal-guides/ugc/how-to-determine-whether-claims-against-a-lender-are-subject-to-fdic-review-under-firrea

...some might state that 'they won't talk to them, but I have not had any issues in contacting any party in a genuine, professional and respectful demeanor; whether by phone, email or written correspondence.

...I believe that your presentation is genuine, professional and respectful and you should give it a shot.

Thank you. I never thought about that, but, I agree limited questions with a Yes or No can be asked citing the above case law as there is nothing to hide or implicate to elicit a response. I will make an effort in this regard and share with you all for refinement prior it sending it across.