Hardware-based secure boot mechanisms are clearly useful for some users. By determining that firmware, bootloaders, and operating systems are not compromised, these mechanisms can protect systems against rootkits and other low-level attacks. Typically, the way that is done is by cryptographically signing the binaries in question such that they can be verified before being run. But disallowing unsigned binaries from running has a potentially problematic side effect: booting free operating systems becomes difficult or, in the worst case, impossible. It all depends on who holds the signing keys.
The Linux kernel has the integrity measurement architecture (IMA) and the proposed extended verification module (EVM) which could be combined with system hardware—such as the Trusted Platform Module (TPM)—to provide a secure boot environment. There have been concerns about these mechanisms as they can be used for both good and ill: either preventing rootkits and other tampering or preventing users from running code of their choice on their hardware. The unified extensible firmware interface (UEFI) specification has recently added some features that could be used similarly, leading to many of the same concerns. But there is also an additional wrinkle for systems that use the GRUB 2 bootloader. ....etc.
Register for free to join our community of investors and share your ideas. You will also get access to streaming quotes, interactive charts, trades, portfolio, live options flow and more tools.