Ultraguard Water Systems (fka UGRD)

[mick]

part #2 ,,, magnesium fuel cell power.

http://www.physics-talk.com/detail-5167042.html

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Annex: Other accidents which already happened
UK Met. Office (information provided by Wynn Jones):

Some years ago UK Met. Office had a buoy invert because the foot had
been removed by fishermen or other unauthorised persons. When the buoy
was eventually retrieved after it had drifted ashore there was some
evidence that some of the batteries had come loose and had shorted
against the steel lid of the container pod they are housed in, causing
an explosion. However, the explosion was contained within the buoy
hull which remained water tight. There was no injury to anyone and the
buoy, and most of its electronics were reused. After that, UKMO
modified the brackets that hold the batteries in place such that they
will not move even if inverted. UKMO practise of housing them in their
own stainless steel container which is itself inside the steel hull of
the buoy probably minimises the consequences such an explosion can
cause.

NDBC (information provided by Eric Meindl, emeindl([at]ndbc.noaa.gov):

A short summary of findings and activities at NDBC with respect to
dealing with explosive gases in moored buoys is given below. NDBC
efforts began in 1988 when an aluminium buoy (6-m NOMAD type),
returned from the field and just opened up within NDBC industrial
facility, exploded. As a result, NDBC now uses meters to sample the
interior of all buoys. NDBC have experienced one or two other
explosions at sea with no injuries, and many incidents when
technicians have taken air samples, found the situation dangerous, and
implemented special procedures to vent the buoy. Information below
addresses specifically the NDBC buoys, which are vented systems, not
sealed as other systems might be. Nevertheless, there may be some
information others can use to make their procedures safer. NDBC also
has specific, detailed reports of their experiences and what they
know. These can be made available upon request.

Summary of NDBC Buoy Power System Flammable Gas

Problems and Solutions

1. Hydrogen gas generation in buoys:

Hydrogen gas mixtures in air are flammable between 4% and 75% by
volume
Accumulation rates increase with poor buoy ventilation (water
intrusion blocks the lower center compartment vent)
Electrolysis (the conductive path is from the positive terminal,
through seawater moisture on the exterior of batteries to the buoy
hull).
Reduction of battery electrolyte (potassium hydroxide and zinc),
aluminum and seawater. The primary batteries are located near the
bottom of the buoy center compartment.
Normal charging of secondary batteries and discharging of primary
batteries
Microbial induced corrosion
2. Hydrogen Gas Generation Past Incidents:

SSC/6N03 1988 Explosion resulted in one death & one injury (a)
44013/3D22 12 Sep. 97 Buoy returned to SSC with 100% LEL
46027/3D24 14 Oct. 97 Caustic residues in bottom of compartment (b)
46013/3D21 30 Oct. 97 Caustic residues; 100% LEL in 4 voids (b)
43D34/3D34 11 Nov. 97 Caustic residues; 100% LEL in void #2 (b)
46030/3DV07 21 Sep. 99 Buoy exploded prior to a service visit
46014/3D59 3 Oct. 99 Buoy Exploded during service visit (b)
42035/3D24 3 Nov. 99 100% LEL due to plugged vents (b)
42039/3D56 6 Nov. 00 100% LEL in a compartment; stuck vent valves

(a) The generation of hydrogen was caused by impurities in the primary
batteries received from the manufacturer.

(b) The generation of hydrogen was caused by seawater intrusion into
the battery compartment.

3. Hydrogen Gas Mitigation:

Obtained expert Marine Chemist Consultants
Improved tests of buoy hatch and cable penetrations
Installed a third battery compartment vent tube (if the buoy leaks,
the lower vent ) is blocked by water
Improved watertight integrity of hatch gaskets and multiplug
penetrations
Increased buoy freeboard
Improved equipment compartment ventilation
Installed a seal fence to reduce excessive loading on hatch covers
Provided sufficient clearance between the hatch cover lip and the
dog-bolt tabs
Improved hatch gasket deficiencies (insufficient gasket stiffness,
gaps in the hatch gasket joint, and the position of the gasket joint
relative to the bow of the buoy)
Filled voids with inert gas
Maintain safe entry procedures and training
Installed explosive gas sensors (FAA)
Deduced the use of primary batteries.The future goal is to discontinue
the use of primary batteries.
Bilge pumps (not yet implemented)

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