Charley, I have been looking at the results of the inquiry into the Deepsea Horizon disaster for some time. As I see it:
The rig itself had everything needed (equipment) to kill that blow out. I have worked on a well with 13,000psi with less blowout protection equipment.
The rig was one of the safest rigs in the world with 7yrs with no accidents.
The crew was trained and key members were trained in well control. Last year they drilled the worlds deepest well.
They saw several indications taught in basic level well control to be indications of an influx in the well or kick, and did not react.
I think the problem is with how we operate these days. Transocean, like everyone else, have a very strict safety culture. The day starts with a short safety meeting before start time. Before you start a job, there are job safety analysis procedures, maybe also site survey forms to get signed, then also maybe a lock out tag out of the equipment, and then a permit which must all be done in hard copy and hand signed by multiple people, before the job can even start. Setting up permits can take up a significant part of the day. Then there are strict procedures to be adhered to, and the world renowned STOP program from DuPont which is a way of life during the day.
7 years with no accidents, the Horizon crews were professionals who excelled in this enviroment.
On the day of the disaster the cement plug had been set and the well was safe in the minds of the crew. Flawed analysis of test data on the rig resulted in the decision the well was safe.
I think we are being conditioned to procedures and policies to the point it is difficult to think out of the box. The guys didnt react as they should have to the indications they saw. Then after they had lost the opportunity to use the blowout protection equipment, the annular was closed, but gas was loose in the riser, now above the blowout preventers,expanding rapidly as it rose with nothing left in their arsenal to stop it from reaching surface. The only choice is to divert the oil based mud and influx over the side, but that went against anti pollution policy, and the policy, plus genuine concern for the enviroment won. They flowed it back into the rigs internal gas seperation system which cannot handle the volumes they were about to experience, and were not fast enough to reverse that decision.
It only takes 15seconds to activate the overboard diverter. Gas has a constant rate of expansion and with 5,000'of riser above the BOPs on the seabed, there was indication of increase all the way. That huge volume of gas does not just appear.
Oil drilling is a dynamic industry, and critical decisions at all levels need to be made quickly at times when things go wrong, and I think we are being conditioned to fail.
Just my opinion and I have been wrong before.
I asked around about that oil based mud and it is not needed, but much better to use.
