Frankly, Idk what the answer is. All I know is that IF common shareholders had to vote to create the Series A preferred shares, then ONLY a very small, specific group of NSI common shareholders that owned NSI common shares BEFORE the Series A were created could have standing to bring a claim like what EQ has specified. Naturally, anyone who bought after the Series A were created, with knowledge of its existence, would not have this claim.
Now, you may recall I did a post where I gave a chronology of filings, inclusive of the O/S at particular times during the period 2015 through 2020. From that analysis, you may recall that when NSI purchased NSH's assets for 75,000,000 NSI common shares, at that moment, NSH shareholders became majority shareholders of NSI common shares. And, you may also recall that the O/S did not substantially increase between 2015 and 2018. Therefore, the NSH majority of NSI common shareholders, at the time the Series A Preferred Shares were created, had not been sufficiently diluted to drastically alter NSH Shareholders' percentage ownership of NSI common shares. Moreover, NSI common shareholders at the time required consummation of the NSH Asset purchase to bring NSH's IP into NSI's ownership. Prior to, NSI owned nothing!
In conclusion, with the benefit of hindsight and taking into account then-present conditions, it would be my contention that if given an opportunity to vote for or against Series A Preferred creation / proposal / solution, the outcome would have been no different. More specifically, NSH Shareholders entitled to vote a large percentage of NSI O/S common shares would not have voted against their own self-interests. And further, pre-Series A Preferred NSI common shareholders went from owning NOTHING to owning ALL OF NSH's IP. Whether this transaction constitutes a technical violation of Nevada state law, I don't really care because from what I can tell, at the time, everyone (all NSI common shareholders) benefited. Classic case of no harm, no foul.
