Let's hope the Jurors see this:
"Is there any proof that Mr. Bowler, while he was the lead Treasury official responsible for managing the aftermath of the financial crisis, played any role in attempting to weaken or terminate Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac?
Well, yes, Mr. Bowler’s fingerprints appear to be all over the Sweep Agreement (the one that serves to wind down Fan and Fred so that Wall Street REITs can take their place).
In Fairholme’s Annual Report released last week, it cites documents that the US Government classifies as “confidential and privileged.” Each of these documents have Timothy Bowler’s name associated with them and they all relate to the 3rd Addendum or Sweep Agreement (which occurred on August 17, 2012).
Here are the communiqués that Mr. Bowler received (which the US Government does not want to become public):
04/23/2012: Confidential report prepared for Treasury by consultant Moody’s relating to Treasury policy and the GSE’s capital positions.
07/13/2012: E-mail communications among Treasury staff containing predecisional information and analysis related to the PSPA.
07/19/2012: E-mail communication among Treasury staff containing draft predecisional policy information and analysis related to relationship between Treasury and FHFA.
08/01/2012: E-mail communications among Treasury staff containing predecisional information and analysis, including discussion with White House staff, related to future GSE draws.
08/07/2012: Predecisional internal forecast of the GSE profitability and PSPA capacity over time, prepared by Treasury staff for purposes of proposed changes to the PSPAs.
08/17/2012: Treasury initiates the 3rd Amendment to the PSPA – Government seizure of private companies’ (Fannie and Freddie) current and future profits.
08/18/2012: Bulletin News President; Senior White House Staff; Geithner, Timothy. White House News Summary prepared for the President and senior White House staff on a variety of issues, including changes to the PSPAs.
09/16/2012: E-mail communication among Treasury staff containing predecisional information related to the methodology for valuing Treasury’s senior preferred stock in the GSEs.
Fairholme’s conclusion is best and worth repeating here:
“More than just patience, this investment requires persistence. Every major financial institution relied upon federal government assistance during the 2008 crisis. Each institution repaid the Treasury in full, plus interest. The same is true of Fannie and Freddie, yet only they remain under the day-to-day control of a federal agency. Government cannot pick private market winners and losers. We forge ahead with the facts squarely on our side, and the assurance that no one is above the law.”
