The Amarin Q1 2023 Earnings Presentation and Conference Call failed to quench investors’ thirst for clear information about the path and expected timeline to increase shareholder value.
The New Board seemed keen, at this point, on demarcating its responsibility for the results of the first quarter from that of the post proxy old board directors and CEO Karim Mikhail who resigned on March 06 and 27 respectively. In preparation for that, it had filed a SEC 10-K/A amending the 01 March Annual Report on 10-K covering the fiscal year 2022; this allowed it to unveil a number of procedures it had inherited from the Old Board.
In this context, Aaron Berg has found himself in the unenviable position of ensuring a TRANSITION towards achieving the ultimate objective of increasing shareholder value by adopting a “Simple Near-Term Strategy” aiming at:
1. maintaining profitability in the US;
2. accelerating activities in the EU;
3. maximizing cash.
Yet, the Interim CEO was unable, or not allowed, to reveal how these three courses of action fit with a “Near-Term Strategy”, particularly as he did not clarify what is meant by “Near-Term”. Is it a couple of months, or three years? Was using “Near” rather than “Short” simply intended to sedate shareholders given their anxiety regarding the unknown length of the transition towards a medium or long-term strategy?
In this context, the accompanying Slide Presentation was stripped to the bare minimum of former CEO’s untenable narrative. And AB was at pain vindicating his lack of knowledge of the European business, attributing it to his focus on his responsibilities as Vice President/US and his two weeks old position as Interim CEO.
While AB’s readiness to learn is commendable the Q1 Earnings Presentation and CC, along with the accompanying SEC filings, reveal a drifting broken-company that now faces a new threat: the security of maintaining appropriate supplies. Moreover, the New Board interestingly opted to exclude any reference to the scientific potential of the Vascepa MOLECULE which is the only asset Amarin can sell.
Vascepa has no market value on its own. Its sole value resides rather in a reformulation of the molecule so that what gets sold is a new improved “Statin+” rather than Vascepa, thereby short-cutting the entire lengthy marketing regulatory approval / reimbursement / budget allocation / sales processes worldwide – processes that can be hindered by a variety of geopolitical, financial, economic, generic competition and bureaucratic factors.
Only a BP selling a statin can integrate this molecule into its product and ESTABLISHED market.
One might then ponder the portent contained in Slide #9 of Sarissa’s 03 February 2023 Amarin Presentation: the worldwide sales of Novartis’ Entresto that presently register $4.64 billion while not having yet peaked; or those of Pfizer’s Lipitor and AstraZeneca’s Crestor that peaked at $12.88 billion and $6.2 billion in 2006 and 2011 respectively.
The next Annual Ordinary Shareholders General Assembly in June will be the first opportunity for the Sarissa-led Board to promote good open relations with shareholders by specifying how it envisages optimizing the value of the molecule, and how can today’s technologies fasten the building of a New Rome.
