Mr Cooper Group Inc (COOP)

[Large Green]

From Dmdmd1-OUTSTANDING DUE DILIGENCE WITH FACTS TO BACK-UP END RESULTS OF 101 BILLION PLUS RETURNING:

Quote from CSNY on February 28, 2023, 11:56:46 AM
The $600B figure is entirely reasonable.

WMI was the parent of the issuer of MBS, WMB. Issuers must retain part of their issues and, naturally, they don't retain just the risky (i.e., equity) tranches. WMB would have chosen as much of the best tranches as it possibly could as it had absolute transparency regarding underlying mortgages/assets.

When WMI/WMB headquarters were seized about $75MM (?) in MBS were found. It is impossible for that to have been 100% the retained portion of $2T in securitizations. Some may doubt that WMB placed the MBS in a trust, but I have no doubt of it. It is exactly what I would have done to have a hope of some assets remaining in the event of seizure. Senior executives would have thought likewise as a major portion of their wealth was in WMI stock.

WMI's consolidated SEC filings clearly state that about $135B in MBS was retained as was about $25B in asset-backed securities, yet only $75MM in securitized paper was found in its headquarters. The MBS themselves have generated interest plus interest is owed for 14.5 years of deprivation. When I made my initial calculation in 2014 I worked with a hypothetical $25B in assets and reached a stupendous figure. (This was before I considered Dmdmd1's numbers.) The $25B was what I considered seat cushion change and was an entirely reasonable estimate given the pre-seizure scale of WMI. (I also felt confident WMI money would emerge given JPM 'found' $30B in undervalued WMB assets. (By the way, don't assume those assets weren't part of WMI's beneficial assets. That may turn out to be the case.))

There is no other rational explanation for Bair's pleading before Congress other than WMB had assets she couldn't reach without control of WMI, and I believe that will be revealed.

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FROM Dmdmd1:

I agree with the statement above in red font:

WMB would have chosen as much of the best tranches as it possibly could as it had absolute transparency regarding underlying mortgages/assets

Per my previous post with respect to David Beck’s testimony:

https://www.boardpost.net/forum/index.php?topic=12150.msg225890#msg225890

Excerpt:

IMO...My conclusions as of August 22, 2018:

1) WMI Escrow Marker Holders are the rightful owners of beneficial interests to MBS Trusts that were created by WMI Subsidiaries because WMI abandoned the WMB stock and it was deemed as worthless. Thus all recoveries of assets revert back to WMI/WMILT/WMI Escrow Marker Holders.

2) Per David Beck's April 13, 2010 congressional subcommittee testimony,
WMI retained more than just residual/equity interests in MBS Trusts.
My previous posts regarding David Beck's testimony is below:

https://www.boardpost.net/forum/index.php?topic=12993.msg225429#msg225429

"Per David Beck, Executive Vice President in charge of WaMu's Capital Markets Division, stated on page 118 to 119 (PDF page 124 to 125) that WMI (WaMu, Long Beach) retained interests in the loan pools that were securitized. The following is the full text:


https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/PSI%20REPORT%20-%20Wall%20Street%20&%20the%20Financial%20Crisis-Anatomy%20of%20a%20Financial%20Collapse%20(FINAL%205-10-11).pdf


"At its peak, right before the collapse of the subprime securitization market, WCC had over 200 employees and offices in Seattle, New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago. The majority of WCC employees were based in New York.432 WCC was headed by Tim Maimone, WCC President, who reported to David Beck, Executive Vice President in charge of WaMu’s Capital Markets Division. Mr. Beck reported to the President of WaMu’s Home Loans Division, David Schneider.433


At the Subcommittee hearing on April 13, 2010, Mr. Beck explained the role of WCC in WaMu and Long Beach securitizations as follows:

“WaMu Capital Corp. acted as an underwriter of securitization transactions generally involving Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corp. or WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp. Generally, one of the two entities would sell loans into a securitization trust in exchange for securities backed by the loans in question, and WaMu Capital Corp. would then underwrite the securities consistent with industry standards. As an underwriter, WaMu Capital Corp. sold mortgage-backed securities to a wide variety of institutional investors.434


WCC sold WaMu and Long Beach loans and RMBS securities to insurance companies, pension funds, hedge funds, other banks, and investment banks.435
It also sold WaMu loans to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. WCC personnel marketed WaMu and Long Beach loans both in the United States and abroad.
Before WCC was able to act as a sole underwriter, WaMu and Long Beach worked with a variety of investment banks to arrange, underwrite, and sell its RMBS securitizations, including Bank of America, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Royal Bank of Scotland, and UBS. To securitize its loans, WaMu typically assembled and sold a pool of loans to a qualifying special-purpose entity (QSPE) that it established for that purpose, typically a trust.436 The QSPE then issued RMBS securities secured by future cash flows from the loan pool. Next, the QSPE – working with WCC and usually an investment bank – sold the RMBS securities to investors, and used the sale proceeds to repay WaMu for the cost of the loan pool. Washington Mutual Inc. generally retained the right to service the loans. WaMu or Long Beach might also retain a senior, subordinated, residual, or other interest in the loan pool.



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IMO...according to David Beck's testimony in the Subcommittee hearing on April 13, 2010, WMI (the parent of WaMu and Long Beach) retained not only residual tranches in MBS Trusts that were securitized, but they also might have retained Senior, and subordinated tranches."

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Per Kerry Killinger’s YouTube interview as of September 2022:

https://www.boardpost.net/forum/index.php?topic=18655.msg334126#msg334126

“ 45:47– Reason to buying Long Beach Mortgage

He regrets buying Long Beach Mortgage but only $300 million in assets while WMI had total $200 billion in assets at the time

WMI wanted to change sub prime market industry because they were charging too much interest on loans”

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IMO…my conclusions as of March 02, 2023 @ 0903 CST:

1) Long Beach Mortgage was a sub-prime lending machine which produced the lion’s share of the pool of mortgages that would go into MBS Trusts.

2) Thus Long Beach Mortgage was a money making machine for WMI.

3) Kerry Killinger might publicly denounce WMI’s purchase of Long Beach Mortgage, but it made a lot of money for them.

4) When a subsidiary of WMB (i.e. Long Beach Mortgage) sponsors the creation of MBS Trusts, it retains beneficial interests in the MBS Trust.

5) Since WMI is the parent of WMB, WMI became the ultimate beneficiary to the beneficial interests created by WMB subsidiaries (such as Long Beach Mortgage).

6) The beneficial interests were not only in the residual tranches of the MBS Trusts, but they were also in the Senior and subordinate tranches.

7) just prior to the seizure, any beneficial interests in MBS Trusts ($101.9 billion) were considered as assets owned by WMI, thus deemed Non-banking, bankruptcy remote assets.

8 ) So yes, WMI is the ultimate owner of the beneficial interest of bankruptcy remote MBS Trusts ($101.9 billion, which is worth $625 billion (per “source”) as of May 20, 2021). Today’s current value of the beneficial interest is, IMO, between $820 billion to $826 billion (based on the “source’s” numbers)

9) Even if seizure and bankruptcy ensued, which it did, Bonderman & Killinger knew that the $101.9 billion in beneficial interests were protected from the bankruptcy court.






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