Neither the common nor the JPS have any economic rights in their shares and the August 17, 2012, Net Worth Sweep was a decision by the FHFA Director to Nationalize the GSES, utilizing the Incidental Powers in HERA.
While the US Congress delegated its power for the FHFA to decide "what's in the best interests of the FHFA and/or the public it serves", it cannot delegate its power to a federal agency to decide major questions of Economic and Political Importance. For instance, Nationalizing the 2 lynchpins of the US Secondary Mortgage Market.
Read Justice Gorsuch's Concurring opinion in IIA.
Here's WV v EPA:
"Precedent teaches that there are “extraordinary cases” in which the
“history and the breadth of the authority that [the agency] has as-
serted,” and the “economic and political significance” of that assertion,
provide a “reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress” meant
to confer such authority. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U. S. 120, 159–160. See, e.g., Alabama Assn. of Realtors v. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Servs., 594 U. S. ___, ___; Utility Air Reg-
ulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U. S. 302, 324; Gonzales v. Oregon, 546
U. S. 243, 267; National Federation of Independent Business v. OSHA,
595 U. S. ___, ___. Under this body of law, known as the major ques-
tions doctrine, given both separation of powers principles and a prac-
tical understanding of legislative intent, the agency must point to
“clear congressional authorization” for the authority it claims. Utility
Air, 573 U. S., at 324. Pp. 16–20."
Justice Gorsuch explains in his Concurring opinion:
"The major questions doctrine works in much the same
way to protect the Constitution’s separation of powers.
Ante, at 19. In Article I, “the People” vested “[a]ll” federal
“legislative powers . . . in Congress.” Preamble; Art. I, § 1.
As Chief Justice Marshall put it, this means that “im-
portant subjects . . . must be entirely regulated by the leg-
islature itself,” even if Congress may leave the Executive
“to act under such general provisions to fill up the details.”
Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 42–43 (1825). Doubt-
less, what qualifies as an important subject and what con-
stitutes a detail may be debated. See, e.g., Gundy v. United
States, 588 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2019) (plurality opinion) (slip
op., at 4–6); id., at ___–___ (GORSUCH, J., dissenting) (slip
op., at 10–12). "
"It is vital because the framers believed that a republic—
a thing of the people—would be more likely to enact just
laws than a regime administered by a ruling class of largely
unaccountable “ministers.” The Federalist No. 11, p. 85 (C.
Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton)."
II
A
"Second, this Court has said that an agency must point to
clear congressional authorization when it seeks to regulate
“‘a significant portion of the American economy,’” "
"Other suggestive factors are present too. “The electric
power sector is among the largest in the U. S. economy,
with links to every other sector.”
"It is only to say that the agency
seeks to resolve for itself the sort of question normally re-
served for Congress. As a result, we look for clear evidence that the people’s representatives in Congress have actually
afforded the agency the power it claims."
"B
At this point, the question becomes what qualifies as a
clear congressional statement authorizing an agency’s ac-
tion. Courts have long experience applying clear-statement
rules throughout the law, and our cases have identified sev-
eral telling clues in this context too.
First, courts must look to the legislative provisions on
which the agency seeks to rely “‘with a view to their place
in the overall statutory scheme.’” Brown & Williamson,
529 U. S., at 133. “[O]blique or elliptical language” will not
supply a clear statement. "
"Second, courts may examine the age and focus of the stat-
ute the agency invokes in relation to the problem the agency
seeks to address. "
"As the Court details, the agency
before us cites no specific statutory authority allowing it to
transform the Nation’s electrical power supply. See ante,
at 28. Instead, the agency relies on a rarely invoked statu-
tory provision that was passed with little debate and has
been characterized as an “obscure, never-used section of the
law.” Ante, at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted). Nor
has the agency previously interpreted the relevant provi-
sion to confer on it such vast authority; there is no original,
longstanding, and consistent interpretation meriting judicial respect."
"When Congress seems slow to solve problems, it may be
only natural that those in the Executive Branch might seek
to take matters into their own hands. But the Constitution
does not authorize agencies to use pen-and-phone regula-
tions as substitutes for laws passed by the people’s repre-
sentatives. In our Republic, “t is the peculiar province of
the legislature to prescribe general rules for the govern-
ment of society.” Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 136 (1810).
Because today’s decision helps safeguard that foundational
constitutional promise, I am pleased to concur."
