Courtesy dmdmd post.
Hope you are all well as we await our event.
IMO...my conclusions as of June 04, 2020 @ 1628 CST:
1) Read the full 12 page ruling by the California Fourth Appellate District Court, it's very concise and short.
2) JPMorgan Chase did not have the right to transfer title of the securitized Masoud loan (which was securitized in 2005, 3 years before the seizure in September 25, 2008).
3) JPMC only had servicing rights, not the authority to transfer titles or ownership of the securitized loan.
4) This is one of many cases that the California Fourth Appellate District Court reversed in favor of the homeowner due to the fact that JPMC did not have ownership or the right to transfer titles of WMI subsidiary securitized loans.
Excerpt from ruling (page 8-9):
"But Masoud's final basis for her title claims—that WaMu sold her deed of trust to
unknown third parties three years before Chase assumed its assets—cannot be so easily
dismissed. In sustaining the demurrer, the trial court relied on the P&A agreement
between Chase and the FDIC to conclude that Chase obtained the rights to Masoud's deed
of trust. But the legal meaning of the P&A is that Chase obtained whatever assets WaMu
possessed as of September 2008. It does not exhaustively list what assets those were.
The P&A agreement sheds no light on whether WaMu sold the Masoud deed of trust in
2005. Assuming (as we must at this stage) that the allegations of the operative complaint
are true, it would mean that Chase was never WaMu's successor in interest as to
Masoud's deed of trust and that at most, it attempted to transfer an asset it never owned to
US Bank in 2011. As a result, according to Masoud, a party with no legitimate claim to
her deed of trust foreclosed on her house.
This is precisely the kind of injury envisioned in Yvanova, which held that a
borrower has standing to challenge a foreclosure sale ordered by a party with no authority
to do so. (Yvanova, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 943.) This court has further clarified that the
protections of Yvanova apply only in the postforeclosure context—exactly the position
Masoud now finds herself in. (Saterbak, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 815.) And on at
least one occasion, this court has applied Yvanova in reversing a judgment of dismissal
after a sustained demurrer when a borrower alleged her deed of trust was sold twice by
the same party, rendering the second sale void and the foreclosure that followed
unlawful. (Sciarratta v. U.S. Bank National Assn. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 552, 565.)
In that case, the homeowner alleged that her deed of trust (which Chase obtained from
...
WaMu) was assigned by Chase to Deutsche Bank—and then assigned again a few
months later by Chase to Bank of America, which ultimately foreclosed on her house.
(Id. at pp. 557–558.) She pleaded wrongful foreclosure on the basis that Bank of
America had no interest in her deed of trust since it was previously assigned to Deutsche
Bank. In finding the homeowner alleged sufficient facts to sustain a wrongful foreclosure
claim, this court noted that a contrary result would undermine the holding of Yvanova.
(Sciarratta, at pp. 566–567.)
Our decision in Sciarratta dictates that Masoud should be permitted leave to
amend her complaint to allege a wrongful foreclosure claim consistent with Yvanova and
Saterbak. Masoud's factual pleadings are sufficiently similar in this regard. In particular,
her allegation that her deed of trust was sold by WaMu in 2005, and thus could not have
been transferred to Chase in 2008, appears to be the basis for a claim under Yvanova.5
Although Masoud's operative complaint was framed as purported contract and title
claims, we believe it is more properly characterized as a wrongful foreclosure action.''
AI
