Verb Technology Company Inc (VERB)

[was CUIN2]

So, why did the following Multi-Billion Dollar Enterprises decide to partner with nFusz and our NotifiTechnology?
Microsoft, Instagram, Facebook, Oracle, Marketo (Adobe), Netsuite, Odoo?

To land 1 would be amazing and extraordinarily lucky, but 7 that we know of?

Important data points about nFusz and our peers for inquiring minds to contemplate:

Salesforce 756,700,000 shares outstanding
Oracle 3,788,000,000 shares outstanding
Microsoft 7,000,000,0000 shares outstanding
nFusz 152,000,000

1) HubSpot - $130 Share Price - $4,900,000,000 Billion Market Cap
2) Salesforce - $141 Share Price - $105,000,000,000 Billion Market Cap
3) Oracle/Netsuite - $46 Share Price - $183,000,000,000 Billion Market Cap
4) Microsoft - $101 Share Price - $777,000,000,000 Billion Market Cap
5) SAP - $117 Share Price - $139,000,000,000 Billion Market Cap
6) *nFusz - $.37 Share Price - $58,000,000 Million Market Cap

nFusz is Blue Ocean Strategy at its finest and Rory has done it before with Telx, disrupting the entire telecommunications industry.

It took him a mere 6 years to build Telx and sell it for $216,000,000 making investors 18X their investment and it sold again several years later for $1.9 Billion and Telx is still the de facto standard.

Rory Cutaia on the July 4th, 2018 Cover of CIO Magazine CRM Edition. The Cover Reads: nFusz the CRM Masterminds (Rory’s Photo) https://magazine.cioreview.com/magazines/July2018/CRM/

Rory / nFusz is on the October 2018 COVER of the current issue of "Insights Success"Magazine. --- nFusz IS the Cover Story !! - big smile big smile

https://www.insightssuccess.com/the-10-most-disruptive-crm-solution-providers-2018-october2018/

Rory Cutaia invested even more of his money in nFusz:

3/29/18
The Reporting Person is the CEO of the issuer and he requested, with Board approval, to convert his entire accrued salary of $582,333 into 407,226 Restricted Shares of common stock at a price of $1.43 per share, which represents the closing price of the issuer's shares as reported on OTC Markets on March 28, 2018.

10/04/18
Explanation of Responses:
(1) The Reporting Person is the CEO of the Issuer. He elected to exercise three warrants, (previously granted to him in consideration for loans made by the CEO to the Issuer), for Restricted Shares of Common Stock of the Issuer.
(2) In addition, the CEO elected to convert $788,538 of the total sums he loaned to the Issuer, (which is the maximum amount permitted under the loan documents), into Restricted Shares of Common Stock of the Issuer, reducing the amount of debt on the Issuer's balance sheet.

“The data collection and analytics capabilities of the nFusz interactive video platform are very impressive,” stated Mr. DuBois. “I see significant market opportunities for the nFusz platform, and I look forward to lending my support to Rory and the management team during this high-growth period in the company’s history.”
Jim DuBois, former CIO at Microsoft

“I’ve been involved in leading-edge technology all of my professional career,” stated Erik Nielsen. “It’s not the technology itself that determines success and leadership status. It’s how the technology is deployed. And that’s what compelled me to become part of the nFusz team. They had the foresight to take a novel technology and deploy it in a way that will have a meaningful impact on numerous industries for years to come. I’m excited to be part of this forward-thinking team.”
Erik Nielsen, Senior Director, Marketing Strategy, Southwest Airlines

“Rory’s growth strategy for nFusz includes an emphasis on complimentary, accretive acquisitions,” stated Mr. Reddy. “I’m very excited to work with him and the other professionals on team nFusz to identify, analyze, and structure those opportunities likely to create the greatest shareholder value. It’s an exciting time to be part of this amazing group of individuals. As a platform business, nFusz represents a remarkable opportunity. I have worked with many young, high-growth companies. I’m thrilled to be joining the advisory team and offer my financial and M&A expertise.”
Chuck Reddy, Managing Director at Top 20 Fortune 500 global investment bank, JP Morgan Co. New York City

“I’m thrilled to be joining such an innovative team,” stated Mr. Jaffe. “The use of video content in sales and marketing has been expanding at an explosive pace. The introduction of interactivity within video, as developed by Rory and his talented team at nFusz, represents the next evolution of video, and I’m very excited to be part of it.”
Lewis Jaffe, former CEO of Oxford Media Inc.

“I understand very clearly what Rory and his exceptional leadership team intend to accomplish with nFusz, and I am excited to apply my knowledge and experience to help them achieve their growth and value creation goals,” stated Mr. Watkins.
Mory Watkins, MBA, award winning business professor at Loyola Marymount University and former CEO of numerous public and private technology companies in video technology and media

Know your time horizon and risk tolerance before investing in any security. Do your own research and due diligence and don’t trust just anyone with your hard earned money.

“Imagine the following situation. Someone says to you, ‘Please get the the salt,’ and as you walk into the next room, you say, ‘But I don’t know where it is.’ After looking for a few minutes, you call out, ‘I can’t find the salt.’ Then that someone walks up, takes the salt right off the shelf in front of you, and says, ‘Look, dummy, it’s right her in front of you. If it was a snake, it would have bitten you.’ When you said, ‘I can’t,’ you gave your brain a command not to see the salt. In psychology, we call it schotoma.”

The above is what has happened with nFusz in the past...

FORBES: How Do Investors Value Pre-Revenue Companies?
Jan 24, 2014, 12:26pm 117,987 views

Answer by Leo Polovets, Partner at Susa Ventures, Early LinkedIn/Factual engineer, Ex-Googler, http://codingvc.com, on Quora,

Deciding how to value pre-revenue companies is hard. There are many signals to process, and even after you've taken all of them into account, the final estimate is as much art as science. Deciding how much a startup should be worth is like deciding how much a one-of-a-kind painting should be worth: there are guidelines to move you in the right direction, but in the end you're basically making an educated guess. What's worse, you don't truly know if your guess was good until long after you've made the investment. Despite that bleak disclaimer, there are heuristics for calculating the value of a startup -- even one that has yet to make a dollar in revenue.

First, let's start with a few thought experiments. For each thought experiment, let's pretend you've been approached by a startup called ShopBetter, a company focused on improving shopping for buyers and for retailers, and you have the opportunity to acquire a 10% stake in the company. Your goal is to determine how much that 10% should be worth.

Thought Experiment #1: Founding Team

ShopBetter was founded last week and the founders know they want to improve shopping, but they haven't decided exactly how they'll do that. However, they are committing to work on something together for at least the next 5-10 years.

If the founders are your neighbors who don't know anything about technology or shopping, then 10% might be worth a few hundred or a few thousand dollars (if you happen to be a generous gambler).
If the founders are great engineers and salespeople that you've worked with, then 10% might be worth tens or thousands of dollars. Maybe even a million dollars.
If the founders are Jeff Bezos, Larry Page, and Jeff Dean, then 10% might be worth tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars.
Thought experiment #2: Traction and Expected Near-Term Revenues

ShopBetter recently released a service that lets retailers learn more about their customers. ShopBetter's businss proposition is that richer demographic info will help those retailers promote and target their products more effectively.

If ShopBetter has 3 pilot customers who are nowhere near becoming paying customers, then 10% might be worth a few hundred thousands dollars (mainly because a finished product with potential is still worth something).
If there are 50 pilot customers, the plan is to charge each of them $1000 per month, and you believe (through surveying a few pilot customers) that about half of 50 will become paying users, then you might value 10% of ShopBetter at something like $500k or $1m.
If the company has 1 pilot customer and plans to charge $50k/month, and you think the customer has a 50% chance of converting to paying, you might value a 10% stake at $300k - $500k. Even though a 50% chance of one customer at $50k/month has the same expected value as 25 customers at $1k/month, the proposition is more risky because it depends on a single client. As a result, the valuation take a hit.
Thought experiment #3: Growth and Engagement

The team at ShopBetter has been busy and launched a mobile app 3 months ago. Based on your research of similar shopping apps, you think a typical user's lifetime value (LTV) will be about $2.

If the app has 100k users and the user base is growing 15% per month, then 10% of ShopBetter might be worth $500k.
If the app has 100k users and the user base is growing 30% per month, then 10% of ShopBetter might be worth $1.25m.
If the app has 100k users and the user base is shrinking 10% per month, then 10% of ShopBetter might be worth $200k. There's still potential value in the company if they can figure out how to improve their app and get the user base to grow, but a shrinking user base is scary signal.
Additionally, user engagement is important. 100k users who log in monthly are not as valuable as 50k users who each use the app for 20 minutes per day.

Thought experiment #4: Market Size

You've analyzed the market for ShopBetter's consumer app -- the one where each new user is worth $2 in revenue -- and have come up with a realistic estimate of the max number of consumers ShopBetter can expect to acquire.

If there are 500k potential users, 10% of the company might be worth $50k.
If there are 10m potential users, 10% of the company might be worth $1m.
If there are 500m potential users and you think ShopBetter has a good chance of acquiring most of those users, then the value of a 10% stake is only limited by your optimism and your bank balance.
Thought experiment #5: Competition

You've take a good look at ShopBetter's founding team, its 100k app downloads so far, and its market potential, and now you turn your focus to the competitive landscape.

If ShopBetter has no competitors, you might value a 10% stake at $500k.
If it has two competitors which each have 25k users, you might value a 10% stake at $400k.
If ShopBetter has several competitors with millions of users each, and Amazon just announced a similar product, you might value the 10% stake at $200k.
These thought experiments are meant to show how different attributes contribute to the value of a company. (The numbers are meant to be illustrative, not exact.)

In addition to these factors, there are other things at play when determining valuations:

Market forces. It doesn't matter if you think a company is worth $5m if other investors all think it's worth $7m. If the market says it's $7m, then it's $7m.
Quality of other investors. If a startup has very notable investors, it might be able to command a small premium. Having a founder's parents invest $250k is a much weaker signal than having Sequoia or Greylock invest $250k. Additionally, institutional investors have deeper pockets, and if a startup has funding from such investors then there's a greater chance it will be able to to raise more money if it needs to. (According to CBInsights, the rate of follow-on funding jumps from 35% to 47% for companies that raise seed money from VCs.)
Comparables. If most comparable startups are valued within a certain price range, then that price range provides an anchoring point. For example, if a typical B2B startup with a recently launched pilot product and 1-5 non-paying pilot customers is usually worth $4m-$6m, then any new startup in that category will be valued similarly unless there are strong signals that drive the valuation up or down.
Market forces and comparables are especially potent. Oftentimes, a founder will look at what valuations their friends are raising at then pick a number out of thin air. Then they offer that price to several investors, and if investors don't push back, that becomes the final price.

The way that I approach valuations -- and I'm speaking for myself and not for other partners in my fund -- is to first look at comparable companies to get a baseline value for a company. I then try to make reasonable adjustments for exceptionally good founding teams, markets, products, or growth/usage metrics. In the end, I come up with an estimate that I can compare to the estimates of my partners. If our estimates are in a narrow range, then we're satisfied; if they're wildly different, then we scrutinize our individual assumptions until we're on the same page.

On final note, valuations do matter, but exact valuations do not. The average return of an angel investment is 2.6x over 3.5 years, and it's okay if your valuation estimates are off by 5-10% once in a while. (An average, well-diversified portfolio should return about 2.6x, and 90% of that is still a healthy return). For a professional fund, the goal is to have better than average returns (e.g. 4x or 8x), and in that case, the quality of companies that you invest in becomes more important than your ability to calculate their valuations to the nearest dollar.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2014/01/24/how-do-investors-value-pre-revenue-companies/#190c9b536027