To Rmarchma: I finally have found some time to respond to your post (have been rather busy with other concerns lately).
My post# 42701 was a direct response to your following statement: "Four years ago many of us old-timers thought and believed that IDCC was destined to reap tremendous 2G riches, very similar to how many now believe that IDCC is destined for 3G riches. It is management's job to turn potential into reality. I sincerely hope that we will not be as disappointed in 3G, as many of us old-timers are with 2G developments."
The implication of that statement is that YOU are one of the old-timers who believed "IDCC was destined to reap tremendous 2G riches" and that YOU are still one of those old-timers still disappointed with 2G developments. It is only from that remarkable and safe position of hindsight that I felt justified in calling your beliefs an example of "incompetent and delusionary" judgment and expectation regarding 2G riches. My own hindsight vision is much stronger than my foresight vision and so I do not think I was inaccurate in that statement.
In answer to your query regarding my history with IDCC: I first invested in IDCC in late 1996 or early 1997, with a thousand shares at about $6 per share, and with little knowledge of its history, and after viewing on TV a representative from some brokerage house (don't remember who it was and have never seen him since) give very strong, unqualified praise of its telecom engineering prowess, even dominance, in fixed local loop wireless technology, with very successful projects going on in Germany and a contract in Burma. I had no great understanding of IDCC at the time, and with the general economy improving, had hopes of at least a small gain and may have sold after a 50% or more rise in price per share. The stock seemed "dead" until after the Nokia agreement and the sudden dramatic price rise in the last week of 1999, with the "baby Qualcomm" news, and general market euphoria making me think I was an accidental investment "genius". The fact that I never sold during the precipitous decline that followed proved that I was an equally accidental "idiot". One of the factors that contributed to my "idiocy" was the purchase of a computer in early 2000 that gave me access to the Raging Bull message board and the incomparable TelecomTech website of Bill Dalglish which fueled my enthusiasm for IDCC. These resources and their successors have provided me with access to more information about IDCC than I have had with any other of my investments. I have gradually accumulated many more shares and have been bullish and long ever since. But I have never hyped IDCC on these boards or provided number estimates or expectations for its earnings or litigation results. If anything, I have tried to underline the inherent risk and uncertainty of investing and have sometimes criticized those who scapegoat management for their investment disappointments or those who engaged in organizing public and secret efforts to undermine and challenge management in ways I thought to be unfair or counterproductive.
There is no doubt that my expectations were raised by the Harris trial results and the disclosures of court documents by our investigative sleuths. But after the Ericy Settlement, upon which so many hopes were based for 2G riches, I was among many others trying to understand its significance and implications and with "hindsight vision" came to recognize the clues and signs that have led me to appreciate the many circumstances and "mandates" constraining management and that have led me to conclude that they have done a decent job on the whole. Some of those important clues: the 1999 Nokia agreement (with its miniscule pre-2001 paid up royalty obligations for 2G), the subsequent arbitration ruling with Samsung tying it to the same Nokia rate for 2G, the dangerously weak financial position of Ericy threatening to dissolve its partnership with SONY and thereby abandoning the handset business, the need to use Ericy to establish a Nokia rate for 2G, the likely pressure of Judge Lynn to get this matter settled, and other signs as well that NO one on this board clearly articulated to suppress expectations prior to the Settlement. It was, however, clear to me soon after the Settlement that establishing a Nokia 2G rate was the secondary but equally critical objective. And despite the current stalemate with Nokia, I believe IDCC will eventually prevail, and when that happens the resulting 2G "modest" riches should be recognized as a major Management achievement.
So, after recognizing and accepting realities, I am not disappointed in Management's performance under the circumstances. I do not believe that IDCC fully controls its own destiny, and herein lies the major risks to its success. There are too many other factors and contingencies at play, and we really have little insight or understanding of exactly what they are or how much risk they pose. I, thefore, never make predictions, and recognize the largely "accidental" and "fortuitous" aspect of my investment success or failure. If I thought management was incompetent I certainly would find that an unacceptable risk. Even the "best" and "brightest" managements, however, can fail in creating a successful business. In this regard, I do not believe the obstacles to IDCC's success lie primarily in King of Prussia or reside in your identification of management "issues". As I see it, the real obstacles reside in the management's of Nokia, Siemann's, perhaps Qualcomm, and some other industry giants, who have their own reasons, like Motorola and Ericy once did, to crush this tiny, annoying technology and competitive company making royalty claims upon their budgets and revenues. The problem has not appeared to be with their sundry engineering teams, and their abilities to work together or acknowledge each others contributions. But something goes on in the board rooms of these large corporations into which we have little, if any, visibility and barely the slightest clue of understanding (the veil was slightly opened by our court sleuths before the Ericy settlement). Our management has to deal with these big "bad" boys, and I just do not believe it is primarily their fault that contracts are not being signed.
I truly had to laugh when YOU wrote a letter to Nokia management scolding them for their behavior in their recent court filing and challenge to IDCC, in which you "heroically" threatened to sell your Nokia shares AFTER they rose to your acceptable share price level. WOW! I thought to myself if only you would do unto Nokia what you have done and want to do to IDCC, harass the hell out of them. Why sell your shares? Why not write 50 questions for Nokia to answer and gadfly their management until you get management's answers. E.g., why has Nokia never publicized or promoted its work with IDCC on WTDD? How does Nokia propose to use its "partnership" with IDCC to advance, incorporate, and utilize WTDD in its phones and networks? etc., etc. I'm sure you can think of many questions to ask Nokia management. Why not appeal to their institutional analyst's to ask some tough questions, or organize their institutional investor's to confront Nokia and hold them accountable? And why don't you organize a campaign of governance reform at Nokia? And why stop there? Why not go after Siemann's, or Qualcomm (whose buckets of insider selling make such IDCC selling look like teaspoonfuls by comparison), or the many other giant corporations that hold IDCC's success or failure and destiny in their collective corporate hands? Why do you so diligently pick upon tiny IDCC, when so many of the solutions to its problems depend upon and can be found in the corporate headquarters of these other companies? How about showing some real heroic moxey and go after these companies executives, instead of just wimping out with a "sell" order on Nokia? By the way, have you heard back from Nokia yet on your last letter? How are their "communication" skills?
I fear that if you or Mr. Espy were elected to the IDCC board, you would either no longer be primarily a shareholder advocate, as your responsibilities would be more focused upon employee and company needs to fulfill its goals, one of which is NOT to worry about short term shareprice fluctuations. If you were solely focused on shareholder interests (which are themselves a bundle of incoherent contradictions), you would quickly bring about so much employee and management dissension and disharmony and so distract them from their singleminded focus upon the most important matters for their success, that you would likely be a trojan horse leading to the company's ultimate failure and takeover at an undervalued price. There are probably IDCC competitors and shareholders who would cheer you or Espy on. Few things in life always appear to be what they really are.
