From Fahy's Response to Joint Opposition of Petition to Deny. He nailed it:
Outlined below is a timetable of the date, value, and by whom Fibertower’s 24 GHz and 39 GHz portfolio was valued at over the course of time. The primary asset was devalued from $288.5M to $1 to $2M in less than 2 years or from $342M to $1 to $2M in less than 4 years leading into bankruptcy.
Date: 24/39 GHz Portfolio Value: Source of Value Origin:
12/31/2006 $342M Fibertower Annual 10K, Tom Scott was CFO
12/31/2007 $342M Fibertower Annual 10K, Tom Scott was CFO
12/31/2008 $342M Fibertower Annual 10K, Tom Scott was CFO
12/31/2009 $288.5M Fibertower Annual 10K, Tom Scott was CFO
12/31/2010 $288.5M Fibertower Annual 10K, Tom Scott was CFO
12/31/2011 $106M Fibertower Annual 10K, Tom Scott was CFO
09/27/2013 $1 to $2M Fibertower Chapter 11 BK, Tom Scott (Advisor /defacto Chief Executive Officer of the Debtors)
01/25/2017 Unknown AT&T Agrees to Purchase Fibertower Interests
As one can see the valuation of Fibertower’s 24 GHz and 39 GHz spectrum portfolio was performed in a narrow financial echo chamber of sorts. It deserves much further examination as to how the primary asset of Fibertower being the 24 GHz and 39 GHz spectrum portfolio can see 99% of its value eroded within 2 years leading into a Bankruptcy Filing with all the valuations managed by the same individual serving in different roles. There is no other instance where Wireless Spectrum Assets have ever been even remotely close to being this extremely devalued in such short order. The notion that wireless spectrum licenses can lose more than 99% of their value within the 2 years leading into a Bankruptcy Filing alone is highly suspect.
