Mr Cooper Group Inc (COOP)

[Large Green]

Two Posters excellent views that carry only the facts as their research and due diligence has shown them. I have also done very much research (since 9/2008) and due diligence since this travesty and concur with both Posters views and thought process.

THANKS GOES to AZCOWBOY and David West - Thanks so much for sharing!

First post is from David West and the second post is from AZCOWBOY


Post one from David West - the FDIC is in place to protect the depositors, and it would seem logical to me that returning the depositor’s money to their bank accounts would be at the top of any list of priorities. As you know, depositing money into an FDIC protected bank account is “risk free” to the depositor up to $250K; the key phrase here being “risk free”. Contrarily, the word “invest” implies “risk”, and that is what all investors, including the MBS purchasers, know and accept before investing. I mentally include the purchasers of the MBSs as members of claimants. In the past, I have seen a small hierarchy of how FDIC-R assigns priorities in a receivership, but it has lost its way in the myriad of research documents I have read. If I were one of our self-serving, criminal politicians and had a lot of money invested by a large hedge fund into WMB MBSs, I know who would be next on the list after the depositor if I could wield the power to make it so. If the FDIC-R recovered a value of $100M, the bank (depositors) would get any part of it needed to make the deposits whole, and then claimants would be satisfied in order of the FDIC-R priority list. I feel certain the WMI estate will be at the very bottom of the list.

FDIC-R does not recognize “safe harbor” or “exempt assets” as they relate to bankruptcy. This maneuver protects no one and no asset in a receivership, including the MBS purchasers, because it is relevant only in bankruptcy court. As assets “hidden in plain sight” do not exist to the court, the protection of those assets does not exist to FDIC-R. This very topic is probably what FDIC and the court had a small spat about. The court probably stepped out of bounds on the subject of “safe harbor” and “exempt assets”, and the FDIC forcefully reminded the court of the power of the FDIC on their side of the line in the sand. The court had no power over FDIC except in bankruptcy matters (remember, the protected assets were not a part of the bankruptcy), and agreed with FDIC. FDIC-R could and would do whatever was legal with the protected assets. Additionally, this subject was probably the topic of many of the “behind doors sessions” of the court, and the redacted documents. The debtors did not want others (equity) to know this information. However, it was impossible to suppress the topic during negotiations, and equity did know after the Trustee authorized the Equity Committee. Even then, the EC could not use the value of the protected assets as an argument to prevent cancellation (enter Nate Thoma, insider trading, equitable disallowance, etc.).

WMI/WMB hid the assets “in plain sight” before OTS seized WMB, and the maneuver is useful in a bankruptcy only by the debtor to justify cancelling equity, showing there is not enough value in allowable assets to pay creditors and equity. You can bet the creditors knew about the “hidden in plain sight” value of the mortgages, and knew that FDIC-R would return “value-in-kind” during the receivership.

We have absolutely no control over the outcome of the receivership. Whatever the final tally, we will have to accept it and move on.

We are the ones who did not know how it worked. We still do not know.


Mostly opinion.

Best regards,
David West

Post two is from AZCOWBOY- The Plan of Confirmation (Feb 2012) dictates the Settled Debtors Pay Out Matrix (exhibit H) ... This approved Pay Out Matrix was determined to be utilized, and adhered to, .... by all participants and recipients ... from Plan 7's implementation and continuing, future tense as a part of the settlement' ...

As I have stated many times, I believe the Bankruptcy will need to finalize leaving the last creditor class impaired, this Bankruptcy Court has to follow its own guidelines, past, present, and future tense' (Had filing #0001 & #0002 been filed fraudulently ? then it was this courts obligation to address either the filings ? or the errors within' .... (Bankruptcy, even in Delaware' is only supposed to be a functional remedy for a structure that's liabilities exceed its assets')

Now, as a separate issue, "R" procedurally, will return to a debtors estate, and take into consideration any classes left impaired and places itself right above "general unsecured" (or in our particular case ... Tranche 5)

Now, ... since exhibit H' as stipulated, within Plan 7's agreement and the Courts Confirmation order' ... is NOT Bankruptcy exclusive' then that would be the settled Payout Matrix (Tranches 1 - 6) .. which is designated to be utilized by' all entities moving forward ... irrelevant' of whether or not the Bankruptcy has finalized'

So stick with me ~ ....

The Bankruptcy finalizes, leaving the last creditor class impaired' (the bankruptcy court saves face')

Then "R" begins to settle with the debtors (WMI's) estate according to its mandated procedure ...

"R" inserts itself into the debtors estate (WMI) and reviews any creditor classes issues'

"R" deals with the creditor classes fairly for anything remaining due them ... then "R" moves into general unsecured (Tranche 5) which should go quickly' ... and subsequently releases funding to the Tranche 6 recipients' or holders of the Trust Markers ~ (us ~ class 19 & class 22)

The Bankruptcy Court has saved face and "R" has followed its procedural and mandated requirements ... funding continues to be distributed back to the debtors estate holders (Trust Markers) as "R" continues to liquidate the estate'

I hope this made sense' ... But I believe I have the procedural sequence of events .... I had to separate the Tranche PayOut matrix from being Bankruptcy exclusive' ... Its NOT ... The Tranche PayOut Matrix is Plan exclusive' ... not BK exclusive ... IMO ~ this works'

... Had Plan 6 been approved ? the holders of the 16's would have been sitting right at the ending position with a hybrid security which could exceed face value ~ a very nice position to be in once the bankruptcy finalized and "R" began to finalize ... luckily ~ the PayOut Matrix was reversed with the approval of Plan 7 ~ and placed us (equity) in the final receiving position (Tranche 6)

The snh's continue to be the ... wild card' ... they' wait and watch the process along with equity'

These are my conclusions and opinions of the process as we move forward'

AZ
___________________________________________________________
Bonderman - Equity Friendly?

This could be the beginning which will happen quickly as these people are being sued individually as well to get them to sing like canaries. When they do sing, this may open the door for RICO charges and much, much more invalidating all releases signed by all parties. There is no statue of limitations on RICO, I do not believe. More importantly with a jury trial at stake and paying for this on their own, do the players want something that has been covered up for six plus years to be exposed worldwide? I think not.

Who knows for sure, but this filing could be a trigger ensuring the Perps follow through on whatever was negotiated or what will be negotiated in the finale to be sent to WMILT for our escrow share holder accounts. Could be a month delay from the P&AA expiration but only time will tell for sure.

Have I told you lately how much I love my escrow shares?

https://www.pehub.com/2008/12/26328/

Bonderman resigns from WaMu Board 12/2008. Bonderman was on the board at the time of the 500 million downstream and he may be our friend since I do NOT see his name listed anywhere. Time will soon tell.

http://www.wmitrust.com/WMITrust

WMI LIQUIDATING TRUST FILES LAWSUIT AGAINST-FORMER DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS OF WASHINGTON MUTUAL - Claims Include Breach of Fiduciary Duties and Corporate Waste

https://www.kccllc.net/wmitrust/document/list/3956

Complaint Filed in State of Washington, King County Superior Court

https://www.kccllc.net/wmitrust/document/8817600141015000000000001

Complaint Objecting to, and Seeking Subordination and Disallowance of, Director and Officer Proofs of Claim

From Doc 02, PDF 3, line 20;
"JPMorgan bankers had begun analyzing how JPMorgan would operate WMB after JPMorgan purchased WMB out of an FDIC receivership. In these discussions, the bankers assumed that JPMorgan would acquire WMB out of an FDIC receivership and pay nothing for it. The Defendants should have understood the financial difficulties faced by WMB better than the bankers at JPMorgan, which was merely a potential buyer. Although many have speculated on the causes of WMB’s failure, nothing in this Complaint is based on, arises out of, directly or indirectly results from, is in consequence of, or in any way involves the acts that caused WMB’s and WMI’s financial condition in September 2008. Rather, this Complaint is based solely on the Defendants’ failure to preserve WMI’s assets once it was apparent by or before September 10, 2008 – as it should have been to each of the Defendants – that the FDIC was very likely to seize WMB in the next few weeks. "

PDF 4, line 5;
"8. Despite all these storm signals, on September 10, 2008, Defendant Thomas Casey (“Casey”) implemented a reckless and inexplicable transaction that wasted at least $500 million of WMI’s capital by transferring that amount from WMI to WMB (the “September Downstream”). On information and belief, WMILT alleges that Casey effected the September Downstream following the direction or acquiescence of all of the other Defendants and contrary to the advice of WMI’s trusted and reliable analysts and advisors.
9. The prudent decision would have been to preserve WMI’s assets at this critical time rather than to place them in the failing WMB. Instead, as described below, the Officer Defendants (defined below) and, by their lack of supervision or exercise of decision-making authority, the Director Defendants (defined below) responded out of panic rather than reason. They abandoned the interests of WMI and allowed the September Downstream, despite the complete absence of any evidence of deliberation as to whether a transfer should be made at that time. Half a billion dollars of WMI’s capital, which otherwise would have been available for the benefit of WMI’s creditors and shareholders, instead was transferred outside of creditors’ reach to WMB, a distressed entity facing imminent seizure.
10. The wasteful September Downstream did nothing to ameliorate the critical problems facing WMB. WMB’s problem in September 2008 was lack of adequate liquidity: WMB had inadequate cash or assets easily convertible to cash to satisfy its short-term obligations (primarily, to return money to its depositors). The September Downstream did not address WMB’s liquidity shortage because the cash that WMI used for the September Downstream already was on deposit at WMB before the September Downstream and was available to satisfy WMB’s short-term obligations. The September Downstream increased the amount of regulatory capital on WMB’s balance sheet, but did nothing to address WMB’s inadequate liquidity.
11. Ultimately, as the Office of Thrift Supervision (the “OTS”) acknowledged in a press release after it seized WMB (and as the Defendants knew or ought to have known at the time of the September Downstream), the seizure of WMB was not due to a lack of capital. Former OTS Director John E. Bowman reiterated this in his testimony before Congress in April 2010. According to Bowman and the OTS, WMB was “well capitalized” at the time it was seized, the highest grade of capitalization. WMB would have had this highest grade of capitalization even without the $500 million from the September Downstream. In fact, on September 7, 2008, WMI and WMB had entered into memoranda of understanding (each, an “MOU”) with the OTS, whichimposed no capital contribution obligations on WMI; indeed, entry into the MOUs was seen within WMI (including by some or all of the Defendants) as a way to avoid pressure from the OTS to make capital transfers to WMB at least in the near future. Thus, the September Downstream was utterly irrational from WMI’s perspective. The September Downstream could only address a problem that WMB did not have (adequate capitalization) and failed to address the problem that WMB did have (inadequate liquidity).

HAVE I TOLD YOU HOW MUCH I LOVE MY ESCROW SHARES LATELY?