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I do not think remoteness is the reason. If WMI owned residual interests as of the effective date the POR language imo was sufficient to have transferred them to the LT at that time. I vaguely remember that there was a provision that the debtors had the right to re-arrange assets before the effective date. That is why I hypothesise that before the effective date these interests could have been placed in some entity or escrow which provided that the monies were to be paid over to the preferred equity interests and common equity interests at some future date. If so, then the definition of "reoganized wmi" would not include the residual assets and wmih would not have received them because as of the effective date the WMI entity would not have owned them
and therefore incapable of transferring them to wmih via the POR.
I think the better counter argument with respect to non legacy shareholders benefitting is that Tepper would not have sold out if wmih was getting these assets. But I remember Coop was very vague about receiving 25 or so million dollars from a trust that ended a year or two ago. No details given.
There are some layman on this board that do a very good job of discussing and grasping the issues. Others not so much. But the fact that there are redactions and perhaps hidden pieces handicaps the lawyers as well.
Unicorn stated:
About there being no assets left in the wmilt one could claim its true because they are a bankruptcy entity so remote assets are not accounted for. The problem i have with the coop theory is it means uninvited guests like kkr are unjustly benefitting those assets, if they exist. How those hidden assets could be returned to benefit Equity is beyond me. One thing i've learned from this case is never rely on the layman's interpretation of the docs from this board. Always fails, all the time.
The POR states otherwise:
1.192 Reorganized WMI: WMI, on and after the Effective Date, which shall include One Hundred Percent (100%) of the equity interests of WMI Investment, WMMRC and, subject to the abandonment of the equity interests of WMB, WMB.
The LT was indeed the successor in interest for some of the assets and not for others such as the reinsurance company and wmb. But apparently all the assets of the investment company have already been accounted for since the LT has stated there are no assets left in the trust. The LT has also stated that WMI never owned interests in MBS. There was also no mention of the ownership of any residual interests in the bankruptcy schedules. Contingent assets of WMI should have been so included. So what am I to conclude, other than somehow the POR did not operate to transfer such assets to the LT? And if not so transferred, then WMI would still own them unless transferred to an entity other than the LT before the effective date. But there seems to be no evidence of such entity or that the LT is in fact successor in interest to those assets. jmho
Well I suspect we are being held in the dark, because they intend to screw us without us knowing about it so we cannot complain. That is why I welcome Alice's newest attempt at finding out if the (a)Underwriters claim was proportionally allocated among all the p's and not just to the retail preferred (b) that TPS p's do not walk away with everything or more than TPS is due and (c) that there was a fair arms length valuation of any and all assets to be distributed. The LT has clearly told us, there is nothing to distribute. How do you verify that other than through litigation.
I would suggest you first read the facts of this case. https://h2o.law.harvard.edu/cases/5821
The case was filed in 2009 and decided in 2015. Now note that the gsa was enacted in 2012 and indicated that there are no side agreements. If JPM's ownership was changed by the gsa, JPM imo would still have not been the Plaintiff in that case when the decision was rendered. Instead the true or subsequent owner would have been substituted. So either JPM ended up owning them, or agreed to pay for them. But there are not suppose to be any side agreements so how can the latter be true.
Then read the first 14 pages of the TPS lawsuit. The lawsuit explains the WA Funding Trust III which is designated on retail P escrows. I found one allegation interesting which said if the TPS Conditional Exchange was upheld, that the investors would receive significantly less. It did not say the investors would be wiped out. Basically there were three trusts that backed the preferreds. According to the Delaware Business search two of those trusts still exist. JPM won the case so got a $4 billion
liquidation preference in those trusts. I do not know if or when JPM got paid. But it seems that even after JPM is/was paid that a couple billion should be left for the P's.
http://bankrupt.com/misc/BlackHorseComplaint.pdf
That is a good start for you. Others perhaps can provide schedules of various mbs .
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius ("the express mention of one thing excludes all others" or "the expression of one is the exclusion of others")
The POR states that the shares are cancelled for all purposes except in two instances.
"32.4 Cancellation of Existing Securities and Agreements: Except as provided herein, any document, agreement, or instrument evidencing any Claim or Equity Interest shall be deemed automatically cancelled and terminated on the Effective Date without further act or action under any applicable agreement, law, regulation, order, or rule and any and all obligations or liabilities of the Debtors under such documents, agreements, or instruments evidencing such Claims and Equity Interests shall be discharged; provided, however, that the foregoing cancellation of securities, documents, agreements or instruments shall not apply to (a) the securities related to the WMB Senior Notes or the WMB Subordinated Notes and (b) any security, document, agreement or instrument related to a Disputed Claim until a Final Order resolving any such Disputed Claim is entered;"
Also, " Cancellation of Common Equity Interests: Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 25.1 hereof, on the Effective Date, all Common Equity Interests shall be deemed extinguished and the certificates and all other documents representing such Equity Interests shall be deemed cancelled and of no force and effect."
So since there is no exception for remote assets listed, your conclusion imo is faulty. And "no force and effect" language cannot be ignored.
Now as to no litigation trust interests being issued, after class 18 litigation interests were resolved, there would be no reason to issue them for the equity interests,because at that time whatever is left is owned by equity and suppose to be distributed solely to equity. No reason to issue them when there is no party after equity to get any assets.
Now as to mbs trusts , I would assume boilerplate language exists which says the residual interest goes to the successor in interest . In the case of WMI, that would be wmih now known as Mr. Cooper group. However there could be a provision in the trust that designates the shareholders of WMI in the event of bankruptcy. However, there are no shareholders anymore, so one has to look for the successors to the shareholders, and that would be those that got the equity interests out of bankruptcy.
There are several canons of construction one must use in interpreting the meaning of provisions in contracts. The document must be construed as a whole.
Ask yourself how or why was the Liquidation Trust amended. One would think those amendments would deal exclusively with streamlining some procedures for the windup...so why is it being withheld from Alice. The LT is making her sue to get a copy of it. So imo one of the provisions deals with the collection, sale, etc of these assets. It could be the LT owned them all along but didn't need to report them because not in their possession till now or conveniently not valued till now. If the LT has no connection to remote assets, there was no need to litigate Alice's "preferred equity interest" theory. The LT simply could have informed the court that the issue was moot because there were/would not be any assets to distribute according to the 75/25 split. And the underwriters imo would have stayed in Class 18 if remote assets were to be distributed without regard to the 75/25 split. I do not think anything was distributed in part because of Alice's appeals, and perhaps the process of collecting the assets was not yet complete. My thinking is that there are escrow accounts which were created soon after the gsa was entered and that the proceeds due the debtors from the trusts were placed in escrow accounts over the years with instructions when to distribute. Moreover, the hedge funds were in control of the bankruptcy process and imo could have had common eliminated. So why let common
end up besting them on recovery? As a side note, I do not think there is any recovery outside those three trusts that secured the preferred. Also, one should realize that what Alice alleges in her complaint about recovery is based on hearsay upon hearsay. I question the motives of her Source. It could very well be a scheme for shorts. But until all is said and done we will not know who was right or even close to being right.
Samurai stated:
WHEN THERE IS NO (AND I MEAN NO) INDICATION THAT THE POR AFFECTS BK REMOTE ASSETS.
I do not think that can be said. One could argue that WMI transferred all of its property (other than express exclusions) per the POR to the LT which imo could include residual interests in remote trusts. If not so transferred wouldn't WMIH now Coop still own them today? I am speaking of MBS in general, not the trusts that supported the P's
One could call up the Delaware registered agent for the LT and ask if they are still accepting service of process for the LT. If the LT is already dissolved the agent should know and probably would decline to accept and say so because it would then be a hassle to get involved.
If memory serves, the $4 billion was settled via the Global Settlement Agreement. Walrath never had to rule on the summary judgment motion for the $4 billion. WMI received the $4 billion to pay creditors. The Senior Note Holders were the first to be paid with it. Nice trick since the SNH were the ones who negotiated the GSA. So if escrows receive nothing , it is because the SNH settled by giving away what otherwise would have been equity's. Then the equity committee complained to Walrath that equity should have had a say in those negotiations. Walrath refused. So if truth be told, the SNH and Walrath are to blame , if escrows do not get anything...not the members of the equity committee.
Yet it doesn't seem to bother the other large shareholders. One would think Cooperman would be vocal about some of the things that have happened as of late.
Split: I mentioned the business judgment rule in regard to the posts seeking redress for alleged breach of fiduciary duty of the Coop directors. The business judgment rule does not apply to the actions/delay of the fdic. If Coop does have control of assets that belong to legacy shareholders the cause of action is termed a "conversion" not a "taking". Conversion is a tort that exposes you to liability for damages in a civil lawsuit. It applies when someone intentionally interferes with personal property belonging to another person. Imo any action for an unlawful taking against the FDIC under the 5th amendment is moot. If I remember correctly, at the time the action was pled, it did not yet apply to the taking of personal property and was therefore defective anyway. Then the senior note holders and debtor released the fdic of all causes of action under the Global Settlement Agreement and the 5th taking suit was later dismissed. Any cause of action legacy shareholders may have against the fdic would be via the Global Settlement Agreement and the statutory requirement that the fdic pay over to shareholders anything leftover in the receivership after all creditors have been fully paid. But there is the problem that WMI was the only shareholder of WMB, and abandoned the WMB shares which raises the question whether legacy shareholders would even have standing to complain.
Overcoming the "business judgment rule" in Delaware is gonna be very difficult imo.
I would identify myself as one of the P holders, and therefore a beneficiary of the two trusts, and ask when could you expect payment. Inquire about any agreement that those trusts have with JPM, the LT, WMIH, the FDIC receivership. If they refuse, then say you are going to file an action for an accounting. Deutsche bank had a court case in orange county california, that involved at least one of the trusts, if I remember correctly.
The first few pages of this complaint
http://bankrupt.com/misc/BlackHorseComplaint.pdf
explain the WA Funding Trust III which is designated on our P escrows. I found one allegation interesting which said if the TPS Conditional Exchange was upheld, that the investors would receive significantly less. It did not say the investors would be wiped out. It also points to two other trusts securing the P's . Deutsche bank is the trustee of the two other trusts and JPM took over the servicing of the trust assets in wmb's stead.
Anyway these trusts were initially funded with some 13 billion in assets of which TPS initially had a $4 billion liquidation preference which Walrath awarded to WMB receivership/JPM. According to
https://livinglies.me/2016/11/18/investigator-bill-paatalo-who-is-private-investor-ao1-jpmorgan-chase-refuses-to-reveal-the-identity-of-this-investor/
the AO1 trust (one of the three trusts) had some 10 billion left a year or two ago.
If I remember correctly TPS appealed the Walrath decision which was later dismissed with the second amended GSA. IMO an escrow agreement was entered into by these trusts and the P holders which provides for JPM to service the monies and then the escrow agent will eventually split the proceeds 75/25. I do not know whether or not the receivership or JPM ever got the 4 billion yet, but it would seem that could only be paid at the same time the other monies were distributed to all P holders.
Anyway, imo research should be aimed at these trusts and perhaps contact should be made with Deutsche as trustee.
I do not understand the point you are trying to make by the bolded language. If you are trying to argue that the trust ends when Walrath says it does, I disagree. The trust is a creature of Delaware law and ends when a Certificate of Cancellation is duly filed according to state law notwithstanding Walraths order that it be dissolved on or before March 19th and/or that her order was not appealed and is final. Her deadline was directed at the wind-up administrators not the State of Delaware. Failure to timely dissolve before the deadline doesn't strike me as being subject to contempt because Walrath was informed beforehand that litigation may prevent meeting that deadline. If your point was something else, have at it.
Added: How would Walrath determine if the administrators were in contempt? She would look to Delaware law and see that the state requires a Certificate of Cancellation before the trust is deemed dissolved and look to see if and when such certificate was filed.
The fact that the liquidation trust met/meets the requirement of a Grantor's Trust for Internal Revenue Service purposes does not negate the fact that the liquidation trust is a Delaware Statutory Trust. Article Three of the liquidation trust itself states that a Certificate of Cancellation must be filed upon dissolution. Until that Certificate is on file, the liquidation trust still exists. Walraths order does not and can not dispense with Delaware's requirement that such a certificate be filed.
Also, the fact that a court order has not been stayed does not mean it is a final judgment. Any possibility of an appeal must be exhausted before the Third Circuit Court of Appeals decision is deemed final. If no judge has taken any action with regard to Alice's motion by now, in all likelihood it is of no consequence. But Alice still has the right to file a writ of certiorari with SCOTUS 90 days from Feb 11th ish . So until this time is exhausted the decision is not final.
The bankruptcy code required Alice to file her objection to the underwriters claim BEFORE the bankruptcy case was closed. So if she waited until assets appeared for escrows it would be impossible to object then.
Hogwash. An appeal keeps the decision from becoming final. Short of an appeal, judges have the power to change their ruling (even on their own accord) before the ruling/decision/judgment becomes final. Anyone who acts on the decision before it becomes final is a fool.
Well the LT knows that Motions for En Banc rehearings are rarely granted, and that Scotus rarely hears bankruptcy issues, so they could take their chances and close it. But what happens to the directors errors and omissions insurance policy coverage in the event Alice gets heard again? Closing imo puts the wind up officers and trustees in jeopardy in the event Alice prevails imo. Also, who would pay any additional attorney fees. The charity ain't going to return anything .
If the trust were closed, I would expect the trust would have to formally substitute the wind up officers in its stead in the appeal with a court filing. The appellee would have to still exist short of that filing. A corporation or trust cannot simply dissolve itself to rid itself of pending litigation. Also, I do not think an extension was required because Class 18 already got their distributions. It is my understanding that the Treasury Regulation and Private Letter Rulings are aimed at ensuring the IRS that all distributions were to be made by a certain time. Hence unlikely the IRS cares about a few weeks, and we know the trust has a reputation for skirting what is clearly written.
Has anyone checked with the Delaware Secretary of State as to the status of the Liquidating Trust? A certificate of dissolution has to be filed to end the trust.
https://delcode.delaware.gov/title12/c038/sc01/
Primarily.
I think the number of total judges is 14.
Rule 35. En Banc Determination
Primary tabs
(a) When Hearing or Rehearing En Banc May Be Ordered. A majority of the circuit judges who are in regular active service and who are not disqualified may order that an appeal or other proceeding be heard or reheard by the court of appeals en banc. An en banc hearing or rehearing is not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered unless:
(1) en banc consideration is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the court's decisions; or
(2) the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance.
(b) Petition for Hearing or Rehearing En Banc. A party may petition for a hearing or rehearing en banc.
(1) The petition must begin with a statement that either:
(A) the panel decision conflicts with a decision of the United States Supreme Court or of the court to which the petition is addressed (with citation to the conflicting case or cases) and consideration by the full court is therefore necessary to secure and maintain uniformity of the court's decisions; or
(B) the proceeding involves one or more questions of exceptional importance, each of which must be concisely stated; for example, a petition may assert that a proceeding presents a question of exceptional importance if it involves an issue on which the panel decision conflicts with the authoritative decisions of other United States Courts of Appeals that have addressed the issue.
(2) Except by the court's permission:
(A) a petition for an en banc hearing or rehearing produced using a computer must not exceed 3,900 words; and
(B) a handwritten or typewritten petition for an en banc hearing or rehearing must not exceed 15 pages.
(3) For purposes of the limits in Rule 35(b)(2), if a party files both a petition for panel rehearing and a petition for rehearing en banc, they are considered a single document even if they are filed separately, unless separate filing is required by local rule.
(c) Time for Petition for Hearing or Rehearing En Banc. A petition that an appeal be heard initially en banc must be filed by the date when the appellee's brief is due. A petition for a rehearing en banc must be filed within the time prescribed by Rule 40 for filing a petition for rehearing.
(d) Number of Copies. The number of copies to be filed must be prescribed by local rule and may be altered by order in a particular case.
(e) Response. No response may be filed to a petition for an en banc consideration unless the court orders a response. The length limits in Rule 35(b)(2) apply to a response.
(f) Call for a Vote. A vote need not be taken to determine whether the case will be heard or reheard en banc unless a judge calls for a vote.
Notes
(As amended Apr. 1, 1979, eff. Aug. 1, 1979; Apr. 29, 1994, eff. Dec. 1, 1994; Apr. 24, 1998, eff. Dec. 1, 1998; Apr. 25, 2005, eff. Dec. 1, 2005; Apr. 28, 2016, eff. Dec 1, 2016. )
Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules—1967
Statutory authority for in banc hearings is found in 28 U.S.C. §46(c). The proposed rule is responsive to the Supreme Court's view in Western Pacific Ry. Corp. v. Western Pacific Ry. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 73 S.Ct. 656, 97 L.Ed. 986 (1953), that litigants should be free to suggest that a particular case is appropriate for consideration by all the judges of a court of appeals. The rule is addressed to the procedure whereby a party may suggest the appropriateness of convening the court in banc. It does not affect the power of a court of appeals to initiate in banc hearings sua sponte.
The provision that a vote will not be taken as a result of the suggestion of the party unless requested by a judge of the court in regular active service or by a judge who was a member of the panel that rendered a decision sought to be reheard is intended to make it clear that a suggestion of a party as such does not require any action by the court. See Western Pacific Ry. Corp. v. Western Pacific Ry. Co., supra, 345 U.S. at 262, 73 S.Ct. 656. The rule merely authorizes a suggestion, imposes a time limit on suggestions for rehearings in banc, and provides that suggestions will be directed to the judges of the court in regular active service.
In practice, the suggestion of a party that a case be reheard in banc is frequently contained in a petition for rehearing, commonly styled “petition for rehearing in banc.” Such a petition is in fact merely a petition for a rehearing, with a suggestion that the case be reheard in banc. Since no response to the suggestion, as distinguished from the petition for rehearing, is required, the panel which heard the case may quite properly dispose of the petition without reference to the suggestion. In such a case the fact that no response has been made to the suggestion does not affect the finality of the judgment or the issuance of the mandate, and the final sentence of the rule expressly so provides.
It isn't an appeal. It is a motion for a rehearing by all the judges of the same circuit court of appeals. Her appeal was only heard by three of the judges.
Could be because Biden extended the moratorium on mortgage foreclosures to June 30th, 2021.
LII Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 40. Petition for Panel Rehearing
Rule 40. Petition for Panel Rehearing
Primary tabs
(a) Time to File; Contents; Response; Action by the Court if Granted.
(1) Time. Unless the time is shortened or extended by order or local rule, a petition for panel rehearing may be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment. But in a civil case, unless an order shortens or extends the time, the petition may be filed by any party within 45 days after entry of judgment if one of the parties is:
(A) the United States;
(B) a United States agency;
(C) a United States officer or employee sued in an official capacity; or
(D) a current or former United States officer or employee sued in an individual capacity for an act or omission occurring in connection with duties performed on the United States' behalf — including all instances in which the United States represents that person when the court of appeals' judgment is entered or files the petition for that person.
(2) Contents. The petition must state with particularity each point of law or fact that the petitioner believes the court has overlooked or misapprehended and must argue in support of the petition. Oral argument is not permitted.
(3) Response. Unless the court requests, no response to a petition for panel rehearing is permitted. Ordinarily, rehearing will not be granted in the absence of such a request. If a response is requested, the requirements of Rule 40(b) apply to the response.
(4) Action by the Court. If a petition for panel rehearing is granted, the court may do any of the following:
(A) make a final disposition of the case without reargument;
(B) restore the case to the calendar for reargument or resubmission; or
(C) issue any other appropriate order.
(b) Form of Petition; Length. The petition must comply in form with Rule 32. Copies must be served and filed as Rule 31 prescribes. Except by the court’s permission:
(1) a petition for panel rehearing produced using a computer must not exceed 3,900 words; and
(2) a handwritten or typewritten petition for panel rehearing must not exceed 15 pages.
Rule 35. En Banc Determination
Primary tabs
(a) When Hearing or Rehearing En Banc May Be Ordered. A majority of the circuit judges who are in regular active service and who are not disqualified may order that an appeal or other proceeding be heard or reheard by the court of appeals en banc. An en banc hearing or rehearing is not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered unless:
(1) en banc consideration is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the court's decisions; or
(2) the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance.
(b) Petition for Hearing or Rehearing En Banc. A party may petition for a hearing or rehearing en banc.
(1) The petition must begin with a statement that either:
(A) the panel decision conflicts with a decision of the United States Supreme Court or of the court to which the petition is addressed (with citation to the conflicting case or cases) and consideration by the full court is therefore necessary to secure and maintain uniformity of the court's decisions; or
(B) the proceeding involves one or more questions of exceptional importance, each of which must be concisely stated; for example, a petition may assert that a proceeding presents a question of exceptional importance if it involves an issue on which the panel decision conflicts with the authoritative decisions of other United States Courts of Appeals that have addressed the issue.
(2) Except by the court's permission:
(A) a petition for an en banc hearing or rehearing produced using a computer must not exceed 3,900 words; and
(B) a handwritten or typewritten petition for an en banc hearing or rehearing must not exceed 15 pages.
(3) For purposes of the limits in Rule 35(b)(2), if a party files both a petition for panel rehearing and a petition for rehearing en banc, they are considered a single document even if they are filed separately, unless separate filing is required by local rule.
(c) Time for Petition for Hearing or Rehearing En Banc. A petition that an appeal be heard initially en banc must be filed by the date when the appellee's brief is due. A petition for a rehearing en banc must be filed within the time prescribed by Rule 40 for filing a petition for rehearing.
(d) Number of Copies. The number of copies to be filed must be prescribed by local rule and may be altered by order in a particular case.
(e) Response. No response may be filed to a petition for an en banc consideration unless the court orders a response. The length limits in Rule 35(b)(2) apply to a response.
(f) Call for a Vote. A vote need not be taken to determine whether the case will be heard or reheard en banc unless a judge calls for a vote.
Notes
(As amended Apr. 1, 1979, eff. Aug. 1, 1979; Apr. 29, 1994, eff. Dec. 1, 1994; Apr. 24, 1998, eff. Dec. 1, 1998; Apr. 25, 2005, eff. Dec. 1, 2005; Apr. 28, 2016, eff. Dec 1, 2016. )
Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules—1967
Statutory authority for in banc hearings is found in 28 U.S.C. §46(c). The proposed rule is responsive to the Supreme Court's view in Western Pacific Ry. Corp. v. Western Pacific Ry. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 73 S.Ct. 656, 97 L.Ed. 986 (1953), that litigants should be free to suggest that a particular case is appropriate for consideration by all the judges of a court of appeals. The rule is addressed to the procedure whereby a party may suggest the appropriateness of convening the court in banc. It does not affect the power of a court of appeals to initiate in banc hearings sua sponte.
The provision that a vote will not be taken as a result of the suggestion of the party unless requested by a judge of the court in regular active service or by a judge who was a member of the panel that rendered a decision sought to be reheard is intended to make it clear that a suggestion of a party as such does not require any action by the court. See Western Pacific Ry. Corp. v. Western Pacific Ry. Co., supra, 345 U.S. at 262, 73 S.Ct. 656. The rule merely authorizes a suggestion, imposes a time limit on suggestions for rehearings in banc, and provides that suggestions will be directed to the judges of the court in regular active service.
In practice, the suggestion of a party that a case be reheard in banc is frequently contained in a petition for rehearing, commonly styled “petition for rehearing in banc.” Such a petition is in fact merely a petition for a rehearing, with a suggestion that the case be reheard in banc. Since no response to the suggestion, as distinguished from the petition for rehearing, is required, the panel which heard the case may quite properly dispose of the petition without reference to the suggestion. In such a case the fact that no response has been made to the suggestion does not affect the finality of the judgment or the issuance of the mandate, and the final sentence of the rule expressly so provides.
That report covers trades in wampq that were made in 2012. Wampq was cancelled in 2012 and cannot be traded since then.
Perhaps the ten year rate rising is/will cause(ing) the share price to rise. Currently at 1.166. This causes the mark to market to increase.
Ten year closed at .684 on Sept 30 2020.
Ten year closed at .919 on Dec. 31, 2020.
Imo Alice's objection wasn't so much about the 1 percent but to ensure that retail escrows would not be screwed out of the other 99 percent. Retail has been told time and time again there was nothing, Someone had to call their bluff and let them know retail thought differently and were willing to fight and keep an eye on the prize. Alice's case could have been settled very easily in the bankruptcy court, just by the underwriters relinquishing their right to preferred security interests. The underwriters did not have to give up the 1.4 million shares. The LT at the time had the funds to make preferred whole for the 1% Class 19 was illegally shortchanged . So why no settlement then? It would have been cheaper than the LT paying legal fees to fight the objection.
Refinance demand jumps 105% annually >
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/16/refinance-demand-jumps-105percent-annually-as-mortgage-rates-set-record-low.html
Huh? Rosen's responses have said the only monies left are going to be donated to charity...about 400,000 after 2.6 million is used to wind down the LT. Rosen never acknowledged that anything is going to escrows.
Other than the libor litigation and legal isolation I do not know what else causes FDIC to be the blame. You would think the hedge funds would be using their political connections to hurry this up.
If Alice was the "front" for others, those others would have joined in her objection and appeal for window dressing .
And Alice did not put up a bond in appealing Walrath's order either. I do not have the closing motion handy, but I think Class 18 still wasn't distributed when Alice filed her objection in the bankruptcy case. So she cannot be said to have delayed the filing of the closing motion either.
There is no court order prohibiting the LT or any other entity from distributing (other than perhaps the fdic) any funds due escrow. Alice did not post any bond to prevent a distribution. The LT or other entity could simply withhold any amounts to the underwriters until her appeal is decided and make distributions to everyone else, and the amount withheld distributed later according to the court decision. So Alice cannot be said to have delayed anything.