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This will bring on the SEC as this is one of their top focus items - ICOs
Just google "ICO SEC" - many many stories
And you might as well say "$1B" financing as no real investor is committing capital here - they are just hoping for suckers to buy their worthless ICO and both ALYI and IW Global will make $$$ no matter what happens. What is the "already sourced investment" - why no 8-K on this? Do those sourced investors feel good about getting super-diluted by a potential $100MM ICO? If not, that must mean that the ICO holders are getting worse terms. How does this dilute the ALYI stock investor - what are these ICO owners getting for their $100MM if not what ALYI stock investors are getting? What is the effective dilution (i.e., how much will the ICO investors get vs the current stock investors). THESE are the things that should have been in the paragraph - I mean "presentation" - rather than just a bunch of non-info about what Ethereum is (but ALYI always likes to connect to a real company in its PRs however tangentially). I was wondering what this "accepted financing proposal" was going to be and it's funnier that I thought. Super risky from management to go this big - even with "being executed in compliance with prevailing regulatory guidelines" - rather than just laying low. Should be fun to see the next chapter.
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/851836/fin+tech/SEC+Brings+Charges+For+ICO+Fraud+DOJ+Indicts+Hackers+Regulatory+Reports+Published
Nope - Randy Torno was CEO two years ago also (see the 9/30/17 quarterly) and was with Ed Bollen then also. ALYI acquired Lithium IP in July of 2017. You are correct that the strategy was totally different but that was as their Lithium IP strategy failed and they had to make something new up. Two years ago Randy was also the CEO of ANCE where he also promised a contract from Kenya that never materialized and which is skull and crossbones on theotcmarkets and Chairman of the Board of PJET (which is "dark and defunct" on theotcmarkets.com). Not the best track record of current management!
It's never house money - it's always your money. Where you got it from in the past shouldn't matter with what you do with it now and in the future.
The shares are not zero as the cost to borrow shares is extremely high and the availability to borrow those shares in order to short them is near 0. Thus no educated institutional holder or fund can short them for a meaningful profit. Retail buyers keep buying it hoping it is a lottery ticket. Even at $.28 this is a $30MM valuation which is basically meaningless in the context of $11B+ in liabilities.
Small edit - WCVC owned 4 Illegal Burgers when they bought NRG (which owned Illegal Burger ) in 2017.
There have been more than 2 Illegal Burgers even when PJET was a private jet company and had nothing to do with Illegal Burger or food at all. WCVC bought Illegal Burger in 2017. Illegal Burger owned 4 Illegal Burgers at that time (see the 2018 WCVC 10-K). The third illegal burger was opened in January 2016 (see the 2018 WCVC 10-K). The fourth and fifth ones were opened in June 2016 and October 2018. So as of June 30, 2016, when there were even four Illegal Burgers, PJET had nothing to do with Illegal Burger or any restaurants but was in the aviation business (see the PJET 10-Q for the period ending June 2016). PJET didn't even buy Telluride, the failed "happy water" (not CBD water) company founded by Yasmine Acebo, until late 2017 (see the PJET PR on 10/12/17). PJET had nothing to do with restaurants or WCVC until 11/8/18 when the whole WCVC/ AmeriCanna / USMJ / PJET shuffling was announced.
If you really bought PJET before January of 2016 when the 3rd Illegal Burger was opened, I don't see why it matters that you bought PJET when it was supposed to be a private jet company and then after many years WCVC opened 3 more debt ridden and money losing (see any WCVC financial statement) Illegal Burgers (which lose money on an OPERATING basis so it's not due to opening new stores - see any of their financials in which their auditor says that their losses and negative working capital raise(s) substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a going concern).
PJET does not own any part of Illegal Burger. They are supposed to do a food truck pilot of AmeriCanna Cafe with WCVC, the owner of Illegal Burger but this was announced more than 10 months ago with no progress.
Moore predicted nothing in that article. The $5.2B bid was on 1/16/2019. Moore's article was the day after - 1/17/19. Also the second lien 10/15/2018 bonds that he said in this article would be eventually worth 100 plus interest were about 33 at the time and now are about 13. We'll probably see soon but it seems pretty obvious to anyone educated that his view on the NOLs was just plain wrong.
American Airlines was a restructuring to allow a merger and get rid of unwanted long-term contracts. Sears / SHLDQ is an insolvency - totally different. The American Airlines when issued stock priced in some value (they underestimated the eventual value for the reasons bar1080 pointed out) and the pricing of American Airlines securities all prices in value and were being bought and held by major hedge funds and other institutions. No such thing is happening for SHLDQ as it is obvious (and we'll learn soon) that the SHLDQ stock is worth 0 (it is extremely expensive to short what little stock can be located otherwise it actually would be 0 today).
ESL paid $5.2B for the ASSETS of Sears while leaving the liabilities behind in SHLDQ. Since the liabilities of SHLDQ are well over double the $5.2B, you would get 10% of negative billions - also known as nothing.
There have been more than 2 Illegal Burgers even when PJET was a private jet company and had nothing to do with Illegal Burger or food at all. WCVC bought Ilegal Burger in 2017. Illegal Burger owned 5 Illegal Burgers at that time (see the 2018 WCVC 10-K). The third illegal burger was opened in January 2016 (see the 2018 WCVC 10-K). The fourth and fifth ones were opened in June 2016 and October 2018. So as of June 30, 2016, when there were even four Illegal Burgers, PJET had nothing to do with Illegal Burger or any restaurants but was in the aviation business (see the PJET 10-Q for the period ending June 2016). PJET didn't even buy Telluride, the failed "happy water" (not CBD water) company founded by Yasmine Acebo, until late 2017 (see the PJET PR on 10/12/17). PJET had nothing to do with restaurants or WCVC until 11/8/18 when the whole WCVC/ AmeriCanna / USMJ / PJET shuffling was announced.
If you really bought PJET before January of 2016 when the 3rd Illegal Burger was opened, I don't see why it matters that you bought PJET when it was supposed to be a private jet company and then after many years WCVC opened 3 more debt ridden and money losing (see any WCVC financial statement) Illegal Burgers (which lose money on an OPERATING basis so it's not due to opening new stores - see any of their financials in which their auditor says that their losses and negative working capital raise(s) substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a going concern).
PJET does not own any part of Illegal Burger. They are supposed to do a food truck pilot of Americanna Cafe with WCVC, the owner of Illegal Burger but this was announced more than 10 months ago with no progress.
If you believe that, you must not know his history w ANCE where he also promised a large contract in Kenya which never happened and he never put out a PR explaining it or published financials ever again. An honorable military executive would not run and go dark on the investors who depend on him when things failed. ANCE is still skull and crossbones on the otcmarkets.com. Also see PJET for which he was the Chairman of the Board. Finally, while at ALYI he briefly announced a partnership with LEXG which everyone knows is one of the biggest OTC scams in history. He backed out of this but obviously either didn’t do due diligence and was sloppy or didn’t care to do that background work before PR’ing that partnership which quickly fell through.
So it's like the fake tiny metal horsetrack at a casino. Everyone knows the horses are fake but because there is a chance that you can make multiples of your money you can bet and cheer your fake horse on and it's fun. Everyone loses if they stay long enough but until that happens it's fun with some chance of making money.
By having a true strategic partner or one of the thousands of legitimate venture capitalists in the US struggling to find a decent return in a near 0% interest rate environment make a real investment. In this era of low interest rates, tight credit spreads, and high credit liquidity, ANY legitimate company can find financing much cheaper than the death spiral financing provided by GHS. A legitimate company would keep the water flowing, the shrimp fed and the lights on by getting non-death spiral financing via a secured bank loan, a strategic partner equity stake or a legitimate VC investment. GHS does not invest. The death spiral financing with look backs is structured such that they make $$$ even if SHMP goes bankrupt unlike a real investment. As long as they can continue to sell diluted expensive (it is a mathematical fact that retail buyers are paying about double for SHMP shares what GHS pays) shares to retail SHMP lovers.
They have diluted like crazy and they have issued more new debt than the old debt they have paid off! They have "paid back" convertible debt by issuing new dilutive convertible debt and issuing hugely dilutive new equity and equity derivatives. Outstanding shares from June 30, 2018 to Aug 16, 2019 have gone from 19.2MM to 68.2MM a 255% dilution! They have not had a single quarter of positive earnings or positive cash flow since inception. If you add up from June 2018 to June 2019 (financials filed in theotcmarkets.com) they have lost $2.5MM in earnings, lost $1.1MM in operating cash flow and lost $1.2MM in free cash flow. Worst NET ISSUANCE of convertible securities from 6/30/18 to 6/30/19 was $200K (they issued $1.2MM worth of convertibles and paid back $1MM - this is in fact getting worse as in the first six months of 2019 NET issuance was $410MM issuing over $1MM and paying back about $600K. They note that they have issued 5 dilutive (converting at a 40 to 50% discount to the then current stock price) and high interest (8 to 12% interest with a 10% OID) convertibles form 6/30/19 to 8/16/19 (so VERY recently) for a total of $437K while paying off $303K old convertibles (thus the $1.4MM "paid off" but at the same time over $1.6MM of new debt was issued) - thus "paid back in cash" means "paid back in cash" with the proceeds of new convertibles or stock or derivatives not with any non-existent restaurant profits. These aren't my words - it's the WCVC's words in its own financial filings.
That's a solid date to spend $$$ and give revenue to a related scam - not like a solid date to GENERATE revenue
Next PR: $3B in revenues over 100 years
It’s called spoofing and it’s illegal with penalties that can include significant fines and jail time
Not when they issue more debt than they pay off (they have paid off $1.4MM in convertibles but issued more than $1.6MM in the same period including issuing more debt than they paid off for 2019 and for the last quarter so it's not getting better plus they have also issued non-convertible debt), continue to lose $1-$2MM per year and dilute the stock by 255% in 14 months in order to "pay back" debt. That's NEVER a good sign.
This is not a profitable company generating cash to pay back debt. They have "paid back" convertible debt by issuing new dilutive convertible debt and issuing hugely dilutive new equity and equity derivatives. Outstanding shares from June 30, 2018 to Aug 16, 2019 have gone from $19.2MM to $68.2MM a 255% dilution! They have not had a single quarter of positive earnings or positive cash flow since inception. If you add up from June 2018 to June 2019 (financials filed in theotcmarkets.com) they have lost $2.5MM in earnings, lost $1.1MM in operating cash flow and lost $1.2MM in free cash flow. Worst NET ISSUANCE of convertible securities from 6/30/18 to 6/30/19 was $200K (they issued $1.2MM worth of convertibles and paid back $1MM - this is in fact getting worse as in the first six months of 2019 NET issuance was $410MM issuing over $1MM and paying back about $600K. They note that they have issued 5 dilutive (converting at a 40 to 50% discount to the then currebt stock price) and high interest (8 to 12% interest with a 10% OID) convertibles form 6/30/19 to 8/16/19 (so VERY recently) for a total of $437K while paying off $303K old convertibles (thus the $1.4MM "paid off" but at the same time over $1.6MM was issued) - thus "paid back in cash" means "paid back in cash" with the proceeds of new convertibles or stock or derivatives not with any non-existent restaurant profits. These aren't my words - it's the WCVC's words in its own financial filings.
There are no shorts - short interest is 20,000 shares as of 7/15/19 - $3,200 - less than 2 minutes of average daily trading volume to cover all the shorts out there
"Will focus on all fronts and more"
That's not a credit line (the $11MM)
It's not an investment in the company. GHS gives equity lines where SHMP sells GHS SHMP stock at a discount to the current market price plus gives some free SHMP shares. This is shady financing only used by very weak borrowers. It is not a sign of approval of SHMP credit or stock. Similar to death-spiral convertible financing, it contains a look back that makes the purchase of the shares by GHS almost guarantee a risk-free profit for GHS. This is NOT good news that SHMP resorts to this dilutive EQUITY financing. NOT a credit line.
SHMP has not yet filed the 8-K (or an S-1 to register these shares) with details but a good example of a GHS equity line with another firm is detailed here
https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2019/07/09/1880253/0/en/Ozop-Surgical-Corp-Announces-7-Million-Equity-Line-Financing-Agreement-with-GHS-Investments.html
and many can't read an income statement or look deeper into a balance sheet. WCVC is not losing just due to expansion. They BARELY make money (COGS - which does not include growth and corporate costs - up from 94% to 98% for the past 6 months vs. last year - I know they explain the high COGs but those are mostly permanent costs) on an OPERATING basis not including cap ex, buildout, and corporate costs. Also the companies that later became successful did NOT finance via super dilutive death spiral converts with lookback options and no one even "with vision or knowledge" will rate a vision over a lack of material control in financial reporting. Even the highest (i.e., the others are lower and thus worse) convertible stock discount at 60% and 12% interest leads to a 72% financing even without considering the high cost of the 20 day lookback. It's ridiculous. If this company were real they could get growth financing for a lot less from an operating partner or legitimate Venture Capital firm. Blaze Pizza had legitimate VC backing (Brentwood Associates w $2.25 Billion under management) not this 72% annual cost death spiral dilution financing.
Also says material weakness in financial reporting and that unless they raise additional funds there may not be money to address this
Item 4. Controls and Procedures
Disclosure Controls and Procedures
We carried out an evaluation of the effectiveness of the design and operation of our disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) as of June 30, 2019. This evaluation was carried out under the supervision and with the participation of our President and our Chief Financial Officer. Based upon that evaluation, our President and Chief Financial Officer concluded that, as of June 30, 2019, our disclosure controls and procedures were not effective due to the presence of material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting.
A material weakness is a deficiency, or a combination of deficiencies, in internal control over financial reporting, such that there is a reasonable possibility that a material misstatement of the company’s annual or interim financial statements will not be prevented or detected on a timely basis. Management has identified the following material weaknesses which have caused management to conclude that, as of June 30, 2019, our disclosure controls and procedures were not effective for the following reasons: (i) inadequate segregation of duties and effective risk assessment; and (ii) insufficient written policies and procedures for accounting and financial reporting with respect to the requirements and application of both US GAAP and SEC guidelines.
Remediation Plan to Address the Material Weaknesses in Internal Control over Financial Reporting
Our company plans to take steps to enhance and improve the design of our internal controls over financial reporting. During the period covered by this quarterly report on Form 10-Q, we have not been able to remediate the material weaknesses identified above. To remediate such weaknesses, we plan to implement the following changes during our fiscal year ending December 31, 2019: (i) appoint additional qualified personnel to address inadequate segregation of duties and ineffective risk management; and (ii) adopt sufficient written policies and procedures for accounting and financial reporting. The remediation efforts set out are largely dependent upon our securing additional financing to cover the costs of implementing the changes required. If we are unsuccessful in securing such funds, remediation efforts may be adversely affected in a material manner.
and the newest liabilities are super dilutive death spiral convertibles with lookbacks - yuck! All of the financing details (home mortgage loan, huge banking fees to refinance loans relative to loan amounts, ongoing lawsuit from the secured lender, etc.) = yuck! (Sorry for that super technical banking term known as yuck).
They do have only $130,000 in cash vs over $4MM in current liabilities with negative cash flow of over $1MM and an earnings loss over over $1MM in the past year which hasn’t been getting better so I don’t know about the rent tomorrow but if you’re their landlord you’re not feeling good. This isn’t do to growth as even gross margins are near 0.
That $1.5MM contract news is from February 8th
This latest PR just highlights the (not) "breaking news" that VW cares about electric vehicles
When the same people controlling those tickers can just transfer management (like ALYI / ANCE) without oversight from a board which isn’t just that same management or assets (like PJET/WCVC/USMJ) without a shareholder vote (or effectively so when one shareholder has a controlling vote) these are certainly correlated. It’s ridiculous from a corporate governance standpoint.
At least they didn't say "Bolstered"
Unfortunately their assets on the 3/31 balance sheet did NOT increase despite massive dilution to that date. In a NORMAL stock issuance cash on the balance sheet would go up or debt would go down as much as the dilution. In a NORMAL company, they would issue an 8-K stating how much the raised for how many shares so that investors could see at what discount the stock traded. It is NOT Normal to excessively PR barely relevant things about Tesla and the African economy and not PR very relevant things about the supposed London financing or why they diluted so much and who is benefitting. There is no factory asset nor extra cash with this dilution. It would be on the 3/31 balance sheet. You don’t just dilute, not change assets and then put an asset on later when it is complete. That’s not legitimate accounting.
The first PR of the $20MM was in April when the stock was at $.06. That PR was made by CEO Randy Torno who, while at ANCE (until very recently), also PR'd a $500,000 contract also in Kenya for Playboy condoms which never materialized in 2 years. Rather than provide an update (he provided one over the next 2 years which also came to no result) he went silent and stopped PRing or publishing financials leading to a skull and cross bones status for ANCE on theotcmarkets.
There are no shorts in this stock. FINRA says its about 74,000 shares (less than $1000 in market value) in June relative to shares outstanding of 275,596,851 shares on 3/31/19 (up from 218MM 3 months prior and almost double the 150MM a year prior!). So basically NO short interest.
This stock isn't being held down by shorts - it's being held down by long selling of all the new shares being created - whoever is getting the massive amounts of new shares in this stock printing dilution machine.
Is there any real short interest in this stock? Seems minimal compared to the shares outstanding. I can't see a locate and I can't imagine one comes at a reasonable rate. I don't think there are a lot of shorts here. Where do you see high short interest - I'm seeing almost none. FINRA says its about 74,000 shares (less than $1000 in market value) in June relative to shares outstanding of 275,596,851 shares on 3/31/19 (up from 218MM 3 months prior and almost double the 150MM a year prior!). So basically NO short interest.
This stock isn't being held down by shorts - it's being held down by long selling of all the new shares being created - whoever is getting the massive amounts of new shares in this stock printing dilution machine.
yes - that's it - every company wants their investors to buy their shares cheaply - Elon Musk is hoping TSLA stock goes down to $100 so that when they have to do a secondary again the investors get a really good deal. I get bored on Shark Tank every time I see the people on that show pleading with the shark investors not to pay so much for their share of the company.
Losing the sarcasm, NO ONE wants their shares to be sold cheap unless they are connected to an investor purchasing equity or a death spiral convertible which resets at a downward percentage, like 50% of the average over a period to make it even more dilutive. If that is the case (and I honestly don't think that's the case here) you have yourself a self-dealing (which is illegal) scam (which is also illegal).
ALYI's prospects not bolstered by incessant irrelevant PRs
What is the nature of the funding? At what rate and what form?
Why the massive dilution in the past year and lately?
What is the (even rough) schedule for revenue generation on US and Kenyan contracts? Are these contingent contracts?
Please PR something specific and RELEVANT rather than general industry updates on EVs, ride sharing, flying taxis, African macroeconomics, etc.
I don't think anyone's fear of the ride sharing industry not being large enough is what is holding down ALYI.
A research company without scientists or lawyers full time (or cash or assets)? The only full time (albeit with many other commitments) employee is Randy Torno, a public policy major who despite calling himself a "hand on expert" in Africa, managed to fall down on a promised $500,000 contract in Kenya he promised and PR'd for ANCE (which he also ran until now) and then very unprofessionally made no more explanation for this during the next 2 years except in another PR which promised but never delivered results or an explanation. They PR all the good without explaining the bad when it doesn't pan out. From a vet, this is far from the military stance of "underpromising and overdelivering." ANCE is now dark and skull and crossbones on theotcmarket without PRs so I think Randy's "expertise" in Africa is not something that has panned out to-date. Also, why no update on the timing or details of the smaller promised US contract? Also no explanation for the MASSIVE dilution of late - see the shares outstanding growth over the past year.
They are most likely getting bought in by their custodians or prime brokers - there is almost no borrow / locate available and that small amount that is available is at rates around 100% fee annually. You can verify this with whatever resource you would normally go to get a locate to short.
Eddie does not control the plan - the US bankruptcy judge does within the confines of US bankruptcy law. The plans filed by each group are public - it's a quite transparent process. There are no NOLs at SHLDQ - they are at tranform holdco. There is no share swap. The only good thing is this lunacy will likely be over soon.
None of the haters are afraid - they just know how to read
Since the float is 13.8 BILLION shares (up from 22.1B at the end of March and from 1.0 billion a year prior due to massive continued dilution), trading 100 million shares a day is tiny- less than 1% of the float. That trading is nothing in the face of the massive dilution going on.
Torno’s business track record in Africa is awful whatever his experience - he ran at least one scam. Apparently he didn’t know Africa well enough to know that his promised $500,000 contract in Kenya for ALYI’s new partner ANCE (that he also ran) was fake. 2 years later after a lot of PR pumping by Torno the ANCE Kenyan condom contract is still non-existent and ANCE has gone dark and is skull and cross bones status on theotcmarkets.
How would that work? We didn't see any expenditure / financing for the hemp nor hemp / real estate assets on ALYI's financials and no revenues to manage this on NOUV's financials (and ALYI never had any cash with which to buy anything major) so how could it be of any value to sell? Since they PR EVERYTHING if this were anything we would know about it or more likely some exaggerated version of it. Like everything about ALYI it makes no sense.