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best post, it´s also my opinion, thanks
https://dm.epiq11.com/case/lehman/info
Distribution and claims
Frequently Asked Questions
Please click here for answers to frequently asked questions. (Updated March 3, 2022)
https://dm.epiq11.com/case/lehman/info
Distribution and claims
Frequently Asked Questions
Please click here for answers to frequently asked questions. (Updated March 3, 2022)
Update frequently asked question
https://dm.epiq11.com/case/lehman/info
look at the breakout of this bond. Maybe it´s important for us?
Corporate Backed Trust Certificates, Goldman Sachs Capital I Securities-Backed Series 2004-6 04-6 A1 3.50 (JBK)
32.73+2.73 (+9.10%)
JBK is a par $25 bond trust that holds Goldman Sachs trust preferred debt.
JBK was created as a variable rate issue. It became a fixed rate issue when Lehman Brothers went bankrupt, terminating a swap agreement.
JBK dividends could be slashed by almost half if it reverts to lower adjustable rate payments.
JBK could be responsible for past damages and future swap payments if the claims by Lehman Brothers are successful.
The $25 par value of the JBK trust may drop if some collateral is sold to pay damages to Lehman Brothers and fund legal costs.
According to some conspiracy theories, bad blood with Goldman Sachs (NYSE:GS) prevented Lehman Brothers from being bailed out during the financial crisis. Ironically, a small group of Goldman Sachs bondholders is now facing onerous claims from the bankrupt estate of Lehman Brothers. JBK is a small NYSE traded bond trust that holds Goldman Sachs bonds and passes through the bond interest as dividends. Unfortunately, JBK shareholders have good reason to fear these attacks from the corpse of Lehman Brothers.
I find this interesting
OPT IN FORM INSTRUCTIONS
If you wish to participate in the Final Distribution and receive $25,000 in full and
final satisfaction of your claims against LBHI, you must sign the Opt In Form attached
hereto (which may be submitted online) and return it to the Plan Administrator by no later
than 6:00 pm (ET) on September 10, 2021. Your response must be received by that time
and date.
Docket # 61143
Filed May 28 2021
Motion to Approve / Notice of Presentment of Motion of the Plan Administrator for an Order Authorizing a Voluntary Final Distribution for Certain Creditors of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. and Granting Related Relief filed by Garrett A. Fail on behalf of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Responses due by 6/25/2021,. (Fail, Garrett)
The 2 cases still are open LBHI and LBFS.
LBHI is the holding with 22 billion USD. I hope we see NEWCO in 2021.
I cant see any change since April 2020:
April 1, 2021
(3) LBHI is the holder of Allowed Claims against itself of approximately $31.1 billion, including: $1.2 billion of Class 3 Claims, $25.3 billion of Class 4A Claims, $0.6 billion
of Class 4B Claims, $0.2 billion of Class 5 Claims, $0.6 billion of Class 7 Claims, $1.2 billion of Class 9A Claims, and $1.9 billion of Class 9B Claims
October 1, 2020
(4) LBHI is the holder of Allowed Claims against itself of approximately $31.1 billion, including: $1.2 billion of Class 3 Claims, $25.3 billion of Class 4A Claims, $0.6 billion of Class 4B Claims, $0.2 billion of Class 5 Claims, $0.6 billion of Class 7 Claims, $1.2 billion of Class 9A Claims, and $1.9 billion of Class 9B Claims.
April 2, 2020
(4) LBHI is the holder of Allowed Claims against itself of approximately $31.0 billion, including: $1.2 billion of Class 3 Claims, $25.2 billion of Class 4A Claims, $0.5 billion of Class 4B Claims, $0.2 billion of Class 5 Claims, $0.6 billion of Class 7 Claims, $1.2 billion of Class 9A Claims, and $1.9 billion of Class 9B Claims.
October 3, 2019
(5) LBHI is the holder of Allowed Claims against itself of approximately $24.8 billion, including: $1.2 billion of Class 3 Claims, $19.3 billion of Class 4A Claims, $0.4 billion of Class 4B Claims, $0.6 billion of Class 7 Claims, $1.2 billion of Class 9A Claims, and $1.9 billion of Class 9B Claims.
https://dm.epiq11.com/case/lbh/info
Frequently Asked Questions
Please click here for answers to frequently asked questions. (Updated Febuary 16, 2021)
yersey
First i thought Dec 6 is the end of the bankruptcy but now we have a extension for another 3 years. I think end of this year or 2021 (look at enron) we will see a solution.
And if you want to see good money you need good markets. Therefore i hope we will see a solution very soon. For me it´s not so easy because i hold commons.
Thank You!
In 2011 I switched tons of my wamuq (commons) into LEHMQ (commons). The price was 4 cents. Since March 2012 I´m locked in OBS but I think this was a good idea.
thank you so much for this analysis!
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=275f517f-90bc-4e29-9b63-ee769b6f461b
"Flip Clause" Payments to Lehman Brothers Noteholders After Termination of Swap Agreement Safe Harbored in Bankruptcy
USA October 14 2020
"Safe harbors" in the Bankruptcy Code designed to insulate non-debtor parties to financial contracts from the consequences that normally ensue when a counterparty files for bankruptcy have been the focus of a considerable amount of scrutiny as part of evolving developments in the pandemic-driven downturn. One of the most recent developments concerning this issue in the courts was the subject of a ruling handed down by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in connection with the landmark chapter 11 cases of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. ("Lehman") and its affiliates. In In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., 2020 WL 4590247 (2d Cir. Aug. 11, 2020), the Second Circuit affirmed lower court rulings that the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor for the liquidation of swap agreements prevented a Lehman affiliate from recovering payments made to certain noteholders in accordance with a priority-altering "flip clause" triggered by Lehman's 2008 bankruptcy filing in agreements governing a collateralized debt obligation ("CDO") transaction. According to the court of appeals, even if the provisions were "ipso facto" clauses that are generally invalid in bankruptcy in other contexts, section 560 of the Bankruptcy Code creates an exception to this rule in connection with the liquidation of swap agreements.
The Bankruptcy Code's Swap Agreement Safe Harbor
Over the past several decades, Congress has recognized the potentially devastating consequences that might ensue if the bankruptcy or insolvency of one financial firm were allowed to spread to other market participants, thereby threatening the stability of entire markets. Beginning in 1982, lawmakers formulated a series of changes to the Bankruptcy Code to create certain "safe harbors" to protect rights of termination and setoff under "securities contracts," "commodities contracts," and "forward contracts." Those changes were subsequently refined and expanded to cover "swap agreements," "repurchase agreements," and "master netting agreements" as part of a series of legislative developments, including the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 ("BAPCPA") and the Financial Netting Improvements Act of 2006.
These special protections are codified in, among other provisions, sections 555, 556, and 559 through 562 of the Bankruptcy Code. Without them, sections 362 and 365(e)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code would prevent a nondebtor party to a financial contract from taking immediate action to limit exposure occasioned by a bankruptcy filing by or against the counterparty. Lawmakers, however, recognized that financial markets can change significantly almost overnight and that nondebtor parties to certain types of complex financial transactions may incur heavy losses unless the transactions are promptly and finally closed out and resolved. Congress therefore exempted the kinds of financial contracts covered in the safe harbors from the automatic stay and section 365(e)(2) to insulate transactions under such contracts from avoidance unless the transactions were made with actual intent to defraud creditors.
For example, section 560 provides in relevant part as follows:
The exercise of any contractual right of any swap participant or financial participant to cause the liquidation, termination, or acceleration of one or more swap agreements because of a condition of the kind specified in section 365(e)(1) of this title or to offset or net out any termination values or payment amounts arising under or in connection with the termination, liquidation, or acceleration of one or more swap agreements shall not be stayed, avoided, or otherwise limited by operation of any provision of this title or by order of a court or administrative agency in any proceeding under this title.
11 U.S.C. § 560. Added to the Bankruptcy Code in 1990, the provision was designed to protect the stability of swap markets and ensure that such markets are "not destabilized by uncertainties regarding the treatment of their financial instruments under the Bankruptcy Code." H.R. Rep. No. 101-484, at 1 (1990). Section 560 was amended by BAPCPA to: (i) broaden the definition of "swap agreement" in section 101(53B) of the Bankruptcy Code to include many types of financial derivatives; and (ii) clarify that, in addition to a swap participant's contractual right to terminate a swap agreement, a participant's right to liquidate and accelerate a swap agreement is also protected.
Section 365(e)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that, after a bankruptcy filing, an executory contract may not be terminated or modified, and any right under such a contract may not be terminated or modified:
solely because of a provision in such contract … that is conditioned on—(A) the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor at any time before the closing of the case; (B) the commencement of a case under this title; or (C) the appointment of or taking possession by a trustee in a case under this title or a custodian before such commencement.
11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1). This general ban on the enforcement of "ipso facto" clauses in bankruptcy helps "deter the race of diligence of creditors to dismember the debtor before bankruptcy and promote equality of distribution." Merit Mgmt. Grp. v. FTI Consulting, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 883, 888 (2018). It is reinforced by various other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(l) and 541(c)(1); see also Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 362.03[5][a] (16th ed. 2020) ("[a]s property of the estate, the debtor's interests in [executory] contracts or [unexpired] leases are protected against termination or other interference that would have the effect of removing or hindering the debtor's rights in violation of section 362(a)(3)," which automatically stays any act to obtain possession of estate property or of property from the estate or to exercise control over estate property).
Section 560 carves out an exemption from this general rule in the case of swap agreements.
Lehman
Lehman commenced the largest bankruptcy case in U.S. history when it filed for chapter 11 protection on September 15, 2008, in the Southern District of New York. Its indirect subsidiary, Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. ("LBSF"), filed a chapter 11 petition two weeks afterward.
Prior to filing for bankruptcy, LBSF entered into a synthetic CDO transaction involving the creation of a special purpose vehicle ("Issuer") to issue notes under an indenture ("Indenture"). The Issuer used the note proceeds to acquire securities that both generated income to pay interest on the notes and served as collateral under a credit default swap agreement ("CDS Agreement") between the Issuer and LBSF. In exchange for the credit protection under the CDS Agreement, LBSF made regular payments to the Issuer, which used the funds to supplement interest payments to noteholders. The CDO transaction and the CDS Agreement were documented separately, but the CDS Agreement and the Indenture referenced each other.
Upon the occurrence of an event of default under the Indenture, including a bankruptcy filing by Lehman, the Indenture trustee was empowered to issue a termination notice, which would accelerate payment due on the notes and trigger early termination of the swaps. The trustee could then liquidate the collateral and distribute the proceeds in accordance with the priority provisions in the Indenture. Those provisions included a "flip clause" providing that, in the event of a default by LBSF, LBSF's otherwise senior claim to the collateral proceeds would be subordinated to noteholder claims.
LBSF defaulted under the Indenture when Lehman filed for bankruptcy, triggering early termination of the credit default swaps. The trustee distributed $1 billion from the proceeds of the sale of the collateral to noteholders, but the proceeds were insufficient to make any payment to LBSF.
In September 2010, LBSF commenced an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court against the noteholders and certain other defendants seeking to recover the $1 billion in payments under the theory that the flip clause in the Indenture that subordinated LBSF's claim upon Lehman's bankruptcy filing was an unenforceable ipso facto clause.
The bankruptcy court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint, ruling that, among other things, even if the flip clause was an ipso facto provision, it was nevertheless enforceable under the section 560 safe harbor for the termination and liquidation of swap agreements. After the district court affirmed on appeal, LBSF appealed to the Second Circuit.
The Second Circuit's Ruling
A three-judge panel of the Second Circuit affirmed the ruling below. Initially, the court rejected LBSF's argument that the ipso facto flip clause in the Indenture was unenforceable because the priority provisions were not part of a swap agreement covered by section 560. According to the Second Circuit, the Indenture's priority provisions were part of a swap agreement, and therefore safe harbored by section 560, because the CDS Agreement incorporated them by reference.
Next, the Second Circuit determined that, consistent with the purpose of section 560, the term "liquidation," as used in the provision, includes the disbursement of proceeds from liquidated collateral. Construing the term in this way, the court wrote, "furthers the statutory purpose of protecting swap participants from the risks of a counterparty's bankruptcy filing by permitting parties to quickly unwind the swap." According to the Second Circuit, the right to liquidate "would hardly protect swap counterparties if it merely sheltered their ability to determine amounts owed, but not to distribute the proceeds from the sold Collateral."
Finally, the Second Circuit rejected LBSF's argument that the distributions to the noteholders were not safe harbored because the Indenture trustee who terminated the swaps and distributed the proceeds of the collateral was not a "swap participant." The court explained that neither party disputed that the Issuer was a swap participant within the meaning of section 101(53C) of the Bankruptcy Code. In addition, the Indenture expressly granted the Indenture trustee all of the Issuer's contractual rights and obligations under the CDS Agreement, including the right to terminate and liquidate the swaps and the obligation to pay the noteholders and LBSF from the proceeds of the collateral. Moreover, the Second Circuit wrote, "section 560 requires the exercise of a contractual right 'of' any swap participant, not by one."
Outlook
Lehman is emblematic of a recent trend among many bankruptcy and appellate courts to apply the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbors for securities contracts broadly, consistent with lawmakers' intent to avoid disruptions in the securities and commodities markets.
To be sure, the U.S. Supreme Court tempered this approach when it held in Merit Mgmt. Grp., LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 883 (2018), that another safe harbor—section 546(e) (shielding certain margin and settlement payments from avoidance except in cases of actual fraud)—does not protect transfers made through a "financial institution" to a third party, regardless of whether the financial institution had a beneficial interest in the transferred property, unless either the transferor or the transferee in the transaction sought to be avoided overall is itself a financial institution. However, after the Court suggested that the section 546(e) safe harbor might apply if the transferor is a "customer" of a financial institution, several lower courts have held precisely that, once again expanding the range of transactions that can qualify for protection. See, e.g., In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litig., 2019 WL 1771786 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2019); Holliday v. K Road Power Management, LLC (In re Boston Generating LLC), 2020 WL 3286207 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2020).
Lehman, Merit, and other cases also suggest that, in determining whether a bankruptcy safe harbor applies, courts are inclined to look at the overall transaction in question as a whole, rather than the individual components separately.
Interestingly, the Second Circuit avoided addressing whether section 365(e) even applied in this case because the provision by its terms invalidates contract termination or modification triggered by the debtor's financial condition or bankruptcy filing, whereas the flip clause in Lehman was activated by Lehman's, rather than LBSF's, bankruptcy filing. The bankruptcy court, which was confronted with several different transactions involving similar flip clauses, recognized the potential for future disputes on this score, but ultimately focused on the "integrated enterprise" of the Lehman entities and the "exigent circumstances" surrounding the chapter 11 filings as the operative facts supporting a "singular event" theory. Given its conclusion that the flip clause was enforceable under section 560, the Second Circuit "assume[d] without deciding the Priority Provisions are ipso facto clauses."
2good can you give me the link
thanks
Doc 60754
the following Debtors’ chapter 11 cases remain open:
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (“LBHI”)
Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. (“LBSF”) ...............................................
stockmojo, thanks for your great post. it´s very interesting for me because I hold tons of commons. if I get nothing or 1 dollar oder 10 Cents it´s a very very big different.
Correct, commons got mostly zero. But Lehman is different and the peer group to Lehman is FNM/FRE. Commons outstanding are 689 mill plus millions RSUs (ex employees). In sum I think 700 millions. IMO commons will have value to give value to the ex-employees and to handle the NOLs. In some cases the commons got a percentage of the newco this would means (cumulative) preferreds will not paid in full. I think commons will get 4% of the new company. My calculation says if Newco will be valued with 10 bill, old commons will get 0.4 bill, CTs 2.1 bill and OBS pref 2.5 bill.
I hope I´m right.
this post is very helpful for me. thank you!
I hope we will see tradeable equity end of the year.
We will see a Newco
But traders seem to be betting that the Fed will rescue bankrupt firms. After all, the central bank is now investing in high-yield bonds and junk bond ETFs.
https://edition.cnn.com/2020/06/11/investing/bankrupt-stocks-surge/index.html
the stocks of the employees (RSUs) are reclassified to the common stocks. therefore i think they want to give more value to the commons in OBS.
this is the reason (my opinion) that ECAPSs was settled for cash.
look around the world. the bankruptcy stocks have an unbelievable high market value. hertz bankrupcy stock rocked up 1000% and is actually valued at 0.2 bill. the bank-bankrupcty stock wirecard (DAX, Germany) 800% and is now valued at nearly 1 bill dollar.
This is an excellent time to close the POR and to open a market for the commons. A high market value for the commons will give more marketvalue to the CTs. But i don´t know if this is possible without a newco or do we need a merger?
lehman will rally too
https://edition.cnn.com/2020/06/11/investing/bankrupt-stocks-surge/index.html
more speculaton is not possible. this is the end game
Let's close OBS and make a capital increase for the common stock
I hold tons of commons
https://stockhouse.com/news/press-releases/2020/06/03/pretium-adds-senior-bankruptcy-and-distressed-specialist-as-senior-Managing
Distressed Specialist as Senior Managing Director
Pretium, a leading investment firm with $14billion of managed assets, today announced that Matthew Cantor has joined the firm as a Senior Managing Director focused on Bankruptcy and Distressed assets. In his role, Mr. Cantor will help identify and provide diligence on investments across the firm’s credit platform.
Mr. Cantor joins Pretium with more than two decades of distressed credit, bankruptcy and special situations experience. Most recently, he was the Executive Vice President of Legal Affairs and General Counsel for Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., where he was responsible for overseeing the company’s complex litigation matters that generated positive outcomes for creditors. Previously, Mr. Cantor was a founding principal at Normandy Hill Capital L.P., an investment manager focused on distressed, event-driven credit and special situations. Earlier in his career, he was a partner Weil, Gotshal & Manages LLP, and Kirkland & Ellis LLP, where he represented debtors, creditors, and investors.
Donald Mullen, CEO and Founder of Pretium, said, “We are pleased to welcome Matt and his depth of knowledge in the bankruptcy arena to Pretium. As corporate America recovers from the effects of the global pandemic, we look forward to leveraging Matt’s unique insights as we look to identify attractive investment opportunities.”
Mr. Cantor said, “Pretium has built a world-class team of investment professionals with substantial investment experience across market cycles and I am excited to be joining the firm at this time.”
In February 2020, Pretium expanded its credit investment platform with the acquisition of Latigo Partners, L.P., an event-driven investment firm focused on distressed and special situations.
ABOUT PRETIUM
Pretium is a $14 billion specialized alternative investment management firm focused on real estate, residential credit, and corporate and structured credit. The firm was founded in 2012 to capitalize on secular investment and lending opportunities arising from structural changes and inefficiencies within residential housing and mortgage finance. Pretium has built an integrated analytical and operational infrastructure that provides exceptional market intelligence within the U.S. residential housing, mortgage, and corporate credit markets. We believe that insight combined with our investment experience and deep focus on these markets creates a strategic advantage for our clients.
give up OBS, make the commons tradeable and close the POR.
docket 60651
3. With the exception of the executory contracts that are the subject of the objections identified on Exhibit B hereto (the “Contested Contracts”), all objections to
assumption of executory contracts have been resolved or adjourned without date (or as otherwise agreed). The Assumption Hearing with respect to the Contested Contracts will be held on
December 8, 2020 at 10:00 a.m. (Prevailing Eastern Time).
There will not be a hearing on June 3, 2020. 4. The Debtors reserve their rights to withdraw in the future their application to assume any of the Contested Contracts.
Until Dec 6 I hope the game is over
11 years...
Lehman is distressed and if you know controlled by the FED... I hope this will be the solution to run a new company.
"
Big companies get cash.
The plan includes loans for distressed companies from a $425 billion fund controlled by the Federal Reserve.
"
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trillion-stimulus-package/story?id=69791823
LEHMQ : LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS INC. PLAN TRUST
SEC CIK 0000806085
Ticker: LEHMQ
https://sec.report/Ticker/LEHMQ
I can do this with my common stocks LEHMQ OBS, too.
After 10 years i can't believe that it is over.
I hope an extension is not possible.
Yes the case is closed but I found it interesting
https://dm.epiq11.com/case/LBH/info
Claims Consolidation Auction Election
Final Purchase Price by Eligible Class
Eligible Class - Final Purchase Price Rate
LBHI CLASS 3 - SENIOR UNSECURED 1.298%
LBHI CLASS 4A SENIOR AFFILIATE CLAIMS 1.130%
LBHI CLASS 4B - SENIOR AFFILIATE GUARANTEE 1.055%
LBHI CLASS 5 - SENIOR THIRD-PARTY GUARANTEE 0.900%
LBHI CLASS 7 - GENERAL UNSECURED 1.174%
LBHI CLASS 8 - AFFILIATE CLAIMS 1.069%
LBHI CLASS 9A - THIRD PARTY GUARANTEE DERIVATIVES 0.826%
Thanks!
I think this is a kind of class action but I´m not sure and I can´t see when it was published.
----------
Lehman Brothers: Shareholders recover despite Lehman bankruptcy
Represented the Alameda County Employees’ Retirement Association, former shareholders of Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., (Lehman) in a case alleging that Lehman made false and misleading statements prior to its unprecedented bankruptcy filing in 2008.
The statements, which concerned Lehman’s net leverage, risk management and concentration of risks, were made ’in registration statements and prospectuses used to market numerous offerings leading up to the bankruptcy filing. Despite Lehman’s bankruptcy, we were able to negotiate a $616 million settlement funded by Lehman’s underwriters, auditor and officers and directors.
https://www.ktmc.com/settled-cases/lehman-brothers-shareholders-recover-despite-lehman-bankruptcy
Lehman JBK is all-time-high 30 USD.
JBK could be responsible for past damages and future swap payments if the claims by Lehman Brothers are successful
https://www.google.com/amp/s/seekingalpha.com/amp/article/3981409-lehman-brothers-zombie-rises-grave-terrorize-goldman-sachs-bond-trust
Therefore I don't believe in paid in full.
Thanks!
My question is what is a distribution?
Is a a stake in newco a distribution?
I say no.
Upon our voluntary or involuntary liquidation, dissolution or winding-up, holders of the Preferred Stock are entitled to receive out of our assets that are available for distribution to stockholders, before any distribution is made to holders of common stock or other junior stock, a liquidation distribution in the amount of $2,500.00 per share of Preferred Stock (equivalent to $25.00 per depositary share), plus any declared and unpaid dividends, including, if applicable, a pro rata portion of any declared and unpaid dividends for the then-current dividend period to the date of liquidation, without regard for any undeclared dividends. Distributions will be made pro rata as to the Preferred Stock and any other parity stock and only to the extent of our assets, if any, that are available after satisfaction of all liabilities to our creditors.
Stock I like your maths.
But how du you calc 3% for commons?
Why not 5%, 1% or zero?