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OMO, So worth repeating!
Just a drop in the bucket! $5.9 Billion to go!
#3 on Breakout Boards this morning! Keep up the great discussions.
CVSL!
Hello ID, Great News!
GLTA
D
Actor Patrick Dempsey wins bid to buy Tully's
http://www.komonews.com/news/local/Patrick-Dempsey-in-Seattle-to-make-pitch-for-Tullys-purchase-185566762.html
New Website Splash Page
http://montavo.com/
I understand the appearance of the sneaky RS but what benefit was it to the company to do so, since the company neither pumped nor sold into it?
If someone could prove an intentional pump and subsequent sell by insiders then I would agree.
IMHO
My take is, that with all the activity of November (MDA equity financing, conversion of all outstanding convertible notes, obligations and shares for services), including the board approval of the RS on November 20, that plans were likely to be communicated or PR'ed.
The kicker, was that the December 7 market reaction to one Form 3 filing caught most folks (myself included)and the company(IMHO) by surprise. I'd like to understand rationale for how this was going to hit .10, .20 .30 or more when in early November the wheels were already in motion to account for and manage the 3.5 billion shares fully diluted that was coming down the pike. This is what triggered the hype and s/p movement, how could the company or any shareholder anticipate this was going to happen that particular day? So was it a sneak attack or . . .
Just my opinion here, is that it caused a knee jerk, poorly executed reaction by the company, on the following Monday resulting in the 8K FS then amended 8K RS announcement. I have already conveyed my dissatisfaction, frustration and anger to the CEO on the timing, execution and overall insensitivity to the retail investor based on MTVO the stock. I am conflicted because I also want MTVO the company to succeed.
MTVO the company does need this deal, it was not the first deal but was likely the best, most viable deal available at this point in time. For most of us who have been here for over two years we want both the stock and the company to succeed. Anyone who's paid attention and done their DD over this time frame has felt the pain of the inability to land viable financing, despite much effort and time.
For some to say they sold out due to a lack of effort to land better financing is not true or accurate. The reality is Montavo has not sold nor did it plan to sell shares into the market. The reality is that Montavo had been offered various financing options all of which were considered death spiral finance deals. The reality is Montavo sought financing through investment bankers who sent packets to all current shareholders in September of 2010, how many here responded? The reality is that Montavo was seeking financing during one of the most challenging times in the history of the markets. The reality is MTVO the stock and company don't always move or gel in tandem, thus the conflict.
All IMHO.
Question?
What would have happened if the Form 3 filing by Steven Moore was not released on that particular Friday 12/7? What if it was released the following Friday post RS announcement? Would MTVO, the stock have moved like it did?
Montavo Executive Summary
by Montavo on Dec 11, 2012 27 views
Montavo is deploying an advanced marketing & advertising technology solution. The Montavo ad platform offers advertisers the unique opportunity to review a “ad spend to gross profit” ratio gauge ...
More… Montavo is deploying an advanced marketing & advertising technology solution. The Montavo ad platform offers advertisers the unique opportunity to review a “ad spend to gross profit” ratio gauge (the Ad Spendometer) which generates and displays a ROI report of their brick-&-mortar stores (not just their on-line store) sales revenue & profits specifically attributed & correlated to their advertising costs (no other ad network has this capability). This means advertisers know in real-time for every dollar they spend in advertising on the Montavo ad platform, how many dollars came back including brick-&-mortar store sales revenue & profits specifically related to their ad spend.
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Montavo Executive Summary
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1. I KNOW I’M WASTING 50% OF MY AD SPEND BUT WHICH 50%?GET THE FACTS, NOT IMPRESSIONS.Anyone will promise you ad impressions; some will offer you specificdemographics. But, what you really need to know is how many peoplesaw your ad, went to the store and bought your product? With Montavoyou’ll get the only analytics that really count: sales and profitability, directlylinked to who saw your ad, from what properties, on what devices, on whatdate/time and from what location? As Arthur C. Clarke once famouslysaid, “Any truly advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.”Get the magic, get Montavo!+1 425.747.5500www.montavo.com Do You Measure Up?™
2. Executive Summary Summary of Investment Opportunity •• Revolutionary, indisputable and global value proposition: Perfect clarity for Advertising ROI analysis •• Veteran, seasoned executive team with strong track record of generating substantial shareholder returns •• Proven market with strong CAGR - ~$156 billion (U.S.), $500 billion (Global) annually •• Opportunity is optimized to mobile and online advertising, the fastest-growing segments of the advertising market •• Montavo technology is ideally positioned to take advantage of the latest paradigm shift in TV technology, plus the social TV revolution, and garner a significant share of the largest advertising medium •• Business model re-distributes a fraction of existing ad spending, as opposed to seeking incremental monies or requiring competitive takeaways •• Proven product delivery team •• Critical Distribution and Service Delivery Partnerships What is Your Return on Advertising?Throughout the history of human commerce, marketing has been considered a “soft” discipline, debatably partscience, part art. With the emergence of “big data” and analytics, enormous volumes of real-time data havebeen amassed, crunched and interpreted in an attempt to better understand the relationship between consum-er advertising and the subsequent bricks & mortar purchase behavior.eCommerce models bridged this gap, but only for the 15% of consumer spending that results in an online pur-chase. For the 85% of consumer spending, driven by online and TV advertising, that concluded with an in-storepurchase, the task has been impossible, until now.U.S. Advertising Spending by Media Type ($ millions)Media Type CAGR 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017Mobile Advertising 22.09% $4,200 $5,400 $7,100 $8,200 $9,700Internet PC Advertising 13.70% $34,300 $38,490 $42,935 $48,839 $54,755Print Advertising -10.74% $19,677 $18,103 $16,293 $14,338 $12,330TV Advertising 2.5% $71,968 $73,767 $75,611 $77,501 $79,439U.S. Totals 5.43% $130,145 $135,760 $141,939 $148,878 $156,224The phenomenal growth of mobile technologies in general, and mobile and digital advertising, specifically, isunlocking an array of opportunities that did not exist five years ago. U.S. spending on digital advertising is fore-casted to grow to more than $74 billion in 2017 at a CAGR of nearly 15%. At the same time, and driven by theconvergence of networked devices and TVs, new modes of content consumption on as many as five classes ofdevice, will continue to drive TV advertising as a critical medium, reaching nearly $80 billion in 2017.According to Jonathan Alferness, director of product management-mobile ads lead at Google, “One thingthat has to happen is a better understanding of when mobile is driving sales in-store … That’s the holygrail”. Montavo will deliver this Holy Grail.Company Confidential Page 2 of 8
3. Executive Summary The Montavo Ad Platform:Closing the Loop from Advertisement to the In-Store SaleMontavo’s flagship product is a cloud-based, closed-loop advertising analytics platform that provides market-ers with the definitive data to correlate their ads with the actual sales of products and services, in a bricks andmortar location. Using patent-pending technology, the Montavo ad analytics platform provides advertisers witha detailed understanding of which consumers, seeing which advertisements, from which advertising proper-ties, on which devices, respond by purchasing in-store.Chief Marketing Officers can now enjoy a real-time view of the impact of offers, advertising campaigns andother promotional activities. From a simple dashboard, the cost of advertising can be mapped against bricks-&-mortar revenue, or channel costs and COGS can also be factored to show the true ROI of media ad spend by channel, outlet and product. Empowered with conclusive, end-to-end data from the Montavo ad analytics solution, marketers are finally able to identify and elimi- nate the non-productive (wasted) portion of their advertising spend. Montavo- powered marketers can focus their advertising investments on proven campaigns, increasing their impact and optimizing the return on their marketing dollar. The Montavo ad platform is targeted to marketing and advertising management at manufacturers and retailers, from global brands to SMBs. In the earliest phases, Montavo will focus on national brand retailers and national brand manufacturers. Surrogate advertising buyers including ad agencies, their media planning and buying groups, and the advertising networks themselves will also benefit from embracing a media program that delivers definitive performance results, differentiating their offerings from competitors.Empowering Advertisers to Demand Better Ad PerformanceThe Montavo ad analytics platform provides the infrastructure to seamlessly correlate advertising events withretail in-store sales. Reconciliation of Advertising to Consumer Devices Our platform enables the advertiser to correlate a single view of their advertisement to specific consumer devices including smart phones, tablets, laptops and TVs. Association of Devices to the Specific Consumer Through a number of proprietary techniques, Montavo is able to match these consumer device(s) to the indi- vidual consumers that viewed the advertisement. Reconciliation of Purchase Transaction with the Consumer Using a series of patent-pending correlation techniques and inference algorithms, Montavo anonymously matches the in-store sale transaction to the consumer ad view. Analytics and Delivery of “Closed Loop” Data This vital data is delivered to the advertising client’s desktop via our Ad Spendometer™, a sophisticated dashboard providing key performance indicators (KPIs) that calibrate advertising costs against gross revenue and profits.The Ad Spendometer immediately highlights unprofitable advertising spending, enabling the ad buyer to elimi-nate underperforming properties and/or creative strategies that aren’t working.Company Confidential Page 3 of 8
4. Executive Summary ? UPDATES AD CLIENT DASHBOARDS ? PLACES AD MONTAVO AD CLIENT ? CREATES ANALYTICS ? DISTRIBUTES AD Push Ad Network Pull Ad Network WEB SITES APPS TV AD SEARCH SHOPPING APPS ? DELIVERS ADS ? SEES AD ON TV ? SEES AD ON PHONE 2:21PM Friday 9:05AM Saturday ? PURCHASES BIKE In-Store - 11:44AM SaturdayCompany Confidential Page 4 of 8
5. Executive Summary Go-To-MarketAdvertising EcosystemThe market for Montavo’s services is highly concentrated and can be readily leveraged. The primary segmentsin our ecosystem are: Advertisers Buyers of advertising including national/global brand manufacturers & retailers, and small and medium businesses (SMB’s). 90% of major national brands have a relationship with one of the top five media advertising planning and buying groups. Montavo sells advertising inventory directly to businesses in this category. Ad Properties Companies in this category sell their own ad inventory, directly to ad- vertisers or through aggregators. This includes web property owners, app developers and single-property TV media companies. Montavo may trade with these companies as an ad aggregator, as a wholesale technology supplier or as a combination of the two. Ad Aggregators This category includes Ad Networks, Ad Exchanges, and Television media companies whose principle role is the packaging and sale of advertising inventory from multiple Ad Properties, to Advertisers and their media planning and buying groups. Montavo sells our ad technology to these businesses in a wholesal- ing model that enables them to offer a new class of analytic service.Strategy Phase 1 - Initial Beachhead, Direct to Ad Clients In our first market phase, Montavo will act as its own ad aggregator in order to offer advertising inventory directly to our early adopter advertising clients. We will focus on recruiting national brand retailers through a direct sales model. We anticipate this phase to drive our initial year of sales and provide us with sufficient traction to leverage an incremental wholesale business model. Phase 2 - Additional Wholesale Technology Distribution With a small number of national brand retailers and manufacturers on board, Montavo will be truly disrup- tive to the existing global advertising eco-system. As prominent advertisers begin to demand Montavo-en- abled and branded advertising programs from the Ad Aggregators, we will aggressively license our technol- ogy to these companies. As we present no incremental cost to the advertising client, and represent the exact same ad properties, why would an advertiser ever accept an advertising program that didn’t offer instant visibility to advertising ROI for in-store sales and their profitability? Through a series of highly-leveraged business development activities, we will license our technology service to the major advertising and TV networks on a white-label basis. This wholesale business will establish the Montavo brand as the new global minimum standard for ad spending, and the concept of “Powered by Mon- tavo” will become a viral market force in the global advertising industry. Monetization Strategy The Montavo business is divided into two separate models: (i) a direct sales business where advertisers purchase advertising inventory directly from Montavo; and a wholesale business where Montavo’s solution is “embedded” as a privately-labeled feature in existing Advertising Aggregator’s or Ad Property owner’s reporting and analytics. Montavo revenues are a percentage of net advertising revenue based on media spending and vary by ad type (push vs. pull, mobile Internet vs. wired Internet, or TV, etc.) In every case, our revenue is derived from existing advertiser spending.Company Confidential Page 5 of 8
6. Executive Summary Competition & DifferentiationThere have been other attempts to provide similar capabilities, none of which have resulted in a sustainable/viable market offering. Many of these efforts have been based on techniques that are deemed inappropriateby the advertiser, raise privacy concerns or are inconvenient and thus not adopted by consumers. These othertechniques have included the requirement to: •• Incorporate coupons in a campaign •• Utilize personally identifiable communication •• Utilize QR codes capabilities including in-store scanning devices, •• Manually supply a promotion code Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, cellular, or RFID •• Register the end-user’s personally identifiable •• Change fundamental consumer behavior information •• Re-train store personnel •• Implement specialty hardware/software at the •• Use a specific payment capability including point-of-sale digital wallets and mobile payment systemsMontavo’s primary competitive advantage is in delivering the most powerful analytics in advertising withoutmodifying the essence of consumer behavior or the business practices of the advertiser. Today, we are unaware of any com- CLOSED-LOOP AD ANALYTICS pany attempting to implement simi- lar capabilities to those of Montavo. Because of the scale of the chal- lenge, it is unlikely that we will see a cluster of start-ups attempting to enter the space. We have identified four segments from which competi- VISION tion may arise: Digital Coupons – that deliver redeemable discount coupons captured at the point-of-sale. This category includes newer companies like Infinian, as well as old-world coupon leaders like Valpak. EXECUTION Advertising Networks – that aggregate advertising “real estate” and re-sell to advertisers. This includes companies like Google, Facebook, Microsoft Media Network, Yahoo!, InMobi, Millenium Media and Adknowledge. Advertising Analytics - that provide benchmarking data for traditional and digital advertising properties. Leaders include Comscore, Adobe, Flurry and Nielsen. Advertising Technology – that offer a variety of technologies to enable different forms of advertising or automate the management of campaigns. The category includes companies like Marchex, AdRoll, Datalogix and BlueKai.Company Confidential Page 6 of 8
7. Executive SummaryBarriers to entry •• Inability to resolve consumer device ownership within current privacy laws and without requiring consumer consent •• Lack of experience and expertise in integrating with advertisers’ back-end retail operations •• Lack of experience and expertise in integrating with payment networks •• The development and application of correlation and inference algorithms required to match advertising impressions with in-store, consumer purchase transactions •• Lack of experience and expertise in enterprise systems design, development and deployment Funding Requirements & Use-of-FundsCurrent Round – Service LaunchThe company is currently completing a $1,000,000 funding round.$500,000 has been secured to accomplish the following goals: •• Completion of a minimal viable product (MVP) – Release 1.0 •• Deploy the solution to a single retailer •• Integration with a single payment gateway providerAn additional $500,000 will be used to: •• Hire the minimal team to launch the service in Summer of 2013 •• Contract with a minimum of 3 additional national brand retailers with deployments to follow in Q3 2013Subsequent Round– July 2013 – Market ExpansionThe company is seeking $15mm in funding to support the primary sales, marketing, business development andcustomer service programs to secure a strong beachhead with manufacturers, retailers and advertising inter-mediaries. Core milestones include: •• Release version 2 of the product •• Generation of $2 million in revenue •• Contract with 10 new advertisers •• Secure advertising inventory from 30 property owners •• Develop wholesale business and recruit 10 ad networksCompany Confidential Page 7 of 8
8. Executive Summary The TeamManagement Brook Lang, Founder & CEO - seasoned executive from Sony, T-Mobile and numerous entrepreneurial start-up companies with a strong wireless sales background. Steve Moore, Strategic Advisor/Investor - interim Chairman and CEO of Contour, formerly CEO of WatchGuard, key roles at The Boeing Company, private technology investor, board advisor to AdmitOne, n2 Systems, IntellectSpace. Torsten Kablitz, CTO - former Chief Architect at CoreConnex and CTO of Zynchros, architecture & development assignments with Microsoft. the Port of Seattle and Amazon. Bob Pinkerton, CMO - former President/COO of Zynchros. Executive marketing and operations roles at start-ups including WatchGuard, Networx, Saros and Motiva.Expert Advisers and Contracted Service ProvidersThe company is committed to developing a network of contractors, consultants, advisors, board advisors, andother experts to leverage our core competencies with specialized expertise. We are actively soliciting relation-ships with a range of entities and individuals to provide technical and market expertise that can shortcut anylearning curve. Doug Chartier – Wireless Providers and Retail - T-Mobile and AT&T Gunnar Wilmot – Advertising & Marketing – Gotham, Inc., Interpublic, McCann-EricksonCompany Confidential Page 8 of 8
http://www.slideshare.net/Montavo/montavo-executive-summary-v13
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Folks need to review the Executive Summary in close detail to understand what has, is and will be possible. Cross reference dates (of earliest events, signing and release) and 8K's to try and make sense of timing of releases, disclosures, etc. Look closely at the funding required (highlighted), moving forward.
No Debt? Start with Note 4 (see below), then read Note 5 and Note 6 to get a sense of their total obligations of Convertible Notes, Warrants, Options, Shares for Services and this was at June 30, 2011.
There was no revenue, no money, just debt! BK was not far off, only chance was product development. Only way MDA with software company to develop product was through payment with shares for services in the amount of $500k plus previous debt. Only way to satisfy MDA was with RS, otherwise they wouldn't have done the deal. If they didn't do the deal, BK was inevitable.
Like it or not, this is what needed to be done.
For the quarterly period ended June 30, 2011
http://www.otcmarkets.com/edgar/GetFilingHtml?FilingID=8112079
Note 4. Notes Payable
In September 2008, we entered into a promissory note with a stockholder in the principal amount of $25,000 with a stated interest rate of 12%. Interest expense related to this note was not material in the three months ended June 30, 2011 and 2010 and the period from inception to June 30, 2011.
On January 16, 2009, we entered into a convertible promissory note for $4,950 at a stated interest rate of 5% per annum. On January 16, 2009, we entered into a convertible promissory note for $5,000 at a stated interest rate of 7% per annum. On January 26, 2009, we entered into a convertible promissory note for $5,062 at a stated interest rate of 5%. In April 2009, we entered into a convertible promissory note to a related party for $3,200 at a stated interest rate of 5% per annum. The notes and related accrued interest were convertible into shares of our common stock at $0.20 per share at the option of the holder. In March 2009, the first three notes discussed above were converted into 75,060 shares of common stock at a conversion rate of $0.20 per share. On April 15, 2009, we issued 16,221 shares of our common stock at $0.20 per share pursuant to the conversion of a related party promissory note with a principal balance of approximately $3,200.
On April 6, 2009, we entered into a convertible promissory note for $23,000 at a stated rate of 7% per annum. The note and related accrued interest were convertible into shares of our common stock at $0.10 per share beginning May 30, 2009. In April 2009, the notes and accrued interest were converted into 232,683 shares of common stock.
On September 8, 2009, we entered into a convertible promissory note for $20,000 at a stated interest rate of 15%. The promissory note is due within twenty-four months after date of issue, and on demand thereafter. The note is convertible into shares of our common stock at $0.10 per share. Terms of the convertible note provided that the conversion price of the notes be reduced in the event of subsequent financings. This provision expired as of September 8, 2010. In accordance with the authoritative guidance related to convertible notes with down-round protection, we recorded a fair value liability for price adjustable convertible notes of $12,330 at issuance. The fair value liability was revalued quarterly utilizing Black-Scholes valuation model computations with the increase or decrease in fair value being reported in the statement of operations as other income (expense). At June 30, 2010, the Black-Scholes assumptions utilized were as follows: stock price of $0.015, volatility of 162%, risk-free rate of 0.42%, expected life of 0.75 year, dividend yield of 0.0% and we recorded a decrease in the fair value liability of approximately $600 and $3,000 as other income during the three and six months ended June 30, 2010, respectively.
On March 1, 2010, we entered into a promissory note for $7,000 at a stated interest rate of 8% per annum, payable upon demand by the holder. We repaid the promissory note in May 2010.
On March 8, 2010, we entered into a promissory note for $6,000 at a stated interest rate of 8% per annum, payable upon demand by the holder. On March 8, 2010, in accordance with the terms of the promissory note, we issued 100,000 shares of our common stock to the holder as loan fees. The loan was repaid in March 2010.
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On April 15, 2010, we entered into a promissory note for $3,000 at a stated interest rate of 8% per annum, payable upon demand by the holder. On April 15, 2010, in accordance with the terms of the promissory note, we issued 100,000 shares of our common stock to the holder as loan fees. In December 2010, this promissory note was settled in connection with a transaction with the same holder. See discussion below.
On May 4, 2010, we entered into a convertible promissory note for $40,000 at a stated interest rate of 12%. The note was due on November 3, 2010, and carries a default rate of interest of 18%. The note is convertible into shares of our common stock at a variable conversion price, such that the average of the lowest Trading Prices (as determined by averaging the highest closing bid and lowest closing ask prices) of the Company’s common stock as listed on the OTCBB during the five (5) trading day period ending one (1) day prior to the date the conversion notice is sent by the holder to the Company multiplied by 35%. In accordance with the authoritative guidance related to convertible notes with down-round protection, we recorded a fair value liability for price adjustable convertible notes of $34,000 at issuance. The fair value liability is revalued quarterly utilizing Black-Scholes valuation model computations with the increase or decrease in fair value being reported in the statement of operations as other income (expense). At June 30, 2010, the Black-Scholes assumptions utilized were as follows: stock price of $0.015, volatility of 162%, risk-free rate of 0.22%, expected life of 0.4 year, dividend yield of 0.0% and we recorded an increase in the fair value liability of approximately $8,000 as other expense for the three months ended June 30, 2010. At June 30, 2011, the embedded derivative fair value liability did not materially change.
On July 28, 2010, we entered into a promissory note for $10,200 at a stated interest rate of 10% per annum, or $12,000, whichever is higher.
In August and September 2010, we entered into convertible promissory notes in the aggregate amount of $40,000 together with two-year warrants to purchase 3,750,000 shares of our common stock at an exercise price of $0.02 per share. The promissory notes bear interest at a rate of 12% per annum, and the notes are due in one year. Upon default, the interest rate is 18%. As the Company is currently seeking to raise financing under a private placement transaction, the promissory notes contain an optional conversion clause whereby, during a 30-day period after the completion of such private placement transaction raising in excess of $250,000, the holders may either convert the promissory note at the share price of such private placement transaction or demand repayment out of the proceeds of such financing. Under the terms of the promissory note agreement, if the share price of such private placement is below $0.02 (the strike price of the warrants), the strike price of the warrants will be downward adjusted to such share price of the private placement. In accordance with the authoritative guidance related to instruments with down-round protection, we recorded a fair value liability of $16,800 at issuance. The fair value liability is revalued quarterly utilizing Black-Scholes valuation model computations with the increase or decrease in fair value being reported in the statement of operations as other income (expense). At June 30, 2011, the Black-Scholes assumptions utilized were as follows: stock price of $0.01, volatility of 162%, risk-free rate of 0.19%, expected life of 1.25 years, dividend yield of 0.0% and we recorded a decrease in the fair value liability of approximately $1,800 and $28,000 for the three and six months ended June 30, 2011, respectively, as other income.
In August 2010, we entered into a promissory note for $1,000 at a stated interest rate of 8% per annum, payable upon demand by the holder. In December 2010, we entered into a convertible promissory note with the same holder in the aggregate amount of $25,000 together with two-year warrants to purchase 1,875,000 shares of our common stock at an exercise price of $0.02 per share, whereby we received $20,000 in cash and the April promissory note for $3,000, the August $1,000 promissory note and $1,000 in accounts payable to the same party were settled. The December 2010 promissory note bears interest at a rate of 12% per annum, and the note is due in one year. Upon default, the interest rate is 18%. As the Company is currently seeking to raise financing under a private placement transaction, the promissory note contains an optional conversion clause whereby, during a 30-day period after the completion of such private placement transaction raising in excess of $250,000, the holder may either convert the promissory note at the share price of such private placement transaction or demand repayment out of the proceeds of such financing. Under the terms of the promissory note agreement, if the share price of such private placement is below $0.02 (the strike price of the warrants), the strike price of the warrants will be downward adjusted to such share price of the private placement. In accordance with the authoritative guidance related to instruments with down-round protection, we recorded a fair value liability of approximately $25,000 at issuance. The fair value liability is revalued quarterly utilizing Black-Scholes valuation model computations with the increase or decrease in fair value being reported in the statement of operations as other income (expense). At June 30, 2011, the Black-Scholes assumptions utilized were as follows: stock price of $0.01, volatility of 162%, risk-free rate of 0.45%, expected life of 1.5 years, dividend yield of 0.0% and we recorded a decrease in the fair value liability of approximately $1,000 and $17,600 for the three and six months ended June 30, 2011, respectively, as other income.
In September 2010, we transferred $20,000 of accounts payable due to our CEO to a third party. These amounts were then converted into a convertible promissory note for $20,000 together with two-year warrants to purchase 1,500,000 shares of our common stock at an exercise price of $0.02 per share. The promissory note bears interest at a rate of 12% per annum, and the note is due in one year. Upon default, the interest rate is 18%. As the Company is currently seeking to raise financing under a private placement transaction, the promissory note contains an optional conversion clause whereby, during a 30-day period after the
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completion of such private placement transaction raising in excess of $250,000, the holder may either convert the promissory note at the share price of such private placement transaction or demand repayment out of the proceeds of such financing. Under the terms of the promissory note agreement, if the share price of such private placement is below $0.02 (the strike price of the warrants), the strike price of the warrants will be downward adjusted to such share price of the private placement. In accordance with the authoritative guidance related to instruments with down-round protection, we recorded a fair value liability of approximately $8,300 at issuance. The fair value liability is revalued quarterly utilizing Black-Scholes valuation model computations with the increase or decrease in fair value being reported in the statement of operations as other income (expense). At June 30, 2011, the Black-Scholes assumptions utilized were as follows: stock price of $0.01, volatility of 162%, risk-free rate of 0.19%, expected life of 1.25 years, dividend yield of 0.0% and we recorded a decrease in the fair value liability of approximately $1,000 and $14,100 for the three and six months ended June 30, 2011, respectively, as other income.
In October 2010, we transferred $25,000 of accounts payable due to our CEO to a third party. These amounts were then converted into a convertible promissory note for $25,000 at a stated interest rate of 12%, together with two-year warrants to purchase 1,875,000 shares of our common stock at an exercise price of $0.02 per share. The promissory note is due within one year. Upon default, the interest rate is 18%. As the Company is currently seeking to raise financing under a private placement transaction, the promissory notes contain an optional conversion clause whereby, during a 30-day period after the completion of such private placement transaction raising in excess of $250,000, the holders may either convert the promissory note at the share price of such private placement transaction or demand repayment out of the proceeds of such financing. Under the terms of the promissory note agreement, if the share price of such private placement is below $0.02 (the strike price of the warrants), the strike price of the warrants will be downward adjusted to such share price of the private placement. In accordance with the authoritative guidance related to instruments with down-round protection, we recorded a fair value liability of $25,000 at issuance. The fair value liability is revalued quarterly utilizing Black-Scholes valuation model computations with the increase or decrease in fair value being reported in the statement of operations as other income (expense). At June 30, 2011, the Black-Scholes assumptions utilized were as follows: stock price of $0.01, volatility of 162%, risk-free rate of 0.45%, expected life of 1.25 years, dividend yield of 0.0% and we recorded a decrease in the fair value liability of approximately $1,100 and $17,500 for the three and six months ended June 30, 2011, respectively, as other income.
In October and December 2010, we entered into convertible promissory notes in the aggregate amount of $37,500 together with two-year warrants to purchase 2,812,500 shares of our common stock at an exercise price of $0.02 per share. The promissory notes bear interest at a rate of 12% per annum, and the notes are due in one year. Upon default, the interest rate is 18%. As the Company is currently seeking to raise financing under a private placement transaction, the promissory notes contain an optional conversion clause whereby, during a 30-day period after the completion of such private placement transaction raising in excess of $250,000, the holders may either convert the promissory note at the share price of such private placement transaction or demand repayment out of the proceeds of such financing. Under the terms of the promissory note agreement, if the share price of such private placement is below $0.02 (the strike price of the warrants), the strike price of the warrants will be downward adjusted to such share price of the private placement. In accordance with the authoritative guidance related to instruments with down-round protection, we recorded a fair value liability of $28,000 at issuance. The fair value liability is revalued quarterly utilizing Black-Scholes valuation model computations with the increase or decrease in fair value being reported in the statement of operations as other income (expense). At June 30, 2011, the Black-Scholes assumptions utilized were as follows: stock price of $0.01, volatility of 162%, risk-free rate of 0.19%, expected life of 1.25 years, dividend yield of 0.0% and we recorded an increase in the fair value liability of approximately $24,600 for the three months ended June 30, 2011 as other expense, and a decrease in the fair value liability of approximately $1,700 for the six months ended June 30, 2011 as other income.
In February 2011, we entered into a convertible promissory note in the amount of $25,000 together with two-year warrants to purchase 1,875,000 shares of our common stock at an exercise price of $0.02 per share. The promissory note bears interest at a rate of 12% per annum, and the note is due in one year. Upon default, the interest rate is 18%. As the Company is currently seeking to raise financing under a private placement transaction, the promissory note contains an optional conversion clause whereby, during a 30-day period after the completion of such private placement transaction raising in excess of $950,000, the holder may either convert the promissory note at the share price of such private placement transaction or demand repayment out of the proceeds of such financing. Under the terms of the promissory note agreement, if the share price of the first $750,000 of such private placement is below $0.02 (the strike price of the warrants), the strike price of the warrants will be downward adjusted to such share price of the private placement. In accordance with the authoritative guidance related to instruments with down-round protection, we recorded a fair value liability of approximately $15,000 at issuance. The fair value liability is revalued quarterly utilizing Black-Scholes valuation model computations with the increase or decrease in fair value being reported in the statement of operations as other income (expense). At June 30, 2011, the Black-Scholes assumptions utilized were as follows: stock price of $0.01, volatility of 162%, risk-free rate of 0.45%, expected life of 1.5 years, dividend yield of 0.0% and we recorded a decrease in the fair value liability of approximately $1,000 six months ended June 30, 2011 as other income. The change in fair value of the embedded derivative liability for the three months ended June 30, 2011 was not material.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In March 2011, we entered into a convertible promissory note in the amount of $5,000 together with two-year warrants to purchase 375,000 shares of our common stock at an exercise price of $0.02 per share. The promissory note bears interest at a rate of 12% per annum, and the note is due in one year. Upon default, the interest rate is 18%. As the Company is currently seeking to raise financing under a private placement transaction, the promissory note contains an optional conversion clause whereby, during a 30-day period after the completion of such private placement transaction raising in excess of $250,000, the holder may either convert the promissory note at the share price of such private placement transaction or demand repayment out of the proceeds of such financing. Under the terms of the promissory note agreement, if the share price of the first $250,000 of such private placement is below $0.02 (the strike price of the warrants), the strike price of the warrants will be downward adjusted to such share price of the private placement. In accordance with the authoritative guidance related to instruments with down-round protection, we recorded a fair value liability of approximately $3,000 at issuance. The fair value liability is revalued quarterly utilizing Black-Scholes valuation model computations with the increase or decrease in fair value being reported in the statement of operations as other income (expense). At June 30, 2011, the Black-Scholes assumptions utilized were as follows: stock price of $0.01, volatility of 162%, risk-free rate of 0.80%, expected life of 2 years, dividend yield of 0.0%. The change in fair value of the embedded derivative liability for the three months ended June 30, 2011 was not material.
In April 2011, we entered into a convertible promissory note in the amount of $3,000 together with two-year warrants to purchase 225,000 shares of our common stock at an exercise price of $0.02 per share. The promissory note bears interest at a rate of 12% per annum, and the note is due in one year. Upon default, the interest rate is 18%. As the Company is currently seeking to raise financing under a private placement transaction, the promissory note contains an optional conversion clause whereby, during a 30-day period after the completion of such private placement transaction raising in excess of $750,000, the holder may either convert the promissory note at the share price of such private placement transaction or demand repayment out of the proceeds of such financing. Under the terms of the promissory note agreement, if the share price of the first $750,000 of such private placement is below $0.02 (the strike price of the warrants), the strike price of the warrants will be downward adjusted to such share price of the private placement. . In accordance with the authoritative guidance related to instruments with down-round protection, we recorded a fair value liability of approximately $1,500 at issuance. The fair value liability is revalued quarterly utilizing Black-Scholes valuation model computations with the increase or decrease in fair value being reported in the statement of operations as other income (expense). At June 30, 2011, the Black-Scholes assumptions utilized were as follows: stock price of $0.01, volatility of 162%, risk-free rate of 0.45%, expected life of 1.75 years, dividend yield of 0.0%. The change in fair value of the embedded derivative liability was not material.
In April, May and June 2011, we entered into convertible promissory notes in the aggregate principal amount of $41,500 together with two-year warrants to purchase 3,112,500 shares of our common stock at an exercise price of $0.02 per share. The promissory note bears interest at a rate of 12% per annum, and the note is due in one year. Upon default, the interest rate is 18%. As the Company is currently seeking to raise financing under a private placement transaction, the promissory note contains an optional conversion clause whereby, during a 30-day period after the completion of such private placement transaction raising in excess of $250,000, the holder may either convert the promissory note at the share price of such private placement transaction or demand repayment out of the proceeds of such financing. Under the terms of the promissory note agreement, if the share price of the first $250,000 of such private placement is below $0.02 (the strike price of the warrants), the strike price of the warrants will be downward adjusted to such share price of the private placement. In accordance with the authoritative guidance related to instruments with down-round protection, we recorded a fair value liability of approximately $16,000 at issuance. The fair value liability is revalued quarterly utilizing Black-Scholes valuation model computations with the increase or decrease in fair value being reported in the statement of operations as other income (expense). At June 30, 2011, the Black-Scholes assumptions utilized were as follows: stock price of $0.01, volatility of 162%, risk-free rate of 0.45%, expected life of 2.0 years, dividend yield of 0.0%. The change in fair value of the embedded derivative liability was approximately $4,200 for the three months ended June 30, 2011.
What's your point?
There is nothing fake, if so, specifically show me. Are you saying you take my word as gospel? You don't understand the difference between posting opinions, discusssions and referenced material?
I really didn't want to make it about you and me but you are taking it there. If that is your intent, I will gladly oblige.
Hi B,
I agree, that an uplist may be in the cards but there are so many milestones to reach prior to that. With Steven Moore's experience and guidance, it would not be out of the question. I have been told that his involvement has been instrumental in the sustenance of Montavo.
As we know, funding has been the critical next step to Montavo's success. I believe, to fully fund Montavo to revenue stage, one needs to try and comprehend the enormous task at hand. The reality is this, assuming a PRE RS s/p of .0011:
- The O/S and float were and still is relatively small.
- The past convertible notes, shares for services and MDA to develop the REV 1 product stood to increase the PRE RS O/S FULLY DILUTED to ~3.5 billion shares (see 8K). This is not a small share structure looking forward.
- In addition, the company needs an additional $500k in operating funds to get to fall product release and minimal launch (see Executive Summary). PRE RS, this would have added another 455 million shares at .0011.
- The next round of funding at $15 million (see Executive Summary)is required for market expansion. At PRE RS s/p of .0011 this would equate to 13.65 billion additional shares, with no guarantee that the s/p would hold at .0011.
All told, if they could get funded in this scenario at the .0011 level, it would result in 17.605 billion shares. That is a big if(share structure) and that is why there likely were so many roadblocks over the years. Any significant and committed funding required a master plan to get to market and an exit plan to recapture investment.
The scenario now with the RS:
- Fully diluted share count = 3.5 million
- $500k for minimal launch at ~$1.10 = +455,000 shares
- $15 million for market expansion at ~$1.10 (hopefully a lot more) = +13.64 million shares
Total fully diluted and outstanding if this scenario = 17.595 million shares.
Is it reasonable to think?
- Current MCAP = $3.85 mil (3.5 mil shares @ $1.10s/p?)
- At completion of REV 1 and minimal market launch MCAP = $38.5 mil (3.955 mil shares @ $9.74s/p?)
- At revenue stage with market expansion MCAP = $385 mil (17.595 mil shares at $21.88s/p?)
In perspective, if one held 1 mil shares pre RS and bought at .01 avg = $10,000 investment (which was worth $1,100 pre RS). The post RS holdings of 1,000 shares @ $9.74 = $9,740 and @ $21.88 = $21,888.
These are simply projections with an assumption that with each funding round the value of the company (based on MCAP)increases ten fold with all funding at the equivalent of the PRE RS value of .0011 and post RS equivalent value of $1.10.
Future funding could be valued higher or lower but I am now on the side of the fence that believes the company is better poised to bring the product to market and enhance share price prior to the largest round of financing.
The bottom line, is they need funding, they need to develop product, they need to get to market, they need to penetrate the market and then need to expand the market. It costs money and the PRE RS share structure would not allow them to do that.
As you know, my initial reaction, was similar to most here, anger and frustration, with MTVO the stock run getting killed by the RS announcement. When I googled and stumbled onto the Executive Summary dated early November 2012 (this was not given to me), it reminded me that what we think we know, we really don't and the original reason why I invested in Montavo, is because I believed the company and product had a viable future. I am underwater (a$$ whooping is probably a better description) like most here but the choice was mine to invest in Montavo and with the latest developments and disclosures of the 8K, I choose to remind myself of why I first bought in. I believe there is still hope and now a better chance of Montavo succeeding, moving forward.
All is simply my opinion and should not be construed as advice to buy, sell or hold. Everyone needs to do their own DD and come to terms with their own decisions.
Wishing you and your family the very best this Holiday Season!
D
Risk, don't disregard the US patent pending technology.
http://www.faqs.org/patents/app/20110055005
Now that they have the software development team on board and writing code as we speak, I understand that the product may be developed for applications beyond the US.
I would think that sometime in the future we should see foreign patent applications coming through. I haven't found them yet but I'll be watching. I think the primary target markets would include over 20 countries.
Just remember, patent pending is just that. It is pending and no guarantees that the application will result in an approved patent. However, this is a big step forward and simply another validating point should this occur.
Much speculation and IMHO.
Happy Holidays!
D
Please speak for yourself.
You are entitled to your opinions.
Please provide proof that 80/90 b/m = .20-.30 s/p or that any of my posts reflect that dilusional sentiment.
The fact that you are using hindsight to reference the accuracy of m/b comments is a testament to your unrealistic expectations of investing in the pinks.
The fact is, the RS caught everyone off guard. Playing MTVO the stock ended up being short lived. However, MTVO the company is still alive and better than being DOA. That is the reality, and that is how I now see it.
There is no amount of whining or name calling that will reverse where things are today. So deal with it, sue me, sue Brook, sue Steve, sue MTVO, buy, sell, hold or move on.
That is incorrect because before the spike when all this was happening in November, the s/p was mired around .001-.0011.
For those who would like to believe the s/p rise and spike was on fundamental news, well, it was a one day phenomenon and purely speculative.
Best wishes to you too Risk!
Happy Holidays to all.
D
Yes, they could have raised more money, in the short term, by selling into the spike (this is short sighted view). However, the spike was not company induced so how could they anticipate or know when to sell? The company has not made it a practice of paying for promos or selling shares into the open market. This is why the share structure was able to remain relatively intact over the past two years.
Contemplate this.
What if they raise another $1 mil dollars in cash at $1.00/share?
That would take the fully diluted share count to 4.5 million shares, still tiny. The majority of these shares in the fully diluted count are not yet earned or converted from notes, therefore are not issued. This means the issued O/S is still tiny, maybe around 130 million divided by 1,000 RS or 130,000 shares. Of this, the float was around 70 million pre RS, therefore would = 70,000 post RS.
70,000 shares in the float at $1.00 = $70,000.
The investor of $100 k or $1 mil could take out the float for ~$77k if everyone here sold their shares at the pre RS value of .0011.
So strong hand investors could take out the float or the company could opt to buy back shares with their net proceeds. This would naturally drive the s/p up and reduce future dilutive effect of financing at the 15 million round (Read the executive summary, this the long term view).
All IMHO but the possibilities with the new share structure bodes much better for the company to fund taking this from development to revenue stage.
GLTU
D
What everyone needs to understand.
Montavo had a choice:
1) Fund product development through equity deal announced in 8K:
http://ih.advfn.com/p.php?pid=nmona&article=55582006 or
2) Go BK, as there were no better deals available.
The current share structure fully diluted is ~3.5 million(as stated in the 8K), this means that with convertible notes, payment for services and equity deal announced the equivalent pre RS fully diluted share count would have been 3.5 billion. This is not the same as O/S and float, which is still relatively small.
The equity funding entity would not accept that share structure. Either, Montavo had to accept the terms on the table or go BK.
If BK, everyone's shares would have gone to no bid, DOA = No Value to Montavo.
Accepting terms of equity funding means we still have a pulse and at the post RS valuation of $1.10 means Montavo has a Market Cap of $3.85 million, with a plan to build the product and company (Read this Executive Summary).
http://www.slideshare.net/Montavo
All these events were developed and agreed to before the market reaction and speculation in December to one Form 3 filing. In hindsight, there is no way (IMHO), this would have hit much higher once the fully diluted accounting of shares were disclosed. Unfortunately, all these deals and accounting were not available at the time of the run but it would not take a rocket scientist to read the past filings to understand that there are derivatives/convertible notes on the books.
This is a public company, they go public to raise money, they filed audited returns showing derivitive liabilities, since July of 2010 Montavo PR'd the intent to raise additional funds through investment bankers, there was no secret that the company needed funding to develop product (It's been stated many times on this board and on the 10K's), the share structure inevitably would have to get diluted. The question is how much, when and whether the company could provide equal or greater value than the dilutive effects of funding.
BK or RS?
In my opinion, Brook had few options and ultimately took the deal because that is what was in the best interest of the company. This I agree with and therefore support the decision of the company.
Those who are in it to see the company succeed will see the light of these decisions.
Those who are in it to trade the spikes will not understand.
What is important, is the Market Cap of Montavo, currently $3.85 million, at $11 = $38.5 million (equivalent to .011 pre RS). We do not need to get $100/share to break even, that would mean folks here bought closer to $.10, which no one here did. Even still, is $385 million market cap unreasonable if their product successfully becomes the 'Holy Grail' of advertising?
Please do your own DD as all are simply my opinions.
GLTU
D
The planned launch date of the Rev. 1.0 product (retailMAAP) is in the fall of 2013.
THE MARKET CAP WILL EXPAND AS FALL APPROACHES.
IMHO
D
$40 MILLION MARKET CAP, POST PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT AT PRODUCT RELEASE WOULD BE MY GUESS!
IMHO
D
$3.85 MILLION MARKET CAP - RIDICULOUS!
READ THIS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.
MONTAVO HAS THE HOLY GRAIL OF ADVERTISING!
http://www.slideshare.net/Montavo
RESEARCH THE MANAGEMENT AND ADVISORS.
$3.85 MILLION?????? RIDICULOUS!
$500K SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT EQUITY IS FACTORED IN. RIDICULOUS!
MARKET CAP OF $3.85 MILLION
3.5 millions shares fully diluted at pre RS valuation of $1.10 = $3.85 million.
Fully Diluted, understand this includes all convertible notes, payments to vendors, AND IT INCLUDES EQUITY PAYMENT OF MDA SOFTWARE DEVELOPERS.
MOST OF THESE SHARES HAVE NOT EVEN BEEN ISSUED.
WHEN THESE SHARES ARE ISSUED THEY WILL BE RESTRICTED.
AS I UNDERSTAND, PRE RS FLOAT WAS ~70 MIL = POST RS FLOAT = 70,000 SHARES
TALK ABOUT A TIGHT FLOAT!
D
8k's are serious SEC releases, believe it!
http://ih.advfn.com/p.php?pid=nmona&article=55582006
Montavo Management and Advisors, IMPRESSIVE!
Management
Brook Lang, Founder & CEO - seasoned executive from Sony, T-Mobile and numerous entrepreneurial start-up companies with a strong wireless sales background.
Steven Moore, Strategic Advixor/Investor - interim Chairman and CEO of Contour, formerly CEO of WatchGuard, key roles at The Boeing Compan, private technology investor, board advisor to AdmitOne, n2 Systems, IntellectSpace.
Torsten Kablitz, CTO - former Chief Architect at CoreConnex and CTO of Zynchros, architecture & development assignments with Microsoft, the Port of Seattle and Amazon.
Bob Pinkerton, CMO - former President/COO of Zynchros. Executive market and operations roles at start-ups including WatchGuard, Networx, Saros and Motiva.
Expert Advisers and Contracted Service Providers The company is committed to developing a network of contractors, consultants, advisors, board advisors, and other experts to leverage our core competencies with specialized expertise. We are actively soliciting relationships with a range of entities and individuals to provide technical and market expertise that can shortcut any learning curve.
Doug Chartier - Wireless Providers and Retail - T-Mobile and AT&T
Gunnar Wilmot - Advertising & Marketing - Gotham, Inc., Interpublic, McCann-Erickson
Things have indeed been happening behind the scenes. All is not lost.
D
8K RELEASE - Montavo plans to bring current SEC Filings
Item 8.01 Other Events
The Company has issued convertible debt and other agreements to convert accounts receivables to shares. The Company has also issued shares, and or options, to advisors, employees, and independent contractors, for services, in order to secure the signing of the software development agreement. Including the equity from the software development agreement, if all debt is converted pursuant to the terms of the debt instruments, and all options issued are exercised, there will be approximately three million five hundred thousand shares of the Company’s common stock issued and outstanding. The Company also has in process plans to brings current its SEC filings in Q1 2013.
8K RELEASE - 3.5 million share fully diluted post MDA
Item 8.01 Other Events
The Company has issued convertible debt and other agreements to convert accounts receivables to shares. The Company has also issued shares, and or options, to advisors, employees, and independent contractors, for services, in order to secure the signing of the software development agreement. Including the equity from the software development agreement, if all debt is converted pursuant to the terms of the debt instruments, and all options issued are exercised, there will be approximately three million five hundred thousand shares of the Company’s common stock issued and outstanding. The Company also has in process plans to brings current its SEC filings in Q1 2013.
8K RELEASE - EQUITY SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT MDA
Item 1.01. Entry into Material Definitive Agreement
On November 12, 2012, Montavo signed an equity software development agreement with a contract software development firm, to develop the Rev. 1.0 version of the retail Montavo Ad Analytics Platform (retailMAAP). The planned launch date of the Rev. 1.0 product (retailMAAP) is in the fall of 2013.
READ CAREFULLY, VERY IMPORTANT INFORMATION!
http://ih.advfn.com/p.php?pid=nmona&article=55582006
Current Report Filing (8-k)
Date : 12/21/2012 @ 5:19PM
Source : Edgar (US Regulatory)
Current Report Filing (8-k)
PrintAlert
UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C. 20549
FORM 8-K
CURRENT REPORT
Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Date of Report (Date of earliest event reported)
November 12, 2012
Montavo, Inc.
(Exact name of registrant as specified in its charter)
Delaware
000-29397
33-0619528
(State or other jurisdiction
(Commission
(IRS Employer
of incorporation)
File Number)
Identification No.)
4957 Lakemont Blvd. Suite 239, Bellevue, WA 98006
(Address of principal executive offices) (Zip Code)
(425) 747-5500
(Registrant’s telephone number, including area code)
(Former name or former address, if changed since last report)
Check the appropriate box below if the Form 8-K filing is intended to simultaneously satisfy the filing obligation of the registrant under any of the following provisions ( see General Instruction A.2. below):
o
Written communications pursuant to Rule 425 under the Securities Act (17 CFR 230.425)
o
Soliciting material pursuant to Rule 14a-12 under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.14a-12)
o
Pre-commencement communications pursuant to Rule 14d-2(b) under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.14d-2(b))
o
Pre-commencement communications pursuant to Rule 13e-4(c) under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.13e-4(c))
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Item 1.01. Entry into Material Definitive Agreement
On November 12, 2012, Montavo signed an equity software development agreement with a contract software development firm, to develop the Rev. 1.0 version of the retail Montavo Ad Analytics Platform (retailMAAP). The planned launch date of the Rev. 1.0 product (retailMAAP) is in the fall of 2013.
Item 8.01 Other Events
The Company has issued convertible debt and other agreements to convert accounts receivables to shares. The Company has also issued shares, and or options, to advisors, employees, and independent contractors, for services, in order to secure the signing of the software development agreement. Including the equity from the software development agreement, if all debt is converted pursuant to the terms of the debt instruments, and all options issued are exercised, there will be approximately three million five hundred thousand shares of the Company’s common stock issued and outstanding. The Company also has in process plans to brings current its SEC filings in Q1 2013.
SIGNATURES
Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, the registrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf by the undersigned hereunto duly authorized.
MONTAVO, INC.
Date: December 21, 2012
Brook Lang, CEO
For those who care to look, CVSL, setting up.
MTVO, still breathing.
D
http://www.slideshare.net/Montavo
This one worked just now.
D
Very interesting stuff, from November 13, 2012. Prior to decisions of November 20,2012 which resulted in filing of Form 3 and 8k in December 2012.
http://www.slideshare.net/Montavo/montavo-executive-summary-15162662
Read last page of slideshow and #7 in Executive Summary. Is this the stuff of crooks and scam artists?
Things have been in motion for longer than we can see from our vantage point.
Game's not over yet. All IMHO.
D
M, I agree that you have every right to your opinions and yes we have shared many cordial conversations, here on Montavo and others. I am aware of your concerns and some of the pinkies gone bad, it's happened to all of us.
This is not a picking on your math exercise, rather trying to understand the rationale behind the numbers and reasons YOU are posting. They didn't make sense and if that was your expectation, don't seem reasonable. Now you want to hold Montavo accountable for future, unrealized, forward projected gains?
I expected MTVO to do better than this but I know that this is a high risk play with POTENTIAL for high returns. I understand that there are many scams in the world of Pinks and pennies and I choose to take the risk. This is what I have always conveyed to you along with patience. I have always told you that if you don't like the silence, direction or decisions of a company you have the choice to Buy, Sell or Hold.
At this point, I will sit tight, and make the best of things. I've got plenty of skin in Montavo too and will continue to try and understand the method to the madness here. My crystal ball has been in the shop now for the past year.
All IMHO, GLTU
D
Risk,
I think what folks are missing is what is in the previous 10k financial filings. Convertible notes were used to fund the company from 2010 to current. Until conversion of notes and/or exercise of warrants, they do not count towards the float or issued outstanding share counts. They would show under derivative liabilities or a SS count including fully diluted issued and outstanding shares, warrants and options. Some may be restricted which would not impact the float. It is possible that some of these obligations are being met and dealt with through the RS, allowing the company to maintain an adequate share structure to attain necessary funding for development of Rev 1.
Development of Rev 1 has always been the target and funding was always the key, this has not changed and has always been above board. Remember Crucible and Moody Capital, both investment banks failed to deliver adequate funding during an absolute horrendous time to raise funds.
It is either fund and develop (which equals dilution) or BK. At what cost should Brook stop trying to develop the product? If the only deal he had was at .0001 would that be bad? Yes, it would be bad but BK would be worse.
My point is that there are so many dynamics involved, the RS doesn't make sense for the current SS so there must be another reason. He hasn't done anything like this over the past 3 years but could have, so why now? That is the question I ask myself. Is there something more to it that us average joe/jane investors don't see or know?
Just my opinion and take on things. It doesn't make sense and yes, he did make a mistake and screwed up on the initial 8k filing.
GLTU, all IMHO.
D
$200/share at 1,100 shares = $220,000
This means you bought$220,000 at $.20 = 1.1 mil shares .
Or are you holding out for a 10 bagger at avg purchase price of .02? Meaning you are in $22,000.
Really? This seems to be implied by your $200 target price for MTVOD. I would have to agree that I don't think they'll hit that either.
GLTU, not opinions just math.
D
You are entitled to your feelings and opinions.
I simply disagree and have already expressed my perspective.
D
T & S,
So good to hear from you, please send my best to S, miss those old days, so fun!
I wish things here were different but the story is not done. The company made a mistake, they screwed up and it was coupled with very unfortunate timing. I am upset about it as all here are and have voiced this to the CEO.
Let's hope this strategy, as insane as it appears, bears fruit.
All IMHO - GLTU
D