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Thanks. EOM
Yes it is. I hope we prevail because a win for share holders will provide college funds for thousands of kids.
Dear Judge Mary Walrath,
I forgot to send you the list of all the stuff that wamu owns. It seem everyone has it except you. This might not be complete. I found it on the internet. My dad says that our EC attorney even has one that says how much everything is worth.
I hope this will help you with the case with {can’t make it out}!
You can share it with Brian Rosen . I don’t think he has a list or can’t find it. You have ask him for it.
I hope you had a good day Haloween.
Yours truly Jake
LOL I like this kid!!!!!!
JP Morgan’s Moves Ahead of Wamu’s Collapse
by Kyle on September 10, 2010
What gives JPM the right to strong arm (thus bypassing the Bankruptcy Process), by most accounts that money could be consider fraudulent transfer – but – a connected enterprise like JPM will only answer questions, not pay for them.
There are many who see the large banks (Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan Chase) and quasi-government agencies (FDIC, OTS, Federal Reserve Bank of New York) as an operating cartel within our country. There has always been a wary eye towards the relationship between these institutions and their secrecy but the events of 2008 shed light on not only the cronyism that creates a network of insiders (creating obvious conflicts of interest), the light revealed favoritism and what some would say was outright collusion between the organizations to ensure that selected bankers remained in business.
That introductory is quite damning and statements such as those had better be backed with deductive and logical evidence. To that point I will say this; “It’s best to see who benefited from the hidden and secretive decisions of the Fed, the FDIC and the OTS and back track…”
In March, 2008, JP Morgan Chase, in conjunction with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, agreed to provide a (up to) 28-day emergency loan to Bear Stearns in order to prevent the potential market crash that would result from Bear Stearns becoming insolvent. Despite, or because of, this, belief in Bear’s ability to repay its obligations rapidly diminished among counterparties and traders. Seeing that the terms of the emergency loan was not enough to bolster Bear Stearns, and worried that a still-floundering Bear would result in systemic losses if allowed to open in the markets on the following Monday, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernake and Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson Jr. told CEO Alan Schwartz that he had to sell the firm over the weekend, in time for the opening of the Asian market. Two days later, on March 16, 2008, Bear Stearns signed a merger agreement with JP Morgan Chase in a stock swap worth $2 a share or less than 10 percent of Bear Stearns’ market value just two days before. This sale price represented a staggering loss as its stock had traded at $172 a share as late as January 2007 and $93 a share as late as February 2008. In addition, the Federal Reserve agreed to issue a non-recourse loan of $29 billion to JP Morgan Chase, thereby assuming the risk of Bear Stearns’s less liquid assets.
The Fed, Bear Stearns and JPM deal netted JP Morgan Chase all of the assets of Bear Stearns and an additional $29 Billion in a non-recourse loan (meaning that the lender, the Fed, would take the loss if the collateral wasn’t good). I brought up the Bear Stearns deal to show deductive evidence that Mr. Paulson was heavy handed in his approach to this deal which is a direct conflict of interest because Bear Stearns was the major competitor of Goldman Sachs which Mr. Paulson was once CEO. In addition, the Fed will not allow itself to be audited so we’ll never know if JP Morgan took on a loss or passed the loss to the Fed (or taxpayer).
The Bear Stearns deal was only the start of what proves to be phenomenal positioning by JP Morgan to rid itself of bad debt/collateral with (once competitive) banks while, in turn, gaining their assets, the next to fall to JPM was Lehman Brothers. True, JPM did not buy Lehman’s but allow me to assign benefit to JP Morgan.
Deal of the Century
Simply put, the Lehman Brothers deal with Barclays was the deal of the century for JP Morgan. The events that lead up to the deal are astounding when one considers the other institutions that were in trouble (AIG) and how they were being handled by Mr. Paulson and Mr. Bernanke. Why was Lehman Brothers treated differently? Could be and it’s true that JP Morgan was Lehman’s bank. For the benefit of JPM, Lehman’s could not be saved by TARP nor could it be allowed to go into traditional bankruptcy as any of these options exposed JP Morgan to a possible loss of $69 Billion. TARP or a liquidated bankruptcy would place JP Morgan as a creditor along with everyone else – there are 69 billion reasons why this could not happen.
The only option that would benefit JP Morgan was to somehow package up the bad collateral that existed between Lehman’s Financial Services division and JP Morgan and pass it onto a buyer. While it’s true the Lehman’s did file for Bankruptcy, it was only for one day, and then sold to Barclays in a deal that closed five days later. What many in the public don’t know is that along with the deal being brokered at the Fed, JP Morgan was allowed to package bad collateral in the deal. In fact the deal almost didn’t go through because JP Morgan felt slighted in that it wasn’t allowed to package even more bad collateral. There is a great article on the Lehman/JP Morgan on the internet – link: http://www.esquire.com/features/barclays-deal-of-the-century-1009, so I will not go into great detail but suffice it to say that JP Morgan having been greatly exposed by the failure of Lehman’s came out on top – passing off untold amounts of bad collateral while removing an exposure to a 69 Billion dollar loan. And we shouldn’t forget the claim that JP Morgan actually contributed to making Lehman’s insolvent by withholding $17 Billion in deposits.
Between March and September of 2008, JP Morgan accomplished the impossible – benefitting repeatedly and handsomely from the financial crisis. Three major financial institutions failed, two of which should have had a ripple effect to the very core of JP Morgan – yet JPM came out smelling like a rose, packaging and removing billions in bad debt/collateral and gaining nearly $550 billion in assets – prompting record percentage gains for the second and third quarter of 09 and with the purchase of WaMu, JPM gained a solid footprint into the West Coast banking system.
Gift from the FDIC
JP Morgan’s luck continues with a gift from the FDIC. Thus far, JP Morgan has ballet its way through the carcasses of banks all over Wall Street.
Every financial institution was hit and hit hard by the crisis of 2008 (except two well connected banks, GS and JPM), but just as the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) is about to be passed – Washington Mutual Bank and its sub (Washington Mutual Bank fsb) was closed by the Office of Thrift Supervision, named the FDIC as receiver for the 100 year old institution, and then sold assets of $307 billion and total deposits of $188 billion to JPM for the conspicuously lowball price tag of $1.88 billion.
Deductive evidence or at a minimum logical evidence in the form of abductive reasoning* indicates cronyism and possible coercion/collusion for and to the benefit of JP Morgan. It’s widely known that the ‘boys of high finance’ float in and out of CEO positions and Federal Reserve positions (in fact James Dimon is the CEO of JP Morgan and sits on the Board of Directors of the New York Federal Reserve Bank) but no one seems to point out this obvious conflict of interest.
Recent revelations tend to indicate that the case of Washington Mutual, Inc. may be more than just a tragic case of a failed banking icon.
For instance, it was recently revealed that former Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson admitted to New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo that he coerced CEO Ken Lewis by threat of ouster if Bank of America invoked a Material Adverse Change (MAC) clause to block the acquisition of troubled Merril Lynch. Paulson also added, however, that he made this threat at the request of Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke. In addition, it is suggested that such action by the Fed and Treasury amount to coercing CEO Ken Lewis to withhold disclosure of materially significant information from shareholders regarding the deal. Source: Wall Street Journal.
As a further example, documents recently released as part of a Judicial Watch Freedom of Information Act request details further coercion by the government regarding TARP funds distribution. “If a capital infusion is not appealing, you should be aware that your regulator will require it in any circumstance,” Paulson’s one-page list of talking points for a meeting with nine U.S. banks’ chief executives said. “We don’t believe it is tenable to opt out because doing so would leave you vulnerable and exposed.” Accompanying Paulson were Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Chairman Sheila Bair and New York Federal Reserve Bank President Timothy Geithner (now current Treasury Secretary). Three and a half hours after the meeting was scheduled to begin, Paulson had obtained the bankers’ signatures on half-page forms along with the handwritten amount of the federal government’s investment, according to the documents. Source: Bloomberg.
“…you should have sold to JP Morgan Chase…”
Two months before Washington Mutual was seized, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson warned then-CEO Kerry Killinger, “you should have sold to JP Morgan Chase in the spring, and you should do so now. Things could get a lot more difficult for you.” Source: Seattle Times
In July of 2008, two months before the seizure Washington Mutual, Inc. was denied protection from illegal short-selling by the SECs naked short-sale ban that protected 19 financial institutions (eight of which were at Paulson’s TARP meeting). Data through June 2008 shows that at one point that month “failures to deliver” (an indicator of illegal or naked short-selling) of Washington Mutual’s stock reached 9 million shares. From June 5 to June 19 there were, on any given day, at least 1 million WaMu shares that had “failed to deliver.”
According to the OTS fact sheet released after the seizure, Washington Mutual was considered to meet OTS capitalization requirements and was in fact a solvent bank. In forward looking third quarter forecasts to the media, CEO Alan Fishman related that Washington Mutual, Inc. had access to over $50 billion in capital and enough liquidity to meet fixed obligations through 2010. According to some reports, the OTS seized Washington Mutual at the behest of the FDIC. The subsequent sale to JP Morgan Chase & Co. was conducted hastily on a Thursday evening, in a highly irregular auction that typically is designed to take place 180 to 360 days after seizure. The price paid was $1.88 Billion for a company with over $300 Billion in assets, over $20 Billion in book value, and over 2200 branches.
While all these revelations can suggest that Washington Mutual, Inc. was not a failed institution, and they can support speculation that Washington Mutual was improperly seized, recent court filings in Federal District Court in Texas and U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Delaware suggest something more sinister.
For example, the filing in U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Delaware, referring to a Texas State Court action – it is alleged that wrongful conduct of JP Morgan Chase & Co. includes:
(i) entering into false negotiations with the Washington Mutual, Inc. under the guise of a good-faith bidder during the summer of 2008;
(ii) gaining access to Washington Mutual’s confidential and proprietary information through a variety of deceptive practices; and
(iii) disclosing Washington Mutual’s confidential information as well as false information to the media and investors in an effort to drive down WMI’s credit rating and stock price, cause depositors to withdraw deposits as a result of fear, and hamper efforts of Washington Mutual, Inc. to find a purchaser for itself.
The filing suggests that additional claims that could arise in the bankruptcy proceeding might include, without limitation, unfair competition, tortious interference, interference with prospective economic advantage, breach of contract, misappropriation of confidential information and trade secrets, and conversion. The filing further suggest that by way of these claims, JPMC may be held responsible for the destruction of Washington Mutual, Inc. and the total losses suffered by its creditors and shareholders.
In addition, the underlying Texas action alleges that JP Morgan Chase & Co. used plants or moles (e.g., the Rotella allegations) inside of Washington Mutual, Inc. for the purposes of gaining insider information and exploiting that information for economic gain. Recent news reports have stated that in 2005, a small group of senior risk managers drew up a plan to limit risky lending practices, but a new executive team at the bank nixed the plan. Thus, it is conceivable that if the allegations of insider plants are true, these same plants could have knowingly undertaken or encouraged risky or fraudulent lending practices in an effort to destroy Washington Mutual’s reputation and shareholder value.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b), the above-identified filings are subject to the requirement of certification “that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances . . . .” Thus, whereas previous revelations in the news or government papers regarding Washington Mutual’s situation might command a relatively lower level of trust, the allegations in the above-identified filings demand the additional respect that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are designed to command.
For JPM, Timing is Everything
I’m of the opinion that JP Morgan was highly ‘ticked’ at WMI’s refusal to accept the $8.00 a share offer in April of 2008. WMI/WaMu instead announced a $7 billion infusion of new capital by new outside investors led by TPG Capital. WMI’s refusal placed WaMu in the cross-hairs of a well connected enemy in JPM and JPM still wanted and even needed those assets. The window to seize WaMu was quickly closing in September of 08, even though WaMu had a “base deposit withdrawl” of 16 Billion, it was announced by Alan Fishman (in June) that WaMu had 50 Billion available with the Discount Window at the Fed and everyone knew that TARP was just around the corner.
Basically, if there was to be a seizure of WaMu that benefitted JPM it had to happen that fourth week of September and it had to happen quickly – and you’ve likely already guessed – that’s exactly what happened.
WMI nor WaMu never received a letter from the OTS to raise additional capital, in fact the OTS, even when placing WaMu into the hands of the FDIC, even stated that WaMu was well capitalized but stated that WaMu was “systemically risky” and that’s why it was placed into receivership. Also, there was a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) active and in-place between WMI and the OTS.
Worth pointing out again – the OTS said WaMu was “systemically risky” while Mr. Paulson did not add WaMu to the “Do Not Short List” which included 19 instituions Mr. Paulson considered “systemically important” – Which was it? Was WaMu systemically important or not? Within the tiniest of timeframes – the Office of Thrift Supervision, named the FDIC as receiver for the 100 year old institution, and then sold assets of $307 billion and total deposits of $188 billion to JPM within hours for 1.888 Billion. It’s absolutely amazing the timing behind the receivership and it’s even more amazing the ability of JPM to be right there, ready with slides and research – ready to make an offer that conformed to the FDIC’s requirements.
Even more amazing than the receivership’s timing was JPM’s incredible fortune-to be at the ready with bid in hand. JPM managed to navigate the moral hazard involved in participation in a limited auction and low-ball bid for a coveted rival with nary a whisper of populist rage is either a testament to the chaos of the period or the desensitived nature of the common citizen and all of this was done within hours…
To be clear, if the OTS had attempted to close WaMu a week earlier (and the OTS would’ve notified WMI of the need to raise additional capital) – WMI would have been able to obtain additional funds through TPG or the Discount Window. And if the OTS waited just a couple of days, WaMu would have been able to access TARP if needed. When I say the tiniest of windows – I mean there was less than a 72 hour window for WaMu to be sold to JP Morgan without WaMu being able to put up a fight and ‘in’ the necessary enviornment where other banks could not bid. WaMu was blind sided for the benefit of JP Morgan.
“The 16 Billion Dollar Bank Run”
There has yet to be a clear definition of “bank run”. While many in media (notably CNBC) damaged WaMu with reports of a 16 Billion dollar bank run, no one seems to put that statement or those numbers into context – 16 Billion of the 300 Billion deposit base is equivalent to 5%. Is 5% a bank run? Or is the term ‘bank run’ just an ill- coined and oft misused term in the media to incite fear and make stories news worthy. In addition, CNBC mistakenly reported a bank run/closwure at WaMu branches that became a self-fulfilling prophecy. CNBC’s mistaken reporting may have actually started the ‘bank run’. At any rate, 5% or 16 Billion is small when compared to the entire removal of private and corporate deposits during the summer of 08 – by most accounts, some $550 Billion moved in the market during that time frame. Finally, while the media favored the term ‘bank run’, the regulatory organizations “FDIC/OTS” downplayed that phrase and used variations of “systemic risk” instead.
“Why JP Morgan?”
And why all this effort to bolster JP Morgan? Pure speculation on my part but I believe that JP Morgan was in dire straits and if JP Morgan’s true state came to light (if the curtain dropped) – then its (JPM’s) exposure to 77.2 Trillion in the derivative market would be exposed and devastate the dollar. The shame is that the deal may have/could have been done on the up-and-up, WMI was looking for a buyer for WMB (not WMBfsb which by all accounts was well funded) and the deal would’ve still protected JP Morgan and the US Dollar but for reasons unknown to me – the FDIC/OTS and JP Morgan decided it best to murder WaMu among the carcasses in hopes that no one would notice another dead body. Who really notices one more body in the killing fields?
WMI saw the offensive onslaught coming and what JP Mogan and the FDIC did not see was, WMI prepariing for the battle (as best if could be). WMI was already in talks with Law Firm Weil, Gotshal & Manges and immediately filed for Bankruptcy protection.
By all accounts, JP Morgan Chase purchased the whole bank assets of Washington Mutual for $1.88 billion in September of 2008. Anyone would agree that 1.88B for a 110 year old organization that had 270 billion on deposit, 29 billion in liquid cash, 2200 banks, 8000 ATM’s, and a credit card company is an unjust deal that deserves scrutiny.
The deal becomes even more unjust when one considers the impact it has to JP Morgan – – the deal creates the nation’s second-largest branch network. A combined network reaching 42% of the U.S. population, with strong positions in attractive markets such as California, Florida, New York, Texas, Arizona, Illinois and Washington. With the assumption of WaMu’s assets, JP Morgan will have $900 billion in deposits, 5,400 branches and 14,000 ATMs in 23 states.
The FDIC, according to its own rule book, could have changed the deal but seems reluctant to do so – instead choosing to defend JP Morgan when its (FDIC) mandate is to defend WMI and obtain fair value. This relationship raises additional questions of collusion and has created confusion in the court system.
Where is the investigation by the U.S. Attorney General?
The sum of these allegations is that, if any number of the allegations are true, the activities of JP Morgan Chase & Co.’s leading up to the seizure and sale of Washington Mutual, Inc. assets have the capacity of implicating the laws of unfair competition, unjust enrichment, fraud, securities violations at the expense of Washington resident investors, breach of contract (confidentiality agreement), breach of fiduciary duty, and conversion. The mere fact that these allegations have been levied in Federal court and against a systemically important financial institution requires that the U.S. Attorney General Office immediately start an investigation for the purpose of ‘finding of facts’.
*Abductive reasoning is a method of logical inference introduced by Charles Peirce prior to induction and deduction for which the colloquial name is to have a “hunch”. Abductive reasoning starts when an inquirer considers of a set of seemingly unrelated facts, armed with an intuition that they are somehow connected. My abduction is quite clear – JP Morgan had either extraordinary luck during the financial crisis of 08 or had the ability (as a someone once said) “to create its own luck.” The question is – did anyone help in creating that luck and if so, was it legal.
Written by Chas September 1, 2010 at 9:12 am
This is interesting the examiner admits WMB was solvent
Footnote pg 25
The examiner in this report has an analysis of solvency, but he also did not conduct a review of the loan portfolio.
Footnote pg 36
WMB was not undercapitalized in March 2008 and, in fact was well capitalized even at the time of seizure.
Proof that wamu should not have been seized.
And they say we don’t have a case against the FDIC!! LOL!!! Bring on a trial!!!!!!
Am I the only one that thinks to seize a solvent bank is against the LAW???
And they say we don’t have a case against the FDIC!! LOL!!! Bring on a trial!!!!!!
Footnote pg 25
The examiner in this report has an analysis of solvency, but he also did not conduct a review of the loan portfolio.
Footnote pg 36
WMB was not undercapitalized in March 2008and, in fact was well capitalized even at the time of seizure.
IMO they are hiding a lot of cash/assets. This is from JPM conference call bragging at how well they did in the WaMu deal. Maybe someone needs to send this to the Judge.
Highlights of the J.P. Morgan-WaMu Analyst Conference Call Sept 26, 2008
Mortgages? Did you say mortgages? Does that mean losses?: J.P. Morgan is going to inherit $176 billion of the home loans. “We think there are $30.7 billion of remaining losses,” Scharf says. “So as of close, we’re going to take on $176 billion of assets, we’re going to mark them down $29.9 billion, and then we have another almost $1 billion of marks to the other portfolios, so we’re recognizing $31 billion of marks related to the loan portfolios.” If it’s a severe recession, expect $42 billion or so of losses. And if it’s a really severe recession, expect $54 billion of losses, Scharf says.
176B in assets for 1.9B LOL time to pay up JD.
http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2008/09/26/highlights-of-the-jp-morgan-wamu-conference-call/
Hell yea! Make my day law. I mean make my day file away.
LOL me too with a 44 chicken wing and modify monkey grip to boot.
I agree that’s why today ruling is impartial. We need hard numbers from the list of assets that was transfer. But wait Rosen doesn’t have them and JPM doesn’t have them. What about the FDIC? Do they have them? Who in the hell has them. How can you have a DS/POR without a valuation? I bet all of the above have them and the examiner is going to point this out.
IMO neutral. Dual track with examiner report pending. eom
You are willing to let JPM off with a slap on the wrist for $4.00 per share! Remember he did offer $8.00 per share and WM said no thanks. So JPM threw a fit and project west went into high gear to steal the company. This type of activity on behalf of JPM must have serious consequences to discourage this type of behavior in the future. I say no thanks to 4 per share and yes to 3 x 8 per share. AIMO. With that said I need to go and take care of some errands.
Should be more ammo for the examiner.
Oops google wrong name
How Susman Godfrey Handles Cases
Blawgletter has worked at one place, a law firm, since getting a bar card in 1985. At some point, the firm tried to distill its approach to trial work into one document. The current version appears below:
How We Handle Cases
In handling complex litigation, our firm is guided by two principles, both of which reduce expense without sacrificing chances for success. First, less is best. Excess discovery is not just nonproductive, it often is counterproductive. Excess discovery removes the element of surprise at trial, forces the opposition lawyers and witnesses to get prepared earlier than they otherwise would, and often takes the eyes of the lawyers who engage in it off the ball. The best lawyers are best able to handle (and create) surprise at trial. We believe in retaining our natural advantage.
Minimal discovery, however, doesn't mean being ill-prepared. It means we prepare by means other than formal discovery, such as thoroughly interviewing our client's employees and the other side's ex-employees, organizing all documents and information chronologically to understand the complete picture, and conducting jury simulations.
Second, we take whatever discovery we need before the other side does. We like to take the first depositions and we like to depose the top executives first - before they can get their stories straight. We don't believe extensive document discovery is necessary to do this.
THE BOTTOM LINE
•We are stand-up jury trial lawyers, not discovery litigators. Everything we do is designed to prepare us to persuade a jury.
•Fifty percent of our time as a firm is spent in handling contingent fee matters for plaintiffs. Since preparation in these cases is on our own nickel, we know how to economize and insist that everything we do potentially be outcome-determinative. We acquire good habits from this contingent fee work.
•We encourage clients to compensate us on a result-achieved basis. We want the same incentive to win our clients have. But even when we are paid by the hour, we pride ourselves in a "mean and lean" approach to litigation.
•In our experience, the bottom line amount of our monthly statements will be lower than those of large firms that compensate partners on a pyramid basis and that leverage off the billings of large numbers of associates. We do not have enough lawyers or enough excess capacity to over-work a case, and even if we did and a client was willing to pay us to do so, it would go against our grain. We often staff cases with just a fraction of the number of lawyers our adversaries use to overwork the case.
•Because we only do litigation, we have few regular clients. The only way we get business is by the result we achieved in the last case. Our most prized asset is our list of clients who have seen us in court. We cannot afford to lose. And we cannot afford to win inefficiently.
TEAMWORK ON THE BIG CASE
(WE HANDLE SMALL ONES, TOO)
At the beginning of a complex case, we assemble our trial team, rarely consisting of more than one or two partners, an associate and a legal assistant.
•We candidly discuss staffing with the client up front and try to assign to the case lawyers with whom the client feels comfortable.
•We believe in one-lawyer-one-task. We rarely assign two lawyers to cover a litigation event.
The partner in charge manages case preparation by using a Task Assignment memo, revised weekly, and a regular weekly team meeting or conference call.
•Task Assignment Memo. Each task is assigned to a named team member with the due date. These memos are numbered sequentially and revised after each weekly meeting.
•The Weekly Meeting. Interoffice conferences among trial team members are necessary for effective communication and to avoid duplication of effort. But they are wasteful if the same message must be repeated. By focusing our interoffice communications into a regularly scheduled meeting or conference call, we avoid unnecessary jawboning among team members at other times. This also allows the client's in-house counsel, co-counsel, etc., to attend and keep up to date.
•Call Reports. If a member of the team has a substantive discussion with the client, co-counsel or opposing counsel, he routes a call report by e-mail to other team members.
DISCOVERY AND DISCOVERY DISPUTES
Dealing with Opposing Counsel
•We try to conduct all discovery by agreement. It is expensive to do otherwise.
•We rarely take discovery disputes to court. Judges hate them and usually give both sides less than they could get by agreement. Our rule is to take a discovery dispute to court only when the issue is outcome-determinative (few are), and only when we have confidence that we can win.
•At the start of a case, we send a memo to opposing counsel seeking agreement to a number of protocols that we have found to facilitate cooperation and reduce costs.
Document Production
•Upon receipt of the other side's document request, an experienced attorney, in consultation with the client, determines what should be objected to. We have found that it is better to produce too much than too little. It is very expensive to review masses of documents to remove what is nonresponsive or irrelevant. Sooner or later, we'll probably have to produce them anyway. We even encourage our clients to allow open files searches if we can get a stipulation preserving privileges or find a way to identify files that are likely to contain privileged documents.
•We do not simply like to rely on our client to locate and furnish to us responsive documents. Our legal assistants are experts at this, and there is too much danger of an inadvertent omission unless we are involved from the beginning. For example, we believe in numbering the originals of all documents produced for inspection before they are inspected, in logging all files searched, and in interviewing file custodians while the searches are being made.
•Before numbered originals are produced for inspection, a lawyer reviews them to remove those that are privileged. All documents withheld on the ground of privilege are logged at the time they are withheld.
Document Organization
•We are not great believers in computerizing all documents. This is expensive and, in most cases, unnecessary. Even the most complex case boils down to less than several hundred hot documents. As we initially review documents - ours and theirs -lawyers select those that are to be included in our hot document chronology. These are the documents that tell the story, which we use to prepare witnesses, and to depose witnesses. They are the ones that likely will become trial exhibits.
•From the document chronology, we prepare a written chronology of events. It is not a document digest, but rather an annotated narrative of what happened.
Depositions
•We don't take many, and those that we take are short. We don't need to look under every stone. We just need to know where the boulders are. Excessive questioning of witnesses, particularly experts, serves only to educate them.
•We normally videotape depositions of fact witnesses. This minimizes excessive talking by opposing counsel and allows us to show the other side's key witnesses during jury simulations.
•We believe there is no such thing as a bad witness -only one who has been ill-prepared. We give witnesses who are our clients "Your Deposition," a memo that incorporates our cumulative experience in trying lawsuits. Then we prepare our witnesses for the twenty tough questions - we don't sit them in a room alone with the thousands of documents they may have been copied over the years and ask them to review them. The documents they may have problems with are usually those they have authored.
Witness Preparation
•Witnesses learn through doing. Therefore, we cross-examine our own witnesses on video as part of their preparation. We play back and critique their performance.
•Defending lawyers are not supposed to talk during depositions. Courts are sanctioning those that do. If the witness is well prepared, there is nothing for the defending lawyers to do but listen proudly. By involving the most experienced lawyers in witness preparation, we often are able to trust deposition defense to lawyers with lower billing rates.
•Some lawyers believe that what a witness doesn't know can't hurt him. They encourage their witnesses not to remember, not to know. This is dangerous. A witness who doesn't know or recall at his deposition is often useless at trial. We encourage our fact witnesses to learn, remember, and be responsive, even at their depositions -to be able to handle even the most off-the-wall hypothetical questions. We encourage our experts to type out their opinions to hand to the other side.
•Most lawyers do not question their own witnesses at their depositions. They are afraid to commit to what they want to prove at trial, often because they themselves haven't taken the time to think their case through. We believe in asking many of our own witnesses questions at their depositions. This gives us some favorable testimony to show or play to the jury during the other side's case. It also removes the need to bring all of our witnesses to trial. Usually opposing counsel is ill-prepared to engage in a trial-type cross examination after we question our own witnesses on direct at the end of the deposition - frequently, they are in a hurry to catch planes home.
BUDGETING AND CALLING THE ODDS
•Upon request, we will prepare litigation budgets for our clients, but we prefer to work on a fixed-fee basis that places the risk of inefficiency on us and allows our clients to accurately budget for a case.
•Clients are entitled to know what we see as the issues and how we call the odds on each. Though we are unable to opine much for auditors, we are not reluctant to share our thoughts in writing with our clients
JURY SIMULATIONS
•We are great believers in jury simulations or mock trials, and we conduct them early and frequently in most cases. They help us predict the outcome, hone our arguments, and conduct discovery with an eye to telling a simple story to a jury. They let our clients see how their lawyers will look and sound during the real thing. When the result is favorable, we frequently disclose it to the other side to encourage settlement.
•A mock trial with 36 jurors costs around $35,000 and can be much more expensive depending on the circumstances. The cost is well worth the information and strategic guidance we gain.
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=9&ved=0CDoQFjAI&url=http%3A%2F%2Fblawgletter.typepad.com%2Fbbarnett%2F2009%2F04%2Fhow-susman-godfrey-handles-cases.html&ei=omuvTN78C8T7lwfqmrj5BQ&usg=AFQjCNGS60IrMnbhqkv-XrKjyxvr80aG0A
Please change my guess to October 25, 9:30 AM. Thanks
8 OCT 10/0930
As I stated I’m not a lawyer, but here is my opinion. Rosen for some reason did a change of strategy in which the majority of the bond holders/BOD’s who bought bonds for pennies on the dollar want to get paid in full. I think he was under enormous amount of pressure to settle this. So Rosen change the course of this chapter 11 case and now finds himself stuck in the mud.
Good question but dude I’m not a lawyer. The post was from Bopfan on the Yahoo board as per the title From Bopfan. Look at the thread, Settlement of Tort Claims is in Addition to and Separate From Restitution. I was just passing along another WaMu long opinion. Go to Yahoo and ask bopfan.
Apparently you have not been following this court case. How can Rosen explain giving away a few billion dollars of WAMU assets (NOL’s) to JPM/FDIC and dropping all claims against them? This makes no sense. He is basically paying JPM to take WAMU. Why would the FDIC be entitled to NOL’s? Past case law ruled against the FDIC in reference to NOL’s. As far as what Rosen is providing to the examiner your guess is as good as mine.
The information you seek is in the IBOX. P’s have a face value of 1000 per share with an option to convert to commons. K’s face value is 25.0 per share. U’s are the biggest risk but can also have the biggest reward percentage wise.
Nice! eom.
A trustee will prevent the bond holders from stealing WAMU.
From Bopfan:
Independent of accounts of JPM's and the FDIC's actions, the examiner's report will, in my opinion, reveal Weil's and WMI's treachery in the starkest term. This is the real reason for the examiner's appointment: the court could not trust the debtors' counsel to protect WMI's shareholders. The report will describe in exhaustive detail that WMI's plan forfeits the legal claims, tax benefits, etc. with no explanation that could be satisfactory to a court of law. It should also describe in detail why Weil would have known that its actions were harmful to WMI's equity classes, therefore setting forth the iron clad case that Weil should be subject to professional discipline and any criminal prosecution against WMI's management.
The court will appoint a trustee forthwith.
Well sir apparently you didn’t read the court filing in reverence to the examiner breaking down teams of investigations within the respect to JPM, FDIC, OTS, Taxes and the list goes on. As far as the good ole boy do you remember the same thing that Brian Rosen stated in court with the EC in reference to doc sharing?
Real I personally don’t believe a settlement is coming in NOV. But I believe the examiner will not allow his firm to get caught up in this twisted web that has been woven. They will remain an independent party with the ability to complete an investigation and present the facts to the court. Don’t get side tracked. Remember this guy use to work for DOJ and knows the repercussions for submitting falsified information.
IMO you need to check the IBOX and look at some of her previous rulings.
No Real you are wrong. LOL! After all that WAMU investors have gone thru you think a 2 month delay is a big deal? The examiner needs time plain and simple. What happen to keeping it real!
The pressure is on!! The government can’t back FDIC for negligently behavior. Pressure cooker is building steam and ready to explode unless someone throws billions of dollars into the pot too cool this shareholder outcry down. The examiner will find evidence, people will face charges, and people will go to jail and have all assets strip from their bank accounts.
Yes I understand about the reorganization of the company and I think the IPO is $25.00 per share. BODS try to push for a chapter 7 and were unsuccessful in this endeavor. But why would BR risk being disbar and open to criminal charges? That is what I can’t comprehend.
Please refresh my memory. I think the MARTA claim is for the police pension fund from Chicago or something like that. This case is very difficult too track everything. I can guarantee one thing if, Brian Rosen was was looking out for equity these claims would have been confronted months ago. IMO Brian Rosen knows the true value of the estate and he is trying to hide every last cent from the true owners of WAMU at the same time gifting JPM and the FDIC with our cash. What I can’t comprehend is why?
The appointment of an examiner has an effect on people with bogus claims. I expect to see more in the coming days.
Tic Tot, Tic Tot time is running out. The good Judge knows her job. Rope has been given and at the present it is slowly taking a grip around BR neck. The SJ on 4B has been put on hold because IMO it’s part of the game. JPM already admitted in court 4B belong to WMI. The problem is FDIC. FDIC threatens the Judge to take the cash if JPM hands it over to WMI. IMO the Judge is once again going to give FDIC enough rope for a serious hang man noose. Also I think that the SEC is starting to become aware of a major problem they face in reference to naked short shares by not doing their job. So don’t worry about the 4 billion ruling. 4 Billion in this case is chump change.
Look again at footnote 1. It states, “Includes make whole payment to investors associated with 7.2b capital raise announced Apr 18, 2008” In other words pay off TPG.
Thanks. That document sure did shoot ABIGHAMMER theory down. IF TPG gets paid ABIGHAMMER gets paid. This is another example of the good ole boy club system. Special treatment for 1 investor to be made whole while the rest holds the bag. I would like to see a deposition on Bonderman.
Nice find. Would you mind if I posted this on Yahoo? Of course you’ll get the credit.