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AZCowboy +1000
Danke !!!!
Just
Report COOP
http://investors.mrcoopergroup.com/Cache/1001249484.PDF?O=PDF&T=&Y=&D=&FID=1001249484&iid=4401869
Tangible Book Value (TBV) sharecount92.090
TBV/share 21.29$ 19.89$
Just
Hello lodas
since some wonder where all the shares are coming from that are given away and why the price for COOP is so low should look at the graph (report). Maybe there is an explanation there.........
https://nakedshortreport.com/company/COOP
Greetings from Germany
Just
Thanks AZCowboy for bringing it into the right light.
~ For The Rest ?, Even The WMI-LT Disagrees ~
... The WMI-LT Itself informs in its Early SEC Filings of the limited financial control it gained at the reorganization ... and it’s also revealed in its early QSR’s ... as I’ve said many times ... but those relevant documents would have needed to be read’ for a proper understanding ... along with a consideration of the venue changed, the WMI Action ...
~ The WMI-LT’s SEC Filed QSR’s Have Been Accurate ~
~ The 75/25 ratios are limited to the RE-Distributions of The WMI-LTs Remains ~
~ No, NO I Will Never Be Issued An LTI ~
The financially relevant continued D,C. Litigation was obviously either ignored or disregarded by the few’ ... We’ ... were a very, very, long way from being done’, as was proffered at the lunch in 2012’ ...
The WMI-LT is WMI’s Liquidation Trust ... period ... currently with roughly $37 million left to RE-Distribute at those misunderstood 75/25 ratios ... but that’s it’ ... that is all’ ...
Everything financially relevant is Class Specific ... the WMB Class 17’s, and the WMI Class 19 and Class 22’s ...
AZ
PickStocks +10000000
Hello AZCowboy
Thanky you for showing the "faces" of some of our enemy's.
~ First Rule, Don’t Trust The Trust ~
Ain’t that right ? M Willingham and D Southard (dont_b_kruel), ...
Ain’t that right Mr Willingham ... ? ... just who exactly were you supposed to be representing again ? ...
Greetings from Germany
Just
AZCowboy thank you for your comments.
Yes your comments helped !!!
Greetings Just
Hello AZCowboy
abot your post:
~ Mr Gold’, It Is The “Truth”, After All ~
I’m planning on having the three point Liquidation Preference of the Capital Trust’ ... Framed For My Home Office’ ...
My WMB Class 17’s (not in default), and my WMI Class 19’s will do just fine’, my P’s especially’, as they Are “Convertible” ... my K’s should produce a nice chunk of Cash’ ...
Rock On Brother’ ... “it is what it is” ... and what it is ... ? ... is, it’s coming to an end’ ...
AZ
What about the WAMUQ ?? Class 21 (22)
Just
Hello AZCowboy it looks like somebody don't like your posting.
Don't worry it is alreday spread out in European boards. So it will be there for ever.
e.g.
https://forum.finanzen.net/forum/Sehr_interessant-t461347#pst_25420022
Greetings from Germany
Just
About the parrots and wishfull thinker..
Here in Germany we have a saying
What does an oak care if a wild boar rubs against it?
Stay your way and thank you for your sacrificial work !!
Just
Hello ItsMyOption
Thank you for your good work with good clear content clearly showing the problems and our frustration.
Great thanks from Germany
Justnormal
AZCowboy
thank you for your tireless and deep work in this complex structure. I wish you and your beloved ones a Merry Christmas and a Healthy New Year. For it to happen what we've all been waiting for.
Best regards from Germany
justnormal
EscrowDollars BS
Hello jerrylev please provide link to this information or is it just a made up story from you ???
Hello Ron keep up posting. I guess you hit a nerv of this JPM writers...
Just
Hello Lodas see naked short positions
https://nakedshortreport.com/company/WMIH
Justnormal
Hello katekir after all this time now you are on track..
Your Post from today.
I'll admit:I was wrong,I was wrong bigtime.I said there were not gonna come billions to us,not even 200 miilion.And now it looks like the billions are really gonna come to us.So I apoligize for not telling the truth to the board here.
Hello Olti100
what are you talking about? hotmeat miss the complete development !
Strange post from you ?
Hello cura asada sorry it was not about you. My message just followed yours.
Greetings Just
The transcript Mr. Carreon
It looks different to me....
http://wmish.com/de/090814/2008.10.30-HEARING%20TRANSCRIPT.PDF
Just
Merry Christmas to everybody who workt for the outcoming of the truth.
Justnormal
Hello Large thank you for your response !!
Hello Large, now this information is out a new 8k musst follow soon i gues.
Hello AZCowboy, Ron, CBA09, Large Green and so on
Thank you for your tireless work and deep insight into the complex process.
A question about the statement
"The Judge originally Ordered the Result’ ... The eventual result was then achieved and submitted on 12/12/2011’ ... All the Judge did’ was tweak and approve, ... “The Settlement” ... the contractual agreements time line started at the submission of the same, ... 12/11/2011’ "
In which document was this specified? GS?
Does this new statue change anything for the 6 year regulation?
Delaware Extends Statute of Limitations For Contract Claims to 20 Years
http://www.environmental-law.net/2014/08/...tract-claims-to-20-years/
Thank you guys in advance and keep on the informationflow
Greetings
Justnormal
Hello Zalviny,
thank you very much. But i knew it was a lie !
Just
Hello hotmeat from yesterday....
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/314643/000092963817000834/0000929638-17-000834-index.htm
Greetings from Germany
Just
Hello BBANBOB, excellent post !
Greetings Just
Sorry maybe this link works
http://www.globic.com/wamurmbssettlement/pdfs/WaMu%20Notice%20to%20Holders_7.5.2017.pdf
Hello AZCowboy at first thanks a lot for your info and DD.
Are those the Trusts you are talking about?
http://www.globic.com/wamurmbssettlement/pdfs/...Holders_7.5.2017.pdf
Keep on posting !!!
Greetings from Germany
just
Mr_Simpson72
http://www.seekingalpha.com/article/3779416
Mr. Troy Racki is a Dentist !!!
What does he know???
Come on stay serious
Just
Aaron Germany is trading !
Hello travelmile1
i am from Germany and i just try to get informations back and forth.
So it don't get lost on the way.
It is important for me to connect infos from both sides !!!
We have strong enemies.
See you
Just
Hello travelmile1
https://www.google.de/search?q=Dr.+Sankarshan+Acharya++Washington+Mutual&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&gws_rd=cr&ei=HnsNVarhJszcasj-gfAM
He made a few simply clear statements about this bank robbery !!!
Maybe we can contact him to get into this discussion.
See you
Just
Hello Tanja
a member from the german board just posted following document
Dr. Sankarshan Acharya 11.May.2010
http://www.kccllc.net/documents/0812229/0812229100603000000000011.pdf
interesting facts ain't it ??
Gruß
Just
Hallo Tanja,
yes you are right !
It is good to have you on our side !!!
I hope you dont mind that i post your point of view on the german boards
Keep on going !
Lieben Gruß
Just
Hi Tanja thanks for your DD !!!
some more information about that company
THACKERAY III BRIDGE, LLC
Corporation File #:
5067220
Formation Date:
01/17/2011
Corporation Type:
GENERAL
Corporation Kind:
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY (LLC)
Corporation State:
DE
Residency:
DOMESTIC
Corporation Registered Agent
Agent Name:
CORPORATION SERVICE COMPANY
Address:
2711 CENTERVILLE RD STE 400
WILMINGTON, DE 19808
Phone:
(302)636-5401
Interesting post from a German board
Interesting Lawsuit - JPM (former Wamu) testifies no transfer of loan ownership
https://www.boardpost.net/forum/index.php?topic=6964.msg92328#msg92328
Zitat kevins3021:
Very interesting link to testimony of JPM lawsuit where former Wamu employee states there are no documents showing any transfer of ownership of loans.
August 2012
No there is no assignments of mortgage. There’s no allonges. There’s no — in the thousands of loans that I have come into contact with that were a part of this purchase, I’ve never once seen an assignment of mortgage. There is simply not — they don’t exist. Or allonges or anything transferring ownership from WAMU to Chase, in other words. Specifically, endorsements and things like that.
http://foreclosuredefensenationwide.com/?p=469
--------------------------------------------------
From boardpost
https://www.boardpost.net/forum/index.php?topic=6926.msg91786#msg91786
Zitat ron_66271:
"When the FDIC takes over a failed bank, it typically lays claim to such assets with the holding company. Its demands are backed by the "source-of-strength doctrine" which the Federal Reserve Board issued nearly three decades ago and requires bank holding companies to support their banks financially. "
WMI was meeting FDIC's "source-of-strength doctrine" through Project Fillmore and 'The Letter' dated September 24, 2008, http://s.wsj.net/public/resources/documents/...sive-e-mails092810.pdf
The difference between WMI-WaMu and other banks was that WMI-WaMu had the cash on hand to be a "source-of-strength doctrine" to WMB as required. The FDIC did not have a "source-of-strength doctrine" argument against WMI-WaMu due to the funding proposed. The $4Billion SJ capital infusion, plus the $6.5 Billion in liquidity contributions. The D&O are ... stop... 'Stay Motion' for the $500MM.
The Tax sharing agreement was stealth-ed into a 'give away' to JPM/FDIC in the 363 Sale that awaits distribution to LT/Escrows with BK closure just like the CRAs.
I'm sure Owlcreek, Holdco Advisors and Vik Ghei, and many other learned the other side of a "source-of-strength doctrine" after reviewing the cash WMI-WaMu was advancing to WMB.
Due to the "source-of-strength doctrine" and WMI's cash on hand, I believe AAOC figured out the 5AT.
Hence, footnote 2; Fifth Amendment Taking. Do I need to re-post Footnote 2?
Ok, I will because I love reading it;
"In its capacity as a creditor, WMI claimed, among other things, that (i) the FDIC dissipated WMB?s assets by selling substantially all the assets of WMB to JPMC rather than liquidating WMB?s assets, and thus the FDIC breached its statutory duty to maximize the net present value return of such assets, and therefore owes damages to WMI; (ii) the FDIC?s wasting of WMB?s assets constitutes a taking for property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution; (iii) the FDIC?s refusal to compensate WMI for the property taken in the receivership constitutes a conversion of WMI?s property, actionable under federal law; and (iv) the FDIC?s refusal to compensate WMI of property taken in the Receivership constitutes a conversion of WMI?s property"
*************** Sent to me by a friend.
This is the most important thing...proof of what you and AZ and the group have been saying forever.
Subject: American Banker on HoldCo/Vik Ghei & Misha Zaitzeff/Corus
Hedge Funds Outwit FDIC in Fight for Failed-Bank Assets
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/178_136/...assets-1060622-1.html
Seen this article about Holdco Advisors and Vik Ghei who are involved with the Corus proceedings.
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. has been engaged in a running battle over the past three years with unsecured creditors over rights to assets owned by the holding companies of dozens of failed banks.
The disputes would be unremarkable except for one surprising fact: the unsecured creditors are beating the pants off the feds.
The assets at issue are essentially table scraps left behind by bankrupt banking companies. They include tax refunds, miscellaneous cash balances and claims against management. In some cases these scraps amount to hundreds of millions of dollars.
When the FDIC takes over a failed bank, it typically lays claim to such assets with the holding company. Its demands are backed by the "source-of-strength doctrine" which the Federal Reserve Board issued nearly three decades ago and requires bank holding companies to support their banks financially.
In a recent twist, however, hedge funds have led a group of debt holders in buying up billions of dollars' worth of failed-bank debt at pennies on the dollar. Then they have challenged the source-of-strength doctrine's validity in bankruptcy court with remarkable success.
Their victories have exposed a costly flaw in the FDIC's failed-bank resolution process that threatens its ability to recoup billions of dollars in assets. In the meantime, the FDIC has been relegated to settling some claims for far less than full value and appealing bankruptcy cases it has lost to higher courts. As with the original cases, it appears to face an uphill battle.
"The FDIC has had a hard time convincing the bankruptcy courts that the source-of-strength doctrine meets the requirements of the bankruptcy code," says Paul Lee, an attorney at Debevoise and Plimpton in New York City who represents large domestic and international banks and has written extensively on the doctrine.
The FDIC said it does not comment on ongoing legal matters.
Source of Weakness
The FDIC's right to seize failed-bank assets from their former holding companies has been disputed since the source-of-strength doctrine was first issued. For twenty years, however, it had rarely been challenged. Then the 2008 financial crisis brought the issue back into bankruptcy courts.
In what appears to be the most recent hedge fund victory, a federal judge in May awarded to the company's creditors a $30 million tax refund left behind by the bankrupt Imperial Capital Bancorp. The FDIC has said it may appeal the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
To prevail, it will need to convince appeals court judges to make a ruling that contrasts with the victories achieved by hedge fund-led creditors in the bankruptcies of IndyMac, BankUnited, AmFin and others.
The FDIC's argument is straightforward: If a bank was responsible for most or all of its holding company's revenue, its tax refunds should rightfully be the property of the bank and in bankruptcy be granted to the FDIC.
For the bank overseer, the catch is that such cases are decided on the basis of the precise wording of tax-sharing agreements between the holding companies and their banks, which differ slightly in each instance. In cases where the agreements fail to specify that a holding company must return refunds to a bank, bankruptcy judges have been ruling that the assets are rightfully the property of the holding company's creditors and not the FDIC.
These agreements "could easily have said that any refund received by the parent company belongs to the bank. Anylawyer worth his salt could have written it that way," says hedge fund partner Vik Ghei. "They did not say that, and in fact they said the opposite."
Ghei, a 31-year-old New York City native, has invested in the holding companies of over 70 failed or distressed banks. HoldCo Advisors, the fund he co-founded two years ago, has been involved in "virtually every community bank restructuring since the 2008 financial crisis," it said in a bankruptcy court filing last month. It has also outflanked the FDIC in several high-profile bankruptcy court cases in which it has sponsored creditor-friendly liquidations.
Currently, HoldCo owns $1.5 billion of debt in the parents of bankrupt or distressed financial firms. That makes it the largest creditor in IndyMac and owner of debt issued by Imperial Capital, BankUnited and Corus Bancshares.
Ghei's reputation as one of the most aggressive and successful investors in the business has garnered the ire of regulators and state agencies. An FDIC attorney characterized the fund as "a speculator whose views are entitled to no deference" and called its principals "gamblers" in a U.S. bankruptcy court filing. In another case, an attorney for the state of Michigan described the hedge fund's business as "buying up severely distressed debt for deep discounts and picking over the bones for scraps of flesh."
Beginning at WaMu
Ghei's career in dead-bank investing began with the Washington Mutual bankruptcy. Ghei was an analyst at the hedge fund Owl Creek Asset Management looking for investment opportunities in WaMu in September 2008 as financial markets were collapsing.
With a limited background in the field, he was tasked with investing in distressed banks based on his previous work with distressed companies at a private equity firm and as a Goldman Sachs analyst covering financial institutions.
The debt of Washington Mutual Inc., the holding company for the operating bank, was organized in a complex, multi-tranche structure and was trading at deep discounts. Ghei studied the company's corporate structure and realized that behind the debt was more than $4 billion of cash, as well as projected tax refunds.
"The holding company, in theory, was supposed to have nothing," Ghei says. "That's what I think people assumed. People did not realize there were so many assets, or who owned what."
The FDIC seized WaMu on September 25, 2008 after a nine-day bank run and sold it to JPMorgan Chase. On the morning of its failure, its holding company's approximately $4 billion of senior bonds were trading at pennies on the dollar of face value. Ghei had spent the previous night in the office analyzing the company and decided to pounce.
By that evening, the value of the debt he'd acquired had risen to around forty cents on the dollar. Over the next several months, Owl Creek increased its holdings in other types of WaMu debt, eventually becoming one of the holding company's largest creditors.
After one of the most complex bankruptcies in history, WaMu's creditors were repaid at par, plus accrued interest. That made Ghei's trades hugely lucrative for Owl Creek, which earned hundreds of millions of dollars and turned him from an analyst into a partner, Ghei says.
The WaMu bankruptcy also gave Ghei a crash course in how the bankruptcy process works for a bank holding company. He realized that he could potentially replicate the trade that had worked so spectacularly for Owl Creek with the hundreds of banks that had failed during the financial crisis.
Ghei decided to leave Owl Creek to invest in distressed financial firms at Tricadia Capital Management, the hedge fund famous for pioneering the CDO-squared. A year and a half later, he set up HoldCo, with Misha Zaitzeff, a former Tricadia analyst. Despite the large number of bank failures at the time, and bank holding companies with large amounts of debt, Ghei had a tough time convincing potential investors that his investment thesis was viable.
"People said 'Look, the FDIC is never going to let you get this money,'" Ghei recalls. "We were buying things that we thought had a lot of value but the market was basically laughing at us."
Brett Jefferson, who runs the hedge fund Hildene Capital, had serious doubts before investing with HoldCo. "At first I didn't trust him," Jeferson says of Ghei. "Everybody was trying to figure out ways to get something out of these deals, but he's already gotten us some recoveries."
More are likely on the way, if court decisions to date are any guide.
Creditors have prevailed over the FDIC in case after case. In March, a federal judge in Ohio rejected the FDIC's claim of rights to a $195 million tax refund due to AmFin Financial Corp., the holding company for AmTrust bank in Cleveland, which failed in December 2009. That decision followed a September ruling in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denying the FDIC's claim to $765 million from AmFin's estate.
Separately, a U.S. District Court judge for the Central District of California ruled last year that IndyMac Bancorp's creditors, and not the FDIC, were entitled to its $55 million tax refund.
In 2011, a U.S. bankruptcy judge in Florida awarded the creditors of BankUnited Financial Corp., the holding company for the Florida bank that failed in 2009, the company's $45 million tax refund. In the case of NetBank, the U.S. bankruptcy court for Florida affirmed that the company's $6.2 million tax refund belongs to the creditors. The ruling was later upheld by a U.S. district court in Florida.
A $1 Billion Appeal
The legal scrum over large tax refunds harks back to a 2009 law permitting companies to use losses incurred in 2008 and 2009 to offset taxes paid during the previous five years. All told, more than $1 billion worth of tax refunds are at stake in cases in which the FDIC is either awaiting a ruling or appealing a bankruptcy court verdict.
The agency's victories have been few. In 2011, a U.S. district court in Georgia awarded the FDIC more than $10 million in tax refunds from the estate of Integrity Bancshares. Unlike with many other banks, the tax-sharing agreement between Integrity and its holding company clearly granted ownership to the bank.
In cases where tax agreements fail to stipulate that holding company assets belong to the creditors of failed bank subsidiaries, the FDIC has marshaled a range of legal arguments. They include the claim that the agreements are ambiguous or flawed, and the invocation of decades-old case law involving nonbanks and in which tax agreements are absent.
Bankruptcy judges have rarely been persuaded and delivered some stinging rebukes. In the IndyMac opinion, Judge Sheri Bluebond of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for Los Angeles said the agency was, in essence, throwing up a legal smokescreen through the "sheer number of arguments and theories" it advanced, in order to complicate a straightforward case.
With AmFin, Judge John Adams of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio wrote that the company's tax-sharing agreement "unambiguously" grants the refund to the holding company, and that "the remaining arguments raised by the FDIC," have already been rejected by "numerous other courts."
As the case law against the FDIC mounts, hedge funds holding claims against failed bank holding companies have become bolder in pressing courts to reject the agency's arguments.
That boldness has even involved financing litigation against the FDIC. Owl Creek and two other hedge funds last year agreed to lend the estate of Colonial Bancgroup $15 million to fund legal expenses in the dispute with the FDIC. At stake: over $610 million in tax assets and other claims. One of the loans was structured to pay the hedge funds 15% annually in interest; the other involved the hedge funds receiving between 27.5% and 100% of the estate's litigation recoveries, depending on how much they recoup.
The FDIC objected on the grounds that the estate's case against the FDIC had been dormant for nearly eight months before the hedge funds stepped in. Judge Dwight Williams of the U.S. bankruptcy court for the Northern District of Alabama permitted the loan to go through, and litigation is ongoing.
Among cases where the FDIC could still prevail: the Corus litigation over a $250 million tax refund and the Downey Financial case involving a $374 million refund.
Some observers expect more losses for the FDIC. Creditors "are likely (though not certain) to prevail in all of the publicly tradable cases," wrote CRT Capital Group analyst Kevin Starke, who specializes in failed banks' debt.
The FDIC officials have "a bad argument," and have been losing these cases "because they should be losing them," says an attorney who asked to remain anonymous because he is involved in litigation against HoldCo.
There are signs that the FDIC is softening its stance, having concluded that expensive litigation offers less hope of recovery than do settlements.
In April, it agreed to a 50-50 split of a $3.3 million tax refund owed to Team Financial, which went bankrupt in 2009. Ghei, who helped negotiate that settlement, calls it a "fair" split and says he's hopeful that the FDIC will be willing to strike deals in other cases.
Beyond the current lawsuits, reforming the resolution process before the next round of bank failures is a major issue for the FDIC.
Strengthening the source-of-strength doctrine would require a legislative change and could take years. The banking industry would likely object, arguing that changing the law would make it harder to raise capital. Meanwhile, the FDIC has yet to propose any legal reforms, say lawyers involved in related litigation.
Another possible route for the FDIC would be to pressure banks to sign capital-maintenance agreements. That would involve requiring the directors of the holding companies for viable banks to pledge that they will use the parent's capital to support the bank, even in bankruptcy.
Even Ghei admits that such a move could solve the agency's problems.
"Guarantee agreements are written all the time and are enforceable," he says. "You can do that in a one-page agreement. You can probably do that in two sentences. But it didn't happen."
*********************
Need more?
--------------------------------------------------
friggin' unbelievable how these "gangster" steal our money
http://www.kccllc.net/wamu/document/0812229150116000000000001