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The Best news imo was HAP!!
Wave is right bang in the middle of the governments
HAP platform where Waves ALT MBR Patent will play
a very important role!!
Expect big government news this year......
Expect additional PC OEMs to come on board with
FDE drives this year besides HP....
Wave/DELL new platforms to deploy with new featured
Wave software with more secure pre boot process....
Alt MBR again.....
2010 is a Very HOT year for Wave on many fronts......
Wave is not involved with Google though....sorry Barge.
2011 for Dell Wave Consumers.....
Doma.
SL....i'll wait to get excited about
Google until i hear that Wave supports Trousers in
their TPM products....
Doma.
cartoon....my guess would be the TPM
is already turned on........
What is more important imo is who is going to
manage this network of trusted consumer devices,
who is going to be the Trusted Service Provider
for Google netbooks.....Google?
Doma.
Ispro...."on demand"
do you mean when you order the TPM as an option
you get the Broadcom TPM....?
Tia
Doma.
After looking some more DELL's Optiplex 960,780 & 760
desktops all have FDE has an option....!
Come on.... just 50% of Dell business machines!!
Doma.
Ispro.....when FDE deployment across Dell machines reaches
50% & Wave sells ERAS to 50% of just that market....that's
about $62.5 million a qtr....
Nice to see FDE in Dell desktops..
Doma.
New Dell 980 Optiplex offers fips 140 FDE
drive as an option..........
http://www.dell.com/us/en/enterprise/desktops/optiplex-980/pd.aspx?refid=optiplex-980&s=biz&cs=555
Doma.
Mig...well the recent Infineon TPM hack
makes that chance greater imo...any other
TPM manufacturer other then Infineon means a
shoe in for Wave's software.
Doma.
VH....WOW!First Consumer TPM PC from...............
GOOGLE!!
Great Find......
Barge will be in heaven............
Doma.
Snackman....thought it had probably been
posted before but i hadn't seen it...anyways it's on Wave's site...sure are seeing a lot of these recently...
Doma.
I will............thanks.
and GM was an HP customer that changed to Dell so
i guess that helped trigger the Wave HP deal?
Doma.
player1234....i know....:)but my point was that
Wave now has two Global Automakers...
Doma.
Thanks mewilli66!that's Two Global Automakers............
I believe the only reason we saw the other Automaker
announced was because they changed PC OEM & the wholesale
change over mean't a large initial contract rather than
say 2000 seats a month as per normal.....
Doma.
Mazda is a Dell customer.....but unless
Japan has moved to the U.S it cannot be considered
as the "U.S based Auto manufacturer"....therefore
Mazda is Wave's 2nd Global Automanufacturer....
I also believe the U.S based manufacturer changed
their PC OEM to DELL............hence the 3 year
contract.
Doma.
Warbil....Wave is still the default Dell bundle with
FDE drives....this sounds like a software FDE solution
offering by DELL that can be ordered at Dell's S&P...Yes
they have just introduced a FDE manager as well...
Wave's FDE & in particular TPM solutions are pretty hard
baked into Dells security suite.
Doma.
CREDANT Announces Encryption Security Solutions Now Available Factory Installed On Dell Commercial Client Systems
Last update: 2/25/2010 7:00:02 AM
Provides Customers with Compliance-Ready, Non-Disruptive, Centrally Controlled Endpoint Data Protection
DALLAS, Feb 25, 2010 (BUSINESS WIRE) -- CREDANT Technologies, the market leader in endpoint data protection solutions, will provide Dell with encryption and data protection for its commercial client systems. Beginning today, Dell customers may select the CREDANT Mobile Guardian Dell Edition security encryption solution factory installed on Dell Precision(TM) workstations, Latitude(TM) laptops and OptiPlex(TM) desktops, along with other CREDANT solutions through Dell's Software and Peripheral (S&P) store with commercial laptop and desktop computer purchases.
Bob Heard, CEO of CREDANT Technologies, said "We are delighted that Dell, one of the leading computer companies in the world, has selected CREDANT as a data protection and compliance supplier. It is inspiring that Dell recognizes the importance of data security and therefore empowers its business customers with intelligent encryption technology that will help protect their data from loss or breaches, and meet their compliance obligations, from the day they purchase a new PC."
CREDANT also announced the launch of CREDANT FDE DriveManager, which allows customers to manage self-encrypting hard drives shipped by Dell on Latitude PCs. These solutions offer customers complete flexibility in deciding which hardware and software solutions best meet their needs, safe in the knowledge that all of their data can be protected.
CREDANT has been providing encryption and data protection through Dell's S&P organization since 2009. Dell customers can purchase additional CREDANT data encryption software and solutions to protect the data at rest on legacy PC's, helping them meet their data compliance needs.
"Data protection is a concern that is top-of-mind for the customers we talk to on a daily basis," said Steve Lalla, VP and GM, Commercial Client Product Group, Dell. "The CREDANT Mobile Guardian Dell Edition solution meets that critical need and provides compliance-ready data encryption with minimal impact on operational processes and the user experience. This allows customers to focus on their core business and end users to get more done."
CREDANT Mobile Guardian is the only centrally managed endpoint data protection solution available providing strong authentication, intelligent encryption, usage controls, and key management for data recovery. By aligning security to the type of user, device, and location, CREDANT permits the audit and enforcement of security policies across all computing endpoints.
Dabears4....Wave's ENVOY Diagnostic Server & Patent!
Btw.....Great stuff from you as always.....thx!
"[0029] The account management server 206 can take the form of a WaveNet server provided by Wave Systems Corporation of Plainsboro, N.J., which is a known computer server for enabling secure payment of goods and services over the Internet for client computers having appropriate secure hardware 104 and software, such as SURF based hardware and software. A diagnostic server 204 can also be provided. The Envoy Diagnostic Web Server from Wave Systems Corporation of Plainsboro, N.J., is suitable for this application."
Inventors:Sprague, Steven (Lenox, MA, US)
Application Number:09/906375 Publication Date:01/16/2003 Filing Date:07/16/2001 View Patent Images:Download PDF 20030014631 PDF help Export Citation:Click for automatic bibliography generation Primary Class:713/168 International Classes:(IPC1-7): H04L009/00 Attorney, Agent or Firm:BAKER & BOTTS (30 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA, NEW YORK, NY, 10112)
Claims:What is claimed is:
1. A method for a user of a computer to access content anonymously from a third party content provider computer comprising: registering a persona having a persona identifier with a persona server to generate an access record; requesting access to content from the content provider using the persona identifier; the content provider generating a challenge message including, at least in part, the persona identifier and data uniquely verifiable by the content provider, and submitting the challenge message to the persona server; the persona server associating the persona identifier with the access record and generating an authentication object including the data uniquely verifiable by the content provider enveloped in a manner extractable only by an authorized user of the persona; the user computer receiving the authentication object; the user computer retrieving data from the access record; the user computer extracting the data uniquely verifiable by the content provider using the data from the access record; and the user computer submitting the extracted data to the content provider for authentication.
2. The method for a user of a computer to access content anonymously according to claim 1, wherein the user is a member of a group of authorized users and the persona identifier is associated with the group.
3. The method for a user of a computer to access content anonymously according to claim 1, wherein the data uniquely verifiable by the content provider is pseudo-random data generated by the content provider computer.
4. The method for a user of a computer to access content anonymously according to claim 1, wherein the user can register a plurality of persona identifiers with the persona server.
5. A method for a content provider to authorize anonymous user access to content on a computer network comprising: receiving a request for access from a user computer having a persona identifier; generating a challenge message including, at least in part, the persona identifier and verification data; submitting the challenge message to a persona server; receiving an authentication object from the persona server and forwarding the authentication object to the user computer, the authentication object including the verification data enveloped such that it is accessible only by an authorized user of the persona identifier; receiving the verification data from the user computer; and granting access to the user computer if the verification data is correct.
6. The method of authorizing anonymous access to content according to claim 5, wherein the verification data is pseudo-random data generated in response to the request for access.
7. The method of authorizing anonymous access to content according to claim 5, wherein the user extracts the verification data from the authentication object using data retrieved from the persona server.
8. The method of authorizing anonymous access to content according to claim 5, wherein the user is a member of a group of users.
9. The method of authorizing anonymous access to content according to claim 5, wherein the user has a plurality of persona identifiers.
10. A method of providing authentication data for a user of a persona to access content anonymously comprising: creating an access record based at least in part on a persona identifier and associating the persona identifier with substantially unique encryption data; receiving a challenge message from a content provider computer including the persona identifier and verification data; enveloping at least the verification data in accordance with the encryption data in the access record associated with the persona identifier to generate an authentication object; and providing the authentication object to at least one of the content provider and the persona user.
11. The method of providing authentication data for a user of a persona according to claim 10, wherein the authentication object is passed to the content provider and from the content provider to the persona user.
12. The method of providing authentication data for a user of a persona according to claim 10, wherein the authentication object is passed to the persona user.
13. A system for authenticating a user of an anonymous persona prior to granting access rights on a public network comprising: a plurality of client computers operatively coupled to the public network, the client computers storing at least one persona identifier; a persona server operatively coupled to the public network, the persona server maintaining a database of access records associated with a plurality of persona identifiers, the access records associating each persona identifier with corresponding decryption data; at least one content provider computer operatively coupled to the public network, in response to a request for access from one of the plurality of client computers using a persona identifier, the content provider computer generating a challenge message including the persona identifier and verification data associated with the request for access, the content provider computer submitting the challenge message to the persona server, the persona server receiving the challenge message and generating an authentication object including the verification data encrypted based on the access record associated with the persona identifier, the authentication object is presented to the client computer requesting access which, if authentic, retrieves data from the access record, decrypts the authentication object and returns the verification data to the content provider computer to establish user authentication.
14. The system for authenticating a user of an anonymous persona according to claim 13, wherein the persona server comprises: an authentication server operatively coupled to the public network; a digital rights management server operatively coupled to the authentication server; and an account management server operatively coupled to the authentication server, to the digital rights management server and to the public network.
15. The system for authenticating a user of an anonymous persona according to claim 13, wherein the plurality of client computers include secure hardware for storing the at least one persona identifier.
16. The system for authenticating a user of an anonymous persona according to claim 15, wherein the secure hardware is a SURF hardware device.
Description:FIELD OF THE INVENTION
[0001] The present invention relates generally to the access and use of content over a public network, such as the Internet, and more particularly relates to a system for access and use of content over a public network where users and groups are identified by a persona which is verifiable by a combination of the operations of the user computer and an authentication server.
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
[0002] The Internet is a vast public network that is now used by millions of users to access content and to engage in electronic commerce transactions. The growth of the Internet, however, has lead to concerns regarding the security of transactions over a public network and the unauthorized use of personal information and personal profiles for improper purposes. For example, as a user accesses a website on the Internet, the user may be required to register with the service provider and divulge personal information and payment information, such as credit card data. The user's activities can be tracked and this information used to establish personal profiles which are commonly sold to others interested in directing marketing efforts to users with certain profiles. Such marketing efforts generally result in unsolicited and unwanted advertisements being directed to the consumer. There is also concern that such profiles can be used for improper purposes, such as theft of an individual's identity and other crimes against the user.
[0003] U.S. Pat. No. 5,815,665, the entire specification of which is herein incorporated by reference, is directed to a system and method for providing trusted brokering services over a distributed network. In the systems and methods disclosed in this patent, a user requests access to a content provider and is provided with a “challenge” message. The user computer provides a response to the challenge message which is passed by the service provider to an online broker server. The broker server uses the response to verify the user identity and provide an anonymous identifier for the user to the content provider for subsequent billing purposes. In this system, the “trust” resides with the broker server and not with the client.
[0004] It would be desirable to have a system where the identity of the user remains anonymous and the user was verifiable by a trusted client computer or the combination of a trusted server and a trusted client computer.
OBJECTS AND SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
[0005] It is an object to provide a system and method for enabling electronic commerce transactions over a public network while maintaining a substantial degree of user anonymity.
[0006] It is a further object to provide a system and method for enabling an individual user or a group of users to be identified by a persona or alias which can be authorized by an authentication server and a user of a trusted client computer.
[0007] It is yet another object to authenticate that a user is a member of an authorized group of users without the individual user's identity being disclosed.
[0008] A method for one or more user(s) to access content anonymously from a third party content provider computer includes the step of a user registering a persona having a persona identifier with a persona server to generate an access record. In the case of a group of users, once an access record for the group is generated, additional personas can be added to the access record by modifying the existing access record. A user requests access to content from the content provider using the persona identifier. In response, the content provider computer generates a challenge message including, at least in part, the persona identifier and data uniquely verifiable by the content provider computer, and submits the challenge message to the persona server. The persona server associates the persona identifier of the challenge message with the access record and generates an authentication object including the data uniquely verifiable by the content provider computer enveloped in such a manner that it is extractable only by a computer of a user of the persona authorized to retrieve the access record. The user receives the authentication object and retrieves the access record from the personal server. Using data stored in the access record, the user extracts the data which is uniquely verifiable by the content provider computer. The user then submits the extracted data which is uniquely verifiable by the content provider computer to the content provider for authentication and access control.
[0009] Another embodiment of the present invention is a method for authorizing anonymous access to content that includes: receiving a request for access from a user having a persona identifier; generating a challenge message including, at least in part, the persona identifier and verification data; submitting the challenge message to the persona server; receiving an authentication object from the persona server and forwarding the authentication object to the user computer, the authentication object packaging the verification data such that it is accessible only by the authorized user computer; receiving the verification data from the user computer; and granting access to the user if the verification data is correct.
[0010] The present invention also includes a method of generating an authentication object for a user of a persona to access content anonymously, which is generally performed by a persona server acting as an authorization agent. The method includes registering a user persona by creating an access record based at least in part on a persona identifier and registration data provided by a user associated with the persona identifier. Upon receiving a challenge message from a content provider computer, including the persona identifier and verification data, the method provides for enveloping at least the verification data in accordance with data stored in the access record associated with the persona identifier to generate an authentication object. The authentication object is provided either to the content provider computer, which in turn forwards it to the persona user, or directly to the persona user. If the persona user requesting access to the content provider is authentic, the user computer can retrieve the access record, extract the verification data and submit the verification data to the content provider for authentication.
[0011] Also in accordance with the present invention is a system for authenticating a user of a persona prior to granting access rights over a public network. The system includes a plurality of client computers which are operatively coupled to the public network. The client computers store at least one persona identifier. Preferably, the persona identifiers are stored in secure hardware which is operatively coupled to the client computer. The system also includes a persona server which is operatively coupled to the public network and maintains a database of access records that are associated with the plurality of persona identifiers. The access records generally include data to associate each persona identifier with the corresponding decryption keys. At least one content provider computer is operatively coupled to the public network. In response to a request for access from one of the plurality of client computers using a persona identifier, the content provider computer generates a challenge message including the persona identifier and verification data associated with the request for access. The content provider computer submits the challenge message to the persona server which in turn generates an authentication object.
[0012] The authentication object generally includes the verification data encrypted based on data in the access record associated with the persona identifier. The authentication object is then presented to the client computer requesting access. If the client computer is an authentic user of the persona, the client computer can retrieve data from the access record to decrypt the authentication object and return the verification data to the content provider computer to establish user authentication.
[0013] Also in accordance with the present invention is a system for authenticating a member of a group of users of a persona prior to granting access rights over a public network. The system includes a plurality of client computers which are operatively coupled to the public network. The client computers store at least one group identifier. Preferably, the group identifiers are stored in secure hardware which is operatively coupled to the client computer. The system also includes a persona server which is operatively coupled to the public network and maintains a database of access records that are associated with the plurality of group identifiers. The access records generally include data to associate each group identifier with the corresponding decryption keys. At least one content provider computer is operatively coupled to the public network. In response to a request for access from one of the plurality of client computers using a group identifier, the content provider computer generates a challenge message including the group identifier and verification data associated with the request for access. The content provider computer submits the challenge message to the persona server which in turn generates an authentication object.
[0014] The authentication object generally includes the verification data encrypted based on data in the access record associated with the group identifier. The authentication object is then presented to the client computer requesting access. If the client computer is an authentic member of the group, the client computer can retrieve data from the access record to decrypt the authentication object and return the verification data to the content provider computer to establish user authentication.
[0015] These and other objects and features of the invention will become apparent from the description of preferred embodiments of the present invention in connection with the drawings.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0016] The invention will be described in connection with certain preferred embodiments thereof in connection with the following drawings, in which:
[0017] FIG. 1 is a simplified block diagram illustrating the present system;
[0018] FIG. 2 is a simplified block diagram of the present system and further illustrating the functional blocks of one embodiment of the persona server;
[0019] FIG. 3 is a flow chart illustrating the process of accessing a third party content provider server with a user persona, in accordance with the present invention;
[0020] FIG. 4 is a flow chart which further illustrates the process of a user generating an authentication object in accordance with one embodiment of the invention; and
[0021] FIG. 5 is a flow chart illustrating the process of registering a persona with a third party content provider website.
[0022] FIG. 6 is a system level flow diagram illustrating an embodiment of a persona registration process.
[0023] FIG. 7 is a system level flow diagram illustrating an embodiment of use of a persona to gain access to a third party content provider.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS
[0024] FIG. 1 is a simplified block diagram of the present system for authenticating individual users or individual members of a group of users using a pseudo-anonymous identifier, which is referred to herein as a persona. The persona is an identifier which is used to grant rights to users and enable transactions between users and third parties while protecting the actual identity of the user. A user or group of users can have a number of personas which are used for different service providers or content providers. In this way, the ability of such providers to share and accumulate user profile data is reduced.
[0025] Referring to FIG. 1, a client computer 100 is operated by a user and includes appropriate interface circuitry to access a public network 102 , such as the Internet. The client computer 100 can take the form of a personal computer, set-top box, hand held computing device and the like.
[0026] To insure a level of security or trust in the client computer 100 , the client computer 100 includes secure hardware 104 to facilitate the payment for goods and services purchased over the public network 102 . The secure hardware 104 preferably includes a dedicated microprocessor and a secure memory area for storing encryption keys and the like. The secure hardware 104 can take the form of a SURF (secure usage reporting functions) device and associated software, such as the USB WaveMeter™ which includes a SURF C device and is available from Wave Systems Corporation of Plainsboro, N.J. The SURF protocol is described in U.S. Pat. Nos. 5,351,293, 5,615,264, 5,671,283 and 5,764,762 which are hereby incorporated by reference in their entireties. The SURF hardware can be embedded in the client computer or can be added as a peripheral device connected to an interface port of the client computer 100 . The use of appropriate secure hardware 104 and software can render the client computer 100 into a trusted client, i.e., there is a high level of assurance that once verified, the identity of the client is authentic rather than being an imposter or “hacker.”
[0027] An overview of the operation of the system of FIG. 1 is now provided. The client computer 100 communicates with a content provider computer 106 via the public network 102 . Similarly, the client computer 102 communicates with a persona server 108 via the public network 102 . In addition, communication between the content provider computer 106 and the persona server 108 is also provided via the public network 102 . In general, a user of the client computer 102 will request access to the content provider computer 106 and will identify itself with a persona identifier. The content provider computer 106 will provide the persona identifier, along with a challenge message, to the persona server 108 . The persona server will generate an authentication object based upon the information provided by the third party content provider computer and data stored in a database having an access record associated with the persona. The authentication object is provided to the content provider computer 106 which in turn passes the authentication object to the client computer 100 . Using the secure hardware 104 and data from the persona server 108 , the client computer 100 extracts the challenge data and provides the challenge data to the content provider computer 106 as user authentication.
[0028] FIG. 2 is a block diagram of the system of FIG. 1 that further illustrates an exemplary embodiment of the persona server 108 . In this embodiment, the persona server 108 includes an authentication server 200 which is operatively coupled to the client computer 100 and the content provider computer 106 via the public network 102 . There is also a digital rights management (DRM) server 202 and an account management server 206 which are in electrical communication with each other and with the authentication server 200 . The DRM server 202 can take the form of a MyPublish server provided by Wave Systems Corporation of Plainsboro, N.J., which is a known computer server for enabling the secure publication of digital content on a public network, such as the Internet.
[0029] The account management server 206 can take the form of a WaveNet server provided by Wave Systems Corporation of Plainsboro, N.J., which is a known computer server for enabling secure payment of goods and services over the Internet for client computers having appropriate secure hardware 104 and software, such as SURF based hardware and software. A diagnostic server 204 can also be provided. The Envoy Diagnostic Web Server from Wave Systems Corporation of Plainsboro, N.J., is suitable for this application.
Press Release Source: Wave Systems Corp. On Tuesday February 16, 2010, 8:30 am
LEE, MA and SCOTTS VALLEY, CA--(Marketwire - 02/16/10) - Before selecting one of the leading software-based full disk encryption solutions, consider this: It could take up to 24 hours to configure, install and encrypt the contents of the hard drive. That's per user. Compare this to self-encrypting drives -- where encryption is built into the drive itself. Each drive takes only a minute or two to configure.
These and other findings are detailed in the newly published review "FDE Performance Comparison: Hardware vs. Software Full Drive Encryption," by Trusted Strategies LLC, an advisory firm specializing in IT security based in Pleasanton, California. The complete report, sponsored by Seagate Technology (NASDAQ:STX - News) and Wave Systems (NASDAQ:WAVX - News), is available at http://www.trustedstrategies.com/papers/comparing_hardware_and_software_fde.pdf.
In its research, Trusted Strategies ran tests on three leading software FDE solutions and one hardware FDE solution, Seagate self-encrypting hard drives, putting them through a battery of tests such as initialization, system backups, virus scanning and opening, reading and writing large 100MB+ files used with larger applications. Startup and application loading took appreciably longer on platforms running software encryption. The biggest performance difference came with specific tasks, such as virus scanning or copying large amounts of data where hardware-based encryption was 114 percent faster than the average software FDE solution and comparable to the performance of a standard, non-encrypting hard drive.
Other highlights of the report include:
-- HARDWARE SPEEDS ENCRYPTION -- Self-encrypting drives performed between 77 and 144 percent faster than the software FDE. File/write performance tests showed hardware encryption performed 43 percent faster than the average of the three software FDE solutions.-- SOFTWARE FDE CAN TAKE A FULL DAY TO DEPLOY AND ENCRYPT DATA -- Installation and configurations for software can take from 12 to 25 minutes, but encrypting the data on a drive adds hours to the process. One software FDE solution took 23 hours and 46 minutes to complete the encryption on a 500 GB drive.-- HARDWARE PROVIDES STRONGER PROTECTION OF KEYS -- With self-encrypting drives, the encryption keys are created and always held in the protected hardware of the drive. Therefore, they are not exposed to memory and CPU attacks. In addition, the user authentication is done securely by the drive hardware.-- SOFTWARE FDE SOLUTIONS DON'T ALWAYS PROVIDE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE -- A primary driver for laptop encryption is to achieve compliance with various data protection laws. While some software-based FDE solutions do a "reasonably good job" in reporting and central management, other software-based solutions can't prove that a specific laptop's disk was ever encrypted or that it is still being encrypted.
"Any type of full disk encryption is better than no encryption at all," noted Trusted Strategies' Bill Bosen, lead author of the review. "Software encryption is a good solution for continued use on legacy machines until the next purchase of laptops. Then it's a good idea to take advantage of the performance, security, and installation advantages of hardware-based protection. Self-encrypting drives, coupled with their powerful central management solutions are clearly the way of the future."
"The chief perennial drawbacks to deploying software encryption for laptop computers are its management complexity and its significant drag on system performance," said Dave Mosley, Seagate Executive Vice President, Sales, Marketing and Product Line Management. "Seagate continues to work closely with Wave Systems and other independent software vendors to deliver hardware-based laptop PC security that centralizes and simplifies the management of secure laptops, reduces related costs, preserves full system performance and, in the end, brings laptop security to a wider range of computer users."
"One of the most striking findings in the Trusted Strategies benchmark review was the significant differences in the time it took for Wave's preboot authentication to occur in the Seagate® drives vs. the software encryption pre-boot solutions," commented Lark Allen, Executive Vice President of Business Development for Wave Systems. "With Wave's pre-boot code on the self-encrypting drives, it added only two additional seconds to authenticate the user and unlock the drive. Software encryption preboot, on the other hand, added a significant amount of time -- between 19 and 23 seconds. That's a real performance penalty every time a user unlocks their system."
About Seagate
Seagate is the worldwide
i wonder if he tried just guessing
the password....?
Doma.
boombreaker...it cost him $200,000 to hack into
a $4 chip....he blew up many TPMs before he perfected
his tehnique to get into one chip.Even if somebody thought
it was worth spending the money & finding the right person
to do the job there is no garantee they wouldn't also
blow the chip.
As pointed out in the TCG p.r this only breaks one TPM
chip......300 million to go.
I think this is great p.r for TPMs!
Doma.
Taxi..............WOW!
Our partner Northrop deploying a TPM infrastructure...
whose tech are they using?
Doma.
Seagate fips 140 FDE drive.............
http://www.seagate.com/www/en-us/products/laptops/momentus/momentus_7200_fde_fips_140_2
Doma.
did somebody margin?
Unless you all stop using margin the MM's are
going to keep taking you guys out..........
ERAS sales continue to record 100% qtr'ly growth.
Q4 will see 100% growth over Q3 & Q1 100% over
Q4.....that's existing & new customers not pilots.
Doma.
Lenovo have gone SOLO.........a while back.
They have their own TPM software....
They now have their own FDE software....
Just April this year they were claiming Wave's
FDE solution was not interoperable across FDE
manufacturers & their's was the only solution
that was....seems they are still claiming this!
Doma
ERAS Licence Consumption...........
http://www.wave.com/support/documents/ERAS/ERAS-002.asp#
Doma.
Thanks SL & AWK.............
So SL....care to expand a little on the "linchpin" patent?
How does Wave make money from this & what position does
ALT MBR put Wave in....in the TC Space?Has this been implemented
yet in Dell's controlpoint & FDE drives?Your opinions would be
welcomed............Tia.
Doma.
AWK..........thanks.
Is there really a hole in TC without
Alt MBR...........iyo?
Doma.
Is "Shadow Master Pre Boot" Alt MBR??
Thanks Jake.......Lark mentions they now have
Shadow Master Pre Boot on these FDE drives...
This is a TCG Spec according to Lark.........
Doma.
How important is Wave's Alt MBR patent?
Not only to Wave but also for Trusted Computing?
If the transitive trust chain is broken so is TC..
Does anyone know if ALT MBR is currently in use?Tia
SRTM.....Static Root of Trust Measurement
DRTM.....Dynamic Root of Trust Measurement
CRTM.....Core Root of Trust Measurement
"One problem with current implementations of SRTM and DRTM is that measurement of code integrity is terminated after the initial program loader ("IPL") has been measured, i.e. at the point at which the OS is booted. Current implementations of SRTM and DRTM do not perform platform state measurement of the OS or of any OS-present applications, and thus the transitive trust chain is broken and a subsequent of functions cannot be trusted. While a new secondary root of trust can be created after the OS loads, there is no way to be certain that the new root of trust has not been compromised if the OS has not been measured. Another problem with current implementations of SRTM and DRTM is that not all PC platforms utilize a BIOS that is able to take advantage of the CRTM.
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
[0007]In accordance with an illustrative embodiment of the present invention, a trusted hard disk drive ("THDD") contains cryptographic primitives and support functions including an alternative master boot record ("ALT-MBR"). The ALT-MBR performs all necessary measurements of the trusted platform ("TP"). The TP, in turn, performs all necessary measurements of the master boot record ("MBR"), a personal computer platform's OS, and the OS-present applications, including a platform trust service ("PTS") kernel. The PTS kernel subsequently performs the measurement functions to allow the transitive trust chain to continue."
In more detail..............
20. A method of performing access control on a computing platform comprising:measuring a program(s) contained in the alternative master boot record ("ALT-MBR") stored on a trusted hard disk drive ("THDD");measuring one or more portions of a trusted partition in the THDD using the program(s) contained in the ALT-MBR;comparing the values of the measurement of the trusted partition with an expected reference value to determine a level of trustworthiness; anddetermining access rights on the platform based on the determined level of trustworthiness.
21. A method of performing network access control on a computing platform comprising:measuring a program(s) contained in the alternative master boot record ("ALT-MBR") stored on a trusted hard disk drive ("THDD");measuring one or more portions of a trusted partition in the THDD using the program(s) contained in the ALT-MBR;comparing the values of the measurement of the trusted partition with an expected reference value to determine that the trusted partition is trustworthy;determining, using the trusted partition, whether the platform is connected to a particular set of one or more computers;permitting an operating system for the platform to boot based on whether the platform is connected to said particular set of one or more computers.
22. A method for making access control decisions for a computing platform, the computing platform including a Trusted Platform Module ("TPM"), the method comprising:passing control of trustworthiness measurement of the computing platform to program(s) loaded from an alternative master boot record ("ALT-MBR"),using the TPM to record trustworthiness measurements;verifying the TPM state; andmaking access control decisions for the computing platform based on the verified TPM state.
23. A system for making access control decisions for a computing platform, the computing platform including a Trusted Platform Module ("TPM"), the system comprising:an alternative master boot record ("ALT-MBR") having programs for trustworthiness measurement of the computing platform,wherein the TPM is configured to record trustworthiness events;a verifier of the TPM state; andmeans for making access control decisions for the computing platform based on the verified TPM state.
Description:
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
[0001]The Trusted Computing Group ("TCG") has created specifications and standards that describe how to measure and verify the trustworthiness of a computing platform with the assistance of a Trusted Platform Module ("TPM") and accompanying BIOS code, which is rooted in the core root of trust for measurement ("CRTM"). Familiarity with the TCG's "trusted computing" specifications, which are incorporated herein by reference, is assumed.
[0002]The TPM stores, protects, and reports various measurements of the PC's integrity. The TPM also generates and stores cryptographic keys (for example, a public/private key pair) that may be used to authenticate those integrity measurements using, for example, digital signature and verification.
[0003]According to the TCG standards, various metrics may be utilized to characterize the integrity or trustworthiness of a particular PC. For example, every operating system ("OS") platform includes a set of device drivers, executables, and other software components. A measurement (such as a hash digest) of the OS components when the OS is in a trusted state (e.g., such as when the OS is first installed on the PC) may function as an integrity metric, since comparison of that trusted measurement with a measurement taken at some later point in time would indicate whether the OS components had been altered or changed in some way. In fact, any hash digest of the PC's software configuration may potentially be used as a measurement to later verify the integrity of that configuration.
[0004]One way that the integrity of a PC's computing platform may be verified is by use of a transitive chain of trust. This is an iterative process that begins with a root of trust established in the PC that is capable of describing a trustworthy state of a second group of measurement functions. Based on this description, a verifier may determine the level of trust that it will place in this second group of functions. If the verifier determines this second group of functions to have an acceptable level of trustworthiness, then the trust boundary is extended from the root of trust to include the second group of functions. The now-trusted second group of functions may now be utilized to describe a trustworthy state of a third group of functions, which extends the trust boundary to the third group of functions, and so on.
[0005]The transitive trust model may be applied to measuring the integrity or trustworthiness of the components of a PC. The TCG's trusted computing standard currently describes two models for doing so: static root of trust for measurement ("SRTM") and dynamic root of trust for measurement ("DRTM"). The SRTM model uses a well-known starting state, such as the PC's power-on BIOS boot block, as a CRTM. In SRTM, measurement must occur at the actual boot time of the PC, and thus occurs only a single time for each boot of the platform. The DRTM model begins with an un-trusted state prior to initiation of its CRTM, and transitions to a trusted state. In DRTM, measurement may occur at any time after the boot of the PC, and can occur more than once.
[0006]One problem with current implementations of SRTM and DRTM is that measurement of code integrity is terminated after the initial program loader ("IPL") has been measured, i.e. at the point at which the OS is booted. Current implementations of SRTM and DRTM do not perform platform state measurement of the OS or of any OS-present applications, and thus the transitive trust chain is broken and a subsequent of functions cannot be trusted. While a new secondary root of trust can be created after the OS loads, there is no way to be certain that the new root of trust has not been compromised if the OS has not been measured. Another problem with current implementations of SRTM and DRTM is that not all PC platforms utilize a BIOS that is able to take advantage of the CRTM.
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
[0007]In accordance with an illustrative embodiment of the present invention, a trusted hard disk drive ("THDD") contains cryptographic primitives and support functions including an alternative master boot record ("ALT-MBR"). The ALT-MBR performs all necessary measurements of the trusted platform ("TP"). The TP, in turn, performs all necessary measurements of the master boot record ("MBR"), a personal computer platform's OS, and the OS-present applications, including a platform trust service ("PTS") kernel. The PTS kernel subsequently performs the measurement functions to allow the transitive trust chain to continue.
[0008]The ALT-MBR also performs functions to clear the PC platform's state such that any events that occurred prior to its execution will not alter the functionality of the OS-present applications. These functions may, for example, include clearing the PC's microprocessor, system memory and cache. In accordance with an illustrative embodiment of the present invention, DRTM types of system resets such as, but not limited to, those performed using Intel's.RTM. LaGrande.TM. technology, may be performed after the PC's OS has booted to force system clears to return the PC platform to a trusted state. Advantageously, the invention can operate within SRTM or DRTM models.
Read more: http://209.85.229.132/search?q=cache:QVwLVMbdkjAJ:www.faqs.org/patents/app/20090172378+mbr+steven+sprague&cd=3&hl=tr&ct=clnk&gl=tr#ixzz0dSg3vxqF
weets..........OT
Fwiw there is a Jesse Livermore that sometimes
frequents the Yahoo Citigroup board....saw him
there the last month or so.
Doma.
"Investors are viewing it as a positive investment theme for 2010 with Symantec, McAfee, and Checkpoint being front and center."
Checkpoint just lost a 100,000 seat FDE deployment to
Wave even when Checkpoint offered the 100,000 seats for
free..............looking forward to Wave being front &
center.....which it now is to that Automaker...who can now
use that ERAS licence to turn on their TPMs!
Doma.
Thanks X-point!...Seems TPMs are a part of Xen Architecture
Another slide covers Xen Architectural's Advantages -
Xen's true hypervisor architecture enables
excellent security and scalability
• Lightweight service domains
- I/O driver domains and utility domains
- Device emulation domains
- Domain building / measurement domains
• Allows efficient large SMP scalability
• Minimum privilege, small TCB
- De-privilege and disaggregate domain 0
True hypervisor design
- Small privileged component, principle of least privilege
• Secure compartmentalization
- Grant tables allow controlled sharing
• Optimized as a hypervisor
• Cross-platform: x86, ia64, Power and ARM
• OS agnostic: Windows, Linux, Solaris, *BSD
• Flexible to enable domain0 disaggregation
- Control-plane OS (e.g. OpenBSD or MiniOS)
- Driver domains
- Service domains (e.g. virus scanners, firewalls etc)
Ian briefly covers the Xen Project Roadmap as well -
Server
- Performance and scalability optimizations
- Enable Smart IO devices
- SCSI pass-through
• Security
- Domain0 disaggregation; XSM Xen Security Modules
- Secure boot, TPM, certification, multi-level secure systems
• Client
- Power management
Suspend and hibernate; Clock management
- 3D video
direct h/w access; high-performance guest virtualization
- USB device pass-through
Cartoon....the NHS?!
Well if it's the UK National Health Service
that's only 1.5 million employees........
Doma.
I found the link but ...
http://afitc.gunter.af.mil/documents/presentations/Security/SEC02-Emerging% 20Technology.ppt
it no longer works .......
thought i would revisit it to see who else might be
upgrading,i remember EDS ... do not recall an Auto
company.
Doma.
Does anyone have that Wave PPT that shows
Wave's 200 customers?
Tia
Doma.
ASISEEIT....and GM's IT contract with HP/EDS runs to
2011.....and then GM sold EDS to HP.
Doma.
Zen..........thanks!....but dark side...me?
Wave has proved they can sell to a Giant....Wave
has come back from the dark side.....:)
Doma.
Great news!!....well done Wave's management...
As to who.....GM or Ford.....unless things have
changed in a big way according to info on the
WWW Ford is aligned with Dell while HP is aligned
with GM....
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/108289/GM_awards_IT_outsourcing_contracts_worth_7B
The P.R said TDM is bundled with FDE drives from several
PC manufacturers....i was only aware of Dell....could a deal
be signed but not announced yet?
2010 will hopefully be awesome!....this is a major
game changer....
Doma.