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Yes...I am reminded of the past BS from FDA...shoot, I have tried to block out the bad memories to no avail!
That said, I am guessing that Anatabloc could still be sold as a neutraceutical assuming they revoked their submission for having it go through approvals for drug submission?
If not, then sell it in Europe like apparently is being now and what's the FDA going to stop you from ordering it for delivery in US? Of course, whether Hydrapharm or whoever is violating property rights is another matter.
I think some seem to be forgetting that FDA never banned Anatabloc for sale as neutraceutical. Only said that claims were a problem. I believe RCPI voluntarily removed selling as neutraceutical as matter of strategy since they opted to pursue the pharma/drug route.
very much doubt they are time release...would likely say so on packaging (assuming they are reputable and why wouldn't they?). Also, you would think dosage would be higher for time release...idea is you only have to take one/day for instance...that is not the case with the dosage/# of mg.
Knuts, I fully agree with you. While I very much appreciate Mine's follow-up, the Trustee and counsel should know much more than they apparently do. And shame on Mullan, Jenkins, etc. for getting us into this predicament with their gross mismanagement of our investment. They were bamboozled by a shady creditor deal that put the nail in the coffin IMO. Yes, they gave up a few years of salary (perhaps) but landed on their feet and have apparently washed their hands of RCPI...many of us lost considerably more. I expect that somehow/someway the creditors will end up being winners - whether legally or illegally (but never to be caught/prosecuted).
Fairly disappointing that a representative of the trustee can be so much in the dark. Any person with 30 minutes on Google and looking at a few web sites websites apparently would be more enlightened than this contact. And there won't be much left after the court lawyer/trustee does his billing???...sheesh...the system stinks.
Good for you. I have enough tax losses accrued for 8-10 lifetimes!
This is all completely UNACCEPTABLE. Can't get any information back from trustee (although looking forward to hearing from our poster today who is supposed to be speaking with someone representing trustee?). I am guessing the trustee is only now compelled to respond to a "nuisance" as he perceives it getting in the way of his well compensated administrative tasks. We get no word/debrief from any of the parties (Mullan, Jenkins, etc.) who we put our faith in to look out for shareholder interests. If I lived closer to Sarasota I would camp out in Roskamp Institute parking lot until I caught Mullan coming in with his morning coffee and ask him what the hell "went and is going on!". Many of us lost big $...yes, very bad investing and will readily admit as such...but I, for one, am unwilling to simply be pushed under the rug and go away quietly. I believe some illegal manipulative behavior went on somewhere along the way...and some of these thieves are expecting to recoup their losses, somehow, someway after they believe the shareholder "dust" has settled. We need representation!
Look forward to your report! Thanks
Shouldn't there be some bankruptcy court entry indicating that creditors had been paid "something" based on sale of (assets) patent rights? With all due respect, the only thing meaningful here would be a court entry vs. something from BONO or some other "source".
To repeat, Knuts where do you see a connection here?
You can do alot with a cheap printer and some adhesive labels these days...especially if you are able to realize over $100/bottle margin.
Makes me wonder if this "company" didn't simply acquire some remaining inventory, slap a new label on the bottle and double the price. Says only "5" still available...and they "specialize" in products that are hard to find elsewhere.
Looks like same 2mg as before...but only qty 150 vs. 300. In effect doubling price of what original Anatabloc was.
Who is Hydrapharm?...they are selling Anatabine out on Amazon?!
https://www.amazon.com/Hydrapharm-Anatabloc-Anatabine-Accelerate-Clinically/dp/B076WWPL5H/ref=sr_1_3_a_it?ie=UTF8&qid=1509582589&sr=8-3&keywords=Anatabine&dpID=41G%252BmQBC3QL&preST=_SY300_QL70_&dpSrc=srch
1M shares = ~ $1,000. Maybe not even a rounding error for what's been lost by many. I am not going to read too much into it. Some tax accountant may be trying to figure out how to best capture losses among various clients...
In the quantities they require, I doubt much of an issue...
Here is Roskamp Facebook link which references anatabine research and possible treatment for TBI.
https://www.facebook.com/TheRoskampInstitute/posts/1394806637224668:0
No. I think it's basically a shell of a company that Mullan set up in anticipation of the Nivaldipine study having positive results.
Not sure I want to dedicate the cycles to recall the MOA of anatabine vs. failed work to date re: Alheimers. All I know is that at least one of the theories of how RCPI might be resurrected from the trash pile is now dead. Doesn't mean every last morsel of hope is completely gone. Without Nilvadipine, researchers involved with Mullan are more in need of alternatives than ever...and they have at least some other things going with Abine (gov study with Gulf War syndrome, etc.). That said, all still a very longshot. The price of the stock tells the story and likely always has. Maybe Bono can weigh in with a hopeful, cryptic haiku.
That Nivaldipine trial conclusion was "negative"? I certainly do not recall that specifically being discussed.
Agree with you. The fanfare will come beating the door down if the results are good. First things first...but if in the fanfare, Mullan gets an opportunity to beat the Abine drum, perhaps there is hope.
Hope you are correct, Knuts...we will be watching.
Good post. Thanks Knuts!
perhaps some responses in Haiku...you know, the 5-7-5 syllable thing!
Good post. My unsophisticated opinion is to "hang in there". Stay away from the news for a few days...things will eventually get better.
maybe 2020...I am guessing 2019 at the very earliest. Unless, someone sees "writing on wall" before then and signs a deal or buys the company.
Don't Let Interdigital Slip Through Your Fingers
Aug. 11, 2017 11:58 AM ET|
2 comments|
About: InterDigital, Inc. (IDCC)
Khursheed Brothers
Khursheed Brothers
Long only, Deep Value, special situations, contrarian
Khursheed Holdings
(25 followers)
Summary
Interdigital has a patent portfolio worth much more than the stated book value that it is poised to monetize.
You can buy the whole company for its reproduction value.
Eliminating "one-time" past patent revenues still gives the company a ROE of 10% and ROIC of 15%; if you consider past patent revenues, the 5 year average ROIC is 39%.
Considering earnings, IDCC has a 23% upside assuming a zero growth case using extremely conservative estimates.
Favorable industry trends can unlock growth potential in 5G/IoT/sensor technology, and considering growth gives the company an upside of 92%.
A great investment can present itself with the combination of two things: one, a company operating at a competitive advantage relative to its peers and two, in an industry currently facing tailwinds. In these situations, the company will benefit from both attractive fundamentals as well as favorable perceptions/multiple expansion through its industry. That being said, I believe I have come across a company that exhibits both of these characteristics.
Interdigital Inc. (NASDAQ: IDCC) is a developer and licensor of wireless digital technology, primarily related to 3G, 4G, LTE and, most recently, innovative 5G technology. It’s also mining at the forefront of “Internet of Things” (IOT) technology, which is essentially technology that facilitates the connection of objects in our everyday lives (i.e. self-driving cars, house artificial intelligence systems, etc.) as well as sensor technology with the acquisition of Hillcrest Labs. IDCC boasts a 20,000-patent portfolio, which it licenses to large technology companies including Apple, Samsung and Huawei, a large telecommunications company from China.
There are a few reasons that I advocate an investment in IDCC, and I will list them from order of relevance:
IDCC has an attractive patent portfolio that it is poised to monetize. Looking at recent market transactions of similar patents as well as transactions directly related to IDCC, we see that its patent portfolio is extremely valuable. The book value of this asset is ~$300mm but I believe the true value is closer to ~$2bn based on extremely conservative estimates.
You can buy the whole company for its reproduction value, making for a great asset-based estimate.
IDCC generates its revenue from two factors: recurring revenues from ongoing license agreements and “past patent” revenues, which licensees pay upfront after an agreement is reached, essentially compensating for using the technology before a license agreement was signed. If you completely disregard past patent royalties, IDCC still consistently generated a ROE>10% and a ROIC>15%. In addition, mitigating the impact of these “one-time” revenues still yields an upside of 20%.
All these numbers were generated using an extremely conservative analysis, using assumptions like “half of the patents are worthless”. Using more realistic assumptions further bolsters the ROI.
Operating income has grown 20% and net income has grown 30% CAGR for the past 5 years. Recurring revenue growth has been 7% for the same time period. If we consider growth in this analysis, the stock can yield an upside of 92%.
The company is pioneering in emerging markets of utmost relevance to today’s society. While developments of 5G technology is still in its infancy, it provides enormous potential for growth. In addition, with the purchase of Hillcrest Labs, IDCC is pioneering sensor technology that goes hand-in-hand with its IoT technology. If these technologies turn out to be big, the stock can enjoy much appreciation. The best part is that this thesis doesn’t rely on this trend- although it’s fairly predictable that the world is progressing to a more IoT world- and it’s just icing on the cake.
The Value of the Patents
On its books, IDCC has about ~$300mm in patents. I think this value is grossly understated. Because the asset-based valuation isn’t the crux of this thesis, we are going to do more of a back-of-the-envelope analysis of the patent portfolio which will primarily be used to justify our earnings arguments.
There are a few indications that the book value of the patents is lower than their true value. First, in 2012, Interdigital sold a mere 1,700 patents to Intel for $375mm. That comes out to a valuation of $226,470 per patent. Secondly, Interdigital also bought a stake in Hillcrest Labs, which had a portfolio of 235 patents/pending patent applications, for $48mm. That’s $204,255 per patent. However, according to its most recent 10-K, the value of the patents in this purchase were $36.2mm, so if we use this number instead, we get $154,042 per patent.
Now, these numbers vary dramatically, but they have one thing in common: they are all significantly greater than the stated book value. Before we move on, we should note one thing: not all patents are created equally. The patents that Intel purchased aren’t the same as the ~19,300 left in the portfolio and the patents that were purchased from Hillcrest Labs aren’t the same as the patents that Intel purchased. If we go into specifics of each deal, Intel bought patents that were primarily related to 4G and LTE technology, while the Hillcrest Labs purchase involved patents related to sensor technology and this probably explains why there are stark differences in the cost per patent of each of the situations. Nonetheless, let us move on.
If we use the Intel purchase as a basis for our valuation, using $226 thousand per patent, the value of the total patent portfolio should be $4.5bn. If we use the Hillcrest Labs as our starting point, the value is $3.1bn. But not all patents are created equal. It is not safe to assume that all 20,000 of IDCC’s patents are as coveted as the 1,700 that Intel purchased. In addition, some of the patents may not be able to be monetized or may cover a general process/product, making them un-defendable. Already, there have been some cases in which many of IDCC’s patents have been deemed un-defendable by the court. To account for this, let us assume half of the patents are worthless. This gives us a value of between ~$1.5-2.25bn.
At this point, it is important to note that the vast majority of IDCC’s patent portfolio is made up of wireless technology; in other words, patents more closely related to those in the Intel sale. Therefore, I’ll stick with $2bn, keeping in mind, however, that the potential value can be much larger.
A huge contradiction should hit you just about now, and this is why this analysis won’t rely on the asset-based valuation. If all patents are not created equally, then the whole method of applying a single cost per patent and multiplying that for all the patents is inherently flawed. Therefore, alternatively we can take an R&D approach.
In this approach, we take the R&D expenses for the past 5 years, as well as the number of new patents signed each year, and use that to find the cost per patent. This method estimates the total R&D expense used to create IDCC’s full 20,000 patent portfolio.
Using this approach, the value of the patents is closer to $1bn. Again, there is a huge discrepancy, but one thing stands out: despite where the actual value falls, it is significantly greater than ~$300mm. Finally, this analysis of the patent portfolio was very crude and quick, but it gave a good idea as to how much the book value understates the Interdigital patent portfolio.
This exercise is futile, however, if the company cannot monetize this portfolio. In the past years, however, we have seen IDCC strike license agreements with Apple and Huawei, extend its agreement with Samsung and strike a deal with Intel. All in all, new patent agreements and patent sales have produced an extra ~$1bn of revenue since 2012. In addition, IDCC recently transferred 500 patents to its variable interest entity, Signal Trust Fund, whose goal is to monetize said assets through asset sales. Looking at the big picture, it seems like monetizing this patent portfolio is at the top of management’s mind.
The point of this exercise to prove that the book value of IDCC is much larger than what is stated, and this sets us up to calculate the reproduction value in the next section. And while this thesis doesn’t rely on this, there is a chance that this patent portfolio appreciates in value if we are at the horizon of a 5G/IoT revolution, but I’ll discuss this more in the last section.
Great Company, Fairly Priced
Buffet once said that it is acceptable to buy a great company at a fair price, and if we solely consider this asset-based valuation, that is exactly what Interdigital is. To find the reproduction value of this firm, let’s use $1.7bn for the patents, which is the midpoint of the above analysis. Without doing anymore adjustments, other assets give us another $1.53bn for a total asset value of $3.2bn. Total liabilities are about $1bn, so the reproduction value of this firm is $2.2bn.
Could we buy this whole business at or less than its reproduction value? It has over $400mm in cash and $500mm short-term investments which can easily be converted into cash if need be, and ~$200mm in debt. Since the market cap is $2.4bn, the enterprise value of this firm is also ~$2.2bn. What does this tell us? We can buy the whole company for its reproduction value; in other words, it is fairly valued based on a conservative asset-based valuation. It is worth reiterating the major assumption that led us to this conclusion: we said that half of IDCC’s whole patent portfolio is utterly useless. Conservatively, the company is fairly valued. If we were wrong and only ¼ of the patents are useless, we could be looking at a huge upside from an asset perspective.
Earnings Power
Before going into the earnings, it is important to understand how the licensing agreements work. When IDCC signs a licensing agreement with another company, the other company agrees to either a royalty-based or fixed-fee agreement depending on how many units with the patented technology are sold. This is recurring revenue. Aside from that, if the licensee had been selling the technology before the license agreement, the licensee agrees to pay an upfront “past patent royalty” which covers all past sales with that technology. For example, when a license agreement was signed with Apple in Q4 2016, IDCC realized ~$300mm in past patent royalties.
Because of their opportunistic nature, past patent royalties cannot be counted on year-in-year-out. They only arise after a new license agreement is signed into action. Therefore, as a starting point in this analysis, we take away all the effects of past patent royalties in the income statement (note that under past patent royalties in 2012, we include $375mm from the Intel deal):
As you see, past patent royalties make up a large portion of revenues. Equally important, however is the returns generated even after making these changes. The average ROIC over these past five years, after making these changes, is 17%.
Now, while we cannot count on huge past patent royalties every year, we can expect some sort of compensation. Over the past five years, IDCC has generated $1bn in patent sales/past patent royalties, or about $200mm a year. To be conservative, I will use $100mm, so we aren’t too dependent on new license agreements. No major license agreements were signed between 2013-2015 and past patent royalties were dabbling around the $100mm figure.
If we make the $100mm adjustment, we get a normalized EBIT of $228mm. The average EV/EBIT for companies in this sector is 12, so applying this multiple yields an EV of $2.7bn for an upside of 23%.
Again, the assumptions used in this exercise were extremely conservative. We downplayed the effect of non-recurring revenue by 50% and we didn’t consider growth in recurring revenue. This analysis also justifies the value of the patents we obtained in the previous exercise; the ~$500mm difference in the earnings power and asset valuation comes from the competitive advantage that stems from the proprietary technology and patents Interdigital owns. After making the $100mm adjustment, the resulting ROIC of 65% in 2016 (39% 5-year average) and 18% 5-year average ROE justifies this claim.
Value of Growth
I do not want to spend too much time on this section because in this opportunity, I see growth more of a qualitative margin of safety. In addition, small mistakes in assumptions can distort the value dramatically, so growth value should be taken with a grain of salt. Nonetheless, many qualitative favorable industry tailwinds give IDCC a long runway for growth. Most notably, the company signed an agreement with Apple and considering the proliferation of the Apple Watch and Cloud connectivity, wireless communication technology is in high demand. IDCC is a pioneer in IoT and 5G technology and it has been recognized in many industry conferences for development in these emerging markets, most notably, the Mobile World Congress (where it predicted that 5G technology will roll-out as early as 2018. With the acquisition of Hillcrest Labs, IDCC is also poised to make strides in sensor technology, with applications most obvious in self-driving cars, which are slowly becoming more prevalent.
To the quantitative factors, recurring revenue has grown at a 9% CAGR for the past 5 years. Operating income has grown 20% CAGR and net income has grown 30% CAGR over the same time period. If we assume a 5% terminal growth rate and an 8% discount rate, the present value of the firm should be $4.6bn, giving us a 92% upside.
Catalyst
There are a few catalysts that may occur over the next few years. One, the company can capitalize on patent sales. In 2012, IDCC sold 1,700 patents to Intel. It signed multiple licensing agreements since then, further monetizing this value. Finally, the creation of the Signal Trust Fund signifies management’s efforts to monetize these assets. Two, if new 5G technology/IoT tech./sensor technologies take off, IDCC will be there to reap the awards. We are seeing a proliferation of self-driving cars, and many tech. companies are using IoT tech. to improve cloud-based, multiple device software, so a future of IoT is not a far-off assumption. Three, market coverage, industry presentations (such as the presentation at the Mobile World Congress) will put the spotlight on IDCC, allowing for a market reevaluation.
Disclosure: I am/we are long IDCC.
I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it. I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.
Sure would be nice to see some corporate buyback of shares. If you believe you are undervalued, you need to back it up with action.
Why would anyone sell given selling several million shares yields peanuts at best
Interesting recent article...
https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2017/07/170727141455.htm
(not related to Archer...or RCPI...but ties to amyloid there)
As a reminder...this 5 minute video from Apr (Dr. Mullan) worth watching. Not sure of its implications for Phase 3 trial results of NIVALD, if any. Perhaps others can comment.
Knuts, I'll buy that...as long as they bring us shareholders along for the ride. We were there for all the bad times and funded them...we should be included in the solution if there is one.
Knuts, I am not sure you have this correct. I believe Archer has rights for both ARC029 and ARC031 for treatment of Alzheimers. While ARC029 may be straight Nilvadipine, I thought that Archer has/had rights for its use as treatment for Alzheimers. I haven't read anything to suggest that it DOES not also maintain its anti-hypertensive properties. Yes, ARC031 supposedly removes the anti-hypertensive properties and ARC029 is being used in the European trial. That said, I believe that Archer stands to win if ARC029 results are good.
While getting to market of course is ultimately key, it's hard to believe that Mullan's past several years spent with Anatabine was a waste of time. I never saw anything to suggest that Mullan had lost his enthusiasm for anatabine other than the fact that they ran out of $. More and more, it seems that Alzheimers treatment of future appears to be combination of drugs vs. one holy grail.
Nice write-up mentioning Archer - published July 17, 2017
http://www.biopharmadive.com/news/alzheimers-disease-lilly-biogen/446963/
Seek, I like that solution! Just saying if it does not come to pass and Archer IS wildly successful...then Mullan and team SHOULD have hell to pay.
If Archer wins big...we common shareholders in RCPI better not lose completely. Forgetting about how mechanics of a combined Archer/RCPI might happen...it certainly would not sit well with me to see Archer succeed substantially with NIVALD and we lose everything. Rightfully, would raise questions about whether Mullan (and CFO of Archer who was CFO at RCPI, etc.) were ever acting in our best interests as executives of RCPI. It has always been a complicated situation with Roskamp Institute, Archer, etc. to me. Conflicting interests, etc of "for profits" vs non-profit. Did Mullan give his full attention to RCPI or was/it in his best interests to see us simply "go away"? Just throwing out food for thought and suggesting that if Archer success comes to pass, we should all be inclined to not simply "go away".
Perhaps this has MUCH to do with what Merritt alluded to during the call? That is, new ideas/ways to get over obstacle of charging/collecting for past licenses. He made it sound as though there was some significant potential for progress without being very specific. (PS fully realize many have heard similar from him before...but the Sep 2017 reference in what you posted suggests there may some correlation)
Tensurf, I have no expertise in this. That said, what you posted seems to be our best/only path to recovery as common shareholders. I do not believe RCPI (or even under previous names or symbols) ever went into bankruptcy previously, so this would appear to still be an option. Key, I would think, is what advantages accrue to go forward entity (or the interests of its backers) by retaining company's historic shareholders and doing the conversion vs. starting from "scratch" with the IP in hand.