G Reorganization


10/12/2009 A. I. Horowitz L520 4.00 850.00 3,400.00

Review congressional statements on 1981 amendment
to G reorganization rules and
draft associated discussion in
brief.



(page 24 of this billing document filed today)





Monthly Application for Compensation for Services Rendered and Reimbursement of Expenses as Special Tax Counsel to the Debtors and Debtors in Possession for the Period from October 1, 2009 Through October 31, 2009 Filed by Miller & Chevalier Chartered. Objections due by 12/14/2009. (Irgens, Andrew) (Entered: 11/23/2009)

http://ghostofwamu.com/documents/08-12229/08-12229-1931.pdf




Guess what? Not GOOD !



Could this possibly be why the bonds have been trading so high and seeing such high DOLLAR VOLUME ???

Type G is NOT GOOD for equity holders .......... especially when most of the debt of their company is long term.

Hearing11/24/2009Phone Details and Audio Archive

"Dial-in at 1:55PM EST
Hearing begins at 2:00PM EST

To be notified as the audio archives become available:
http://twitter.com/WaMuAudio

AUDIO ARCHIVE:
The archived audio will be made available at the conclusion of the hearing:
http://www.mediafire.com/?sharekey=b932994e293c11f5c79b87b207592a1c8c789da78c1b65a0bf1b77d2eb488dac

LISTEN LIVE:
The bridge number is 712-432-1001 and when prompted for the access code enter 477420980
You will hear no music just an intermittent beep until the hearing begins.

WMI calendar:
http://www.my.calendars.net/wmi/";



Courtesy of DanBB from the following post:

http://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/read_msg.aspx?message_id=43859637

SCAM companies often put out "buyout" "information" right before "the end", and from what I've read about Lumb, I would have to say that FFGO fits the mold.

Best of luck!

Are Great West shares simply fool's Gold?

In early 2005 I paid $21,000 (£10,200) for 21m "restricted shares" in US company Great West Gold. Now I have been approached by Collins Capital Management of Nashville, acting for a potential buyer of the company, offering me 10 times what I paid.

The snag is paying $10,000 upfront as a "Reg 144 Restriction Fee", which they tell me is required by US law to allow this share to be sold, and is refundable on completion. Is this real?
AS, Bath

You were sold Great West Gold by an offshore boiler room share pusher on the grounds it could find gold and the gold price was rising.

But GWG, which has never filed returns to US regulator the Securities and Exchange Commission, never found much gold. So, as so often happens with boiler room stocks, the original mining concept was buried. Without telling you, GWG turned into Fortress Financial by acquiring Unitrust Capital earlier this year amid a series of complex share changes. Unitrust is a Costa Rican firm which offers "prepaid debit card solutions" via card issuers "based in tax-free jurisdictions therefore offering complete privacy".

London-based South African financier Stephen Lumb is listed as the investor contact for Fortress. Lumb has been a director of more than 140 UK companies, including many in mining. In July, he was banned from UK company directorships for three years for Companies Act transgressions.

You have been told that if you pay $10,000 to Collins, it will pass it on to International Equities Administrators, which works out of a rented office in Memphis, although Collins told you it was a US government organisation.

Who would pay 10 times what you laid out for GWG? And why can't they send the $210,000 less the $10,000? You may well unlock the restriction on selling the shares. But once you have paid the money, there is no guarantee the buyer will still want the shares. After all, you say yourself the anonymous buyer is only "potential". You could find yourself sending good money after bad."


http://www.guardian.co.uk/money/2007/nov/17/3

Banned SA director causes stink in US

Serves time in message board "jail" after a bitter exchange with Pink Sheet investors.


"Julius Cobbett
07 August 2008 16:32

Colourful South African penny stock boss Stephen Lumb is making waves in the risky world of tiny US public companies, or Pink Sheets. Lumb, or someone purporting to be him, was suspended from an online investing forum after his jousting with sceptical investors became a little too enthusiastic.

One cannot blame US investors for being sceptical of companies associated with Lumb: the man has a chequered history.

Lumb rose to notoriety in 2001 when he was CE of since-failed JSE-listed stock Igaming. He was wrapped on the knuckles after the company failed to comply with listing requirements.

Lumb went on to the UK where he was banned as a company director until 2010. His company Hanover Capital Group was booted off the UK's junior Alternative Investment Market after failing to comply with exchange rules and company law. Hanover was ostensibly a mining investment company.

Companies associated with Lumb have resurfaced in the US and, again, his recent actions are making him a poor ambassador for South Africa.

The same mining assets that were housed in Hanover group have been transferred from one Lumb-related company to another. This has left a bewildering trail of transactions that has not resulted in much tangible benefit to minority shareholders.

The latest scheme involves a company called Fortress Financial Group, currently quoted at five ten thousandths of a dollar ($0,0005) per share. This might sound cheap, but it is worth bearing in mind that the company has 35bn shares in issue.

There has been some hype created in the company regarding the announcement of an "extraordinary dividend" of $400m, which works out to $0,0124 per share, a tantalising offer to investors. However, the dividend will not be paid in cash, but in stock of a yet to be named company, known as "Goldco".

There has been much scepticism among investors on online investing forum Investors Hub. When he became aware of the pessimists, Lumb, or someone purporting to be him, felt obliged to respond. The exchange got heated and many of the posts were deleted and are no longer available. However, an observer says he "totally lost it in a posting rampage in support of Fortress Financial Group".

Contacted by Moneyweb, Lumb neither confirmed nor denied that he was responsible for the posts. "I have no comment to make; nor do I need to," he replied.

Moneyweb sent this article to Lumb ahead of publication. His response follows:

Your facts are incorrect. No surprise to me. I could care less what you publish, the more inaccurate, the better.

You have absolutely no clue as what I own, nor what I even do; that is obvious.

I am [not] even involved in any day to day dealings of that Company; that is the biggest joke of it all."

http://www.moneyweb.co.za/mw/view/mw/en/page91?oid=218974&sn=Detail

"review abandonment regulations for worthless subs."


(page 38)

http://www.kccllc.net/documents/0812229/0812229090623000000000012.pdf


How many worthless subS does WMI have ??????

"WMB will use a portion of the proceeds it receives in connection with the offering for general corporate purposes which may include dividend payments to its ultimate parent, WMI. In turn, WMI intends to use the proceeds of any such dividend payments to repurchase shares of its common stock and for general corporate purposes. Such repurchases will be effected in accordance with WMI’s existing common stock repurchase program, which may include accelerated share repurchase.
WMB has received confirmation from the Office of Thrift Supervision (the “OTS”) that the Company Preferred Securities are eligible for treatment as core capital of WMB under the OTS’ applicable regulatory capital regulations and intends to treat the Company Preferred Securities accordingly.
If the OTS so directs following the occurrence of an Exchange Event (defined below), each WaMu Cayman Preferred Security and each Trust Security will be automatically exchanged for a like amount of depositary shares representing a 1/1000th of a share of specified classes of preferred stock (the “WMI Preferred Stock”) of WMI. “Exchange Event” means (a) WMB becoming “undercapitalized” under the OTS’ “prompt corrective action” regulations, (b) WMB being placed into conservatorship or receivership or (c) the OTS, in its sole discretion, directing such exchange in anticipation of WMB becoming “undercapitalized” in the near term or taking supervisory action that limits the payment of dividends, as applicable, by WMB, and in connection therewith, directs such exchange.
In connection with the closing of the transactions described above, on March 7, 2006, WMI entered into a Replacement Capital Covenant (the “Covenant”) whereby WMI agreed for the benefit of specified debtholders that it would not repurchase or redeem the WaMu Cayman Preferred Securities, the Trust Securities, the Company Preferred Securities or the WMI Preferred Stock (including any depositary shares representing WMI Preferred Stock) unless such repurchase or redemption is made from proceeds of certain qualifying securities issuances and on other terms and conditions described in the Covenant. A copy of the Covenant is attached hereto as Exhibit 99.1 and is incorporated herein by reference. "

http://www.secinfo.com/dsvR3.v1Zg.htm


"Washington Mutual (WM) Reports Q4 EPS of $1.10; Accelerated Buyback, Raises Dividend"


http://www.streetinsider.com/Dividends/Washington+Mutual+(WM)+Reports+Q4+EPS+of+$1.10%3B+Accelerated+Buyback,+Raises+Dividend/1503942.html



The "issue" is accounting-related ("issue" usually really means "issues" andit could open up other cans of worms as well).

I am in 100% agreement , that is INDEED a FACT , and it's not up for reasonable debate.

The stock was restricted well before June and the restriction has nothing to do with Walrath. If you look at other bills these inquiries came in July and August as well.

Actually, preferred shares are NEVER listed as liabilities on any balance sheet. Preferred shares are not debt, they are preferred shares, and they are NOT liabilities, and WMI's case is no different.

This is not a case of semantics. Preferreds are not liabilities PERIOD.

As far as cost of capital goes, DEBT is actually CHEAPER, because interest payments are tax deductible (whereas dividend payments are not) , and for a HEALTHY company, it is better to issue debt rather than preferreds for those very reasons. In WMI's case, they decided to issue preferreds that they couldn't even make the dividend payments on so for them it was definitely cheaper to issue the preferreds and then not pay the divis.

NO PREFERRED SHARES of any company are ever listed as liabilities,thus the securities referenced ARE NOT listed as liabilities, and when/if New Classes of preferred shares are issued, there will be a credit to shareholder equity (which does not benefit common equity at all), and upon the issuance of new preferreds there would be a recording of an investment in subs followed by an immediate write-down of that investment. Talk to an accountant regarding the significance of a credit to shareholder equity upon issuance of preferred shares.

“In accordance with the terms of the documents governing the Securities, the Conditional Exchange of the
Securities occured on Friday, September 26, 2008 at 8:00 A.M. (New York time). The documentation
governing the Securities contemplates that at the time of the Conditional Exchange, each outstanding Security
was intended to be exchanged automatically for a like amount of newly issued Fixed Rate Depositary Shares or
newly issued Fixed-to-Floating Rate Depositary Shares, as applicable, each representing a 1/IOOOth interest in
one share of the applicable series of preferred stock of WMI. If and until such depositary receipts are delivered
or in the event such depositary receipts are not delivered, any certificates previously representing Securities are
deemed for all purposes, effective as of 8:00 AM (New York time) on September 26, 2008, to represent Fixed
Rate Depositary Shares or Fixed-to-Floating Rate Depositary Shares, as applicable.
WMI and its advisors are currently assessing a number of legal, accounting and tax issues related to the
Securities and the transactions related to the Conditional Exchange. Because of these unresolved issues, WMI
has not yet reflected the Conditional Exchange and/or its attendant transactions on its financial statements,
including any possible interests (direct or indirect, contingent or otherwise) in the Securities and the assets, as
the case may be, of Washington Mutual Preferred Funding LLC.
Assuming that the Conditional Exchange had been completed in accordance with the terms of the relevant
documentation, on a pro forma basis, WMI's financial statements would reflect Ca) a credit to shareholders'
equity of approximately $3.9 billion upon issuance of the new classes of preferred stock; (b) an investment in
subsidiary (I.e. WMB) of approximately $3.9 billion Upon contribution of the Preferred Securities by WMI to
WMB; and (c) an immediate and corresponding write-down of such investment in subsidiary.”

Also, what you have to realize is that WMI would actually have to have the assets to back the issuance of NEW preferreds, and since the “preferred securities” are supposedly backed by assets that are held in trust (some, if not all of which are MBSs), one could reasonably argue that the value of the assets that back the securities are not worth the $3.9 billion they are “valued” at.

"WMPF's assets WERE LIMITED to direct OR indirect interests in MORTGAGE or MORTGAGE-RELATED assets, cash, and other permitted
assets which were held in certain trusts."

"The Trust Securities have an aggregate liquidation preference of approximately $4 billion and upon information and BELIEF are currently worth at least that much."

I really don’t think that WMI has the assets/value to back up the issuance of New Classes of Preferred Stock.

This is what got WMI in trouble in the first place. Their "ASSETS" simply didn't/don't have the value they claimed they had/have.

Actually strong banks like JPM took tarp so that weak banks didn't look as bad as they would have if they were the only ones that took TARP. JPM is strong and smart, and they accepted the money and made money off of it.




STRONG BANKS like JPM have no problem raising money as is illustrated in the following article, and they didn't need the TARP money like a lot of banks did.




How J.P. Morgan Raised $11.5 Billion in 24 Hours

"The fall of Washington Mutual wasn’t a surprise to the government. Nor was it a surprise to J.P. Morgan.

Three weeks before J.P. Morgan bought WaMu’s deposits for $1.9 billion, officials at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation had called J.P. Morgan to say that the FDIC was carefully monitoring WaMu and that a seizure of its assets was likely. The FDIC said it would want to immediately auction off WaMu’s assets if a seizure was necessary, people familiar with the situation told Deal Journal.

J.P. Morgan was well-prepared, then, when the FDIC asked for bids on Tuesday, Sept. 23. On Wednesday night, the regulators told J.P. Morgan that the bank had won the bidding, one person close to the situation said. The Wall Street Journal reported the sale at around 7 p.m. on Thursday, and J.P. Morgan hurriedly called a conference call in two hours to discuss the sale.

But that was just the first step. J.P. Morgan had known for three weeks that if WaMu was seized, and J.P. Morgan won the assets, the big bank would want to raise enough capital to keep its Tier 1 capital at at least 8%. Tier 1 capital is the gauge of a bank’s health watched by regulators, and it measures whether a bank has sufficient capital to cushion future losses. The federal government requires a minimum Tier 1 ratio of 4%, and 8% is typically thought to be robust. J.P. Morgan’s plan was to gather $8 billion in one big capital-raising, which would put its Tier 1 ratio between 8% and 8.5%

It is not, however, easy to raise $8 billion of capital without revealing why. J.P. Morgan could not risk revealing anything about WaMu’s potential seizure, or face the FDIC’s wrath and a major market disruption. So the bank chose a strategy that has become increasingly popular in these times of crisis: “wall-crossing.”

Here’s how it worked. J.P. Morgan picked 10 major financial firms that could help the bank raise money. None were sovereign wealth funds or private equity firms, according to people familiar with the situation; all 10 were U.S. asset managers, and several were already among the list of the biggest J.P. Morgan shareholders. Some of the firms — who remain unnamed — also helped Goldman Sachs raise billions of dollars last week.

J.P. Morgan’s bankers called the 10 chosen firms and posed a question: the bankers were advising a U.S. bank that was contemplating a strategic acquisition of a retail bank, and a capital-raising could be connected. The bankers could not reveal their client until the bidding was done. Did the investors want to hear more? If they said yes, they would get details; if they said no, they would be left out in the cold on a deal that could potentially move the markets.

Nine of the 10 investors that J.P. Morgan invited said they were interested in hearing more. As soon as they agreed, they were asked to sign confidentiality agreements that would make them official J.P. Morgan insiders, which would mean that they could not trade in the bank’s stock. J.P. Morgan’s CEO, Jamie Dimon, along with CFO Mike Cavanagh and retail chief Charlie Scharf triple-teamed to speak with the investors in half-hour conference calls that extended throughout the day on Thursday. The investors were told that the U.S. bank in question was J.P. Morgan itself. Some of the investors independently guessed that the takeover candidate was WaMu, but none knew that a potential seizure of WaMu’s assets was in the works, nor did J.P. Morgan tell them.

By the end of the day, J.P. Morgan had raised $7 billion from the nine investors. By 9:15 p.m., when J.P. Morgan held its public conference call to announce the deal, all seven investors were taken off the “insiders” list and no longer had any access to material non-public information about the bank. J.P. Morgan also planned to raise another $1 billion in the capital markets on Friday by opening the offering to anyone who wanted to participate. Meanwhile, Dimon repeatedly touted the effort as an “offensive” one, painting the capital-raising as an effort to get ahead while other banks, he indicated, were just trying to keep up.

Between 7 a.m. and 9:30 a.m. on Friday, before the markets opened, J.P. Morgan pitched the offering to new investors, who clamored for enough shares to double the amount J.P. Morgan had expected to raise in the open market to $2 billion. A “greenshoe,” or overallotment, added another $1.5 billion. The bank had gathered $11.5 billion, enough to take its regulatory capital ratio very close to 9%, a full 100 basis points above what it had expected just a day before.

J.P. Morgan had sold its open-market shares at their Wednesday closing price of $40.50, a 6.8% discount to the Thursday close of $43.46. Investors expected a thick discount because the offering itself was so large. In addition, nvestors wanted the benefit of a lower price where they would not be paying for Thursday’s one-day rally in a volatile market.

In an internal memo, J.P. Morgan executives Steve Black and Bill Winters warned employees, “the dislocation and volatility in the markets are far from over.” Many investors, including J. Christopher Flowers and his old shop Goldman Sachs, are gearing up to bid for the masses of distressed bank assets that are expected to flood the markets in coming months.

Will J.P. Morgan be a buyer again? "


http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2008/09/29/how-jp-morgan-raised-115-billion-in-24-hours/

It is common knowledge that WMI will get "some refund".

"Oh now you agree we will get some refund."


This is a very simple issue, and if total liabilities are 9B an total assets are 8 B, then the commons are not in the money. Commons are actually more than 4.5B short of being in the money because WMI has to issue $3.9 billion in NEW PREFERREDS due to the exchange event (aka the preferred securities referenced in WMI's MORs ).

"This a very simple issue.

Total Liabilities ~ 9B

Total Assets ~ 8B

Preferred Share ~ $3.5B (Not due anytime soon so pay divis and 3.5B would only cost the estate about $300M/yr). Therefore, commons would immediately be in the money. Only at liquidation is all the money due.

So commons are $4.5B short of being in the money. "


Worst case for WMI is not that "we split it 50:50" .


Tax refund of ~$7B and we split it 50:50 worst case = $3.5B


"Now all we need is the Judges to get this moving. "

"1. Re-evaluate the sale price. "

When this happens the BANK creditors will get paid.

"2. Give back FSB and Providian. "

FSB and Providian are not coming back and WMI isn't even asking for them back.


"3. Goldman Sachs purchase of the wind power business. "

When WMI Investment corp. sold their interest in the joint wind-venture they actually lost money per WMI's own MOR.


"4. 5 Million Shares of Series A Visa shares. "

These were part of the bank, and even if they weren't they aren't worth even close enough to put the commons in the money.

"5. Subsidiaries "

The subsidiaries that WMI has left aren't worth very much at all and there has been no "dd" that proves they have high worth.


"6. Return of Trust Assets. "

Since you didn't even reference which trust assets you feel will be returned and since you didn't even reference a "worth" of these assets I'll leave this alone for now.




I can go on too.


How about this ...


"24. The Debtors are currently insolvent. The Debtors' financial position subsequent
to the loss of their primary operating asset, WMB, is reflected on their schedules filed with this
Court which indicate $4.48 billion in assets and $7.83 billion in liabilities. This reality is further
bolstered by the presumption of insolvency afforded debtors pursuant to section 553 of the
Bankruptcy Code for the 90-day period immediately preceding the petition date See 11 U.S.c. §
553(c). It is the setoff applicant's burden to establish otherwise. In re Balducci Oil Co., 33 B.R.
847, 850 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983). Although the Debtors have asserted claims to certain assets such as trust preferred securities and prospective tax refunds, both JPMC and the FDIC have
asserted claims against the Debtors for more than the total amount of such assets.

Further,
more than $100 billion in claims have been filed against the Debtors' estates in these chapter 11
cases. While a significant portion of these will not likely be allowed, they are further evidence
that the Debtors are currently insolvent and would be at the time of any exercise of Section 9.5.
Therefore, invocation of Section 9.5 would consist of a postpetition procurement of a debt of the
sort that section 553(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code prohibits from forming the basis for any
setoff."

Now I know where they are going with the section 9.5 argument, but the following item is what should be considered troubling to shareholders imo.

38. The further delay imposed on the Debtors threatens to derail the Debtors' chapter
11 cases. The $4 billion in Deposits are significant estate assets CRITICAL to the Debtors chapter 11
process. The recent amendments to the Bankruptcy Code impose a HARD DEADLINE of March 10,
2010 on the Debtors' exclusive period to file a chapter 11 plan. If the Debtors recover the
Deposits from JPMC, they will be well-positioned to file a plan in advance of their exclusivity
deadline. Without the Deposits, however, the Debtors will not be able to construct a viable plan
BENEFICIAL TO THEIR CREDITORS."


http://www.kccllc.net/documents/0812229/0812229091112000000000001.pdf

There have been several requests for the restrictive legend to be removed, there have been no objections by WMI (aka the issuer), and the reason certain parties had the legend removed (by the transfer agent BONY ) is because they wanted to SELL their shares, and that has EVERYTHING to do with WAMUQ.

There are actually references to restructuring plans in the billings I've posted, and don't worry, the lawsuits related to copyright infringements are 100% laughable.

I didn't decide they'll lose all the NOLs generated by WMB, the Federal Laws that protect subsidiaries decided that a long time ago.

As far as the plan goes, creditors will be paid in part cash (generated from refunds) and part new stock (upon issuance wamuq will be cancelled) , and the capital losses (which if carried forward don't increase the As) will be carried forward to off-set future income .

The creditors WILL WIN, and the dollar volume and prices of the bonds tell the story.

Oh, they'll get some refunds, but not near enough to keep commons in the money, and after WMI loses all of the NOLs that were generated by WMB, forget about it.



The viable plan will benefit creditors and not shareholders, and that is the beauty of bankruptcy from a company's perspective.

Start fresh with new paper and a clean slate.

Ask the lawyers and consultants. There are references to cusip #s in one of the Weil bills. It's up to you to decide what they want them for.


On page 77 of this bill, there are references to 382 analysis relating to include transfers of escrow shares and redemptions, and transfers from escrow account and cancellations.

http://www.kccllc.net/documents/0812229/0812229091002000000000005.pdf

I can't remember if this is the bill that refers to cusip #s or not.

Wed 9/23/2009 1.80 550 990.00 Conference calls re: documentation retention; documentation data review; state tax memorandum
amendments; conference call re: JPMC total tax receivable and analysis of summary worksheets with
review of related state tax refund amounts.

(page 37)

Thur 9/24/2009 6.50 550 3,575.00 Conference call re: documentation retention; conference call re: basis study updates; project mapping for
stock deduction analysis and basis study amendment; review and analysis of basis adjustment rules re:
excess stock deduction; review and continued drafting of overview study memorandum; analysis of JPMC
tax receivable summary.


(page 37)

Fri 9/25/2009 1.40 355 497.00 Review JPM proof of claim for reasonableness of the state tax refunds

(page 43)


10/21/2009 0812229-1793 1750 Monthly Fee and Services Report of Alvarez & Marsal as Restructuring Advisors for the Debtors and Debtors in Possession for the Period from September 1, 2009 Through September 30, 2009


http://www.kccllc.net/documents/0812229/0812229091021000000000006.pdf

Fri 9/25/2009 2.40 670 1,608.00 Review timing of worthlessness deduction.

(page 34)

Thur 9/10/2009 1.30 550 715.00 Review of unclaimed property claim. Reviewed research related to all 17 unitary states in which WMI files
and made conclusions related to AK, CA, CO, ID, IL, HI, MT, KS. Conclusions relate to availability and
timing of a worthless stock deduction.

Wed 9/16/2009 0.30 550 165.00 Discussions/emails regarding WMI's federal stock basis calculation, its timing, and responsibility for the
state stock basis calculation.

(page 38)

Thur 9/3/2009 7.50 220 1,650.00 Work related to the worthless stock memo prepared in support of WMI & Subs' 2008 return.

(page 45)

Thur 9/10/2009 7.70 220 1,694.00 Researched and drafted stock basis memorandum. Worked on a number of issues in the stock basis
memorandum, including the worthless stock deduction rules. The stock basis memorandum describes
analysis, assumptions and methodology in preparing an estimate of the stock basis of Washington
Mutual Bank as of August 31, 2008 for regular federal income tax purposes.

(page 46)





Wed 9/23/2009 1.80 550 990.00 Conference calls re: documentation retention; documentation data review; state tax memorandum
amendments; conference call re: JPMC total tax receivable and analysis of summary worksheets with
review of related state tax refund amounts.

(page 37)

Thur 9/24/2009 6.50 550 3,575.00 Conference call re: documentation retention; conference call re: basis study updates; project mapping for
stock deduction analysis and basis study amendment; review and analysis of basis adjustment rules re:
excess stock deduction; review and continued drafting of overview study memorandum; analysis of JPMC
tax receivable summary.


(page 37)

Fri 9/25/2009 1.40 355 497.00 Review JPM proof of claim for reasonableness of the state tax refunds

(page 43)


10/21/2009 0812229-1793 1750 Monthly Fee and Services Report of Alvarez & Marsal as Restructuring Advisors for the Debtors and Debtors in Possession for the Period from September 1, 2009 Through September 30, 2009


http://www.kccllc.net/documents/0812229/0812229091021000000000006.pdf

More references to "removal of restrictive legend " and several references to "382 analysis" (which is tax related (do your own dd) can be found in the following Weil bill as well. Also, only certain people/investors hold/held restricted stock.



removal of restrictive legend references = page 69

382 references = 63,64,65



11/9/2009 0812229-1903 1860 Ninth Monthly Application of Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, as Attorneys for the Debtors, for Allowance of Compensation for Professional Services Rendered and for Reimbursement of Actual and Necessary Expenses Incurred from August 1, 2009 Through August 31, 2009


http://www.kccllc.net/documents/0812229/0812229091109000000000003.pdf

A lot of emotional people thought it was a good idea to short JPM in the $18 range (basically out of spite) , and it did not work out too well for them.

Cash is KING, JPM has it, and only the STRONG SURVIVE.


By the way, JPM already won !

An "admin error" supposedly made 2 years ago that was never corrected?

I don't think so.

As it stands, the current information is as follows.


Per the Secretary of State the A/S is 5 TRILLION.

5 TRILLION AUTHORIZED SHARES


"04/12/07 amendment 5,000,000,000,000 shares, common with a par value of $.0001 per share "



https://wyobiz.wy.gov/Ecommerce/Common/FilingDetail.aspx?FilingNum=2003-000459064


This is not an "admin error" as some claim. What, there was a minor "admin error" in the form of an amendment that changed the A/S to 5 TRILLION . There was an "error " of 4.965 Trillion ?

An authorized share count of 5 TRILLION absolutely screams......SCAM !!!!!

Per the Secretary of State the A/S is 5 TRILLION.

5 TRILLION AUTHORIZED SHARES


"04/12/07 amendment 5,000,000,000,000 shares, common with a par value of $.0001 per share "



https://wyobiz.wy.gov/Ecommerce/Common/FilingDetail.aspx?FilingNum=2003-000459064


This is not an "admin error" as some claim. What, there was a minor "admin error" in the form of an amendment that changed the A/S to 5 TRILLION . There was an "error " of 4.965 Trillion ?



In response to:

"Authorized 35 Billion...not 5 Trillion

This will likely be addressed in the upcoming 8K "

5 TRILLION AUTHORIZED SHARES


"04/12/07 amendment 5,000,000,000,000 shares, common with a par value of $.0001 per share "



https://wyobiz.wy.gov/Ecommerce/Common/FilingDetail.aspx?FilingNum=2003-000459064




Common Shares: 5 Trillion

https://wyobiz.wy.gov/Ecommerce/Common/FilingDetail.aspx?FilingNum=2003-000459064


People can claim that it is less than 5 TRILLION, but if that were the case, the proper paperwork would have been filled out and filed, and the Secretary of State's numbers would reflect any changes along with current information.


Verifiable documentation proves that the A/S is 5 TRILLION.


The A/S of 5 TRILLION is not an " admin error " .

You might want to take a look at this post and the billing statement contained therein,figure out the signifance of certain references, and reconsider your position.

http://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/read_msg.aspx?message_id=43814003

Who wants to dump their restricted stock?





restricted stock, restricted stock issues (on multiple pages)

call with j maciel and r jain re: RESTRICTED STOCK (page 106)


review and respond to emails relating to removal of restrictive legend for VARIOUS STOCKHOLDERS (page 106)



respond to questions from securities holders re: removal of restrictive legend ...(page 107)


removal of restrictive legend (page 110)

work with bank of new york mellon regarding wmi securities transfers


9/21/2009 0812229-1662 1635 Seventh Monthly Application of Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, as Attorneys for the Debtors, for Allowance of Compensation for Professional Services Rendered and for Reimbursement of Actual and Necessary Expenses Incurred from June 1, 2009 Through June 30, 2009

http://www.kccllc.net/documents/0812229/0812229090921000000000023.pdf



Now who wants the legend removed so they can dump and still get something for their shares?????????? Who are these various stockholders that wanted the restricted legend having sell these shares, FBRC ???????





**************************************************************************************************************************

Well, all claims need to be resolved no matter what anybody says.

MGM is still in play in the 10-12 range imo.

buy it, sell it, short it, buy to cover, buy it, sell it, short it, buy to cover...............

10. Over 3,750 proofs of claim have been filed in these chapter 11 cases. The Debtors are in the process of reviewing and reconciling the filed proofs of claim. To date, approximately 750 claims have been expunged and over 100 claims have been withdrawn.

http://www.kccllc.net/documents/0812229/0812229091118000000000012.pdf

(filed 11/18/09)



A "settlement" is NOT coming and the auctioning of the TARP warrants have absolutely nothing to do with this case.

Application for Compensation Twelfth Monthly Application of Perkins Coie LLP for Compensation for Services Rendered and Reimbursement of Expenses as Special Counsel to Debtors and Debtors in Possession for the Period from September 1, 2009 through September 30, 2009 Filed by Perkins Coie LLP. Objections due by 12/10/2009. (Irgens, Andrew) (Entered: 11/20/2009)


"telephone conference with M. Ehrlich. W. Wong. W.
Curchack, M. Mcisaac. and representatives of Bank of
New York and Wells Fargo regarding issues related to
securities pOSitions lor PIERS unit securities (.7); draft
email message to C. Smith regarding request for OTC
position listing for PIERS unit securities and related
CUSIP numbers"


(page 62 of the following pdf)


http://ghostofwamu.com/documents/08-12229/08-12229-1926.pdf

Fourth Order Extending Exclusive Periods for Filing a Chapter 11 Plan and Solicitation of Acceptances Thereto (Related Doc # 1736) Order Signed on 11/20/2009. (MAS) (Entered: 11/20/2009)


.....ORDERED that the Motion is granted; and it is further
ORDERED that, pursuant to section 1121(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Plan
Period for each Debtor is extended through and including January 19,2010; and it is further
ORDERED that, pursuant to section I121(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, the
Solicitation Period for each Debtor is extended through and including March 22,2010;and it is
further
ORDERED that the extension of the Exclusive Periods granted herein is without
prejudice to such further requests by the Debtors that may be made pursuant to section 1l2l(d)
of the Bankruptcy Code........


Signed by Walrath Nov 20, 2009


http://www.kccllc.net/documents/0812229/0812229091120000000000007.pdf


tick tock tick tock

DIMEQ is a litigation tracking warrant that used to have the symbol DIMEZ.

" In connection with Washington Mutual’s acquisition of Dime Bancorp, Inc., Washington Mutual assumed the obligations under Litigation Tracking Warrants that Dime had issued to holders of its common stock. As a result of Washington Mutual’s acquisition of Dime, the Litigation Tracking Warrants are now convertible into shares of Washington Mutual common stock upon receipt by Washington Mutual of any damages upon the final adjudication or settlement of Anchor Savings Bank FSB v. United States , litigation that Washington Mutual assumed upon the acquisition of Dime. Upon receipt by Washington Mutual of any final damages from this lawsuit, holders of Litigation Tracking Warrants will, in the aggregate, be entitled to receive shares of Washington Mutual common stock whose aggregate value will be based on the amount actually recovered in the lawsuit, if any, net of litigation costs and any taxes. "


Related to:

"WaMu Prevails in Anchor Savings Goodwill Litigation.
Publication: Business Wire
Date: Monday, March 17 2008
$382 Million Award to Benefit WaMu and Holders of DIMEZ Litigation Tracking Warrants

SEATTLE -- Washington Mutual, Inc. (WaMu) (NYSE:WM) today announced that on March 14, 2008, the United States Court of Federal Claims published its written decision in the case of Anchor Savings Bank,

FSB v. The United States of America, awarding Washington Mutual Bank $382 million for damages, and an additional amount for taxes that will be determined by the court.
The plaintiff alleged the government breached its agreement to allow regulatory goodwill to be considered in Anchor's regulatory capital calculation, thereby forcing the sale of assets in order to meet regulatory capital requirements. The government is expected to appeal the decision, a lengthy process that could delay, reduce or negate the award.

WaMu's rights in this litigation against the government arose from WaMu's acquisition of Dime Bancorp in January 2002. Dime had previously acquired Anchor Savings. Prior to the WaMu acquisition of Dime, Dime had created litigation tracking warrants ("LTWs") and had distributed them to its shareholders. The LTWs originally permitted the holders to receive common stock of Dime Bancorp at a price based on the adjusted amount actually recovered in the Anchor Savings case. Upon WaMu's acquisition of Dime Bancorp, the LTWs became exercisable for Washington Mutual common stock. Additional information on the litigation and the LTWs related to the litigation is included in the WaMu Current Report on Form 8-K dated March 12, 2003 filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

The LTWs trade on the NASDAQ Global Market under the symbol "DIMEZ." No shares may be acquired under the LTWs until the litigation, including all appeals, is finally concluded and the proceeds of any judgment against the government have been collected. WaMu expects to provide additional information about the effects of the judgment on the LTWs in a Form 8-K to be filed later this week."

Funny you should bring up those patents. I was just digging through some old articles and found one that is related to your post.

Do you think it was money well spent for them to obtain those patents and re-design the branches? Do you think they will get money from JPM for patent infringement related to those patents?

: ^ )


WaMu's Branches Lose the Smiles

"DALLAS -- Before it collapsed last September, Washington Mutual Inc. spent roughly $1 billion on a branch-building binge that replaced bank-teller windows with free-standing counters and cash-dispensing machines.

New owner J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. is now dismantling it all, right down to the signs that promise "free checking, free smiles," and basically dragging the former WaMu branches back to the past.

Traditional branches "are superior in every way," said Charles Scharf, who runs the Chase unit of J.P. Morgan. "They might be boring, but they're practical."


The remodeling of about 900 former WaMu branches, which will take until October to complete, is a repudiation of the warm and fuzzy retail-banking strategy embraced by the Seattle thrift and other financial institutions when times were good.

Some tellers are learning for the first time how to count cash. The circle of teller stations in the center of each branch is being replaced by a line of windows, including bulletproof glass. The renovations will free up room for more bankers to pitch credit cards, mortgages and other products to customers inherited from WaMu.

It will take about two weeks to overhaul each WaMu branch, with much of the work done at night so the branches can remain open. The WaMu name will disappear as each location's remodeling is finished.

J.P. Morgan, the largest U.S. bank in stock-market value, is racing to absorb WaMu's branches, customers and employees during the banking industry's worst crisis in a generation. J.P. Morgan bought most of WaMu for $1.9 billion when the thrift was seized by regulators in by far the largest failure ever by a federally insured financial institution. WaMu depositors were withdrawing their money, and the thrift was teetering under a mountain of bad mortgages.

Some analysts said it isn't a good time to mess with WaMu's branches. "The name of the game right now when it comes to banking is keeping customers," said Brad Strothkamp, an analyst at Forrester Research Inc.

Mr. Scharf said J.P. Morgan is confident that the "sooner we get those branches to look and feel the way we want them to, the better off we are." The redesigns are proceeding despite a companywide push to cut costs.

J.P. Morgan executives coveted WaMu for years because of its branch network in California and Florida, two states where there are few Chase branches. But the New York company has criticized WaMu's touchy-feely branch design as confusing and inconvenient.

About 1,000 of WaMu's 2,200 former branches are laid out in the concept that the company patented in 2004 under the name "Occasio," which means "favorable opportunity" in Latin, according to WaMu's Web site. J.P. Morgan is closing about 100 Occasio branches.

With the purchase of WaMu, J.P. Morgan's branch network expanded to more than 5,000.

WaMu began introducing Occasio branches in 2000 as part of its expansion into new markets like Chicago. The push coincided with a wave of new branches that were being built around the U.S. as banks realized that customers still liked to go to brick-and-mortar facilities even as they did many transactions online.

The first thing many WaMu customers see when they walk in the door is a "concierge desk" where an employee directs them to tellers standing in the middle of the branch. Occasio tellers don't handle cash. Customers who want to withdraw money take a slip of paper from a teller to a cash dispenser, entering a numerical code.

The unusual format still confuses some customers. On a recent visit to a branch in Santa Ana, Calif., one teller repeatedly stepped away from her station and waved vigorously in order to get the attention of a customer who was standing in line but couldn't see her.

"I got used to it, but at first it felt like 'The Jetsons,' " said one customer who was withdrawing money recently at a WaMu branch in Dallas. The woman was referring to the futuristic cartoon television series from the 1960s.

Worst of all, the strategy never vaulted WaMu beyond also-ran status in most of the markets it invaded. In the Chicago area, WaMu held just 0.6% of all deposits as of June 30, ranking 25th among all banks and savings institutions, according to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. As WaMu's mortgage problems deepened, the thrift closed some poorly performing branches, scaled back openings and ditched plans to enter additional markets.

Other banks have tried but failed to reinvent the traditional branch concept. In the late 1990s, First Union Corp., now part of Wells Fargo & Co., launched "Future Bank," emphasizing video kiosks and electronic banking over traditional teller transactions. It was a flop, hurting the Charlotte, N.C., bank's revenue and fueling a customer backlash that took years to mend.

Even Mr. Scharf, the J.P. Morgan executive, dabbled with one-on-one teller stations earlier this decade when he ran the retail business at Chicago-based Bank One Corp., which J.P. Morgan acquired in 2004. "We thought it would be more engaging for customers to be close to the teller," he said. "It just didn't work." "

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123906012127494969.html

What do you think?

(in response to.........)



"http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-Parser?Sect1=PTO1&Sect2=HITOFF&d=PALL&p=1&u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsrchnum.htm&r=1&f=G&l=50&s1=6,681,985.PN.&OS=PN/6,681,985&RS=PN/6,681,985

Iwas rumaging through some documents found this felt like posting it wami patents

Assignee: Washington Mutual, Inc. (Seattle, WA)"

SCHEDULING ORDER WITH
RESPECT TO HEARING ON EMPLOYEE CLAIMS


......"ORDERED that the Parties shall serve written discovery requests, including,
without limitation, requests for production of documents, on or prior to December 11, 2009; and
it is further
ORDERED that responses or objections to written discovery requests shall be
served in accordance with the requirements imposed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as
adopted by the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and the Local Rules; and it is further
ORDERED that, on or before January 22, 2010, the Parties shall exchange a list
of witnesses (collectively, the "Witnesses") who may be called at the Hearing; and it is further
ORDERED that, to the extent requested, depositions ofthe Witnesses shall be
taken on or prior to March 3, 2010; and it is further
ORDERED that the Parties shall be entitled to submit supplemental briefing with
respect to the Omnibus Objections and any fact discovery that may be elicited pursuant to this
Scheduling Order by not later than five (5) days in advance of the Hearing; and it is further
ORDERED that the Hearing shall be held on [WEEK OF MARCH 15,2010)
March 15 , 2010 at 10:00 AM" .....

Signed Nov, 19, 2009 by THJMW

: ^ )


http://ghostofwamu.com/documents/08-12229/08-12229-1924.pdf

Dime Bancorp is not being traded. DIMEQ is a litigation tracking warrant that used to have the symbol DIMEZ.

" In connection with Washington Mutual’s acquisition of Dime Bancorp, Inc., Washington Mutual assumed the obligations under Litigation Tracking Warrants that Dime had issued to holders of its common stock. As a result of Washington Mutual’s acquisition of Dime, the Litigation Tracking Warrants are now convertible into shares of Washington Mutual common stock upon receipt by Washington Mutual of any damages upon the final adjudication or settlement of Anchor Savings Bank FSB v. United States , litigation that Washington Mutual assumed upon the acquisition of Dime. Upon receipt by Washington Mutual of any final damages from this lawsuit, holders of Litigation Tracking Warrants will, in the aggregate, be entitled to receive shares of Washington Mutual common stock whose aggregate value will be based on the amount actually recovered in the lawsuit, if any, net of litigation costs and any taxes. "

I'm wasn't referring to the tax sharing agreement.

Take Care

psst. NOLs generated by WMB belong to WMB and not WMI. Check out the applicable laws when you have a little time.

Real money as in BIG MONEY, compared to the approximate total of only $716,960 spent on WMI equities today.

REAL MONEY is still pouring into the WMI bonds and not WMI equity.


There has been over $14 million put into WMI senior bonds today alone. Not good news for WMI equity. This indicates that purchasers of these bonds expect WMI to exit bk but that wamuq will not.





Issue: WAMU.JC Description: WASHINGTON MUTUAL INC Coupon Rate: 5.500 Maturity Date: 08/24/2011

Execution
Date Time Status Quantity Price Yield Comm. Modifier 2nd Modifier Special As Of Reporting Party Side
11/20/2009 11:18:41 T 1MM+ 93.500 0.000 N @ B
11/20/2009 11:07:00 T 1MM+ 94.000 0.000 N @ B
11/20/2009 11:07:00 C 1MM+ 94.000 0.000 N @ B
11/20/2009 11:06:40 T 1MM+ 94.500 0.000 N @ S
11/20/2009 11:05:21 T 1MM+ 94.000 0.000 N @ S

Issue: WAMU.IT Description: WASHINGTON MUTUAL INC Coupon Rate: 5.250 Maturity Date: 09/15/2017

Execution
Date Time Status Quantity Price Yield Comm. Modifier 2nd Modifier Special As Of Reporting Party Side
11/20/2009 10:38:39 T 1MM+ 95.125 0.000 N @ B



Issue: WAMU.IL Description: WASHINGTON MUTUAL, INC. Coupon Rate: 4.200 Maturity Date: 01/15/2010

Execution
Date Time Status Quantity Price Yield Comm. Modifier 2nd Modifier Special As Of Reporting Party Side
11/20/2009 11:58:54 T 1MM+ 94.250 0.000 N @ S
11/20/2009 11:55:37 T 1MM+ 94.750 0.000 N @ S

Issue: WAMU.IP Description: WASHINGTON MUTUAL, INC. Coupon Rate: 5.000 Maturity Date: 03/22/2012

Execution
Date Time Status Quantity Price Yield Comm. Modifier 2nd Modifier Special As Of Reporting Party Side
11/20/2009 11:50:23 T 1000000 93.750 0.000 N @ B
11/20/2009 11:48:21 T 100000 94.312 0.000 N @ D
11/20/2009 11:46:52 T 1000000 94.500 0.000 N @ S
11/20/2009 11:42:50 T 1000000 94.187 0.000 N @ D


Issue: WAMU.IO Description: WASHINGTON MUTUAL, INC. Coupon Rate: 3.504 Maturity Date: 03/22/2012

Execution
Date Time Status Quantity Price Yield Comm. Modifier 2nd Modifier Special As Of Reporting Party Side
11/20/2009 10:25:04 T 1MM+ 92.250 0.000 N @ B




Issue: WAMU.IE Description: WASHINGTON MUTUAL, INC. Coupon Rate: 4.000 Maturity Date: 01/15/2009

Execution
Date Time Status Quantity Price Yield Comm. Modifier 2nd Modifier Special As Of Reporting Party Side
11/20/2009 11:57:32 T 1MM+ 94.250 0.000 N @ S
11/20/2009 11:55:12 T 1MM+ 94.750 0.000 N @ S
11/20/2009 10:48:00 T 20000 93.000 0.000 N @ B
11/20/2009 10:48:00 T 20000 93.000 0.000 N @ D
11/20/2009 10:47:11 T 20000 93.000 0.000 N @ D
11/20/2009 10:25:05 T 25000 93.500 0.000 N @ D
11/20/2009 10:25:05 T 25000 93.500 0.000 N @ D
11/20/2009 10:23:00 T 80000 93.000 0.000 N @ B
11/20/2009 10:23:00 T 80000 93.000 0.000 N @ D
11/20/2009 10:23:00 T 80000 93.000 0.000 N @ D
11/20/2009 08:30:00 T 5000 92.000 0.000 N Z B
11/20/2009 08:30:00 T 5000 93.000 0.000 N Z D


Those that are purchasing these are expecting to the owners of the restructured company, and the lack of money flowing into the WMI equity is not a good sign IMO IMO.

7. Motion of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, as Receiver for Washington Mutual Bank, for an Order Modifying the Automatic Stay [Docket No. 1834; filed 11/4/09]


A. Debtors' Objection
B. Statement of Bank Bondholders
C. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association's response
D. Objection of the Washington Mutual Inc Noteholders Group



Status: THIS MATTER HAS BEEN ADJORNED UNTIL THE HEARING SCHEDULED FOR DECEMBER 18, 2009


http://ghostofwamu.com/documents/08-12229/08-12229-1920.pdf

(PAGE 6)


That's only about at least another 1 month of waiting for a decision.