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Thanks so much to those bringing good energy and info to this board, no one has a crystall ball, mistakes will be made when trying to guess what future will bring but right dot connections will also surface and HAVE surfaced here
Simple analisis:
Escrows: you can love them or hate them, it will make absolutely no difference (at least in their current no tradable status), considering that loving is not that easy I would not love (spend good energy on) them and focus all my energy in
WMIH common shares, loving them or hating them makes a YUUUUUGE difference here, so focus your energy here? why not? :)
From memory, I will stand corrected if wrong; What has WMIH acomplished since March 2012??
Nothing, not only that, WMIH has unnecessarily paid 54,000,000 (18 million a year x 3 years) just in interest for the Series B preferred, how much NET cash (of the original 75,000,000) does WMIH have left?
Going on with this "business model" will/WOULD drive us into chapter 11 again, in/during that scenario WMIH would became very cheap and affordable for those with the guts and courage to stay in the game and buy them...
At the same time, dilution (increased number of shares) on WMIH shares has been small..... HMMMMM.
Our "managment" team doesn´t mind destroying per share value while adding WMIH shares for themselves and not diluting them, at least is what they have done is last 5+ years
Now WMIH is supossed to enter a YUUUGE dilution phase: interest payment alone is 5% x 600,000,000 = 30,000,000 a year to be paid in WMIH shares, and this is quite dilutive itself (even without M&A/using the 600,000,000 and trigering the 1,35 conversion clause)
Unless this dilution and aditional destrucction of WMIH per share value is just a charade that doesn't last/last long; Cash is not abundant and our "managment" team has to go on with this game at the price of WMIH dilution , Will they?
We will soon know
JMHO
Looks like you nailed it :) thanks for sharing
do you have an opinion about deadlines?
TIA
Hopefully, buy low, ... :)
Thanks so much for sharing Large
¡¡ Merry Christmas & Happy Holidays to Everyone !!
A federal bankruptcy judge has approved a settlement that could allow First NBC Bank Holding Co. to take advantage of nearly $1 billion in accumulated tax credits if it successfully emerges from bankruptcy.
http://www.4-traders.com/FIRST-NBC-BANK-HOLDING-CO-34912586/news/First-NBC-Bank-Bankruptcy-judge-clears-way-for-First-NBC-Bank-s-estate-to-pursue-plan-for-marketin-25706433/
Single Point of Entry “SPOE” Resolution Strategy for systemically important financial institutions SIFIs under Dodd-Frank
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/01/17/spoe-resolution-strategy-for-sifis-under-dodd-frank/
Was First National Bank/ First NBC Bank Holding Company a SIFI?
Did First NBC Bank Holding Company have access to their records/books when they filed for bankruptcy?
They want us to surrender our shares to our broker/bank (fruit of fatigue, neccesity or desperation) for tax reasons
Got cake, Got chair?
Rea(OL)lly?
Mattchew,
Wasn't WMB excluded from the LT assets (as per 7th amended plan)?
, I don't have it handy but (from Memory) I believe WMB was excluded from LT assets definition
If excluded, Who is/are the future owner(s) of potential recovery from WMB?
Thanks in advance
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/933136/000095012406005225/0000950124-06-005225-index.htm
Form 424B5 - Prospectus [Rule 424(b)(5)]: SEC Accession No. 0000950124-06-005225
Filing Date
2006-09-13
Accepted
2006-09-13 14:41:31
Documents
3
The first of those 3 documents is the original (2006-09-13) wamkq prospectus, was it amended later?
Thanks in advance
thanks for the info Hotmeat¡, I will check it again :)
thanks so much HotMeat¡¡
Hotmeat
I beleive your theory is closely related to this filing (Docket#9224):
http://www.kccllc.net/wamu/document/0812229111220000000000006
"...Prior to the filing WMI had directly or indirectly owned all
of the outstanding capital stock of Washington Mutual Bank
(“WMB”) and WMB’s subsidiaries, including WaMu Asset Acceptance
Corp. (“WaMu Asset Acceptance”) and WaMu Capital Corp.(“WaMuCapital”).
WMB originated residential mortgages, which were then pooled
and transferred to special-purpose trusts (the “WaMu Trusts”).
The loans were also pooled with those of third parties into
similar trusts (the “WMALT Trusts”). The Trusts sold securities
to WaMu Asset Acceptance for resale to investors. From 2006
through 2007, WaMu Asset Acceptance sold approximately $71
million in WaMu and WMALT Trust Certificates to Tranquility..."
"...The Court finds that the Debtors have not adequately proven
that the Pooling and Servicing Agreements constitute an operating
agreement under the plain meaning of the statute. Even if they
could, however, they cannot overcome the fact that WMI was not a
party to those agreements... because the agreement
in question is between two non-debtors, it cannot provide a basis
for subordination ..."
"...Therefore, the Court concludes that because the Certificates
sold by WaMu Asset Acceptance were not securities of the Debtors
or an affiliate of the Debtors, subordination under section
510(b) is not available..."
"... IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Tranquility
has sufficiently stated a claim against the Debtors and the
Debtors have not stated a basis for its subordination.
An appropriate order is attached..."
Reagrding your this part of your post:
"This is why I believe there was a Turnover Action, WMI v WMIIC and the LT claimed ownership of WMIIC's assets in an SEC filing. "
Could you please expand or facilitate link/filing about this??
Thanks in Advance,
Kind regards
thanks for your input Johnny, the WMILT extension solicitation made me check some old data again; I posted this OLD ( SEATTLE, March 16, 2017 ) filing of the WMILT just to remind myself of what Escrows are (and are NOT),
Kind Regards
I´m reading this again:
http://www.kccllc.net/documents/8817600/8817600170531000000000001.pdf
For Immediate Release
WMI LIQUIDATING TRUST ISSUES STATEMENT ON ESCROW CUSIPS
SEATTLE, March 16, 2017 – WMI Liquidating Trust (the “Trust”), formed pursuant to the confirmed Seventh Amended
Joint Plan of Affiliated Debtors under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (as modified, the “Plan”) of
Washington Mutual, Inc. (“WMI”), today issued a statement regarding certain Escrow CUSIPs issued to eligible former
shareholders of WMI. Eligible former shareholders are those who timely submitted relevant documentation, including the
release required under Section 41.6 of the Plan.
The Trust has received inquiries regarding the status of “Escrow CUSIPs” issued on the Effective Date in accordance with
the Plan. As has been stated in the past, such Escrow CUSIPs were issued solely to facilitate potential future distributions,
if any, to eligible former shareholders of WMI if Claims involving Disputed Equity Interests are disallowed.
By way of background, as of the Effective Date of the Plan, the Depository Trust Company (“DTC”) established and
maintains positions in the aforementioned Escrow CUSIPs. These Escrow CUSIPs represent nominees’ positions that
would be used to make future distributions, if any, of common stock issued by WMIH Corp. (formerly known as WMI
Holdings Corp. (“WMIHC”)). Pursuant to the Plan, such shares of WMIHC’s common stock were deposited in the
Disputed Equity Escrow established in accordance with the Plan and are to be maintained in the Disputed Equity Escrow
until such time as Claims involving Disputed Equity Interests are either allowed or disallowed.
Upon resolution of those Claims, the related portion of the shares maintained in the Disputed Equity Escrow will be
distributed to claimants holding the newly allowed claim or, if the claim is disallowed, the related portion of the shares
will be redistributed to beneficiaries of the Trust in accordance with the distribution mechanics set forth in the Plan. In the
event any future distributions of WMIHC common stock are made from the Disputed Equity Reserve, DTC will be
instructed to allocate such common stock to each of the Escrow CUSIPs on a pro rata basis.
In June 2015, several Claims were disallowed and 1.4 million shares were subsequently distributed to holders of Escrow
CUSIPs on a pro rata basis; however, a holder received such a distribution solely to the extent such holder’s ownership
position resulted in a distribution of at least one share. Since that date, no additional disallowances with respect to those
relevant Claims have occurred. On that basis, former positions represented by the Escrow CUSIPs are not currently
entitled to receive any distributions under the terms of the Plan.
As stated above, the Escrow CUSIPS were established solely to facilitate potential distributions, if any, of shares of
WMIHC common stock. The only source of common stock available for any such a distribution would be from the
1.5 million of shares remaining on deposit in the Disputed Equity Escrow. Specifically, the Escrow CUSIPS do not, in and
of themselves, represent an entitlement to any possible future cash distributions from the Trust, WMIHC or the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (either in its corporate capacity or as the receiver for Washington Mutual Bank), as the
case may be.
In accordance with the Plan, the Trust will issue Liquidating Trust Interests to WMI’s former shareholders if, and only if,
the Trust is able to monetize Liquidating Trust Assets in amounts sufficient to pay-in-full claims held by beneficiaries of
the Trust who are senior to members of Classes 19 and 22, and then, only if a shareholder had satisfied timely all
conditions applicable to receiving any such Liquidating Trust Interests. There can be no assurances that the Trust will be
able to monetize assets in a manner sufficient to give effect to the foregoing.
The Trust regularly discloses the status of its operations (including the status of pending litigations) and unaudited
financial information in a Form 10-K filed annually with the Securities and Exchange Commission. In addition, the Trust
files a Quarterly Summary Report with the Bankruptcy Court and under Form 8-K with the Securities Exchange
Commission.
Capitalized terms used and not otherwise defined in this Press Release have the meanings given to such terms in the Plan.
The Plan and additional information about WMI Liquidating Trust can be found at www.wmitrust.com.
###
Contact
Andrew Siegel / Aaron Palash
Joele Frank, Wilkinson Brimmer Katcher
(212) 355-4449
Cura Asada
Do you still think and state that Brian S. Rosen is out?
If so, Please page 29/32 of this filing:
http://www.kccllc.net/wamu/document/0812229171204000000000004
Purpose??
Those geting Fees and money from the WMILT want it to extend, at least that is logical and should surprise noone
Other than that, Maybe/probably the WMILT needs an extensión in order to wait for the seizure end; as Janice from the FDIC said, sometimes it takes more than 10 years, conciliation of assets between FDIC and JPM, etc
What I find difficult is not knowing if are there potential sources (Remote assets, whatever) of $ recovery not disclosed/disclosable due to confidentiality agreements, etc
I believe the filing points in a different direction, way beyond sept 2018, IMO
Maybe just a answer from the WMILT stating that there are other potential sources of recovery not publicy disclosed due to confindentiality agreements (or something similar and legal for the WMI TRUST to publicily state) would be really appreciated/helpful
JMHO
Do WMILT claim/interest/escrow holders have any mechanism to decide?
To change people in control of the WMILT, etc??
Waiting for another 3 years for peanuts (employee claims, tax refunds) at least thats what is admited in the filing...
So, writing to the WMILT asking about potential recovery from
Bankruptcy Remote/MBS Trusts/etc in a Proper way [ by some individual or group with Real knowledge about how this MBS TRUSTS,safe harbour assets work] this, would also be a good option
Just My humble opinion
TIA
3 year extension :(
Release Tables:
Mortgage Debt Outstanding, Millions of Dollars; End of Period (FED data since Q1 1949)
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/release/tables?rid=300&eid=147813&snid=147869
My pleasure
Take Care, Fingers Crossed
HI Olti
It was an affiliate of WMB and of the debtors; WMI and WMI Investment Corp. (collectively, the "Debtors")
Whats your point?
TIA
My pleasure ¡¡
Just trying to help :)
http://thjf.org/2013/09/21/residential-mortgage-trusts-in-2004/
835 TRUSTS REGISTERED WITH THE SEC IN 2004
WITH OFFERING AMOUNTS TOTALING: $599,934,541,655
http://thjf.org/2013/09/07/mortgage-trusts-in-2005/
1,045 TRUSTS REGISTERED WITH THE SEC IN 2005
WITH OFFERING AMOUNTS TOTALING: $908,928,982,721
http://thjf.org/2013/09/07/updated-mortgage-trusts-in-2006/
1,161 TRUSTS REGISTERED WITH THE SEC IN 2006 WITH OFFERING AMOUNTS TOTALING: $1,002,727,759,469
http://thjf.org/2013/09/25/residential-mortgage-trusts-in-2007/
745 TRUSTS REGISTERED WITH THE SEC IN 2007
WITH OFFERING AMOUNTS TOTALING: $598,417,576,873
http://thjf.org/2013/09/25/mortgage-backed-securities-loan-documents-the-banktrustees/
According to the Federal Reserve, there were about 54.7 million loans in the U.S. residential mortgage market in 2008, for a total mortgage debt of $10 trillion. Most of these loans were made from 2004 – 2007 when Americans were borrowing and refinancing at breakneck speeds. Most of these loans were sold to residential mortgage-backed trusts. These trusts were formed by both government-sponsored entities (“GSEs”), primarily Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and by securities companies. The trusts formed by securities companies are often called “private label” trusts.
Lynn E Szymoniak
403 S Sapodilla Ave
Ph 2-5
West Palm Beach, FL 33401-5772
Palm Beach County
Contact Lynn E Szymoniak
(561) 630-6928
Send E-mail Contact email address for Lynn E Szymoniak
http://www.legaldirectories.com/Contact-Szymoniak-Lynn-E-Atty-815942.aspx
http://www.legaldirectories.com/Szymoniak-Lynn-E-815942-Atty.aspx
https://www.federalreserve.gov/data/mortoutstand/current.htm
https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/supplement/2008/12/table1_54.htm
DmDmD2020, thanks so much for your posts, help and insights, I have to admit much of this is Way above my pay grade
[ Not his pay grade :
https://www.kattenlaw.com/epc/getstddoc.aspx?BioID=141988
https://www.kattenlaw.com/shan-haider
Shan A. Haider
Partner
shan.haider@kattenlaw.com
New York Office
p+1.212.940.6337 ]
[ https://www.corporatetrustinsider.com/2014/11/mbs-investors-are-entitled-to-increased-bankruptcy-distributionsby-shan-haider-on-november-12-2014/ ]
I believe is this:
Court Docket: #9224 & # 9225
http://www.kccllc.net/wamu/document/0812229111220000000000006
http://www.kccllc.net/wamu/document/0812229111220000000000005
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2187817/in-re-washington-mut-inc/?
Tranquility's claim was small, in the millions, did this same logic/ruling apply to claims in the Billions??
Dmdmd2020:
Thanks so much for this really helpful post !!
Regarding point seven of your theory [ 7) By 2011, Walrath's court had ruled that assets via MBS Trusts were bankruptcy remote. Investors in MBS Trusts were guaranteed that they would be paid, without any problems from the bankruptcy court. ];
Do you know in which filing/docket # Mary F. Walrath ruled this??
TIA
MBS Investors are Entitled to Increased Bankruptcy Distributions
By Shan A. Haider on November 12, 2014
Posted in Case Law, Default & Bankruptcy
Investors in mortgage-backed-securities (“MBS”) suffered significant losses in connection with the Financial Crisis. Those losses generated a substantial amount of litigation brought by MBS investors; much of it centered on securities-fraud based causes of actions against originators, sponsors, and/or depositors involved in securitizations. In addition to securities litigation, the Financial Crisis yielded many bankruptcy filings by parties connected to the issuance of MBS – leading to an intersection between the litigation claims and the bankruptcy cases. MBS investors have found some solace over their losses (through increased recoveries) in decisions reached by the bankruptcy judges presiding over the Washington Mutual and Lehman Brothers bankruptcy cases. More precisely, these decisions held that the MBS investors’ claims are not subject to subordination in bankruptcy, unlike the situation faced by typical purchasers of securities issued by debtors.
Typically, securities-based tort claims against a debtor in bankruptcy are subordinated to claims made by other general unsecured creditors, pursuant to bankruptcy code section 510(b). Section 510(b)’s purpose is to prevent shareholders from maneuvering their way to parity with general unsecured creditors. The policy driving section 510(b) is based on the risk profile of a creditor versus an equity holder; the creditor expects a fixed return, whereas, equity’s expectation is to share in profits (if any). Thus, a security holder should bear the weight of the risk involved with purchasing a security – not the general unsecured body. Section 510(b) assures that claims asserted against a debtor that arise from the purchase of its securities receive no distribution, unless general secured creditors are paid in full (a rarity). However, as explained in Lehman and Washington Mutual, section 510(b) does not apply to MBS investors who lodge claims against bankrupt originators, sponsors, or depositors.
MBS investors are saved from subordination because securitizations utilize a bankruptcy remote issuer to issue the securities. Ironically, the use of a bankruptcy remote entity in securitizations results in increased bankruptcy rights for MBS investors. Section 510(b) subordinates securities-based claims only if based on a “security of the debtor” or of a debtor’s affiliate. 11 U.S.C. § 510(b)(emphasis added). The MBS investor, on the other hand, holds securities issued by a non-debtor bankruptcy remote entity. A debtor may have performed as an originator, sponsor, or depositor, in connection with the securitization. However, it was not the issuer of the MBS; that function was performed by the bankruptcy remote SPE (please note that certain securities regulations deem a depositor as an issuer, as discussed in the Lehman decision referenced herein). Thus, the MBS investor’s claims are not subordinated.
The MBS investor’s benefits are twofold :
the MBS investors maintain the benefits of investing in an off-balance sheet bankruptcy remote entity (such that this investment is not affected by an originator’s/sponsor’s creditors) and
the MBS investor is able to share in distributions to the originator’s/sponsor’s unsecured creditors.
Two decisions from the leading bankruptcy jurisdictions (S.D.N.Y. and Delaware) have ruled that section 510(b) subordination does not apply to MBS investors. See In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., 513 B.R. 624 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014); In re Wash. Mut., Inc., 462 B.R. 137 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011). In Lehman, the debtors performed a variety of roles in connection with the purchase and sale of MBS; however, they did not have any liability on the obligation evidenced by the MBS. The Lehman debtor entities originated and/or purchased loans, marketed the MBS, and was the depositor in connection with the securitization. Nevertheless, despite these connections to the MBS, the MBS provide no recourse against any Lehman debtor entity. In other words, Lehman’s multi-faceted involvement results in securities litigation exposure, but stops short of resulting in exposure to claims grounded in the contractual rights given to the MBS investor. In Washington Mutual, the court explained that a claim based upon the debtor’s sale of its own securities (ie Wamu selling Wamu equity) is fairly and properly subordinated because the purchaser assumed that bankruptcy risk; whereas, if Wamu sold stock of another completely independent company (ie Wamu selling Apple), the purchaser should only be exposed to the insolvency subordination risk of an Apple bankruptcy, not that of a Wamu bankruptcy. In each case, the debtors’ estates argued that 510(b) was applicable because the MBS was a security of the debtors or of the debtors’ affiliates; however, the courts disagreed.
Securitizations are attractive to originators and their stakeholders (including general unsecured creditors and equity) because, in part, the originator’s balance sheet is improved. Risk-carrying receivables are transferred to a bankruptcy remote special purpose entity in exchange for value. The SPE then securitizes those receivables, issuing MBS. The balance sheet clean-up benefits the originators’ stakeholders because it reduces credit risk, reduces cost of funding, increases return on equity (ROE) and optimizes certain metrics – such as debt to equity ratios. This is beneficial to the originator’s unsecured creditors, who in turn should be more willing to extend credit (and on more favorable terms). However, as explained above, an MBS investor is able to share in distributions available to general unsecured creditors.
[ See:
https://www.corporatetrustinsider.com/2014/11/mbs-investors-are-entitled-to-increased-bankruptcy-distributionsby-shan-haider-on-november-12-2014/ ]
Purchase & Asumption Agreement (P&AA)
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/firstnbc-p-and-a.pdf
Failed Bank (FDIC) Information
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/firstnbc.html
only OL' Fred and his crystal ball know :)