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The Naked Short Selling That Toppled Wall Street
Excerpt taken frm full article below
"The SEC has never in history prosecuted a major case against a short seller, and there is no reason to believe that it is actually going to nail someone now. But it is not difficult to see why the SEC feels that is has no choice but to investigate.
It must investigate, or at least appear to investigate, because the data scream, “Investigate!”
Take the case of Washington Mutual, which met its demise on the same day that the Journal published its editorial. While the SEC has not yet released data covering the last couple weeks of turmoil, the data through June show that at one point that month “failures to deliver” of Washington Mutual’s stock reached an astounding 9 million shares. From June 5 to June 19 there were, on any given day, at least 1 million WaMu shares that had “failed to deliver.”
In other words, hedge funds and brokers sold as many as 9 million shares that they did not possess (which is why they “failed to deliver” them), and they kept the market saturated with at least 1 million phantom shares for more than two weeks. WaMu’s stock price dropped by more than 30% during this period. Similar attacks, with similar effects, occurred one after another in the months leading up to June.
That is very good evidence of illegal market manipulation.
Aside from Washington Mutual, Bank of America, Fannie Mae, MBIA, Ambac, and close to 50 smaller financial firms – not to mention a couple hundred non-financial companies – have appeared on the SEC-mandated “threshold” list of companies whose stock has “failed to deliver” in excessive quantities.
That, too, is very good evidence of illegal market manipulation.
The Naked Short Selling That Toppled Wall Street
October 2nd, 2008 by Mark Mitchell
FULL ARTICLE
The Wall Street Journal stated in a lead editorial last week that the SEC was “reasonable” to “clamp down” on naked short selling. Well, that was progress of sorts, though one wonders how it could have taken all these years for the nation’s most important newspaper to suggest that it might be “reasonable” to put an end to criminal activity that has eviscerated hundreds of companies and destroyed countless lives.
And now that this criminal activity has been implicated in the Humpty Dumptying of our financial system, one grows wistful for the golden age of journalism when editorialists (people working for famous newspapers, not just cyber weirdos) would express a little outrage, demand that heads roll – muster something better than “reasonable” to describe the limpid “clamp down” of an SEC that bows in oily servitude to the very short-sellers who manhandled our markets.
Alas, The Wall Street Journal is not angry about the scandal of naked short selling. To the contrary, it devotes most of its editorial to tut-tutting the SEC for taking the mild step of requiring hedge funds to disclose their short positions. This, the Journal laments, means the government wants to “slap a scarlet letter on short sellers.” And (shed a tear) hedge funds will now have to “worry that their strategies will be put on display for the world to see.”
Might the world like to see which hedge funds are employing the strategy of illegal naked short selling – offloading huge chunks of stock that they do not possess – phantom stock – in order to drive down prices? No, nothing to see there, says the Journal. Having thoroughly investigated the matter, the editorialist reports that there is “no evidence of widespread naked shorting of financial stocks in this panic.” Indeed, the Journal assures us that there is no evidence that short sellers have engaged in any market manipulation whatsoever.
That is a mighty bold claim. As the Wall Street Journal itself reported, the SEC has ordered two dozen hedge funds to turn over trading records as part of its investigation into possible short-seller manipulation of six big financial institutions — American International Group, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Morgan Stanley, Washington Mutual, and Merrill Lynch.
The SEC has never in history prosecuted a major case against a short seller, and there is no reason to believe that it is actually going to nail someone now. But it is not difficult to see why the SEC feels that is has no choice but to investigate.
It must investigate, or at least appear to investigate, because the data scream, “Investigate!”
Take the case of Washington Mutual, which met its demise on the same day that the Journal published its editorial. While the SEC has not yet released data covering the last couple weeks of turmoil, the data through June show that at one point that month “failures to deliver” of Washington Mutual’s stock reached an astounding 9 million shares. From June 5 to June 19 there were, on any given day, at least 1 million WaMu shares that had “failed to deliver.”
In other words, hedge funds and brokers sold as many as 9 million shares that they did not possess (which is why they “failed to deliver” them), and they kept the market saturated with at least 1 million phantom shares for more than two weeks. WaMu’s stock price dropped by more than 30% during this period. Similar attacks, with similar effects, occurred one after another in the months leading up to June.
That is very good evidence of illegal market manipulation.
Aside from Washington Mutual, Bank of America, Fannie Mae, MBIA, Ambac, and close to 50 smaller financial firms – not to mention a couple hundred non-financial companies – have appeared on the SEC-mandated “threshold” list of companies whose stock has “failed to deliver” in excessive quantities.
That, too, is very good evidence of illegal market manipulation.
A number of the big banks never appeared on the SEC’s “threshold” list. Perhaps that explains the Journal’s claim that there is “no evidence” that naked short selling contributed to our financial crisis. If so, the Journal does not understand the methods that naked short sellers use to manipulate the markets. The Journal also does not understand how powerful financial elites manipulate the government (and the media).
Peter Chepucavage, the former SEC official who authored Regulation SHO (the rules that governed short sales from 2005 until the SEC temporarily banned short-selling of financial stock last week) has told us that the rules were watered down under fierce pressure from the hedge fund lobby.
One result is that Regulation SHO did not force short sellers to borrow real shares before they sold them. They were given three days to produce stock before it was declared a “failure to deliver.” If they missed the three-day deadline, they were given another ten days, after which they were supposed to buy (not borrow) real shares and deliver them, or face penalties.
In practice, many hedge funds and brokers ignored the deadlines without repercussions. But even traders who met the deadlines were able to churn the markets. Since they were not required to possess real shares before they hit the sell button, they could offload a large block of phantom stock and let it dilute supply for three to 13 days. When the deadline arrived, they might borrow real shares and deliver them, and then sell another block of phantom stock, which would hammer prices for another three to thirteen days.
Or, rather than borrow real shares, the hedge fund might buy stock (the price having been knocked down during 13 days of diluted supply) from a friendly broker. Often, the brokers did not have any stock to sell the hedge fund, but they pushed the sale button anyway. The hedge funds then used the broker’s phantom stock to settle its initial sale of phantom stock, and when the broker’s deadline came, he bought an equal quantity of phantom stock from another broker, and so on.
A lot of journalists have portrayed this naked short selling as “legal.” In fact, it is grossly illegal assuming the goal is to manipulate markets. But the SEC until recently shied away from making that assumption. So long as the hedge funds met the delivery deadlines, they could distort and destroy at will.
Another result of the short-seller lobby’s intervention is that a company does not appear on the SEC’s “threshold” list unless there are failures to deliver of more than 10,000 of the company’s shares (and at least 0.5% of its total shares outstanding) for five consecutive days. So long as there are no failures on day six, there are no flashing red lights at the SEC. That is, threshold (excessive) levels of phantom shares can float around the system for a total of eight days (three days before they are registered as “failures to deliver,” plus five more) without a company being designated a victim of naked short selling.
An eight-day blast (or even just a one day blast) of, say, a couple-hundred thousand phantom shares can knock down a stock’s price very nicely. Blasts of a million-plus shares, which are common, can do even more damage.
If a company has weaknesses that can be blown out of proportion with help from the media, and if hedge funds blast the company with phantom stock, then pause, then blast again, then pause, then blast again — over and over — for a couple of months, then the company’s share price can soon be in the single digits. – without ever having appeared on the SEC’s threshold list.
Unsurprisingly, the data through June shows this blast-pause-blast pattern in the stocks of nearly ever major financial institution that has been wiped off the map, and quite a few that were in death spirals before the SEC temporarily banned short-selling. Very often, huge failures to deliver have occurred in stretches of precisely five days – just long enough to keep a stock off the threshold list.
The attack on Bear Stearns, for example, began on January 9, when hedge funds naked shorted more than 1.1 million shares. The shares “failed to deliver” at the end of Friday, January 11 (the three-day deadline). For the next four days, beginning Monday, January 14, there were massive failures to deliver, peaking at 1 million shares on January 17. That is, the attack lasted a total of eight days, with failures to deliver lasting precisely five days. On day six, there were few failures to deliver, so Bear did not appear on the threshold list.
Over the next few weeks, there were several more blasts – with failures to deliver ranging from 200,000 to 500,000 shares. Those were threshold levels, but the failures lasted less than five consecutive days, so no flashing red light at the SEC.
On February 28, 800,000 shares of Bear Stearns failed to deliver. For the next five business days, anywhere from 100,000 to 350,000 shares failed to deliver. On day six, there was a pause — few failures to deliver. So no threshold list – no flashing red light at the SEC.
A week later, just before CNBC’s David Faber reported the false information (given to him by a hedge fund “friend” whom he had “known for twenty years”) that Goldman Sachs had cut off Bear’s credit, somebody naked shorted more than a million shares of Bear’s stock.. Over the course of the next couple of weeks, there was a sustained effort to drive the stock to zero, with massive failures to deliver every day — peaking at 13 million shares.
This attack lasted long enough to put Bear Stearns on the threshold list, but by then, it was too late. The bank’s mangled remains had been swallowed by JP Morgan. Ultimately, at least 11 million shares of Bear Stearns were sold and never delivered.
Meanwhile, the naked short sellers began their attack on Lehman Brothers. On March 18, Lehman’s stock had begun to increase sharply, so somebody unleashed more than 1.5 million phantom shares. Those failed to deliver on March 20. For the next three days, there were failures to deliver of between 400.000 and 800.000 shares — far exceeding the daily “threshold.” That helped the share price to fall sharply, but on day five, there were no failures, so Lehman didn’t appear on the threshold list of companies victimized by naked short selling.
On April 1, another round of naked short selling commenced, coinciding with a wave of false rumors about Lehman’s liquidity. That continued until April 3, when SEC Chairman Christopher Cox, for the first time, told a Senate committee hearing that naked short selling was a big problem. Using the words “phantom stock,” he said many companies had been affected and vowed to crack down.
For a few weeks after that, there was not much new naked short selling.
Then, on May 21, short-seller David Einhorn gave his famous speech accusing Lehman’s executives of cooking their books. Though Lehman, like most banks, was guilty of participating in the dodgy business of securitized debt, it was not cooking its books. It had, however, failed to mark some of its assets down to levels prescribed by Einhorn, who waved the CMBX index as the proper barometer of commercial mortgages.
The CMBX comes from a company called Markit Group, which is owned by four hedge funds, the names of which the Markit Group will not disclose. I don’t know if the managers of those hedge funds are friends of David Einhorn, but the Wall Street Journal’s Lingling Wei published a story in February noting that the CMBX “doesn’t make sense.” It grossly undervalues commercial property, implying default rates, for example, that are four-times higher than they are in reality.
Nonetheless, the media, including the Wall Street Journal, trumpeted Einhorn’s analysis, which was distorted in many other ways – but that is a tale for a future blog.
For now, it is enough to know that coinciding with Einhorn’s speech, somebody naked shorted more than 200,000 shares (the settlement date for that sale was May 27, three business days after the speech, owing to a holiday weekend). Thus began a five day stretch of failures to deliver (ranging from 120,000 to 450,000 shares). On day six, as usual, there were few failures to deliver, so Lehman did not appear on the threshold list.
After a pause of a few days, somebody circulated the falsehood that Lehman had gone to the Fed for a handout. Coinciding with that rumor, hedge funds naked shorted close to 1.5 million shares. Those shares failed to deliver three days later, on June 9. The next day, there were 650,000 failures. The day after that, 263,000 failures. On day four, there were 510,000 failures. On day five, there were 623,000 failures. Time for Lehman to appear on the threshold list. But, on day six, of course, the failures to deliver stopped. No list – no flashing red light at the SEC.
Throughout this time, Einhorn continued to appear on CNBC and in the major newspapers, doing his best to make Lehman’s problems (which were real, but probably, at this stage, manageable) appear to be both catastrophic and criminal. From May 21, the day of Einhorn’s speech, to June 15, the stock lost almost half its value.
For reasons that I cannot fathom, Lehman then opted for a strategy of appeasement. Rather than challenge Einhorn’s assumptions, Lehman aimed to silence him and his media yahoos by doing what they asked. It “reduced its exposure” to mortgages, primarily by marking them down to levels dictated by Einhorn’s bogus index – the CMBX. This is the main reason why it booked a 2.8 billion loss in the second quarter.
When Lehman announced its quarterly results, on June 16, there was another blast of naked short selling, with failures to deliver at threshold levels from June 19 to June 24. Exactly five days. Then the failures stopped. No threshold list. No flashing red light.
I look forward to the day (in a few months) when the SEC will release data covering July to September. But I can tell you right now what happened next.
On June 30, somebody floated the false rumor that Barclays was going to buy Lehman at 15 dollars a share (it was then trading at 20). Simultaneously, hedge funds no doubt naked shorted large blocks of shares. It’s a safe bet that the data will show failures to deliver lasting precisely five days.
On July 10, somebody (SAC Capital?) circulated the false rumor that SAC Capital was pulling its money out of Lehman. Hours later, there was another false rumor — that PIMCO was pulling out its money. Quite certainly, these rumors were accompanied by naked short selling, with failures to deliver beginning three days later, and probably continuing at threshold levels for precisely five days. Lehman’s stock lost almost 50% of its value in the four weeks leading to July 15..
At this point, the SEC finally came to realize what was happening to Lehman. It realized that similar madness had destroyed Bear Stearns. It realized that AIG, Citigroup, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Bank of America and fifty other financial companies were getting clobbered in exactly the same fashion.
Clearly, naked short selling posed a real threat to the stability of the financial system. So the SEC issued an emergency order forcing hedge funds to borrow real stock before they sold it. No more saying “Yeah, my cousin Louie has the stock in a drawer somewhere.” No more naked short selling.
This order protected only 19 big financial institutions – which is as far as the SEC thought it could go and still retain friendly relations with its short-selling paramours – but it was something. During the three weeks that the emergency order was enforced, Lehman’s stock price increased by around 50 percent. The other companies that had been under attack enjoyed similar rebounds.
The short-sellers, of course, fumed. Some of those fumes wafted to The Wall Street Journal and other prestigious publications, which lambasted the SEC for issuing the emergency order. They published all manner of mumbo-jumbo about the emergency order wrecking “market efficiency” – though the only evidence of this was an utterly dubious report circulated by the short seller lobby (see here for the details), and it was hard to comprehend what could possibly have been “efficient” about a market getting smothered with false information and fake supply.
Of course, the SEC, captured by the short-sellers, and ever mindful of the media, decided to let its emergency order expire, and announced no new initiatives to stop naked short selling..
The day after the emergency order expired, Lehman’s stock nosedived. So did a lot of other stocks that had enjoyed a temporary reprieve.
Mark my words, the data for August and September will show that soon after the order was lifted, rampant naked short selling began anew.
It will show a sustained attack on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, with failures to deliver exceeding one million shares, until the day the two companies were nationalized. It will show Lehman getting hammered (blast-pause-blast) until its stock was so low that there was no way it could raise capital. And it will show that in Lehman’s final days, hedge funds sold unprecedented amounts of phantom stock, knowing that the stock would never, ever have to be delivered.
Two days after Lehman was vaporized, AIG watched its stock fall to as low as one dollar. The data through June shows that AIG was repeatedly blasted with phantom stock, often in stretches of eight days (three + five), with peak failures to deliver reaching 2 million shares. It’s a safe bet that the data will show that these attacks continued, and grew in magnitude, until a price of one buck per share resulted in paralysis, and AIG had to be nationalized. But the company never appeared on the SEC’s threshold list.
After AIG, the rumor was that Citigroup would go down next. The data through June shows that Citigroup was bombarded – blast, pause, blast – with massive amounts of phantom stock. Failures to deliver peaked at 8 million shares. No doubt, the blasts continued and grew in magnitude in the days leading up to September 16, when Citigroup’s stock went into a death spiral.
On September 17, the SEC rushed out new rules governing naked short selling. The new rules seemed a lot like the old rules. Hedge funds would not have to actually possess stock before selling it. Instead, they would merely have to “locate” the stock. The SEC would have no way of knowing whether hedge funds had “located” stock, but if they lied and told their broker, “Yeah, I located the stock, I got it somewhere, push the sell button,” then that would be “fraud.” Presumably, the brokers, who depend on the hedge funds for most of their income, and are complicit in their naked short selling, would line up to inform the SEC that their clients were telling them lies.
Meanwhile, the hedge funds would still have three days to deliver stock, with no strong penalties for failing to do so, and no mechanism for determining whether a hedge fund had delivered real stock, as opposed to new phantom stock that it had received from a friendly broker. As for the “threshold” of five consecutive days before a company could get on the list that sets off the flashing red lights that the SEC ignores – that would remain the same.
When these rules were announced, the short-seller lobby cheered loudly. The media transcribed the lobby’s cheerful press releases, and then the naked short sellers eliminated Merrill Lynch. After that, they turned on Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, at which point both stocks went into death spirals and the companies’ CEOs treated us to the spectacle of calling the SEC to complain that Morgan and Goldman (ie., the companies that housed the brokerages that invented and profited the most from naked short selling) were now getting mauled by their own monstrous creations.
A week later, the Wall Street Journal stated in an editorial that there was “no evidence” of naked short selling or market manipulation during this financial crisis.
* * * * * * * *
P.S. I am a former employee of The Wall Street Journal editorial page. I think it is the finest editorial page in the world. I enjoyed my time at the Journal. They let me live in Europe. I got to write mean things about socialists.
But with genuine respect, I say to my former colleagues –you are like the boy in the bubble. You live and breath the “free markets” paradigm. This is healthy, but it is limiting. It is not the real world..
Please, get out of that bubble. Get dirty with the data. Behold the slop in our clearing and settlement system. Consider how this slop is affecting our market, and tell me what is free or efficient about it.
Please, do it quickly.
If you do not, this nation is screwed.
Mark Mitchell
Mitch0033@gmail.com "
This, in my mind, is the number one issue keeping my retirement on hold
What was mentioned?
what is ap #
Any word on the response from USPTO yet? Soon?
say it isn't so joe..u will be missed
some large dumps..5000000 still got gtc on 10000000..then i'm done till the ship comes in...which might be monday?
i'm looking for 10 mil at .0005
mikeyk..what is the bid/ask nite and the rest are sitting on
There goes the neighborhood..the big warehouses always knockin the little guy and determining price....your excellent training is always appreciated..
MM's at it again..no uptick on buys but all down ticks on sells..if you've all heard this before..clap your hands... repeating the same message over and over again might get the point across that there is no logic in the pinks and maybe the SEC will see this one day
actually i believe the MM's are guiding the bid/ask as always
Itsa party always..i live in Vegas...wamoooolah
JPMorgan Again & the Fed
The Fed's new program, called the Money Market Investor Funding Facility, will be used to support a private-sector initiative designed to provide liquidity, or cash, to money market investors. The Fed plans to back purchases of short-term debt including certificates of deposit and commercial paper that expire in three months or less from money market mutual funds.
The Fed is tapping its Depression-era emergency powers to create the new program. It will provide financing to a series of five private-sector facilities — EACH RUN BY JPMorgan Chase. They will buy commercial paper — issued by highly rated financial institutions — and CDs, bank notes and other eligible short-term debt from the funds. Commercial paper is a short-term financing mechanism used by companies for day-to-day operations.
and one share to move down LOL
here's what i mean by logic..bid finally moved up along with ask and a sell occurs below the bid
No movement on the bid..still selling at market..doesnt matter what ask is at this point..won't move until bid moves higher
There is no logic when you have a puppeteer controlling the strings
Doesn't change the fact that there needs to be huge reform with the SEC rules governing the MM's
Smoke & mirrors..raise ask one tick.. still sell at current price..
I have not seen one sell yet..and still no uptick...This is blatant Bs...The MM controls the whole market for themselves
Yea 15 straight buys and not one uptick
Read post #20145 & 20147
MM's and players will run UVSE when the time is right
Gotta go....Doesn't anyone realize it's time for some FOOTBALL....
Exactly
We should probably get to know one another..Between your obvious education and my fortune cookie insight & good looks we could rule the world...to be continued
Didn't say we would lose our shares, just that this will be some time before it is settled and we see re-imbursement for the losses under wamu symbol
This ch 11 will be a long`time coming..The restructuring report won't be done in a day..then the attorneys, and judge..Too many people going nowhere fast..Too many people
I reade somewhere that Market Makers don't want to only make commissions . No-siree-bob , they want to also sell shares for a point or two higher and then buy them back for a point or two lower , keeping the difference for themselves . It is commonly known as MM manipulation , and they do it to ALL OTCBB and OTC stocks .
Thanks SB, Hope you don't mind the Plagiarism
Hey SB, Glad to make your acquaintance and your day...you helped me to understand the chaos.. Viable information is the new drug for me..I'm tired of taking WooHoos and HeHas before bed for a single uptick..By the way..I'm Blonde and smart...UVSE will either make us rich or turn our hair white trying
UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, DC 20549
FORM 8-K
CURRENT REPORT PURSUANT
TO SECTION 13 OR 15(D) OF THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Date of report (Date of earliest event reported): October 3, 2008
Washington Mutual, Inc.
(Exact Name of Registrant as Specified in Its Charter)
Washington
(State or Other Jurisdiction of Incorporation)
1-14667 91-1653725
(Commission File Number) (IRS Employer Identification No.)
1301 Second Avenue, Seattle, Washington 98101
(Address of Principal Executive Offices) (Zip Code)
(206) 461-2000
(Registrant’s Telephone Number, Including Area Code)
Not Applicable
(Former Name or Former Address, if Changed Since Last Report)
Check the appropriate box below if the Form 8-K filing is intended to simultaneously satisfy the filing obligation of the registrant under any of the following provisions ( see General Instruction A.2. below):
o Written communications pursuant to Rule 425 under the Securities Act (17 CFR 230.425)
o Soliciting material pursuant to Rule 14a-12 under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.14a-12)
o Pre-commencement communications pursuant to Rule 14d-2(b) under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.14d-2(b))
o Pre-commencement communications pursuant to Rule 13e-4(c) under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.13e-4(c))
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Item 1.01 Entry into a Material Definitive Agreement.
On October 11, 2008, Washington Mutual, Inc. (the “ Company ”) entered into an engagement letter (the “ Engagement Letter ”) with Alvarez & Marsal North America, LLC (“ A&M ”), a management consulting firm. A&M’s engagement by the Company was approved by the Company’s Board of Directors (the “ Board ”) on October 11, 2008 and remains subject to approval by the Bankruptcy Court. Under the Engagement Letter, Mr. William Kosturos will act as the Company’s Chief Restructuring Officer and additional personnel (the “ Additional Personnel ”) will assist Mr. Kosturos in performing the duties outlined in the Engagement Letter.
Under the Engagement Letter, Mr. Kosturos and the Additional Personnel will perform a financial review of the Company, assist in developing for the review of the Board possible restructuring plans or strategic alternatives for maximizing the enterprise value of the Company’s various business lines and perform other services as reasonably requested or directed by the Board. Mr. Kosturos will also serve as the principal contact with the Company’s creditors with respect to the Company’s financial and operational matters. Mr. Kosturos will report to the Board until a successor CEO or other executive officer with direct supervision of the Company’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy is appointed, at which time Mr. Kosturos will report to such CEO or other executive officer and the Board. The Additional Personnel will report to Mr. Kosturos.
The Company will pay A&M $695 per hour for Mr. Kosturos’ services under the Engagement Letter and will pay A&M hourly rates ranging from $175 to $750 per hour for the services of the Additional Personnel. These rates are subject to adjustment annually at such time as A&M adjusts its rates generally. The Company will also reimburse A&M for the reasonable out-of-pocket expenses of Mr. Kosturos, the Additional Personnel and any other A&M personnel providing services to the Company. In addition, the Company will pay for the attorneys’ fees and expenses incurred by A&M in connection with the preparation, negotiation and approval of the Engagement Letter.
The Company will pay A&M a retainer fee of $250,000, to be credited against amounts due at termination of the engagement and returned upon the satisfaction of all obligations under the Engagement Letter.
The letter agreement may be terminated by either party without cause upon 30 days’ written notice. If the Company terminates the Engagement Letter for cause (as defined in the Engagement Letter) at any time, the Company will be relieved of all of its payment obligations thereunder, except for the payment of fees and expenses incurred by A&M through the effective date of termination, the maintenance of director and officer liability insurance covering Mr. Kosturos and the Additional Personnel for two years following termination of their services to the Company under the Engagement Letter and the obligation to indemnify A&M against certain claims or losses arising out of its performance of services for the Company.
A copy of the Engagement Letter is attached hereto as Exhibit 10.1 and is incorporated herein by reference.
Item 5.02 Departure of Directors or Certain Officers; Election of Directors; Appointment of Certain Officers; Compensatory Arrangements of Certain Officers.
On October 11, 2008, the Board approved the removal of all of the Company’s officers with the exception of Alan Fishman, Chief Executive Officer, and Stewart Landefeld, Executive Vice President. The officers who were removed include Melissa J. Ballenger, Executive Vice President and Controller and Thomas W. Casey, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer. Stephen J. Rotella, President and Chief Operating Officer, had previously tendered his resignation on October 3, 2008.
On October 11, 2008, the Board also appointed Mr. Kosturos as President, Vice President, General Auditor, Controller, Chief Financial Officer, Treasurer, Assistant Secretary and Chief Restructuring Officer (“ CRO ”). Mr. Kosturos will serve as the Company’s designated principal financial officer and principal accounting officer for Securities and Exchange Commission reporting purposes. He was appointed as CRO in accordance with the terms of the Engagement Letter that the Company entered into with A&M described in Item 1.01 above. This Item hereby incorporates by reference the description of the Engagement Letter contained in Item 1.01 of this report.
Since June 2002, Mr. Kosturos, age 47, has been a Managing Director at A&M, a management consulting firm specializing in advisory and business consulting services for companies in transition. Mr. Kosturos specializes in interim management and advising and assisting boards of directors, investment groups, management groups and lenders in a wide range of turnaround, restructuring and reorganization situations. Most recently, Mr. Kosturos served as the Chief Restructuring Officer of Movie Gallery from June 2006 to May 2008. Previously, from February 2003 to June 2005, he served as interim Chief Executive Officer and Chief Restructuring Officer of The Spiegel Group.
Under the terms of the Engagement Letter, Mr. Kosturos will continue to be employed by A&M and, while rendering services to the Company, will continue to work with A&M personnel in connection with other unrelated matters. As a result, Mr. Kosturos will not receive any compensation directly from the Company and will not participate in any of the Company’s employee benefit plans. The
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Company will instead compensate A&M for Mr. Kosturos’ services. See the disclosure set forth in Item 1.01 above regarding the Engagement Letter with A&M, which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety.
Item 8.01 Other Events
On October 14, 2008, the Company, WMI Investment Corporation, a subsidiary of the Company (“ WMI Investment ”), and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“ Chase ”) filed a stipulation with the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the “ Court ”) under which nearly $4.4 billion deposited in accounts with Washington Mutual Bank and Washington Mutual Bank fsb are agreed to belong to the Company, WMI Investment and their non-bank subsidiaries. The accounts holding the funds were part of the books and records transferred to Chase in connection with the Purchase and Assumption Agreement, Whole Bank entered into between Chase and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, in its corporate capacity and as receiver of Washington Mutual Bank, Henderson, Nevada on September 25, 2008.
Under the terms of the stipulation, within one business day following an entry of an order from the Court approving the stipulation, Chase and Washington Mutual Bank fsb (“ WMBfsb ,” and, together with Chase, “ JPM ”) will transfer the funds that are the subject of the stipulation as the Company and WMI Investment may direct. The stipulation also provides, however, that prior to and after JPM’s transfer of the funds, the funds will remain subject to all claims, rights and remedies, if any, that JPM may have in the funds. In addition, the Company and WMI Investment grant (subject to the Court’s approval) a replacement lien in the transferred funds, with the replacement lien having the same force, effect, validity and priority as any setoff or lien rights would have had in such funds had such funds continued to be maintained where and as they were on September 26, 2008. Finally, the stipulation will not prejudice the rights of the Company and WMI Investment to identify additional accounts at Chase or WMBfsb or demonstrate that the accounts that are the subject of the stipulation have more funds than specified in the stipulation, or the rights of JPM to contest the existence of additional accounts at Chase or WMBfsb or additional amounts in the accounts that are the subject of the stipulation.
On October 15, 2008, the United States Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Washington announced that it, together with investigators from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Office of Inspector General (FDIC-OIG), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigations (IRS-CI), is examining the activities of Washington Mutual Bank, its leaders and others to determine if any federal laws were violated in connection with the failure of Washington Mutual.
Item 9.01 Financial Statements and Exhibits.
(d) Exhibits
10.1 Engagement Letter between Washington Mutual, Inc. and Alvarez & Marsal North America, LLC, dated October 11, 2008
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SIGNATURES
Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the registrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf by the undersigned hereunto duly authorized.
WASHINGTON MUTUAL, INC.
(Registrant)
Date: October 17, 2008 By: /s/ Stewart M. Landefeld
Stewart M. Landefeld
Executive Vice President and Secretary
Exhibit 10.1
100 Pine Street, Suite 900, San Francisco, CA 94111
Phone: 415.490.2300 Fax: 415.837.1684
www.alvarezandmarsal.com
October 11, 2008
Stewart M. Landefeld
Executive Vice President
Washington Mutual, Inc.
1301 Second Avenue
Seattle, WA, 98101
Dear Mr. Landefeld:
This letter confirms and sets forth the terms and conditions of the engagement between Alvarez & Marsal North America, LLC (“A&M”) and Washington Mutual, Inc. and subsidiaries (collectively the “Company”), including the scope of the services to be performed and the basis of compensation for those services. Upon execution of this letter by each of the parties below and receipt of the retainer described below, this letter will constitute an agreement between the Company and A&M.
1. Description of Services
a. Officers . In connection with this engagement, A&M shall make available to the Company:
(i) William Kosturos to serve as the Chief Restructuring Officer (the “CRO”); and
(ii) Upon the mutual agreement of A&M and the Board of Directors of the Company (the “Board”), such additional personnel as are necessary to assist in the performance of the duties set forth in clause 1.b below (the “Additional Personnel”). Such Additional Personnel shall be designated by the Company as executive officers.
b. Duties .
(i) The CRO together with any Additional Personnel shall perform a financial review of the Company, including but not limited to a review and assessment of financial
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information that has been, and that will be, provided by the Company to its creditors, including without limitation its short and long-term projected cash flows;
(iii) The CRO and Additional Personnel shall assist in developing for the Board’s review possible restructuring plans or strategic alternatives for maximizing the enterprise value of the Company’s various business lines;
(iv) The CRO shall serve as the principal contact with the Company’s creditors with respect to the Company’s financial and operational matters; and
(v) The CRO and Additional Personnel shall perform such other services as requested or directed by the Board and agreed to by such officer.
c. Reporting . The CRO shall report to the Board and Additional Personnel will report to the CRO until a successor CEO or other executive officer function as CEO or other title with direct board responsibility for the Chapter 11 is appointed. Upon the appointment of a CEO or other board officer, the CRO shall report to the CEO or other board officer and the Board.
d. Employment by A&M . The CRO and Additional Personnel will continue to be employed by A&M and while rendering services to the Company will continue to work with other personnel at A&M in connection with other unrelated matters, which will not unduly interfere with services pursuant to this engagement. With respect to the Company, however, the CRO and Additional Personnel shall operate under the direction of the Board and A&M shall have no liability to the Company for any acts or omissions of such officers.
e. Projections; Reliance; Limitation of Duties . You understand that the services to be rendered by the CRO and Additional Personnel may include the preparation of projections and other forward-looking statements, and that numerous factors can affect the actual results of the Company’s operations, which may materially and adversely differ from those projections and other forward-looking statements. In addition, the CRO and Additional Personnel will be relying on information provided by other members of the Company’s management in the preparation of those projections and other forward-looking statements. Neither the CRO, Additional Personnel nor A&M makes any representation or guarantee that an appropriate restructuring proposal or strategic alternative can be formulated for the Company, that any
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restructuring proposal or strategic alternative presented to the Board will be more successful than all other possible restructuring proposals or strategic alternatives, that restructuring is the best course of action for the Company or, if formulated, that any proposed restructuring plan or strategic alternative will be accepted by any of the Company’s creditors, shareholders and other constituents. Further, neither the CRO, Additional Personnel nor A&M assumes responsibility for the selection of any restructuring proposal or strategic alternative that any such officer assists in formulating and presenting to the Board, and the CRO and Additional Personnel shall be responsible for implementation only of the proposal or alternative approved by the Board and only to the extent and in the manner authorized and directed by the Board.
f. Additional Responsibilities . Upon the mutual agreement of the Company and A&M, A&M may provide such additional personnel as the Company may request to assist in performing the services described above and such other services as may be agreed to, on such terms and conditions and for such compensation as the Company and A&M shall agree.
g. In connection with the services to be provided hereunder, from time to time A&M may utilize the services of employees of its affiliates. Such affiliates are wholly owned by A&M’s parent company and employees.
2. Compensation
a. A&M will be paid by the Company for the services of the CRO and any Additional Personnel at the following hourly billing rates. The hourly billing rate for the CRO is $695. The current hourly billing rates for other A&M personnel, based on the position held by such A&M personnel in A&M, are:
i. Managing Director $ 550 - $750
ii. Directors $ 450 - $550
iii. Associates $ 300 - $450
iv. Analysts $ 175 - $300
Such rates shall be subject to adjustment annually at such time as A&M adjusts its rates generally.
b. In addition, A&M will be reimbursed by the Company for the reasonable out-of-pocket expenses of the CRO and any Additional Personnel, and if applicable, other A&M personnel, incurred in
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connection with this assignment, such as travel, lodging, duplications, computer research, messenger and telephone charges. In addition, A&M shall be reimbursed by the Company for the reasonable fees and expenses of its counsel incurred in connection with the preparation, negotiation, and approval of this Agreement. All fees and expenses due to A&M will be billed on a monthly basis or, at A&M’s discretion, more frequently.
c. The Company shall promptly remit to A&M a retainer in the amount of $250,000, which shall be credited against any amounts due at the termination of this engagement and returned upon the satisfaction of all obligations hereunder.
3. Term
The engagement will commence as of the date hereof and may be terminated by either party without cause by giving 30 days’ written notice to the other party during which notice period A&M will cooperate with the Company to facilitate an orderly transfer of duties to Company personnel. A&M normally does not withdraw from an engagement unless the Company misrepresents or fails to disclose material facts, fails to pay fees or expenses, or makes it unethical or unreasonably difficult for A&M to continue to represent the Company, or unless other just cause exists. In the event of any such termination, any fees and expenses due to A&M shall be remitted promptly (including fees and expenses that accrued prior to but were invoiced subsequent to such termination). The Company may immediately terminate A&M’s services hereunder at any time for Cause by giving written notice to A&M. Upon any such termination, the Company shall be relieved of all of its payment obligations under this Agreement, except for the payment of fees and expenses through the effective date of termination (including fees and expenses that accrued prior to but were invoiced subsequent to such termination) and its obligations under paragraphs 7 and 8. For purposes of this Agreement, “Cause” shall mean if (i) the CRO or any of the Additional Personnel is convicted of, admits guilt in a written document filed with a court of competent jurisdiction to, or enters a plea of nolo contendere to, an allegation of fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation or any felony; (ii) the CRO or any of the Additional Personnel willfully disobeys a lawful direction of the Board, CEO or responsible executive; or (iii) a material breach of any of A&M’s or the CRO’s or any of the Additional Personnel’s material obligations under this Agreement which is not cured within 30 days of the Company’s written notice thereof to A&M describing in reasonable detail the nature of the alleged breach. For purposes of this Agreement, termination for “Good Reason” shall mean either its resignation caused by a breach by the Company of any of its
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material obligations under this Agreement that is not cured within 30 days of A&M having given written notice of such breach to the Company describing in reasonable detail the nature of the alleged breach.
4. No Audit, Duty to Update .
It is understood that the CRO, any Additional Personnel and A&M are not being requested to perform an audit, review or compilation, or any other type of financial statement reporting engagement that is subject to the rules of the AICPA, SEC or other state or national professional or regulatory body. They are entitled to rely on the accuracy and validity of the data disclosed to them or supplied to them by employees and representatives of the Company. The CRO, any Additional Personnel and A&M are under no obligation to update data submitted to them or review any other areas unless specifically requested by the Board to do so.
5. No Third Party Beneficiary .
The Company acknowledges that all advice (written or oral) given by A&M to the Company in connection with this engagement is intended solely for the benefit and use of the Company (limited to its Board and management) in considering the matters to which this engagement relates. The Company agrees that no such advice shall be used for any other purpose or reproduced, disseminated (other than to its advisers and accountants), quoted or referred to at any time in any manner or for any purpose other than accomplishing the tasks referred to herein without A&M’s prior approval (which shall not be unreasonably withheld), except as required by law.
6. Conflicts .
A&M is not currently aware of any relationship that would create a conflict of interest with the Company. Because A&M is a consulting firm that serves clients on an international basis in numerous cases, both in and out of court, it is possible that A&M may have rendered or will render services to or have business associations with other entities or people which had or have or may have relationships with the Company, including creditors of the Company. In the event you accept the terms of this engagement, A&M will not represent, and A&M has not represented, the interests of any such entities or people in connection with this matter. Each of the Companies acknowledges and agrees that the services being provided hereunder are being provided on behalf of each of them and each of them hereby waives any and all conflicts of interest that may arise on
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account of the services being provided on behalf of any other Company. Each Company represents that it has taken all corporate action necessary and is authorized to waive such potential conflicts of interest.
7. Confidentiality / Non-Solicitation .
The CRO, Additional Personnel, A&M and its affiliates’ employees and agents shall keep as confidential all non-public information received from the Company in conjunction with this engagement, except (i) as requested by the Company or its legal counsel; (ii) as required by legal proceedings (provided that the Company be given sufficient notice and an opportunity to intervene on its own behalf) or (iii) as reasonably required in the performance of this engagement. All obligations as to non-disclosure shall cease as to any part of such information to the extent that such information is or becomes public other than as a result of a breach of this provision. Except as specifically provided for in this letter, the Company on behalf of itself and its subsidiaries and affiliates and any person which may acquire all or substantially all of its assets agrees that, until two (2) years subsequent to the termination of this engagement, it will not solicit, recruit, hire or otherwise engage any employee of A&M who worked on this engagement while employed by A&M (“Solicited Person”). Should the Company or any of its subsidiaries or any person who acquires all or substantially all of its assets extend an offer of employment to or otherwise engage any Solicited Person and should such offer be accepted, A&M shall be entitled to a fee from the party extending such offer equal to the Solicited Person’s hourly client billing rate at the time of the offer multiplied by 4,000 hours for a Managing Director, 3,000 hours for a Senior Director and 2,000 hours for any other A&M employee. The fee shall be payable at the time of the Solicited Person’s acceptance of employment or engagement.
8. Indemnification .
The Company shall indemnify the CRO and all Additional Personnel to the same extent as the most favorable indemnification it extends to its officers or directors, whether under the Company’s bylaws, its certificate of incorporation, by contract or otherwise, and no reduction or termination in any of the benefits provided under any such indemnities shall affect the benefits provided to the CRO or Additional Personnel. The CRO and each Additional Personnel shall be covered as an officer under the Company’s existing director and officer liability insurance policy to the extent allowed under such policy. As a condition of A&M accepting this engagement, a Certificate of Insurance evidencing such coverage shall be furnished to A&M prior to the effective date of this Agreement. To the
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extent practicable, the Company shall give thirty (30) days’ prior written notice to A&M of cancellation, non-renewal, or material change in coverage, scope, or amount of such director and officer liability policy. The Company shall also maintain such insurance coverage for the CRO, CFO, Treasurer and each Additional Personnel for a period of not less than two years following the date of the termination of such officer’s services hereunder. The provisions of this section 8 are in the nature of contractual obligations and no change in applicable law or the Company’s charter, bylaws or other organizational documents or policies shall affect the CRO’s or any Additional Personnel’s rights hereunder. The attached indemnity provisions are incorporated herein and the termination of this agreement or the engagement shall not affect those provisions, which shall survive termination.
9. Miscellaneous .
This Agreement shall (together with the attached indemnity provisions) be: (a) governed and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of New York, regardless of the laws that might otherwise govern under applicable principles of conflict of laws thereof; (b) incorporates the entire understanding of the parties with respect to the subject matter thereof; and (c) may not be amended or modified except in writing executed by each of the signatories hereto. The Company and A&M agree to waive trial by jury in any action, proceeding or counterclaim brought by or on behalf of the parties hereto with respect to any matter relating to or arising out of the performance or non-performance of the Company or A&M hereunder. The Company and A&M agree that the Bankruptcy Court having jurisdiction over the Company’s Chapter 11 case (or any case into which it may be converted) shall have exclusive jurisdiction over any and all matters arising under or in connection with their obligations hereunder. Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, A&M may reference or list the Company’s name and/or a general description of the services in A&M’s marketing materials, including, without limitation, on A&M’s website upon the termination of the engagement for any reason other than Cause.
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If the foregoing is acceptable to you, kindly sign the enclosed copy to acknowledge your agreement with its terms.
Very truly yours,
Alvarez & Marsal North America, LLC
By: /s/ William C. Kosturos
William C. Kosturos
Managing Director
Accepted and Agreed:
Washington Mutual, Inc.
By: /s/ Stewart M. Landefeld
Stewart M. Landefeld
Executive Vice President
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INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENT
This indemnity is made part of an agreement, dated October 6, 2008 (which together with any renewals, modifications or extensions thereof, is herein referred to as the “Agreement”) by and between Alvarez & Marsal North America, LLC (“A&M”) and Washington Mutual, Inc (the “Company”), for services to be rendered to the Company by A&M.
A. The Company agrees to indemnify and hold harmless each of A&M, its affiliates and their respective shareholders, members, managers, employees, agents, representatives and subcontractors (each, an “Indemnified Party” and collectively, the “Indemnified Parties”) against any and all losses, claims, damages, liabilities, penalties, obligations and expenses, including the costs for counsel or others (including employees of A&M, based on their then current hourly billing rates) in investigating, preparing or defending any action or claim, whether or not in connection with litigation in which any Indemnified Party is a party, or enforcing the Agreement (including these indemnity provisions), as and when incurred, caused by, relating to, based upon or arising out of (directly or indirectly) the Indemnified Parties’ acceptance of or the performance or nonperformance of their obligations under the Agreement; provided, however, such indemnity shall not apply to any such loss, claim, damage, liability or expense to the extent it is found in a final judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction (not subject to further appeal) to have resulted primarily and directly from such Indemnified Party’s gross negligence or willful misconduct. The Company also agrees that no Indemnified Party shall have any liability (whether direct or indirect, in contract or tort or otherwise) to the Company for or in connection with the engagement of A&M, except to the extent that any such liability for losses, claims, damages, liabilities or expenses are found in a final judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction (not subject to further appeal) to have resulted primarily and directly from such Indemnified Party’s gross negligence or willful misconduct. The Company further agrees that it will not, without the prior consent of an Indemnified Party, settle or compromise or consent to the entry of any judgment in any pending or threatened claim, action, suit or proceeding in respect of which such Indemnified Party seeks indemnification hereunder unless such settlement, compromise or consent includes an unconditional release of such Indemnified Party from all liabilities arising out of such claim, action, suit or proceeding.
B. These indemnification provisions shall be in addition to any liability which the Company may otherwise have to the Indemnified Parties. In the event that, at any time whether before or after termination of the engagement or the Agreement, as a result of or in connection with the Agreement or A&M’s and its personnel’s role under the Agreement, A&M or any Indemnified Party is required to produce any of its personnel (including former employees) for examination, deposition or other written, recorded or oral presentation, or A&M or any of its personnel (including former employees) or any other Indemnified Party is required to produce or otherwise review, compile, submit, duplicate, search for, organize or report on any material within such Indemnified Party’s possession or control pursuant to a subpoena or other legal (including administrative) process, the Company will reimburse the Indemnified Party for its out of pocket expenses, including the reasonable fees and expenses of its counsel, and will compensate the
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Indemnified Party for the time expended by its personnel based on such personnel’s then current hourly rate.
C. If any action, proceeding or investigation is commenced to which any Indemnified Party proposes to demand indemnification hereunder, such Indemnified Party will notify the Company with reasonable promptness; provided, however, that any failure by such Indemnified Party to notify the Company will not relieve the Company from its obligations hereunder, except to the extent that such failure shall have actually prejudiced the defense of such action. The Company shall promptly pay expenses reasonably incurred by any Indemnified Party in defending, participating in, or settling any action, proceeding or investigation in which such Indemnified Party is a party or is threatened to be made a party or otherwise is participating in by reason of the engagement under the Agreement, upon submission of invoices therefor, whether in advance of the final disposition of such action, proceeding, or investigation or otherwise. Each Indemnified Party hereby undertakes, and the Company hereby accepts its undertaking, to repay any and all such amounts so advanced if it shall ultimately be determined that such Indemnified Party is not entitled to be indemnified therefor. If any such action, proceeding or investigation in which an Indemnified Party is a party is also against the Company, the Company may, in lieu of advancing the expenses of separate counsel for such Indemnified Party, provide such Indemnified Party with legal representation by the same counsel who represents the Company, provided such counsel is reasonably satisfactory to such Indemnified Party, at no cost to such Indemnified Party; provided, however, that if such counsel or counsel to the Indemnified Party shall determine that due to the existence of actual or potential conflicts of interest between such Indemnified Party and the Company such counsel is unable to represent both the Indemnified Party and the Company, then the Indemnified Party shall be entitled to use separate counsel of its own choice, and the Company shall promptly advance its reasonable expenses of such separate counsel upon submission of invoices therefor. Nothing herein shall prevent an Indemnified Party from using separate counsel of its own choice at its own expense. The Company will be liable for any settlement of any claim against an Indemnified Party made with the Company’s written consent, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld.
D. In order to provide for just and equitable contribution if a claim for indemnification pursuant to these indemnification provisions is made but it is found in a final judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction (not subject to further appeal) that such indemnification may not be enforced in such case, even though the express provisions hereof provide for indemnification, then the relative fault of the Company, on the one hand, and the Indemnified Parties, on the other hand, in connection with the statements, acts or omissions which resulted in the losses, claims, damages, liabilities and costs giving rise to the indemnification claim and other relevant equitable considerations shall be considered; and further provided that in no event will the Indemnified Parties’ aggregate contribution for all losses, claims, damages, liabilities and expenses with respect to which contribution is available hereunder exceed the amount of fees actually received by the Indemnified Parties pursuant to the Agreement. No person found liable for a fraudulent misrepresentation shall be entitled to contribution hereunder from any person who is not also found liable for such fraudulent misrepresentation.
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E. In the event the Company and A&M seek judicial approval for the assumption of the Agreement or authorization to enter into a new engagement agreement pursuant to either of which A&M would continue to be engaged by the Company, the Company shall promptly pay expenses reasonably incurred by the Indemnified Parties, including attorneys’ fees and expenses, in connection with any motion, action or claim made either in support of or in opposition to any such retention or authorization, whether in advance of or following any judicial disposition of such motion, action or claim, promptly upon submission of invoices therefor and regardless of whether such retention or authorization is approved by any court. The Company will also promptly pay the Indemnified Parties for any expenses reasonably incurred by them, including attorneys’ fees and expenses, in seeking payment of all amounts owed it under the Agreement (or any new engagement agreement) whether through submission of a fee application or in any other manner, without offset, recoupment or counterclaim, whether as a secured claim, an administrative expense claim, an unsecured claim, a prepetition claim or a postpetition claim.
F. Neither termination of the Agreement nor termination of A&M’s engagement nor the filing of a petition under Chapter 7 or 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (nor the conversion of an existing case to one under a different chapter) shall affect these indemnification provisions, which shall hereafter remain operative and in full force and effect.
G. The rights provided herein shall not be deemed exclusive of any other rights to which the Indemnified Parties may be entitled under the certificate of incorporation or bylaws of the Company, any other agreements, any vote of stockholders or disinterested directors of the Company, any applicable law or otherwise.
WASHINGTON MUTUAL, INC. ALVAREZ & MARSAL NORTH AMERICA, LLC
By: /s/ Stewart M. Landefeld By: /s/ William C. Kosturos
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I see this stock going between .0005? to .0023+ back an forth for the next 6 months?..Still time to sell something and buy back and forth to increase position or cash
we all know the game..been in it a while..too bad the SEC is blind..Seabiscuits info eye opener to just how blind...don't know about you but all the woohoo's and heha's she's going to blow through the roof drive me nuts because there is no honest action at this point with this stock and many others and it only goes where the controller wants it right now and it's not through the roof yet....jump on the controllers band wagon and collect some money for now as it goes back and forth..but stay in it for eventually, who ever the controller is, will want to collect their millions when they want to or can
i would pesonally guess to defer blame to the corporate sector as govt always does
Awesome, now that was information..lets get FINRA back on this
That's my position...0005...lets hope, then buy it all just in time for retirement next year
I may be Naïve, but i'm a strong believer in free enterprise. Wouldn't it be great to eliminate the MM and let the people determine the pps based on the natural process of supply and demand.i just think it very wrong to be able to knowingly put your money on the horse of a fixed race
I'm not being sarcastic but just ask the MM..MM seems to be able to do what ever MM wants..like hold the ask at .0015 for 25 straight buys while selling at the bid
can anyone tell me in no uncertain terms their thoughts on the announcement that gspg will be featured in an edition of "The Economic Report," which will air on the Fox Business Network and on CNN Headline News and Regional News Networks in October and November. Does anyone know the exact date?