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Royal dude can you please explain what this all means, been following you for a long time, been holding small amount of Ps and Ks since 2009. How does this really relate to WMI ? Thanks
Listen Bro i dont get paid like you, please STFU
Front Page news, LETS RENAME THIS BOARD TO THE "LODAS AND PICKSTOCKS SHOW", they FILL the entire front page of this message board, again for the 1000th time, over 25 comments alone every morning i wake up of them contesting something they never believe in. They must be working over time overseas, so when we wake up in america we hear only there jibberish. Good morning america specials from lodas and pickstocks.
I have been on this board since 2010 actually, so please get out of here.
no one cares, good for you, please go away
Go away, you dont have nothing better to do, STOP.
Looking at the page this morning, and every day of my life, no real talk about coop from you or pickstocks, only escorw arguements and around 40% of the page is posts from lodas and pickstocks, man you dont have a life, over a decade of reading your stupid post and what i call filler on the page to keep the real conversation from being seen. TRUE COOLERS
I thought your concerned about COOP, Why all this chatter about WAMU escrows. Stop with your nonsense, We see that between you and lodas, you like to fill the page with nonsense, and push any talk to the second and third page so they get less views. Where and when have you talked about COOP?, All chatter to deflect Escrows, Stop With your BS, everyone can see right through both your BS.
no one cares about your reference, just leave already, we know there is no money coming in, i thought you were worried about coop, but every conversation you have is about wamu escrows. THE COOLER HAS ARRIVED TO THE TABLE. TIME TO CHANGE TABLES.
its funny that you can pivot this and turn it on me, instead of leaving the board and stop with your non sense, you spin it back on me. honestly after years of your bs between you adn pickstocks, filling the page with your non sense always trying to move other message to the next page so they get less views from people interested in there post, no one wants to see both your negative posts, i see every night your messages filling the page with non sense, keeping valid converrsations on the second and third page so they get no attention. Your like the cooler at the casino coming in and screwing with the table so the house win and the players lose.
Tell me what facts your writing about. Why are you here for COOP?, you have been trash talking everyone since 2009 way before there was a COOP. your paid to be on these boards, no one would waste this much time and effort. you need to STOP.
I agree with you this is coop board but what interesting facts are you posting about coop, your always wasting everyone time with your BS about Wamu, and never talking about COOP, why not ? your a coop guy. Since the begining you have discrediting everyone, even when this was a WAMU Board way before it was a COOP board. Been on here since 2009, All you do is spit garbage. Dont tell me your here for Coop. Your are paid to discredit everything.
Anyone think JPM is planning to use there new onyx blockchain to tokenize the assets of all of wamus assets that they need to repay, would it be smart to issue tokens instead of preferred shares or cash as payment to old shareholders? digitization and tokenization of assets is the future, and we are closer than most people think.
SVB Financial to get restructuring chief from Washington Mutual failure
Silicon Valley Bank parent company SVB Financial Group (SIVB) said late Monday the board's restructuring committee named William Kosturos as chief restructuring officer. Kosturos was provided by Alvarez & Marsal, the advisory firm that is serving as SVB's "restructuring counsel" as it explores "strategic alternatives" for the company and its businesses, SVB said in a filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Kosturos previously served as CRO for Washington Mutual, the largest U.S. bank failure back in 2008.
Deutsche Bank serves as Trustee for 99 “Primary Trusts” and 28 “Secondary Trusts” (collectively the Trusts) at issue in this case. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2, 3. The Primary Trusts were created, sponsored, and/or serviced by WaMu and its subsidiaries, their predecessors-in- interest, and their affiliates; the Primary Trusts issued RMBS and other securities, holding as collateral mortgage loans originated or acquired by WaMu and sold into the Primary Trusts.
Id. ¶ 2. WaMu also issued securities through 28 Secondary Trusts, which are express or implied third-party beneficiaries of the Primary Trusts, and whose performance is allegedly dependent, in whole or in part, on the performance of the Primary Trusts or other RMBS issued by WaMu. Id. ¶ 3. Defendant WMMSC, now a subsidiary of JPMC, serves as the seller and depositor for 44 of the 99 Primary Trusts. Id. WaMu served as the seller and depositor (or assumed similar roles) for the remaining Trusts. See id.
Each Trust is governed by a series of agreements memorializing the rights and obligations of the contracting parties (the Governing Agreements). See, e.g., Ex. 802 (WaMu Series 2007-HE1 Trust) [Dkts. 161-17—161-21]. Specifically, the Governing Agreements imposed various obligations upon WaMu in its capacity as seller, including the obligation to cure, repurchase, or substitute new mortgage loans for any that were materially defective or in material breach of their representations or warranties. See id.5WaMu accounted for the possibility that it would have to repurchase loans by recording on its balance sheet a reserve for the liabilities associated with repurchasing loans. See Ex. 753 (Expert Report of S.P. Kothari) [Dkt. 167-1], ¶¶ 17-18; Ex. 769 (Expert Report of Thomas Blake) [Dkt. 167-3] at 9. That reserve balance “at any given point in time reflects a dollar estimate of future resources that could be needed to satisfy this contingent liability.” Ex. 753, ¶ 21; Ex. 769 at 9 (“WMB’s repurchase reserve was based on an estimate because in many cases the liability had not yet been identified, meaning that a claim had not been made, or a determination had not been made by WMB that a representation or warranty had been breached and that the breach caused a material adverse effect on the value of a particular loan.”).
The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) was an agency within the U.S. Department of the Treasury, established by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA), Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989), on August 9, 1989. See Ex. 767 (FDIC Resolution Handbook) [Dkt. 161-12] at 96.6 It was the primary regulator of all federal and many state chartered thrift institutions. Id. As WaMu’s primary regulator, Ex. 912
Ex. 1 (P&A Agreement) [Dkt. 158-1], § 3.1 (JPMC assumes “all right, title, and interest” in all subsidiaries of WaMu). Because JPMC assumed all of the stock of WMMSC, it cannot now disclaim WMMSC liabilities, whatever they turn out to be. See Ex. 498 (Internal JPMC December 2008 presentation) [Dkt. 164-12] at 7 (“JPMC[ ] cannot avoid repurchase liability under the terms of the FDIC agreement for transactions in which Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corp. (WMMSC) maintains the liability. This is because JPMC[ ] bought the stock of WMMSC.”); see also FDIC Opp. to JPMC’s Mot. for Summ. J. (FDIC Opp.) [Dkt. 148] at 44- 45. WMMSC does not dispute that it is responsible for its own liabilities, and thus summary judgment will be entered in favor of FDIC with respect to all trusts for which WMMSC was the seller or depositor.
Established Master Servicing Operation: Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corp. (WMMSC) has been operating for almost 40 years, including several predecessor entities that JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Chase) acquired from Washington Mutual Bank (WaMu) and EMC Mortgage Corp. (EMC). WMMSC performs master servicing functions for legacy EMC and WaMu master-serviced transactions. Portfolio Runoff: The master servicer portfolio declined 17% from Sept. 30, 2018 to Sept. 30, 2019 by loan count. Chase’s management indicated that it does not have future plans to engage as a master servicer in new RMBS transactions. However, WMMSC continues to timely update its systems and processes with operational enhancements that incorporate industry changes. Established Master Servicing Technology: WMMSC utilizes SBO2000, a third-party vendor master servicing system with robust cash controls and verification. Chase also continues to maintain and support WMMSC’s information technology and Analytics on Demand (AOD). Effective Operational Controls: The master servicer maintains satisfactory results on its internal audit reviews. In addition, WMMSC has updated policies and procedures, and a business continuity plan. Financial Condition: In June 2019, Fitch Ratings affirmed the Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) of Chase at ‘AA’/Stable. Servicer Considerations Positive: Chase has a highly experienced master servicing team, uses established technology for master servicing and employs effective operational controls. Negative: Chase continues to run off its portfolio.
127] In Re Washington Mutual, Inc. Debtors. Chapter 11. Case No. 08-
122229 (MFW) Jointly Administrated. January 11, 2011.
[128] Washington Mutual Bank was headquartered in Henderson, Nevada
and Washington Mutual Bank FSB was headquartered Park City, Utah.
[129] As of July 21, 2011, OTS will transfer its authority over thrift
holding companies to the Federal Reserve. The Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency then will supervise all federal thrifts.
OTS will cease operations 90 days later.
[130] Department of the Treasury and FDIC Offices of Inspector
General, Evaluation of Federal Regulatory Oversight of Washington
Mutual Bank. Report No. EVAL-10-002. (Washington, D.C.: April 2010).
[131] Joshua R Hochberg. Final Report of the Examiner. In re
Washington Mutual, Inc. et al. Case No. 08-12229 (MFW).
[132] The Federal Home Loan Banks are 12 regional cooperative banks
that member financial institutions use to access credit and liquidity.
Washington Mutual Bank FSB was also a member of the Federal Home Loan
Bank of Seattle.
[133] Purchase and assumption agreements are an FDIC resolution
mechanism that involves transferring some or all of the failed
institution's deposits, certain other liabilities, and some or all of
its assets to an acquirer.
[134] On March 16, 2011, FDIC filed a complaint in the U.S. District
Court in the Western District of Washington at Seattle against three
former executives of Washington Mutual, Inc. and their spouses,
seeking to recover damages for gross negligence, ordinary negligence,
breaches of fiduciary duties, and for assets FDIC said were
fraudulently transferred conveyances.
[135] The examiner also found that: (1) JPMC was the only potential
purchaser of Washington Mutual Bank that did not want government
assistance or guarantees, and the institution had an advantage in
calculating the value of the bank because of its work in the spring of
2008; and (2) FDIC could be more transparent in its actions, better
inform potential purchasers of the value of assets, and should require
better documentation of assets being sold.
[136] In re Washington Mutual, Inc., 442 B.R. 314, 322 (Bankr. D.Del,
2011).
[137] A detailed discussion of the disputed accounts can be found in
the Examiner's report.
[138] A fraudulent transfer could imply the holding company was trying
to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors (such as FDIC) and would have
to be unwound. The fraudulent transfer provision of the Bankruptcy
Code is 11 U.S.C. § 548.
[139] Pub. L. No. 111-92 § 13.
[140] See, e.g., In re Washington Mutual, Inc., 442 B.R. 314, 321
(Bankr. D. Del. 2011).
[141] Trust preferred securities are securities having characteristics
of both debt and equity that often are issued by bank holding
companies through a trust. In this case, the trust preferred security
holders own a preferred equity interest in Washington Mutual, Inc.
[142] In the proceeding brought by trust preferred securities (TPS)
holders, Black Horse Capital LP v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 442 B.R.
297 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011), the court granted the defendants' motions
for summary judgment and denied the TPS holders' motion for summary
judgment, finding that the TPS holders no long have any interest in
the TPS because the interests were converted to interest in preferred
stock of Washington Mutual, Inc.
[143] In the litigation tracking warrant proceeding, known in the
context of the WMI bankruptcy as the "Anchor Litigation," the court
ruled that although a genuine dispute remained concerning the status
and valuation of the claims, the holders' interests are adequately
protected by the debtor's Chapter 11 plan. See In re Washington
Mutual, Inc., 442 B.R. 314 at 324-25, 339-341 (Bankr. D. Del, 2011).
18] These safe harbors are primarily located in the following
sections of the Code, which list types of contracts and instruments
exempt from the automatic stay: 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b)(6), (b)(7),
(b)(17), 546, 556, 559, 560. Related definitions are set forth in 11
U.S.C. § 101. This same class of contracts is defined in the FDI Act
(and FDIC regulations, see 12 C.F.R. 360.5) and under the OLA
authority as "qualified financial contracts." See 12 U.S.C. §
1821(e)(8)-(10) (FDI Act); Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 §
210(c)(8)-(10). Financial industry participants typically refer to
these instruments generally as QFCs. Because safe harbor contracts and
QFCs generally refer to the same types of contract, in the remaining
discussion we use the term "QFC" to refer both to contracts under the
safe harbor provisions of the Code and to the instruments defined as
QFCs under the FDI Act and the Dodd-Frank Act. Although a specific
type of instrument might not be covered under both sets of provisions,
this general reference is consistent with industry practice.
Additionally, the FDI Act and the Dodd-Frank Act treat QFCs in an
analogous manner to the Code, with one notable exception--the ability
of FDIC to prevent the termination of these QFCs by transfer within 1
business day--this will be discussed later in this report.
[19] The Code defines the types of entities that can benefit from the
safe harbor ("counterparty limitations"). See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b),
101(22A), (46), (53C).
[20] Ordinarily, an ipso facto clause in an executory contract is
unenforceable against a debtor in bankruptcy due to the automatic
stay, and the exercise of the right to recover property or act against
the property of the debtor is prohibited by the automatic stay. 11
U.S.C. §§ 365(e), 362. In bankruptcy, an executory contract is one in
which both parties to the contract have future performance obligations
that, if unperformed by either party, would result in a material
breach. See Regen Capital I, Inc., v. Halperin, 547 F.3d 484 (2d Cir.
2008); Olah v. Baird, 567 F.3d 1207 (10TH Cir. 2009).
[21] An offset provision enables the nondefaulting party to offset
(net) obligations owed against collateral pledged to the debtor. 11
U.S.C. § 553. The safe harbors include "master netting agreements" for
cross-product netting. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(38A), (38B), 362(b)(27),
546(j), 561. The debtor and the counterparty presumably would arrive
at a net sum owed either to or from the debtor.
[22] As discussed previously, the Code does not apply to insured
depository institutions. The OLA provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act
state that "the provisions of this title shall exclusively apply to
and govern all matters relating to . . ." an institution placed into
receivership under the OLA authority. Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 202(c)(2).
For QFCs involving a bank in receivership, see 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(1),
(8); for those involving an institution in OLA receivership, see Pub.
L. No. 111-203 § 210(c)(1), (8).
[23] See e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821(c)(8)(E), 4403, concerning the
netting of bilateral netting rights between financial institution
counterparties.
Appendix VII: Safe Harbors for Contracts under the Bankruptcy Code:
On the filing of a bankruptcy petition, the Code provides for an
automatic stay, or freeze, of any action by creditors to recover
assets from the debtor in possession. A debtor-in-possession (DIP) or
trustee, as the case may be, may, subject to the court's approval and
certain provisions in the Code, assume or reject any executory
contracts or unexpired leases, and may "avoid" any prepetition
preferential payments given to creditors within 90 days of the
filing.[Footnote 162] However, the DIP or trustee may not use any
"cash collateral," such as cash, securities, documents of title, or
other cash equivalents, without the consent of secured creditors and
the court. Secured creditors of the debtor receive payment from the
proceeds of the collateral, and if the collateral is insufficient to
pay the claim in full the balance becomes an unsecured claim.
Certain contracts, sometimes referred to as qualified financial
contracts (QFC), receive "safe harbor" protections from the automatic
stay by allowing counterparties to choose whether or not to terminate,
or "close-out," contracts underlying QFC transactions with a debtor.
If a collateralized QFC counterparty closes-out a contract, it can
remove and liquidate the collateral used to secure the transaction
before that collateral becomes part of the bankruptcy estate. Also,
the counterparty has the option, but is not obligated, to apply the
proceeds of the collateral liquidation to any amounts owed to the
debtor, a process called "netting." After netting, if the counterparty
is owed money by the debtor, it awaits payment under a reorganization
plan with the unsecured creditors. If it owed money to the debtor
after netting, the debtor would collect what it was owed and include
those funds in the estate for payment to creditors according to the
established order of priority.
In addition, the safe harbor for QFCs allows the QFC counterparty to
keep prepetition preferential payments, which can be understood by the
example of a CDS. A CDS is generally a contract between two parties
where the first party promises to pay the second party if a third
party experiences a credit event such as failing to pay a debt. If the
third party suffers a credit event, then the first party would be
required to post increased collateral to assure the second party that
it could meet its contractual obligation. On a bankruptcy filing of
the first party, without the safe harbor, the second party would
normally be required to return the increased collateral to the first
party's estate as a prepetition preferential payment. Instead, under
the safe harbor, the second party could close-out the CDS, liquidate
the collateral, and net the proceeds against its debts to the first
party.
Washington Mutual was a thrift holding company that had 133
subsidiaries. These subsidiaries included Washington Mutual Bank,
which was the largest savings and loan association in the United
States prior to its failure, with more than 2,200 branches and $188.3
billion in deposits, according to the confirmation opinion of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court of the District of Delaware.[Footnote 127] Washington
Mutual Bank conducted most of Washington Mutual, Inc.'s primary
banking activities. Washington Mutual Bank had more than $300 billion
in assets at the time of its failure and a large subsidiary of its
own, called Washington Mutual Bank, FSB.[Footnote 128] The Office of
Thrift Supervision (OTS) was the primary regulator for Washington
Mutual Bank and Washington Mutual Bank, FSB.[Footnote 129] Washington
Mutual also had several nonbanking subsidiaries, including two captive
reinsurers, several mortgage companies, and several real estate
companies. At the time of filing, Washington Mutual had approximately
$32.9 billion in total assets and total debt of approximately $8.1
billion. Washington Mutual's common stock was listed on the New York
Stock Exchange and traded at its highest level of $46.55 per share in
January 2006 for a total market capitalization at that time of $44.9
billion.
Washington Mutual Bank was the largest bank failure in U.S. history.
According to the joint report of the Offices of Inspectors General for
the Department of the Treasury and FDIC on regulatory oversight at
Washington Mutual Bank, Washington Mutual Bank had weak risk
management and pursued a strategy to pursue growth through
originating, acquiring, securitizing, and servicing nontraditional
loan products and subprime loans.[Footnote 130] This strategy broke
down when housing and mortgage markets began to collapse in mid-2007.
Until late 2007, Washington Mutual Bank remained profitable, but loan
losses caused earnings to decrease 73 percent from the second to third
quarter of 2007. Further loan losses and chargeoffs caused Washington
Mutual Bank to post $1 billion in losses in both the fourth quarter of
2007 and the first quarter of 2008.
In March 2008, Washington Mutual began seeking additional capital.
According to the report of the court-appointed examiner for the
bankruptcy case and the Inspectors General's report, the holding
company received a capital infusion of about $7 billion from TPG
Capital (formerly known as the Texas Pacific Group) in April 2008,
part of which went to Washington Mutual Bank and part of which was
used to pay down Washington Mutual's debt.[Footnote 131] However,
Washington Mutual Bank continued to suffer from significant depositor
withdrawals as the housing market further deteriorated and IndyMac,
FSB failed in July 2008. Washington Mutual Bank was a member of the
Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, which also began to limit
Washington Mutual Bank's borrowing capacity.[Footnote 132] Following
company share price declines, Washington Mutual appointed a new chief
executive officer on September 7, 2008. However, after the collapse of
Lehman on September 15, 2008, Washington Mutual Bank had a net deposit
outflow of $16.7 billion (or more than 9 percent of total deposits)
and experienced a second liquidity crisis. According to the Inspectors
General's report, the bank was further hindered by its borrowing
capacity limits, share price decline, portfolio losses, and other
restrictions tied to the $7 billion capital investment.
By September 23, 2008, OTS had found that Washington Mutual Bank had
$4.6 billion in cash to meet its liquidity obligations, and its
expected earnings would be insufficient to supplement its cash base.
OTS began preparations to take over Washington Mutual Bank and appoint
FDIC as the receiver. FDIC opened its Web site for potential bids for
the bank. On September 24, JPMorgan Chase and Co. (JPMC), Citigroup,
Inc., and Wells Fargo & Company each submitted bids to purchase
Washington Mutual Bank, but both Citigroup's and Wells Fargo's bids
did not meet FDIC's bid requirements. At the same time, the holding
company's management was pursuing other alternatives to gain liquidity
without a buyout, including using other assets to pledge as collateral
to receive funding from the San Francisco Federal Home Loan Bank and
the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, according to the examiner's
report. On September 24, Washington Mutual staff presented these
alternatives to OTS but did not get a response. On Thursday, September
25, OTS found Washington Mutual Bank to be unsafe and unsound and
appointed FDIC as receiver. FDIC then sold substantially all of
Washington Mutual Bank's assets to JPMC through a purchase and
assumption agreement for $1.88 billion.[Footnote 133]
The Bankruptcy:
On September 26, 2008, Washington Mutual, Inc. filed a petition for
relief pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Code. The filing for bankruptcy
was completed the day after the closure of Washington Mutual Bank.
Washington Mutual filed for bankruptcy to receive automatic stay
protection against the seizure or dissipation of the holding company's
remaining assets. The holding company's representatives maintain that
they did not know which assets were transferred to JPMC when the bank
was sold because they did not have access to the purchase and
assumption agreement between FDIC and JPMC, so they wanted to maintain
control over the remaining assets. The holding company's subsidiary
WMI Investment Corp. also filed for Chapter 11 protection on September
26, and these cases were administratively consolidated into one case.
After filing its bankruptcy petition in September 2008, Washington
Mutual's estate sought to recover $4 billion in deposits and other
assets from FDIC that it said were on deposit with a subsidiary of
Washington Mutual Bank (Washington Mutual Bank, FSB). FDIC denied all
of Washington Mutual, Inc.'s claims in a letter dated January 23,
2009. The holding company sued FDIC to return its deposits, among
other reasons, while JPMC also sued Washington Mutual, seeking
judgment that the funds (and other disputed assets) belonged to them
as a cash infusion the holding company made to the bank to maintain
the depository institution's capital levels. When the depository
institution and holding company became eligible for more than $5
billion in tax refunds as the result of a change in federal tax law
related to the carrying forward of more than $14 billion in past
losses, Washington Mutual, JPMC, and FDIC were able to come to an
agreement in 2010 on how to split those proceeds, which would provide
the holding company with value from the refunds.[Footnote 134] This
agreement is discussed in greater detail later in this appendix.
Nevertheless, Washington Mutual's shareholders were not satisfied with
the settlement and sought review by a court-appointed examiner. The
shareholders expressed disapproval of the global settlement plan and
raised concerns about the failure of Washington Mutual Bank, including
whether it was improperly assessed as unsafe and unsound or sold to
JPMC for less than fair market value. In January 2010, the U.S.
Trustee's Office appointed the official Committee of Equity Security
Holders. In April 2010, the committee filed a motion for the
appointment of an examiner because the debtors and the creditors'
committee refused to provide equity holders with information. On July
28, 2010, the bankruptcy court approved the appointment of an
examiner, selected by the U.S. Trustee's office, to investigate the
claims of various parties that were addressed by the global
settlement. The examiner's report reviewed key issues related to the
global settlement agreement including the disputed assets as part of
the sale and was issued on November 1, 2010. While the examiner's
findings supported a determination that the settlement agreement was
fair and reasonable, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware
did not allow the report as evidence because the judge found the
report to be based mostly on hearsay, and officials commenting in the
report were not available to testify.[Footnote 135]
In January 2011, the bankruptcy judge in the Washington Mutual
proceeding entered an order denying confirmation of the proposed plan
of reorganization, which incorporated the global settlement.[Footnote
136] Although finding that the global settlement of claims was fair
and reasonable and provided a basis for confirmation, the judge
concluded that the plan did not adequately address the terms of a
global settlement of various claims by creditors and some
shareholders. The judge also found that the plan was not confirmable
unless certain deficiencies were corrected. After the order was
issued, the interested parties pursued a revised plan. Confirmation
hearings in the case have been repeatedly delayed, but could take
place as early as July 2011.
Table 5: Timeline of Selected Events Related to the Washington Mutual,
Inc. Bankruptcy, from September 2008 through July 2011:
Key date: Sept. 25, 2008;
Event or activity: OTS finds Washington Mutual Bank to be unsafe and
unsound and appoints FDIC as receiver. FDIC facilitates the sale of
Washington Mutual Bank to JPMC for $1.8 billion and assumption of
liabilities.[A]
Key date: Sept. 26, 2008;
Event or activity: Washington Mutual, Inc. files for bankruptcy
protection in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Delaware.
Key date: Oct. 3, 2008;
Event or activity: First day of bankruptcy court hearing.
Key date: Dec. 30, 2008;
Event or activity: Washington Mutual, Inc. files proof of claim with
FDIC related to the Washington Mutual Bank receivership.
Key date: Jan. 23, 2009.;
Event or activity: FDIC denies all of the debtors' claims.
Key date: Mar. 20, 2009;
Event or activity: Washington Mutual (debtor) files suit in the D.C.
District Court against FDIC regarding $4 billion in assets FDIC
transferred to JPMC.
Key date: Mar. 24, 2009;
Event or activity: JPMC files suit against Washington Mutual in U.S.
Bankruptcy Court in Delaware over disputed assets in an adversary
proceeding.
Key date: Nov. 6, 2009;
Event or activity: Enactment of the Worker Homeownership and Business
Assistance Act of 2009 permits businesses to use 2008 net operating
losses to receive refunds on taxes paid in prior years.[B]
Key date: Mar. 12, 2010;
Event or activity: Washington Mutual, FDIC, and JPMC announce that
they have reached a settlement regarding the disputed property and
claims (called the global settlement).
Key date: Apr. 12, 2010;
Event or activity: Parties displeased with the global settlement
(which included allocation of the tax refunds) file an adversary
proceeding in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Delaware.
Key date: May 21, 2010;
Event or activity: Washington Mutual, Inc. files amended plan of
reorganization and disclosure statement reflecting agreements reached
with FDIC and JPMC.
Key date: July 6, 2010;
Event or activity: Parties displeased with the global settlement file
a different adversary proceeding in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in
Delaware (known as the Trust Preferred Securities adversary
proceeding).
Key date: July 28, 2010;
Event or activity: The U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Delaware approves the
U.S. Trustee's selection of an examiner to conduct an investigation
into the merits of the various claims of the estate, JPMC, and FDIC
which were being resolved by the global settlement. The examiner
completed his report on November 1, 2010.
Key date: Oct. 6, 2010;
Event or activity: Modification of global settlement plan.
Key date: Jan. 7, 2011;
Event or activity: Denial of summary motion April 12, 2009, adversary
proceeding.
Key date: Mar. 30, 2011;
Event or activity: Approval of disclosure statement and solicitation
procedures for revised plan.
Key date: July 13, 2011;
Event or activity: Scheduled date of confirmation hearing for plan.
Sources: Judicial filings and decisions from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court
of the District of Delaware, FDIC, and OTS.
[A] The sale resulted in a closed bank transaction with no losses to
the deposit insurance fund.
[B] Pub. L. No. 111-92 § 13 (2009) allows firms to apply losses in
2008 and 2009 to their taxable income for up to 5 prior years (with a
limited amount for the fifth prior year), instead of the 2 years
otherwise generally allowed.
[End of table]
Adversary Proceedings:
Washington Mutual, Inc. and JPMC:
Shortly following the sale of Washington Mutual Bank to JPMC,
Washington Mutual filed a proof of claim with FDIC as receiver to
recover about $4 billion in deposits allegedly held by the holding
company in a subsidiary of Washington Mutual Bank. According to
representatives of the holding company, the holding company was the
largest creditor for the receivership and followed timelines for an
appeal of FDIC's decision to transfer the holding company's assets.
FDIC denied the claim in a letter dated January 23, 2009, and
Washington Mutual then sought an appellate review.
As discussed earlier, on March 20, 2009, Washington Mutual filed suit
in D.C. District Court against FDIC, asserting that FDIC: (1) should
review its denial of Washington Mutual's claims; (2) wrongfully
dissipated Washington Mutual Bank's assets; (3) took Washington
Mutual, Inc.'s property without just compensation; (4) should convert
Washington Mutual, Inc.'s property back to the holding company; and
(5) should void its prior disallowance of Washington Mutual, Inc.'s
claim to the deposits. This filing became known as the WMI action.
Representatives of the holding company told us the holding company
took a portion of the funds it raised in April 2008 and put it in a
deposit account at a subsidiary of Washington Mutual Bank, called
Washington Mutual Bank FSB, which also was seized by regulators. By
the end of the second quarter of 2008, $5 billion of the funds from
TPG Capital went into Washington Mutual Bank. Representatives of
Washington Mutual told us they filed in the D.C. District Court
because FDIC's main office is located there, and the challenged action
occurred there.
Four days later, JPMC filed a complaint in bankruptcy court against
Washington Mutual, Inc. (known as the JPMC adversary proceeding)
seeking a declaratory judgment that JPMC owned the deposited funds
contested by Washington Mutual, Inc. JPMC maintained that the funds
were a capital contribution to the bank rather than a deposit.
[Footnote 137] JPMC and FDIC further questioned whether the deposits
were a fraudulent transfer.[Footnote 138] On May 29, 2009, Washington
Mutual, Inc. filed an answer and counterclaims to this adversary
proceeding asserting ownership of the disputed assets in the deposits
made to Washington Mutual Bank. Additional claims and counterclaims
were made during this period both in D.C. District Court and in the
Bankruptcy Court (District of Delaware). In the meantime, Washington
Mutual, Inc.; JPMC; and FDIC entered into discussions on a settlement
to resolve the distribution of assets.
In November 2009, the Congress passed the Worker Homeownership and
Business Assistance Act of 2009, which allowed companies like
Washington Mutual to use their losses in 2008 to offset income on
which taxes had been paid in the prior five years.[Footnote 139] As a
result, the bank was entitled to receive refunds from federal income
taxes paid in 2001-2008 of approximately $5 billion. There were
competing claims to these tax refunds; however, on March 12, 2010,
Washington Mutual, Inc., JPMC, and FDIC announced that they had
reached a settlement of all the issues regarding the disputed property
and related claims (known as the global settlement).[Footnote 140] The
plan set forth the allocation of the tax refund among all of the
parties: up to $2.2 billion to the holding company, up to $2.2 billion
to JPMC (new owner of the bank), up to $850 million to FDIC, and $335
million to the bank's bondholders.
Other Adversary Proceedings:
Two other groups filed adversary proceedings claiming that the
transfer of certain assets under the global settlement to JPMC free
and clear of all claims was improper. First, holders of trust
preferred securities, issued in private placements from a holding
company subsidiary called Washington Mutual Preferred Funding LLC
(WMPF) and based on portfolios of home mortgage loans, filed an
adversary proceeding against Washington Mutual, Inc. and JPMC on July
6, 2010.[Footnote 141] The bankruptcy court ruled against the trust
preferred securities holders.[Footnote 142] The second adversary
proceeding stems from holders of litigation tracking warrants--
securities that track and pay-off based on outcomes of litigation--
from the proceeds of an ongoing lawsuit of one of Washington Mutual,
Inc.'s former subsidiaries.[Footnote 143] The court denied the motion
for summary judgment for the litigation tracking warrants holders
because of disputed issues of material fact.
FDIC's first option is similar to the safe harbor provisions under the
Code. If FDIC retains QFCs in the receivership, the counterparty may
terminate the contract and exercise any contractual right to net any
payment the counterparty owes to the institution against the payment
the institution owes to the counterparty on a different QFC.[Footnote
23] While this right is immediate under the Code's safe harbor, the
QFC counterparty generally cannot exercise it against a failed insured
depository institution in FDIC receivership until after 5:00 p.m.
(eastern standard time or eastern daylight time) on a normal business
day following the date of appointment of FDIC as receiver.[Footnote
24] Because bank regulators almost always close depository
institutions on Fridays, the stay remains in effect until 5:00 p.m.
the following Monday. The second option involves FDIC's transfer of
QFCs to another financial institution or permissible entity. If FDIC
transfers a QFC to another financial institution, the counterparty
cannot exercise its contractual right to terminate the QFC solely as a
result of the transfer, the insolvency, or the appointment of the
receiver.[Footnote 25] Under the third option, FDIC may repudiate
(reject) a QFC, within a reasonable period of time, if FDIC determines
that the contract is burdensome.[Footnote 26] However, FDIC must pay
actual direct compensatory damages, which may include the normal and
reasonable costs of cover or other reasonable measure of damages used
in the industry for such claims, calculated as of the date of
repudiation. If FDIC decides to transfer or repudiate (reject) a QFC,
all other QFCs entered into between the failed institution and that
counterparty, as well as those QFCs entered into with any of that
counterparty's affiliates, must be transferred to the same financial
institution or repudiated at the same time.[Footnote 27]
Safe harbor treatment was first added to the Code in 1982 for forward
contracts, commodity contracts, and security contracts, and over time
the Congress has expanded the types of contracts and counterparties
covered.[Footnote 28] The most recent changes to the treatment of safe
harbor contracts under the
and repurchase agreements, an overnight source of funding used by
financial institutions, and included provisions to strengthen and
clarify the enforceability of such contracts.[Footnote 29] According
to legislative history and FDIC regulations, the purpose of these safe
harbors and the QFC provisions in the FDI Act is to maintain market
liquidity and reduce systemic risk, which we define as the risk that
the failure of one large institution would cause other institutions to
fail or that a market event could broadly affect the financial system
rather than just one or a few institutions.[Footnote 30]
interesting but long read, they speak of alot big banks and also vII safe harbor.United States Government Accountability Office:
https://www.gao.gov/assets/a321224.html
GAO:
Report to Congressional Committees:
July 2011:
Bankruptcy:
Complex Financial Institutions and International Coordination Pose
Challenges:
GAO-11-707:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-11-707, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-
Frank Act) created the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA) that can be
used to resolve failed systemically important financial institutions.
However, questions continued to be raised about the effectiveness of
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (Code) and current mechanisms for
international coordination in bankruptcy cases. The Dodd-Frank Act
requires GAO to report on the effectiveness of the Code in resolving
certain failed financial institutions on an ongoing basis. Among its
objectives, this report addresses (1) the effectiveness of Chapters 7
and 11 of the Code for facilitating orderly resolutions of failed
financial institutions; (2) proposals for improving the effectiveness
of liquidations and reorganizations under the Code; and (3) existing
mechanisms that facilitate international coordination under the Code
and barriers to coordination of financial institution bankruptcies.
GAO reviewed laws, judicial decisions, regulations, data, and academic
literature on resolutions, and spoke with relevant government
officials, industry representatives, and experts from the legal and
academic communities about the effectiveness of the Code.
GAO makes no recommendations in this report. GAO provided a draft for
comment to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, the
Treasury, and the federal financial regulators, among others. All
provided technical comments that GAO has incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found:
The effectiveness of the Bankruptcy Code in resolving failed complex
financial institutions is unclear for several reasons, including that
criteria are not well-developed, a paucity of data, and the complex
activities and organizational structures of financial institutions.
Experts agreed that maximizing asset values and minimizing systemic
impacts are potential criteria for judging effectiveness, but the Code
does not directly address systemic factors in bankruptcies. Even if
criteria were established, few complex financial institutions have
filed for bankruptcy, and those that have, have done so recently,
making measuring effectiveness difficult. Nonetheless, experts
generally agreed that certain attributes of complex financial
institutions—highly liquid funding sources; use of derivatives;
complex legal structures, including regulated and unregulated
entities, that do not correspond to integrated, interconnected
operating structures; and international scope of operations—complicate
bankruptcy proceedings.
Financial, legal, and regulatory experts have made proposals to modify
the Code, but they do not agree on specifics. These proposals
generally focus on or combine several types of actions: (1) increasing
opportunities for bankruptcy planning, (2) providing for regulatory
input in the bankruptcy process, (3) modifying the safe harbor for
certain financial contracts, (4) treating firms on a consolidated
basis, and (5) improving court expertise on financial issues. For
example, experts generally agree that changes need to be made
regarding the safe harbor treatment of certain financial contracts.
The Code exempts these contracts from the automatic stay that, in a
bankruptcy, preserves assets and generally prevents creditors from
taking company assets in payment of debts before a case is resolved
and assets are distributed in a systematic way. However, the experts
do not agree on whether the types of contracts receiving this safe
harbor treatment need to be changed or whether, as with regulatory
processes, a temporary stay should be adopted.
Efforts to improve international coordination continue, but existing
mechanisms are not comprehensive, and international coordination
generally is limited—often because national interests can play a
determining role in resolution outcomes. For example, Chapter 15 of
the Code promotes coordination between U.S. bankruptcy courts and
foreign jurisdictions when the debtor in a U.S. bankruptcy proceeding
is a company with foreign operations. However, national interests and
other factors limit its effectiveness during bankruptcies of financial
institutions. When national interests are aligned, even during a
financial crisis, courts and regulators find ways to coordinate, but
when they diverge, the need to safeguard those interests takes
priority. Variations in countries’ insolvency laws, differences in
definitions and factors that trigger insolvencies, and limits on
information sharing also constrain international coordination.
Proposals have been made to improve international coordination for
financial institution resolutions, but most efforts focus on
regulatory, rather than judicial, processes.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-707] or key
components. For more information, contact Alicia Puente Cackley at
(202) 512-8678 or cackleya@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
D.C. District Court Has Issued Rules to Implement Required Judicial
Review under the Orderly Liquidation Authority:
The Effectiveness of the Bankruptcy Code in Resolving Complex and
Internationally Active Financial Institutions Is Unclear:
Bankruptcy Proposals Address Some Financial Institution Challenges,
but There Is No Consensus on Specifics:
Courts and Regulators Have Mechanisms for International Coordination,
but National Interests and Other Factors Limit Coordination:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Local Civil Rule 85:
Appendix III: CIT Group Bankruptcy:
Appendix IV: Lehman Bankruptcy:
Appendix V: Washington Mutual Bankruptcy:
Appendix VI: Other Financial Institution Failures:
Appendix VII: Safe Harbors for Contracts under the Bankruptcy Code:
Appendix VIII: Some Characteristics of Insolvency Systems in Selected
Countries:
Appendix IX: Organizational Affiliations of Experts:
Appendix X: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Chapter 11 Mega Bankruptcy Filings, by Total Filings and
Financial Institution Filings, 2000-2009:
Table 2: Thirty of the Largest International Financial Institutions
(Ranked by Size) and Their Subsidiaries and Branches:
Table 3: Timeline of Selected Events Related to the CIT Bankruptcy,
from April 2007 through December 2009:
Table 4: Timeline of Selected Events Related to the Lehman Bankruptcy,
from September 2008 through April 2011:
Table 5: Timeline of Selected Events Related to the Washington Mutual,
Inc. Bankruptcy, from September 2008 through July 2011:
Table 6: Repayment Rankings of Selected Countries:
Figure:
Figure 1: Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Process for a U.S.-Headquartered
Financial Institution as of June 2011:
Abbreviations:
ABN AMRO: ABN AMRO Holding, NV:
AOUSC: Administrative Office of the United States Courts:
AIG: American International Group, Inc.
BIA: Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act:
BHC Act: Bank Holding Company Act:
BCCI: Bank of Credit and Commerce International:
BIS: Bank of International Settlement:
BNY: Bank of New York Mellon Corporation:
Herstatt: BankHaus Herstatt:
Barclays: Barclays PLC:
BNY trustee: BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited:
CDIC: Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation:
CDIC Act: Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation Act:
CIT: CIT Group, Inc.
CCCA: Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act:
Co-Co: contingent convertible bonds:
CDS: credit default swap:
DIP: debtor-in-possession:
Dodd-Frank Act: Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act:
Drexel: Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc.
EU: European Union:
FDI Act: Federal Deposit Insurance Act:
FDIC: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation:
FRBNY: Federal Reserve Bank of New York:
Federal Reserve: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System:
Fortis: Fortis Bank, SA/NV:
G10: Group of Ten:
G20: Group of 20:
IMF: International Monetary Fund:
ISDA: International Swaps and Derivatives Association:
JPMC: JPMorgan Chase and Co.
LBF: Lehman Brothers Finance:
LBHI: Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.
Lehman: Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. and subsidiaries:
LBI: Lehman Brothers, Inc.
LBIE: Lehman Brothers International Europe:
LBSF: Lehman Brothers Special Financing, Inc.
LTCM: Long-Term Capital Management:
MOU: memorandum of understanding:
Nordea: Nordea Group:
Nortel: Nortel Networks, Inc.
NAFTA: North American Free Trade Agreement:
NPR: notice of proposed rulemaking:
OTS: Office of Thrift Supervision:
OLA: Orderly Liquidation Authority:
Perpetual: Perpetual Trustee Company Limited:
P&A agreement: Purchase and Assumption Agreement:
QFC: qualified financial contracts:
Saphir: Saphir Finance Public Limited Company:
Section 23A: Section 23A of the 1913 Federal Reserve Act:
SEC: Securities and Exchange Commission:
SIPA: Securities Investor Protection Act:
SIPC: Securities Investor Protection Corporation:
Swedbank: Swedbank AB:
TLGP: Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program:
TARP: Troubled Asset Relief Program:
UK: United Kingdom:
UNCITRAL: United Nations Commission on International Trade Law:
Code: U.S. Bankruptcy Code:
D.C. District Court: U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia:
Washington Mutual: Washington Mutual, Inc.
WMPF: Washington Mutual Preferred Funding LLC:
WURA: Winding Up and Restructuring Act:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
the link is here,
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Report to Congressional Committees:
July 2011:
Bankruptcy:
Complex Financial Institutions and International Coordination Pose
Challenges:
GAO-11-707:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-11-707, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-
Frank Act) created the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA) that can be
used to resolve failed systemically important financial institutions.
However, questions continued to be raised about the effectiveness of
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (Code) and current mechanisms for
international coordination in bankruptcy cases. The Dodd-Frank Act
requires GAO to report on the effectiveness of the Code in resolving
certain failed financial institutions on an ongoing basis. Among its
objectives, this report addresses (1) the effectiveness of Chapters 7
and 11 of the Code for facilitating orderly resolutions of failed
financial institutions; (2) proposals for improving the effectiveness
of liquidations and reorganizations under the Code; and (3) existing
mechanisms that facilitate international coordination under the Code
and barriers to coordination of financial institution bankruptcies.
GAO reviewed laws, judicial decisions, regulations, data, and academic
literature on resolutions, and spoke with relevant government
officials, industry representatives, and experts from the legal and
academic communities about the effectiveness of the Code.
GAO makes no recommendations in this report. GAO provided a draft for
comment to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, the
Treasury, and the federal financial regulators, among others. All
provided technical comments that GAO has incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found:
The effectiveness of the Bankruptcy Code in resolving failed complex
financial institutions is unclear for several reasons, including that
criteria are not well-developed, a paucity of data, and the complex
activities and organizational structures of financial institutions.
Experts agreed that maximizing asset values and minimizing systemic
impacts are potential criteria for judging effectiveness, but the Code
does not directly address systemic factors in bankruptcies. Even if
criteria were established, few complex financial institutions have
filed for bankruptcy, and those that have, have done so recently,
making measuring effectiveness difficult. Nonetheless, experts
generally agreed that certain attributes of complex financial
institutions—highly liquid funding sources; use of derivatives;
complex legal structures, including regulated and unregulated
entities, that do not correspond to integrated, interconnected
operating structures; and international scope of operations—complicate
bankruptcy proceedings.
Financial, legal, and regulatory experts have made proposals to modify
the Code, but they do not agree on specifics. These proposals
generally focus on or combine several types of actions: (1) increasing
opportunities for bankruptcy planning, (2) providing for regulatory
input in the bankruptcy process, (3) modifying the safe harbor for
certain financial contracts, (4) treating firms on a consolidated
basis, and (5) improving court expertise on financial issues. For
example, experts generally agree that changes need to be made
regarding the safe harbor treatment of certain financial contracts.
The Code exempts these contracts from the automatic stay that, in a
bankruptcy, preserves assets and generally prevents creditors from
taking company assets in payment of debts before a case is resolved
and assets are distributed in a systematic way. However, the experts
do not agree on whether the types of contracts receiving this safe
harbor treatment need to be changed or whether, as with regulatory
processes, a temporary stay should be adopted.
Efforts to improve international coordination continue, but existing
mechanisms are not comprehensive, and international coordination
generally is limited—often because national interests can play a
determining role in resolution outcomes. For example, Chapter 15 of
the Code promotes coordination between U.S. bankruptcy courts and
foreign jurisdictions when the debtor in a U.S. bankruptcy proceeding
is a company with foreign operations. However, national interests and
other factors limit its effectiveness during bankruptcies of financial
institutions. When national interests are aligned, even during a
financial crisis, courts and regulators find ways to coordinate, but
when they diverge, the need to safeguard those interests takes
priority. Variations in countries’ insolvency laws, differences in
definitions and factors that trigger insolvencies, and limits on
information sharing also constrain international coordination.
Proposals have been made to improve international coordination for
financial institution resolutions, but most efforts focus on
regulatory, rather than judicial, processes.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-707] or key
components. For more information, contact Alicia Puente Cackley at
(202) 512-8678 or cackleya@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
D.C. District Court Has Issued Rules to Implement Required Judicial
Review under the Orderly Liquidation Authority:
The Effectiveness of the Bankruptcy Code in Resolving Complex and
Internationally Active Financial Institutions Is Unclear:
Bankruptcy Proposals Address Some Financial Institution Challenges,
but There Is No Consensus on Specifics:
Courts and Regulators Have Mechanisms for International Coordination,
but National Interests and Other Factors Limit Coordination:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Local Civil Rule 85:
Appendix III: CIT Group Bankruptcy:
Appendix IV: Lehman Bankruptcy:
Appendix V: Washington Mutual Bankruptcy:
Appendix VI: Other Financial Institution Failures:
Appendix VII: Safe Harbors for Contracts under the Bankruptcy Code:
Appendix VIII: Some Characteristics of Insolvency Systems in Selected
Countries:
Appendix IX: Organizational Affiliations of Experts:
Appendix X: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Chapter 11 Mega Bankruptcy Filings, by Total Filings and
Financial Institution Filings, 2000-2009:
Table 2: Thirty of the Largest International Financial Institutions
(Ranked by Size) and Their Subsidiaries and Branches:
Table 3: Timeline of Selected Events Related to the CIT Bankruptcy,
from April 2007 through December 2009:
Table 4: Timeline of Selected Events Related to the Lehman Bankruptcy,
from September 2008 through April 2011:
Table 5: Timeline of Selected Events Related to the Washington Mutual,
Inc. Bankruptcy, from September 2008 through July 2011:
Table 6: Repayment Rankings of Selected Countries:
Figure:
Figure 1: Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Process for a U.S.-Headquartered
Financial Institution as of June 2011:
Abbreviations:
ABN AMRO: ABN AMRO Holding, NV:
AOUSC: Administrative Office of the United States Courts:
AIG: American International Group, Inc.
BIA: Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act:
BHC Act: Bank Holding Company Act:
BCCI: Bank of Credit and Commerce International:
BIS: Bank of International Settlement:
BNY: Bank of New York Mellon Corporation:
Herstatt: BankHaus Herstatt:
Barclays: Barclays PLC:
BNY trustee: BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited:
CDIC: Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation:
CDIC Act: Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation Act:
CIT: CIT Group, Inc.
CCCA: Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act:
Co-Co: contingent convertible bonds:
CDS: credit default swap:
DIP: debtor-in-possession:
Dodd-Frank Act: Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act:
Drexel: Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc.
EU: European Union:
FDI Act: Federal Deposit Insurance Act:
FDIC: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation:
FRBNY: Federal Reserve Bank of New York:
Federal Reserve: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System:
Fortis: Fortis Bank, SA/NV:
G10: Group of Ten:
G20: Group of 20:
IMF: International Monetary Fund:
ISDA: International Swaps and Derivatives Association:
JPMC: JPMorgan Chase and Co.
LBF: Lehman Brothers Finance:
LBHI: Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.
Lehman: Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. and subsidiaries:
LBI: Lehman Brothers, Inc.
LBIE: Lehman Brothers International Europe:
LBSF: Lehman Brothers Special Financing, Inc.
LTCM: Long-Term Capital Management:
MOU: memorandum of understanding:
Nordea: Nordea Group:
Nortel: Nortel Networks, Inc.
NAFTA: North American Free Trade Agreement:
NPR: notice of proposed rulemaking:
OTS: Office of Thrift Supervision:
OLA: Orderly Liquidation Authority:
Perpetual: Perpetual Trustee Company Limited:
P&A agreement: Purchase and Assumption Agreement:
QFC: qualified financial contracts:
Saphir: Saphir Finance Public Limited Company:
Section 23A: Section 23A of the 1913 Federal Reserve Act:
SEC: Securities and Exchange Commission:
SIPA: Securities Investor Protection Act:
SIPC: Securities Investor Protection Corporation:
Swedbank: Swedbank AB:
TLGP: Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program:
TARP: Troubled Asset Relief Program:
UK: United Kingdom:
UNCITRAL: United Nations Commission on International Trade Law:
Code: U.S. Bankruptcy Code:
D.C. District Court: U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia:
Washington Mutual: Washington Mutual, Inc.
WMPF: Washington Mutual Preferred Funding LLC:
WURA: Winding Up and Restructuring Act:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Just spoke to Mr. Kenneth Posner from Mr Copper group
I asked him a few questions regarding the structure of WMIH and WMIHC, some questions to who from the bankruptcy of Washington mutual are the legal owners of WMIH and now mr cooper. I asked him about any assets/safe harbor assets that were passed through the bankruptcy from Wmi to Mr Cooper, if he new of anything regarding the 308 billion in assets that WMI had on its books and if he new where those assets are stored. I also mentioned the other hedge funds that were fighting for all classes during the bankruptcy and where did any of those assets go.
His reply was that he did not know anything regarding the assets or bankruptcy of WMB and WMI, only what he heard on the news, he said there are no assets coming to Mr cooper from the WMI portfolio. He didnt seem to know much prior to 2018. he said the institutional investors are listed on Nasdaq.com.
He also said this is all new news to him. Mr cooper is a publicly traded company and all materials regarding assets would be public information.
best of his knowledge was wamu had 308 billion in assets and 270 billion in liabilities and the difference in between was wrtitten down because of the value decrease in home properties and portfolios back in 2009.
thought i would share this.
thanks for reposting my post much appreciated.
i would like to know AZ thoughts on the SEC document i put up?
AZ is there any thing you can add?
The 2012 Plan took effect on May 22, 2012, and will terminate on May 22, 2022.
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/933136/000156459018004269/wmih-10k_20171231.htm#Security_Ownership_of_Certain_Beneficial
Tons of info in this document,
May 22 2022 the official plan terminates....... HMMMMMMM.........
6 days left
AZ what are your thoughts on the 15Ga filed feb 09 22
UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C. 20549
FORM ABS-15G
ASSET-BACKED SECURITIZER
REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 15G OF
THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Check the appropriate box to indicate the filing obligation to which this form is intended to satisfy:
X Rule 15Ga-1 under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.15Ga-1) for the reporting period January 1, 2021 to December 31, 2021.
Date of Report (Date of earliest event reported): February 9, 2022
Commission File Number of securitizer: 025-01131
Central Index Key Number of securitizer: 0001317069
WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp.1
(Exact name of securitizer as specified in its charter)
Eric A. Senzon, (813) 584-3951
Name and telephone number, including area code, of the person to
contact in connection with this filing.
Indicate by check mark whether the securitizer has no activity to report for the initial period pursuant to Rule 15Ga-1(c)(1) [ ]
Indicate by check mark whether the securitizer has no activity to report for the quarterly period pursuant to Rule 15Ga-1(c)(2)(i) [ ]
Indicate by check mark whether the securitizer has no activity to report for the annual period pursuant to Rule 15Ga-1(c)(2)(ii) [X]
___ Rule 15Ga-2 under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.15Ga-2)
Central Index Key Number of depositor:
______________________________________
(Exact name of issuing entity as specified in its charter)
Central Index Key Number of issuing entity (if applicable): ____________
Central Index Key Number of underwriter (if applicable): ____________
______________________________________
Name and telephone number, including area code, of the person to
contact in connection with this filing.
1WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp., as Securitizer, is filing this Form ABS-15G in respect of all mortgage-backed securities representing interests in pools of residential mortgage loans for which it acted as depositor and which are outstanding during the reporting period. On September 25, 2008, JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association (“JPMCB”) acquired the banking operations of Washington Mutual Bank from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”). It is JPMCB’s position that certain of the repurchase obligations of Washington Mutual Bank remain with the FDIC receivership. Assets are reported herein in accordance with Rule 15Ga-1 regardless of the validity of the demand or defenses thereto, and nothing in this report shall constitute, or be deemed, a waiver of any rights, defenses, powers or privileges of any party relating to these assets.
SIGNATURES
Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the reporting entity has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf by the undersigned hereunto duly authorized.
Dated: February 9, 2022
WAMU ASSET ACCEPTANCE CORP. (Securitizer)
By: /s/ William Betz
Name: William Betz
Title: Managing Director
(DISCLOSURE: This article is not intended to be construed as legal advice. Seek advice from a licensed attorney in your jurisdiction regarding any of the information provided below.)
High praise to Attorney Ron Freshman in San Diego, CA and his paralegal Kimberly Cromwell who recently obtained this remarkable “Stipulation of Fact” from JPMorgan Chase Bank’s counsel. (See #8 – Chase Stipulated Fact – AO1 – WMAAC). Last November, I wrote the following article seeking the identity of private investor “AO1.” (See: https://bpinvestigativeagency.com/who-is-private-investor-ao1-jpmorgan-chase-refuses-to-reveal-the-identity-of-this-investor/).
Thanks to the aggressive prosecution and discovery efforts put forth by Attorney Freshman and his team, the answer has now been revealed. JPMorgan Chase’s counsel has stipulated in paragraph #8, “Investor code AO1 in the Loan Transfer History File represents WaMu Asset Acceptance Corporation.”
Folks, I have opined against Chase for years now that this investor code does not signify “banked owned” loans on the “books of Washington Mutual Bank,” but rather a securitization subsidiary of Washington Mutual, Inc. I’ve been attacked by Chase who has argued vehemently that my opinion is simply dead wrong, and has sought to have my testimony stricken. Well it appears as though I’ve now been vindicated! This stipulated fact runs contrary to Chase’s long standing position, in thousands of foreclosures across the United States, that it acquired “AO1” loans because they were “on the books” of “Washington Mutual Bank” per the Purchase & Assumption Agreement (PAA) with the FDIC. This has been a lie, as these “AO1” loans could not have been a part of the PAA due to the sale and securitization of said loans by WMB through its “off-balance sheet activities.” More so, Chase’s use of the FIRREA argument against homeowners for loans not on WMB’s books may have suffered a tremendous blow here.
It has long been my opinion that testimony put forth by Chase witnesses, like the following by Peter Katsikas, have been downright false. Again, more vindication. Here’s what Katsikas had to say under oath regarding investor code “AO1”:
PETER KATSIKAS,
called as a witness, having been duly sworn, testified as follows:
(Beginning – P. 43):
Q. And do you know whether or not at the time of the acquisition of the assets that are identified in the purchase and assumption agreement with the FDIC to Chase dated September 2008, did it include a list of the loans that Chase was acquiring?
A. I mean, I didn’t see an actual list, but there’s — it’s in the system. It’s in the MSP servicing — that’s a system the bank uses to service the accounts.
Q. Is it your testimony that the Freeman loans were owned by Washington Mutual F.A. at the time the bank failed?
A. Yes.
Q. Is it your testimony that Washington Mutual Bank or some subsidiary of the bank was not servicing those loan at the time?
MR. HERMAN: Can you read that back, please.
(Question read)
MR. HERMAN: At what time?
MR. WRIGHT: Prior to September 25, 2008, between the time they were made and September 25, 2008.
A. The servicer was Washington Mutual F.A.
Q. Okay. Was there an investor?
A. It was bank-owned. It’s always been bank-owned.
Q. It’s always been bank-owned?
A. Correct.
Q. And you know that because?
A. I reviewed Chase’s books and records.
Q. What in the books and records would indicate to you that it was
bank-owned versus not bank-owned?
A. Well, they’re through the investor screens and also the ID codes,investor ID codes.
Q. Okay. And the ID codes are letters, aren’t they?
MR. HERMAN: Objection.
A. They consist of letters and numerals.
Q. Okay. And what letters would indicate an investor?
A. There’s three digits or three characters.
Q. Two letters and a number?
A. No, it could be a mixture of.
Q. So what three characters — well, let’s put it another way. What characters would indicate a Chase-owned asset — a WaMu-owned asset?
Excuse me.
A. For these two loans?
Q. Yes.
A. AO1.
Q. AO1?
A. Yeah.
Q. And that AO1 stands for what?
A. That’s just the three digit code, which is bank-owned.
Q. AO1?
A. Uh-huh.
(Recess)
Katsikas Depo Transcript
Bill Paatalo – Private Investigator – OR PSID# 49411
BP Investigative Agency, LLC
P.O. Box 838
Absarokee, MT 59001
Office: (406) 328-4075
bill.bpia@gmail.com
One Responseto “WaMu Investor Code “AO1” Revealed – Chase Stipulates It Represents “WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp.””
Chase Discovery Demand #1: Produce The WaMu “Servicing Agreement(s)” With All “Approvals & Consents”
Posted by Bill Paatalo on Sep 23, 2021 in Uncategorized | 0 comments
In response to a recent QWR sent to JPMorgan Chase regarding ownership of a WaMu deed of trust, the following response was provided:
Chase acquired certain assets of Washington Mutual Bank, FA, including servicing rights in your loan, from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as receiver for Washington Mutual Bank, FA, pursuant to the Purchase and Assumption Agreement dated as of September 25, 2008. As a result, certain servicing agreements previously completed by Washington Mutual were transferred to Chase. It is not clear why you believe the Corporate Assignment of Deed of Trust dated July 23, 2014, is fraudulent, but we consider the document to be valid. [Bold emphasis added.]
Here, Chase’s position is the same as thousands of others; the loan was never sold or securitized by WaMu, was “bank-owned,” and was acquired by Chase via the Purchase & Assumption Agreement with the FDIC. But this begs the question – if WaMu was both owner and servicer, then why the need for a servicing agreement with itself? In all my years of research, I have yet to see a “servicing agreement” executed by a lender who was servicing a loan on its own behalf.
Now, apply the language in this QWR response with the language used in paragraph 1 of the FDIC’s hollow limited power of attorney granted to Chase for all “sold loans.” The last sentence states, “[a]nd to provide approvals and consents for the transfer of servicing related to the Sold Mortgage Loans.”
The language in both the QWR response (which can be applied universally) and the POA both reveal that the FDIC did not sell any servicing rights to Chase, but rather the FDIC stepped into the current “servicing agreements” previously entered into between WaMu and various investors to which consents and approvals were required by the investors to allow Chase to continue servicing the loans. And as a reminder, the FDIC’s position that they became the successor in interest to WaMu for servicing these loans is also highly suspect because the typical trust agreements in these securitization transactions triggered the trustees to become the default servicers in the event of a bankruptcy or receivership of the existing servicer (WaMu).
This is why I would make the #1 request for production to include the “servicing agreement(s)” and all necessary “Approvals & Consents” to service the WaMu loans. This will expose the big lie.
FDIC Exposed In Its On-Going “Cover-Up” Of Washington Mutual Bank Loans
Posted by Bill Paatalo on Jan 28, 2021 in Uncategorized | 1 comment
People reach out to me on regular basis expressing frustration with the FDIC and its stonewalling of information and documentation regarding the sale of their Washing Mutual Bank mortgage loans to JPMorgan Chase. I have read countless email exchanges with the FDIC, as well as formal requests made for such information using “The Freedom of Information Act” (FOIA Requests). The responses coming back from various ombudsmen and customer service personnel routinely state that all requests for such information need to be sent to Chase. It is a vague and indirect way of saying the FDIC has nothing.
The attached public filing is an FDIC subpoena response that is now a public record in the matter: Wayne Barber, George White vs. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. In the Superior Court of Riverside County, California Case number PSC 1802458. (See partial filed response: FDIC Subpoena Response – parial filed document – White v SPS). This response confirms the FDIC has nothing, and it is my opinion that this response is universal for all WaMu loans.
Here are some of the specific requests to which the FDIC acknowledges “no responsive documents.”
PLEASE PRODUCE ANY and ALL DOCUMENTS that evidence YOU acquired ownership of the SUBJECT LOAN when Washington Mutual Bank, Henderson, Nevada failed.
PLEASE PRODUCE ANY and ALL DOCUMENTS that evidence ownership of SPECIFIC SUBJECT LOAN was sold as part of “certain assets” acquired by JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. on September 25, 2008.
PLEASE PRODUCE ANY and ALL DOCUMENTS that evidence servicing rights for the SPECIFIC SUBJECT LOAN was sold as part of “certain assets” acquired by JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. on September 25, 2008.
PLEASE PRODUCE ANY and ALL DOCUMENTS that evidence the SUBJECT LOAN appeared on the financial statement(s) WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, HENDERSON, NEVADA between January 1, 2006 to October 30, 2008.
PLEASE PRODUCE ANY and ALL DOCUMENTS that evidence the PURCHASE & ASSUMPTION AGREEMENT between the FDIC-R and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. included assets of WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp.
PLEASE PRODUCE the guidelines as established by YOU as to when and how JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. could, by power of attorney, transfer any ownership interest in the SUBJECT LOAN, SUBJECT NOTE, or SUBJECT DEED OF TRUST.
PLEASE PRODUCE the power of attorney issued by YOU to JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. specific to the SUBJECT LOAN, SUBJECT NOTE or SUBJECT DEED OF TRUST.
Here is the FDIC’s response:
The FDIC’s Litigation Information Technology Unit advised this office they have completed searching the databases available for this Receivership and have identified no records that are responsive to your request.
It is now revealed that the FDIC can search its own databases through its “Litigation Information Technology Unit” without having to pawn the requests off to Chase. Here is what that database search screenshot looks like:
Despite this subpoena response, the FDIC continues to cover-up and stonewall those seeking this information. Here is a recent example of an FDIC FOIA response dated 12/29/2020 in which this specific screenshot was requested:
(Bold emphasis added)
The FDIC has provided you with a copy of all the agency records responsive to your request in reference to your loan. The FDIC does not have any record of the date of sale of your loan prior to September 25, 2008; therefore, please direct any further questions or records requests to JPMorgan Chase as the Custodian of Records. Per Section 6.3 of the Purchase and Assumption Agreement, JPMorgan Chase agreed to preserve and maintain all records in its custody and to respond to subpoenas, discovery requests, and other similar official inquiries with respect to the records of which it has custody.
Per the Purchase and Assumption Agreement, the Receiver (FDIC) delivered the records pertaining to Loan and collateral records, credit files and other documents to JPMorgan Chase. This included deeds, mortgages, abstracts, surveys, and other instruments or records pertaining to real estate or real estate mortgages.
JPMorgan Chase has an active Limited Power of Attorney from the FDIC and is authorized to act on its behalf in the assignments and mortgage lien releases originated and owned by WAMU.
If you need any additional information, please contact JPMorgan Chase at 1-800-242-7399 or email: executive.office@chase.com
Best regards,
Frank C Montañez
Resolutions and Closings Manager
Customer Service
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Division of Resolutions and Receiverships
This doesn’t appear to jibe with the subpoena response. Furthermore, the FDIC states that not only was it required to maintain custody of “Loan and collateral records,” it actually “delivered” said records to Chase. This is NOT how things went down according to the FDIC receiver Robert Schoppe who testified as follows (See: Testimony of Robert Schoppe – FDIC )
A. The agreement does call for us to get a list of the loans. We agreed that we would not get them. There were tens of hundreds of thousands of loans. We had no way of actually getting and — we usually — every other bank, we will get a download of all the loans. They number in the thousands. Here, they were numbering in the millions, I believe, tens of millions, and we simply didn’t have capacity to download that information, store it someplace where we could get it. So we agreed with JPMorgan that we would not take a download. If we needed the information, we would just get it from them.
The subpoena response above succeeded in opening the door for Plaintiff to amend its complaint based upon this new information and evidence, and the court has granted the request.
Both the subpoena response and the testimony of Robert Schoppe confirm that the FDIC has no evidence of selling any specific WaMu loan to Chase.
Bill Paatalo – Private Investigator – OR PSID# 49411
Bill.bpia@gmail.com
One Responseto “FDIC Exposed In Its On-Going “Cover-Up” Of Washington Mutual Bank Loans”
izraulFebruary 9, 2022 at 6:56 amThe excuse that “there were too many loans” doesn’t make sense. That’s like saying “There was just too much information to do our jobs.” They should just tell the truth. And they should never have given Chase a Limited Power of Attorney for loans they have no clue about. That’s just bat shit crazy.
AZ any thoughts on the 15G filed on feb 9 2022
Also are there others?
UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C. 20549
FORM ABS-15G
ASSET-BACKED SECURITIZER
REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 15G OF
THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Check the appropriate box to indicate the filing obligation to which this form is intended to satisfy:
X Rule 15Ga-1 under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.15Ga-1) for the reporting period January 1, 2021 to December 31, 2021.
Date of Report (Date of earliest event reported): February 9, 2022
Commission File Number of securitizer: 025-01131
Central Index Key Number of securitizer: 0001317069
***********************************************************************
FDIC -we want our "F" ing money
***********************************************************************
1WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp., as Securitizer, is filing this Form ABS-15G in respect of all mortgage-backed securities representing interests in pools of residential mortgage loans for which it acted as depositor and which are outstanding during the reporting period. On September 25, 2008, JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association (“JPMCB”) acquired the banking operations of Washington Mutual Bank from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”). It is JPMCB’s position that certain of the repurchase obligations of Washington Mutual Bank remain with the FDIC receivership. Assets are reported herein in accordance with Rule 15Ga-1 regardless of the validity of the demand or defenses thereto, and nothing in this report shall constitute, or be deemed, a waiver of any rights, defenses, powers or privileges of any party relating to these assets.
SIGNATURES
Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the reporting entity has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf by the undersigned hereunto duly authorized.
Dated: February 9, 2022
WAMU ASSET ACCEPTANCE CORP. (Securitizer)
By: /s/ William Betz
Name: William Betz
Title: Managing Director
EX-99 2 wamuasset_exhibit991.htm
EXHIBIT 99.1 DISCLOSURES REQUIRED BY RULE 15Ga-1(1)(2)
Asset Class: Residential Mortgage Loans
Name of Issuing Entity
Check if Registered
Name of Originator
Total Assets in ABS by Originator
Assets That Were Subject of Demand (3)
Assets That Were Repurchased or Replaced (3)
Assets Pending Repurchase or Replacement (within cure period) (3)
Demand in Dispute (3)
Demand Withdrawn (3)
Demand Rejected (3)
#
$
% of principal balance
#
$
% of principal balance
#
$
% of principal balance
#
$
% of principal balance
#
$
% of principal balance
#
$
% of principal balance
#
$
% of principal balance
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
(j)
(k)
(l)
(m)
(n)
(o)
(p)
(q)
(r)
(s)
(t)
(u)
(v)
(w)
(x)
WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp. WAMU 2005-AR19 CIK: 0001346793
X
(4)
3,698
$2,490,010,170
100%
2
$1,896,829
0.076%
0
$0
0.000%
0
$0
0.000%
2
$1,896,829
0.076%
0
$0
0.000%
0
$0
0.000%
WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp. WAMU 2006-AR10 CIK: 0001370359
X
Washington Mutual Bank
1,824
$1,343,223,942
100%
1
$548,000
0.041%
0
$0
0.000%
0
$0
0.000%
0
$0
0.000%
1
$548,000
0.041%
0
$0
0.000%
WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp. WAMU 2006-AR17 CIK: 0001379745
X
Washington Mutual Bank
2,048
$1,136,063,311
100%
1
$252,000
0.022%
1
$252,000
0.022%
0
$0
0.000%
0
$0
0.000%
0
$0
0.000%
0
$0
0.000%
WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp. WAMU 2006-AR18 CIK: 0001383018
X
Washington Mutual Bank
1,980
$1,570,257,831
100%
3
$2,090,000
0.133%
0
$0
0.000%
0
$0
0.000%
0
$0
0.000%
3
$2,090,000
0.133%
0
$0
0.000%
WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp. WAMU 2006-AR4 CIK: 0001355536
X
Washington Mutual Bank
1,618
$932,088,472
100%
1
$420,000
0.045%
0
$0
0.000%
0
$0
0.000%
0
$0
0.000%
0
$0
0.000%
1
$420,000
0.045%
WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp. WAMU 2006-AR5 CIK: 0001360258
X
(4)
1,314
$796,522,189
100%
1
$445,550
0.056%
0
$0
0.000%
0
$0
0.000%
0
$0
0.000%
0
$0
0.000%
1
$445,550
0.056%
WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp. WAMU 2006-AR7 CIK: 0001364476
X
99.98% Washington Mutual Bank; 0.02% Washington Mutual Bank fsb
1,897
$1,274,997,851
100%
16
$6,544,728
0.513%
0
$0
0.000%
0
$0
0.000%
5
$4,011,209
0.315%
1
$386,800
0.030%
10
$2,146,719
0.168%
WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp. WAMU 2007-HY3 CIK: 0001389141
X
Washington Mutual Bank
3,868
$3,002,013,634
100%
1
$1,200,000
0.040%
0
$0
0.000%
0
$0
0.000%
0
$0
0.000%
1
$1,200,000
0.040%
0
$0
0.000%
WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp. WAMU 2007-HY4 CIK: 0001392110
X
Washington Mutual Bank
2,447
$1,703,997,801
100%
92
$56,137,729
3.294%
0
$0
0.000%
0
$0
0.000%
1
$420,000
0.025%
90
$54,737,729
3.212%
1
$980,000
0.058%
WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp. WAMU 2007-HY7 CIK: 0001402110
X
Washington Mutual Bank
3,525
$2,827,846,601
100%
1
$997,500
0.035%
0
$0
0.000%
0
$0
0.000%
0
$0
0.000%
1
$997,500
0.035%
0
$0
0.000%
WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp. WAMU 2007-OA3 CIK: 0001392111
X
Washington Mutual Bank
1,906
$1,067,998,559
100%
2
$3,029,759
0.284%
0
$0
0.000%
0
$0
0.000%
2
$3,029,759
0.284%
0
$0
0.000%
0
$0
0.000%
WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp. WAMU 2007-OA5 CIK: 0001400092
X
(4)
2,668
$1,470,224,918
100%
1
$1,856,369
0.126%
0
$0
0.000%
0
$0
0.000%
0
$0
0.000%
1
$1,856,369
0.126%
0
$0
0.000%
WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp. WAMU 2007-OA6 CIK: 0001402111
X
Washington Mutual Bank
2,435
$1,448,100,398
100%
1
$1,950,000
0.135%
0
$0
0.000%
0
$0
0.000%
1
$1,950,000
0.135%
0
$0
0.000%
0
$0
0.000%
WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp. WMABS 2006-HE2 CIK: 0001358935
X
(4)
2,579
$472,002,321
100%
1
$93,978
0.020%
0
$0
0.000%
0
$0
0.000%
1
$93,978
0.020%
0
$0
0.000%
0
$0
0.000%
WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp. WMABS 2007-HE1 CIK: 0001385019
X
(4)
1,962
$284,442,108
100%
1
$167,909
0.059%
0
$0
0.000%
0
$0
0.000%
0
$0
0.000%
1
$167,909
0.059%
0
$0
0.000%
WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp. WMABS 2007-HE2 CIK: 0001389138
X
(4)
4,451
$814,263,307
100%
1
$100,858
0.012%
0
$0
0.000%
0
$0
0.000%
0
$0
0.000%
1
$100,858
0.012%
0
$0
0.000%
WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp. WMALT 2006-4 CIK: 0001358936
X
(4)
2,025
$528,202,412
100%
36
$19,815,088
3.751%
1
$726,314
0.138%
0
$0
0.000%
1
$444,000
0.084%
28
$15,292,967
2.895%
6
$3,351,807
0.635%
WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp. WMALT 2006-9 CIK: 0001374632
X
(4)
942
$241,332,109
100%
1
$115,439
0.048%
0
$0
0.000%
0
$0
0.000%
0
$0
0.000%
1
$115,439
0.048%
0
$0
0.000%
WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp. WMALT 2006-AR4 CIK: 0001361533
X
(4)
2,794
$983,553,610
100%
1
$224,750
0.023%
0
$0
0.000%
0
$0
0.000%
1
$224,750
0.023%
0
$0
0.000%
0
$0
0.000%
WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp. WMALT 2006-AR6 CIK: 0001367736
X
(4)
2,061
$875,099,554
100%
2
$1,328,713
0.152%
1
$705,461
0.081%
0
$0
0.000%
0
$0
0.000%
1
$623,252
0.071%
0
$0
0.000%
WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp. WMALT 2006-AR8 CIK: 0001374629
X
(4)
2,940
$1,075,130,493
100%
1
$130,000
0.012%
0
$0
0.000%
0
$0
0.000%
0
$0
0.000%
0
$0
0.000%
1
$130,000
0.012%
WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp. WMALT 2007-OA2 CIK: 0001389144
X
(4)
2,036
$836,592,102
100%
2
$1,406,403
0.168%
0
$0
0.000%
0
$0
0.000%
0
$0
0.000%
2
$1,406,403
0.168%
0
$0
0.000%
WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp. WMALT 2007-OA3 CIK: 0001392114
X
(4)
4,969
$2,371,959,261
100%
2
$3,657,063
0.154%
0
$0
0.000%
0
$0
0.000%
2
$3,657,063
0.154%
0
$0
0.000%
0
$0
0.000%
Total
57,987
$29,545,922,955
100%
171
$104,408,666
0.353%
3
$1,683,775
0.006%
0
$0
0.000%
16
$15,727,588
0.053%
132
$79,523,227
0.269%
20
$7,474,076
0.025%
___________________________
(1) We have attempted to gather the information required by this Form ABS-15G and Rule 15Ga-1 by, among other things, (i) identifying asset-backed securities transactions that fall within the scope of Rule 15Ga-1 for which we are a Securitizer and that are not covered by a filing to be made by an affiliated Securitizer (“Covered Transactions”), (ii) gathering information in our records regarding demands for repurchase or replacement of pool assets in Covered Transactions for breaches of representations or warranties concerning those pool assets (“Repurchases”) that is required to be reported on Form ABS-15G (“Reportable Information”), (iii) identifying the parties in Covered Transactions that have a contractual obligation to enforce any Repurchase obligations of the party or parties making those representations or warranties based on our records (“Demand Entities”), and (iv) requesting all Reportable Information from trustees and other Demand Entities that is within their respective possession and which has not been previously provided to us. However, we cannot be certain that we have obtained all applicable Reportable Information because, among other things, some Demand Entities have not agreed to provide Reportable Information or may not have provided complete Reportable Information, and some Demand Entities may be unable or unwilling to provide Reportable Information without unreasonable effort or expense (or without imposing unreasonable expense on us). The information in this Form ABS-15G has not been verified by any third party and the Securitizer makes no representation as to the accuracy of the information required by this Form ABS-15G and Rule 15Ga-1.
(2) WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp., as Securitizer, is filing this Form ABS 15-G in respect of all mortgage-backed securities representing interests in pools of residential mortgage loans for which it acted as depositor and which are outstanding during the reporting period. On September 25, 2008, JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association (“JPMCB”) acquired the banking operations of Washington Mutual Bank from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”). It is JPMCB’s position that certain of the repurchase obligations of Washington Mutual Bank remain with the FDIC receivership. Assets are reported herein in accordance with Rule 15Ga-1 regardless of the validity of the demand or defenses thereto, and nothing in this report shall constitute, or be deemed, a waiver of any rights, defenses, powers or privileges of any party relating to these assets.
(3) The outstanding principal balance of each asset for which a decision has been made to repurchase or replace, is calculated as of the date of the repurchase or replacement; the outstanding principal balance of each asset that has been liquidated or for which a decision has been made to make-whole, is calculated as of the date of liquidation; and the outstanding principal balance of every other asset is calculated as of the last day of the reporting period.
(4) While certain originators may be identifiable by the Securitizer, the Securitizer is currently unable to identify repurchase demands and resulting activitiy to a specific originator. Work is in progress by the Securitizer in order to make such an identification.
A tranche is one of a series of certificates or interests created and issued as part of the
same transaction.
5
For example, the GSEs purchased Certificates issued pursuant to both the A1A and
A1B tranches of the JPMAC 2006-RM1 Securitization.
33
Table 2
Transaction Tranche Sponsor Depositor Lead
Underwriter
Principal
Amount
Issued
Date of
Issuance
Supporti
ng Loan
Group
AABST 2005-5 IIA
Aegis
Mortgage
Corp.
Aegis Asset
Backed
Securities
Corp.
BSC $500,000,000 10/28/2005 Pool 2
AHM 2005-1 VIA
American
Home
Mortgage
Acceptance,
Inc.
American
Home
Mortgage
Securities
LLC
BSC $337,000,000 4/25/2006 Group VI
AHM 2005-4 IVA
American
Home
Mortgage
Acceptance,
Inc.
BSABS BSC $556,435,000 10/7/2005 Group IV
ARSI 2006-M2 A1
Ameriquest
Mortgage
Company
Argent
Securities Inc.
J.P. Morgan
Securities
(co-lead with
Citigroup)
$717,382,000 8/29/2006 Group I
BALTA 2005-10 II2A1 EMC SAMI BSC $407,783,000 12/30/2005 Group II-2
BALTA 2005-10 II3A1 EMC SAMI BSC $569,686,000 12/30/2005 Group II-3
BALTA 2006-1 II1A1 EMC BSABS BSC $300,000,000 1/31/2006 Group II-1
BALTA 2006-2 II2A1 EMC SAMI BSC $431,361,000 3/31/2006 Group II-2
BALTA 2006-3 II1A1 EMC SAMI BSC $276,267,000 4/28/2006 Group II-1
BALTA 2006-4 I2A1 EMC SAMI BSC $807,809,000 6/30/2006 Group I-2
BALTA 2006-4 III1A1 EMC SAMI BSC $132,532,000 6/30/2006 Group III1
BSABS 2005-HE12 IIA EMC BSABS BSC $302,737,000 12/30/2005 Group II
BSABS 2006-AQ1 I2A EMC BSABS BSC $192,142,000 11/30/2006 Group I-2
BSABS 2006-HE2 IIA EMC BSABS BSC $241,697,000 2/28/2006 Group II
BSABS 2006-HE4 IIA EMC BSABS BSC $264,889,000 4/28/2006 Group II
BSABS 2006-HE5 IIA EMC BSABS BSC $162,020,000 5/30/2006 Group II
BSABS 2006-HE7 II2A EMC BSABS BSC $100,275,000 8/30/2006 Group II-2
BSABS 2006-HE8 II2A EMC BSABS BSC $51,306,000 10/30/2006 Group II-2
BSABS 2006-HE9 IIA EMC BSABS BSC $218,304,000 11/30/2006 Group II
BSABS 2006-HE9 IIIA EMC BSABS BSC $236,045,000 11/30/2006 Group III
BSABS 2006-HE10 II2A EMC BSABS BSC $201,892,000 12/29/2006 Group II-2
BSABS 2006-HE10 II3A EMC BSABS BSC $132,221,000 12/29/2006 Group II-3
BSABS 2007-FS1 IIA EMC BSABS BSC $70,635,000 2/28/2006 Group II
BSABS 2007-HE1 II2A EMC BSABS BSC $118,512,000 1/30/2007 Group II-2
BSABS 2007-HE1 II3A EMC BSABS BSC $92,100,000 1/30/2007 Group II-3
BSABS 2007-HE2 II2A EMC BSABS BSC $75,162,000 2/28/2007 Group II-2
BSABS 2007-HE2 II3A EMC BSABS BSC $77,349,000 2/28/2007 Group II-3
BSABS 2007-HE3 IIA EMC BSABS BSC $131,715,000 3/30/2007 Group II
BSABS 2007-HE3 IIIA EMC BSABS BSC $90,354,000 3/30/2007 Group III
BSABS 2007-HE4 IIA EMC BSABS BSC $210,625,000 4/30/2007 Group II
34
Transaction Tranche Sponsor Depositor Lead
Underwriter
Principal
Amount
Issued
Date of
Issuance
Supporti
ng Loan
Group
BSABS 2007-HE5 IIA EMC BSABS BSC $99,922,000 5/30/2007 Group II
BSABS 2007-HE5 IIIA EMC BSABS BSC $122,752,000 5/30/2007 Group III
BSABS 2007-HE6 IIA EMC BSABS BSC $291,210,000 8/30/2007 Group II
BSABS 2007-HE7 IIA1 EMC BSABS BSC $137,892,000 9/19/2007 Group II
BSABS 2007-HE7 IIIA1 EMC BSABS BSC $69,504,000 9/19/2007 Group III
BSMF 2006-SL5 IIA EMC BSABS BSC $23,706,000 11/30/2006 Group II
BSMF 2006-SL6 IIA EMC BSABS BSC $20,279,000 12/29/2006 Group II
BSMF 2007-AR3 II2A1 EMC SAMI BSC $241,679,000 3/30/2007 Group II-2
BSMF 2007-SL1 IIA EMC BSABS BSC $24,050,000 1/30/2007 Group II
BSMF 2007-SL2 IIA EMC BSABS BSC $21,671,000 2/28/2007 Group II
CBASS 2006-CB2 AV
Credit-Based
Asset
Servicing and
Securitization
LLC
Bond
Securitization,
LLC
J.P. Morgan
Securities $347,712,000 2/28/2006 Group 1
CBASS 2006-CB7 A1
Credit-Based
Asset
Servicing and
Securitization
LLC
Bond
Securitization,
LLC
J.P. Morgan
Securities $385,237,000 10/5/2006 Group I
GPMF 2005-AR5 IIA1 EMC SAMI BSC $470,923,000 10/31/2005 Group II
GPMF 2006-AR3 IIA1 EMC SAMI BSC $492,223,000 4/28/2006 Group II
GPMF 2006-AR3 IIA2 EMC SAMI BSC $259,690,000 4/28/2006 Group II
JPALT 2005-A2 2A1 J.P. Morgan
Acquisition
J.P. Morgan
Acceptance
J.P. Morgan
Securities $68,406,000 12/29/2005 Pool 2
JPALT 2007-A2 11A1 J.P. Morgan
Acquisition
J.P. Morgan
Acceptance
J.P. Morgan
Securities $369,061,000 5/31/2007 Pool 1A
JPMAC 2005-FRE1 AI J.P. Morgan
Acquisition
J.P. Morgan
Acceptance
J.P. Morgan
Securities $274,516,000 11/29/2005 Group I
JPMAC 2005-OPT2 A1A J.P. Morgan
Acquisition
J.P. Morgan
Acceptance
J.P. Morgan
Securities $311,578,000 12/21/2005 Group 1
JPMAC 2005-
WMC1 A1 J.P. Morgan
Acquisition
J.P. Morgan
Acceptance
J.P. Morgan
Securities $404,000,000 10/27/2005 Group 1
JPMAC 2006-ACC1 A1 J.P. Morgan
Acquisition
J.P. Morgan
Acceptance
J.P. Morgan
Securities $266,700,000 6/2/2006 Group 1
JPMAC 2006-CH1 A1 J.P. Morgan
Acquisition
J.P. Morgan
Acceptance
J.P. Morgan
Securities $149,925,000 11/14/2006 Group 1
JPMAC 2006-CH2 AV1 J.P. Morgan
Acquisition
J.P. Morgan
Acceptance
J.P. Morgan
Securities $900,296,000 12/14/2006 Group 2-
A
JPMAC 2006-CW1 A1A J.P. Morgan
Acquisition
J.P. Morgan
Acceptance
J.P. Morgan
Securities $213,081,000 5/31/2006 Group 1
JPMAC 2006-CW2 AV1 J.P. Morgan
Acquisition
J.P. Morgan
Acceptance
J.P. Morgan
Securities $410,588,000 8/8/2006 Group 2
JPMAC 2006-FRE1 A1 J.P. Morgan
Acquisition
J.P. Morgan
Acceptance
J.P. Morgan
Securities $279,696,000 1/27/2006 Group 1
JPMAC 2006-FRE2 A1 J.P. Morgan
Acquisition
J.P. Morgan
Acceptance
J.P. Morgan
Securities $267,476,000 3/29/2006 Group 1
JPMAC 2006-HE1 A1 J.P. Morgan
Acquisition
J.P. Morgan
Acceptance
J.P. Morgan
Securities $166,827,000 2/28/2006 Group 1
JPMAC 2006-HE2 A1 J.P. Morgan
Acquisition
J.P. Morgan
Acceptance
J.P. Morgan
Securities $171,430,000 6/30/2006 Group 1
35
Transaction Tranche Sponsor Depositor Lead
Underwriter
Principal
Amount
Issued
Date of
Issuance
Supporti
ng Loan
Group
JPMAC 2006-HE3 A1 J.P. Morgan
Acquisition
J.P. Morgan
Acceptance
J.P. Morgan
Securities $189,800,000 11/10/2006 Group 1
JPMAC 2006-NC1 A1 J.P. Morgan
Acquisition
J.P. Morgan
Acceptance
J.P. Morgan
Securities $345,251,000 4/27/2006 Group 1
JPMAC 2006-NC2 A1A J.P. Morgan
Acquisition
J.P. Morgan
Acceptance
J.P. Morgan
Securities $223,083,000 8/23/2006 Group 1
JPMAC 2006-RM1 A1A J.P. Morgan
Acquisition
J.P. Morgan
Acceptance
J.P. Morgan
Securities $230,853,000 9/27/2006 Group 1
JPMAC 2006-RM1 A1B J.P. Morgan
Acquisition
J.P. Morgan
Acceptance
J.P. Morgan
Securities $57,713,000 9/27/2006 Group 1
JPMAC 2006-
WMC1 A1 J.P. Morgan
Acquisition
J.P. Morgan
Acceptance
J.P. Morgan
Securities $161,500,000 3/30/2006 Group 1
JPMAC 2006-
WMC2 A1 J.P. Morgan
Acquisition
J.P. Morgan
Acceptance
J.P. Morgan
Securities $324,255,000 6/28/2006 Group 1
JPMAC 2006-
WMC3 A1SS J.P. Morgan
Acquisition
J.P. Morgan
Acceptance
J.P. Morgan
Securities $175,270,000 9/14/2006 Group 1
JPMAC 2006-
WMC3 A1MZ J.P. Morgan
Acquisition
J.P. Morgan
Acceptance
J.P. Morgan
Securities $43,817,000 9/14/2006 Group 1
JPMAC 2006-
WMC4 A1A J.P. Morgan
Acquisition
J.P. Morgan
Acceptance
J.P. Morgan
Securities $376,675,000 12/20/2006 Group 1
JPMAC 2006-
WMC4 A1B J.P. Morgan
Acquisition
J.P. Morgan
Acceptance
J.P. Morgan
Securities $41,853,000 12/20/2006 Group 1
JPMAC 2007-CH2 AV1 J.P. Morgan
Acquisition
J.P. Morgan
Acceptance
J.P. Morgan
Securities $234,600,000 3/15/2007 Group 2-
A
JPMAC 2007-CH3 A1A J.P. Morgan
Acquisition
J.P. Morgan
Acceptance
J.P. Morgan
Securities $374,118,000 5/15/2007 Group 1
JPMAC 2007-CH3 A1B J.P. Morgan
Acquisition
J.P. Morgan
Acceptance
J.P. Morgan
Securities $41,569,000 5/15/2007 Group 1
JPMAC 2007-CH4 A1 J.P. Morgan
Acquisition
J.P. Morgan
Acceptance
J.P. Morgan
Securities $435,000,000 6/15/2007 Group 1
JPMAC 2007-CH5 A1 J.P. Morgan
Acquisition
J.P. Morgan
Acceptance
J.P. Morgan
Securities $304,336,000 7/12/2007 Group 1
JPMMT 2006-A3 1A1 J.P. Morgan
Acquisition
J.P. Morgan
Acceptance
J.P. Morgan
Securities $174,568,800 7/12/2007 Pool 1
LBMLT 2005-3 IA Long Beach
Mortgage
Long Beach
Securities
WaMu Capital
(co-lead with
Lehman
Brothers Inc.)
$604,830,000 9/7/2005 Group I
LBMLT 2006-1 IA Long Beach
Mortgage
Long Beach
Securities Credit Suisse $870,736,000 2/7/2006 Group I
LBMLT 2006-2 IA Long Beach
Mortgage
Long Beach
Securities
WaMu Capital
(co-lead with
RBS
Greenwich)
$1,101,891,000 3/7/2006 Group I
LBMLT 2006-3 IA Long Beach
Mortgage
Long Beach
Securities WaMu Capital $513,901,000 4/6/2006 Group I
LBMLT 2006-4 IA Long Beach
Mortgage
Long Beach
Securities
WaMu Capital
(co-lead with
Lehman
Brothers Inc.)
$787,668,000 5/9/2006 Group I
LBMLT 2006-5 IA Long Beach
Mortgage
Long Beach
Securities WaMu Capital $631,423,000 6/15/2006 Group I
LBMLT 2006-6 IA WaMu Bank Long Beach
Securities WaMu Capital $415,891,000 7/26/2006 Group I
LBMLT 2006-7 IA WaMu Bank Long Beach
Securities WaMu Capital $360,139,000 8/30/2006 Group I
LBMLT 2006-8 IA WaMu Bank Long Beach
Securities WaMu Capital $366,091,000 9/21/2006 Group I
36
Transaction Tranche Sponsor Depositor Lead
Underwriter
Principal
Amount
Issued
Date of
Issuance
Supporti
ng Loan
Group
LBMLT 2006-9 IA WaMu Bank Long Beach
Securities WaMu Capital $420,396,000 10/12/2006 Group I
LBMLT 2006-10 IA WaMu Bank Long Beach
Securities WaMu Capital $288,380,000 11/9/2006 Group I
LBMLT 2006-11 IA WaMu Bank Long Beach
Securities WaMu Capital $408,047,000 12/14/2006 Group I
LBMLT 2006-WL1 IA1 Long Beach
Mortgage
Long Beach
Securities Goldman Sachs $284,678,000 2/8/2006 Group I
LBMLT 2006-WL1 IA2 Long Beach
Mortgage
Long Beach
Securities Goldman Sachs $256,210,000 2/8/2006 Group I
LBMLT 2006-WL2 IA Long Beach
Mortgage
Long Beach
Securities
Lehman
Brothers Inc. $462,263,000 10/12/2006 Group I
LBMLT 2006-WL3 IA Long Beach
Mortgage
Long Beach
Securities
Lehman
Brothers Inc. $440,218,000 1/30/2006 Group I
LUM 2006-3 II2A1
Luminent
Mortgage
Capital, Inc.
SAMI BSC $147,795,000 4/28/2006 Group II-2
NCMT 2007-1 1A1
Newcastle
Investment
Corp.
BSABS BSC $370,224,000 7/12/2007 Group 1
PCHLT 2005-4 2A1
People’s
Choice
Funding, Inc.
People’s
Choice Home
Loan
Securities
Corp.
BSC $433,582,000 10/26/2005 Group 2
SACO 2007-1 IIA EMC BSABS BSC $50,429,000 1/16/2007 Group II
SACO 2007-2 IIA EMC BSABS BSC $20,226,000 2/28/2007 Group II
SAMI 2006-AR4 IA1 EMC SAMI BSC $316,180,000 6/30/2006 Group I
WAMU 2007-OA3 1A WaMu Bank WaMu
Acceptance WaMu Capital $140,139,000 3/27/2007 Group 1
WMABS 2006-HE1 IA WaMu
Securities
WaMu
Acceptance WaMu Capital $53,578,000 4/20/2006 Group 1
WMABS 2006-HE3 IA WaMu
Securities
WaMu
Acceptance WaMu Capital $175,828,000 9/27/2006 Group I
WMABS 2006-HE4 IA WaMu
Securities
WaMu
Acceptance WaMu Capital $117,798,000 10/27/2006 Group I
WMABS 2006-HE5 IA WaMu
Securities
WaMu
Acceptance WaMu Capital $269,063,000 12/7/2006 Group I
WMABS 2007-HE1 IA WaMu
Securities
WaMu
Acceptance WaMu Capital $115,217,000 1/16/2007 Group I
WMABS 2007-HE2 IA WaMu
Securities
WaMu
Acceptance WaMu Capital $286,276,000 3/13/2007 Group I
WMALT 2005-9 1CB WaMu
Securities
WaMu
Securities WaMu Capital $69,400,400 10/31/2005 Group 1
WMALT 2005-10 1CB WaMu
Securities
WaMu
Securities WaMu Capital $62,532,200 11/30/2005 Group 1
WMALT 2006-AR4 1A WaMu
Securities
WaMu
Acceptance WaMu Capital $76,071,000 5/30/2006 Group 1
WMALT 2006-AR4 2A WaMu
Securities
WaMu
Acceptance WaMu Capital $69,518,000 5/30/2006 Group 2
WMALT 2006-AR4 3A WaMu
Securities
WaMu
Acceptance WaMu Capital $251,313,000 5/30/2006 Group 3
WMALT 2006-AR5 1A WaMu
Securities
WaMu
Acceptance WaMu Capital $74,766,000 6/28/2006 Group 1
WMALT 2006-AR5 2A WaMu
Securities
WaMu
Acceptance WaMu Capital $57,966,000 6/28/2006 Group 2
37
Transaction Tranche Sponsor Depositor Lead
Underwriter
Principal
Amount
Issued
Date of
Issuance
Supporti
ng Loan
Group
WMALT 2006-AR8 1A WaMu
Securities
WaMu
Acceptance WaMu Capital $211,150,000 9/28/2006 Group 1
WMALT 2006-AR9 1A WaMu
Securities
WaMu
Acceptance WaMu Capital $270,142,000 10/26/2006 Group 1
WMALT 2007-OA1 1A WaMu
Securities
WaMu
Acceptance WaMu Capital $255,047,000 1/26/2007 Group 1
WMALT 2007-OA2 1A WaMu
Securities
WaMu
Acceptance WaMu Capital $222,967,000 2/26/2007 Group 1
WMALT 2007-OA3 1A
WaMu
Securities &
WaMu Bank
WaMu
Acceptance WaMu Capital $230,966,000 3/28/2007 Group 1
WMALT 2007-OA3 3A
WaMu
Securities &
WaMu Bank
WaMu
Acceptance WaMu Capital $195,998,000 3/28/2007 Group 3
WMHE 2007-HE1 IA WaMu Bank WaMu
Acceptance WaMu Capital $368,226,000 1/16/2007 Group I
WMHE 2007-HE2 IA WaMu Bank WaMu
Acceptance WaMu Capital $491,550,000 4/10/2007 Group I
WMHE 2007-HE3 IA WaMu Bank WaMu
Acceptance WaMu Capital $372,475,000 5/10/2007 Group I
WMHE 2007-HE4 IA WaMu Bank WaMu
Acceptance WaMu Capital $249,921,000 6/13/2007 Group I
C. The Securitization Process
1. J.P. Morgan Acquisition, EMC, WaMu Bank, WaMu
Securities, and Long Beach Mortgage Transfer The Mortgage
Loans To Special Purpose Trusts
105. As the sponsor for 27 of the 103 Securitizations (the “JPMorgan Securitizations”),
J.P. Morgan Acquisition purchased the mortgage loans underlying the Certificates for those 27
Securitizations after they were originated, either directly from the originators or through
affiliates of the originators.
106. As the sponsor for 32 of the 103 Securitizations (the “Bear Stearns
Securitizations”), EMC purchased the mortgage loans underlying the Certificates for those 32
Securitizations after they were originated, either directly from the originators or through
affiliates of the originators.
107. As the sponsors or co-sponsors for 26 of the 103 Securitizations (the “WaMu
Securitizations”), WaMu Bank and WaMu Securities purchased the mortgage loans underlying
38
the Certificates for those 26 Securitizations after they were originated, either directly from the
originators or through affiliates of the originators.
108. As the sponsor for nine of the 103 Securitizations (the “Long Beach
Securitizations”), Long Beach Mortgage purchased the mortgage loans underlying the
Certificates for those nine Securitizations after they were originated, either directly from the
originators or through affiliates of the originators.
109. Non-party sponsors Aegis Mortgage Corporation, American Home Mortgage
Acceptance, Inc., Newcastle Investment Corporation, Luminent Mortgage Capital, Inc., People’s
Choice Funding, Inc., Credit-Based Asset Servicing and Securitization LLC, and Ameriquest
Mortgage Company were each a sponsor of one or more of the remaining nine Securitizations.
The sponsor for each Securitization is included above in Table 2.
110. J.P. Morgan Acquisition then sold the mortgage loans for the 27 Securitizations
that it sponsored to the depositor, J.P. Morgan Acceptance, which is a JPMorgan-affiliated entity.
EMC then sold the mortgage loans for the 32 Securitizations that it sponsored to one of two
depositors, SAMI and BSABS, both of which are Bear Stearns-affiliated entities. WaMu Bank
then sold the mortgage loans for the 12 Securitizations that it sponsored or co-sponsored to one
of two depositors, WaMu Acceptance or Long Beach Securities, one of which is a WaMuaffiliated entity and one of which is a Long Beach-affiliated entity. WaMu Securities then sold
the mortgage loans for 13 of the 15 Securitizations that it sponsored or co-sponsored to WaMu
Acceptance, which is a WaMu-affiliated entity. WaMu Securities itself acted as the depositor for
the remaining two Securitizations that it sponsored. Long Beach Mortgage then sold the
mortgage loans for the nine Securitizations that it sponsored to the depositor, Long Beach
Securities, which is a Long Beach-affiliated entity.
39
111. With respect to three of the remaining nine Securitizations, non-parties American
Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc. and Newcastle Investment Corp. sold the mortgage loans to
Defendant BSABS for the AHM 2005-4 and NCMT 2007-1 Securitizations, respectively, and
Luminent Mortgage Capital, Inc. sold the mortgage loans to Defendant SAMI for the LUM
2006-3 Securitization. With respect to the remaining six Securitizations, non-party sponsors sold
the mortgage loans to non-party depositors, as reflected above in Table 2; Defendant J.P. Morgan
Securities was the lead or co-lead underwriter and selling underwriter for the ARSI 2006-M2,
CBASS 2006-CB2, and CBASS 2006-CB7 Securitizations; Defendant BSC was the lead or colead underwriter and selling underwriter for the AABST 2005-5, AHM 2005-1, and PCHLT
2005-4 Securitizations.
112. Both J.P. Morgan Acquisition (sponsor) and J.P. Morgan Acceptance (depositor)
were controlled by their ultimate parent, JPMorgan Chase. Both EMC (sponsor) and SAMI and
BSABS (depositors) were controlled by their ultimate parent, BSI. Both WaMu Securities
(sponsor and depositor) and WaMu Acceptance (depositor) were controlled by their ultimate
parent, WaMu Bank, who also was a sponsor. Both Long Beach Mortgage (sponsor) and Long
Beach Securities (depositor) were controlled by their ultimate parent, WaMu Bank, who also was
a sponsor. The sole purpose of the depositor, and the common law trusts created through this
process, was to act as a conduit through which loans acquired by the sponsor could be securitized
and sold to investors.
113. The transfer of the mortgage loans to the trust was generally effected by means of
either a Pooling and Servicing Agreement or other agreement of substantially similar effect6
(a
6
In AHM 2005-1 and AHM 2005-4, the trustee executed a Trust Agreement; in JPMAC
2006-CW1, the trustee executed a Pooling Agreement; and in PCHLT 2005-4, the trustee
executed a Sale and Servicing Agreement.
40
“PSA”) executed among the depositor and the parties responsible for monitoring and servicing
the mortgage loans in that Securitization. The trust, administered by the trustee, held the
mortgage loans pursuant to the related PSA and issued certificates, including the GSE
Certificates, backed by such loans. The GSEs purchased the GSE Certificates, through which
they obtained an ownership interest in the assets of the trust, including the mortgage loans.
2. The Trusts Issue Securities Backed by the Loans
114. Once the mortgage loans were transferred to the trusts in accordance with the
PSAs, each trust issued Certificates backed by the underlying mortgage loans. The Certificates
were then sold to investors like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which thereby acquired an
ownership interest in the cash flow from the assets held by the corresponding trust. Each
Certificate entitles its holder to a specified portion of the cashflows from the underlying
mortgages in the Supporting Loan Group. The level of risk inherent in the Certificates was a
function of the capital structure of the related transaction and the credit quality of the underlying
mortgages.
115. The Certificates were issued pursuant to one of 19 Shelf Registration Statements
filed with the SEC on Form S-3. The Shelf Registration Statements were amended by one or
more Forms S-3/A filed with the SEC. The depositor affiliates of JPMorgan, Bear Stearns,
WaMu, and Long Beach collectively filed 13 of the 19 Shelf Registration Statements. Each
Individual Defendant signed one or more of the 13 Shelf Registration Statements or amendments
thereto which were filed by the depositor affiliates of JPMorgan, Bear Stearns, WaMu, and Long
Beach. The SEC filing number, registrants, signatories and filing dates for the 19 Shelf
Registration Statements and amendments thereto, as well as the Certificates covered by the Shelf
Registration Statements, are reflected in Table 3 below.
41
Table 3
SEC File
Number
Date
Registration
Statement
Filed
Date(s)
Amended
Registration
Statements
Filed
Registrant(s) Related Certificates Signatories of
Registration Statement
Signatories of
Amendments
333-
141607 3/27/2007 4/23/2007 J.P. Morgan
Acceptance
JPMAC 2007-CH4,
JPMAC 2007-CH3,
JPMAC 2007-CH5
Brian Bernard
Louis Schioppo, Jr.
Christine E. Cole
David M. Duzyk
William A. King
Edwin F. McMichael
Brian Bernard
Louis Schioppo, Jr.
Christine E. Cole
David M. Duzyk
William A. King
Edwin F. McMichael
333-
141255 3/13/2007 4/9/2007 WaMu
Acceptance
WMHE 2007-HE4,
WMHE 2007-HE3
Thomas G. Lehmann
David Beck
Diane Novak
Stephen Fortunato
Donald Wilhelm
Thomas G. Lehmann
David Beck
Diane Novak
Stephen Fortunato
Donald Wilhelm
333-
140247 1/26/2007 2/23/2007,
2/09/2007 SAMI BSMF 2007-AR3
Jeffrey L. Verschleiser
Michael B. Nierenberg
Jeffrey Mayer
Thomas F. Marano
Jeffrey L. Verschleiser
Michael B. Nierenberg
Jeffrey Mayer
Thomas F. Marano
333-
130192 12/7/2005
8/2/2006,
4/3/2006,
3/13/2006
J.P. Morgan
Acceptance
JPALT 2007-A2,
JPMMT 2006-A3,
JPMAC 2006-CW1,
JPMAC 2006-ACC1,
JPMAC 2006-
WMC2, JPMAC
2006-CW2, JPMAC
2006-NC2, JPMAC
2006-WMC3,
JPMAC 2006-RM1,
JPMAC 2006-CH2,
JPMAC 2006-CH1,
JPMAC 2006-HE3,
JPMAC 2006-
WMC4, JPMAC
2006-HE2, JPMAC
2006-NC1, JPMAC
2007-CH2
David M. Duzyk
Louis Schioppo, Jr.
Christine E. Cole
Edwin F. McMichael
David M. Duzyk
Louis Schioppo, Jr.
Christine E. Cole
Edwin F. McMichael
42
SEC File
Number
Date
Registration
Statement
Filed
Date(s)
Amended
Registration
Statements
Filed
Registrant(s) Related Certificates Signatories of
Registration Statement
Signatories of
Amendments
333-
131374 1/30/2006
3/31/2006,
3/28/2006,
3/27/2006,
3/6/2006,
3/3/2006
BSABS
BSABS 2007-HE3,
BSABS 2007-FS1,
BSABS 2007-HE5,
BSABS 2007-HE4,
BSABS 2007-HE7,
BSABS 2007-HE6,
BSABS 2006-HE4,
BSABS 2006-HE5,
BSABS 2006-HE7,
BSABS 2006-HE8,
BSABS 2006-HE9,
BSABS 2006-AQ1,
BSABS 2006-HE10,
BSABS 2007-HE1,
BSABS 2007-HE2,
BSMF 2006-SL6,
BSMF 2006-SL5,
BSMF 2007-SL1,
BSMF 2007-SL2,
NCMT 2007-1,
SACO 2007-1,
SACO 2007-2
Matthew E. Perkins
Samuel L. Molinaro, Jr.
Thomas F. Marano
Kim Lutthans
Katherine Garniewski
Joseph T. Jurkowski, Jr.
Matthew E. Perkins
Samuel L. Molinaro, Jr.
Thomas F. Marano
Kim Lutthans
Katherine Garniewski
333-
131252 1/24/2006 3/31/2006,
3/21/2006
Long Beach
Securities
LBMLT 2006-11,
LBMLT 2006-4,
LBMLT 2006-5,
LBMLT 2006-6,
LBMLT 2006-7,
LBMLT 2006-8,
LBMLT 2006-9,
LBMLT 2006-10
Thomas W. Casey
John F. Robinson
Keith Johnson
Suzanne Krahling
Larry Breitbarth
Thomas W. Casey
John F. Robinson
Michael J. Giampaolo
Stephen Fortunato
Rolland Jurgens
David H. Zielke
333-
132232 3/6/2006 3/10/2006 SAMI
LUM 2006-3, SAMI
2006-AR4, BALTA
2006-2, BALTA
2006-3, BALTA
2006-4, GPMF 2006-
AR3
Jeffrey L. Verschleiser
Michael B. Nierenberg
Jeffrey Mayer
Thomas F. Marano
Jeffrey L. Verschleiser
Michael B. Nierenberg
Jeffrey Mayer
Thomas F. Marano
333-
130795 12/30/2005 1/3/2006 WaMu
Acceptance
WMABS 2006-HE1,
WMHE 2007-HE2,
WMHE 2007-HE1,
WAMU 2007-OA3,
WMALT 2006-AR4,
WMALT 2006-AR9,
WMABS 2006-HE3,
WMABS 2006-HE4,
WMABS 2007-HE2,
WMABS 2006-HE5,
WMALT 2007-OA3,
WMALT 2006-AR5,
WMABS 2007-HE1,
WMALT 2006-AR8,
WMALT 2007-OA1,
WMALT 2007-OA2
Richard Careaga
David Beck
Diane Novak
Thomas Green
Rolland Jurgens
Richard Careaga
David Beck
Diane Novak
Thomas Green
Rolland Jurgens
43
SEC File
Number
Date
Registration
Statement
Filed
Date(s)
Amended
Registration
Statements
Filed
Registrant(s) Related Certificates Signatories of
Registration Statement
Signatories of
Amendments
333-
127020 7/29/2005 8/15/2005 J.P. Morgan
Acceptance
JPMAC 2006-HE1,
JPMAC 2006-FRE1,
JPMAC 2006-FRE2,
JPMAC 2006-
WMC1, JPMAC
2005-WMC1,
JPMAC 2005-FRE1,
JPALT 2005-A2,
JPMAC 2005-OPT2
David M. Duzyk
Louis Schioppo, Jr.
Christine E. Cole
Edwin F. McMichael
David M. Duzyk
Louis Schioppo, Jr.
Christine E. Cole
William A. King
Edwin F. McMichael
333-
125422 6/1/2005 6/14/2005 BSABS
AHM 2005-4,
BALTA 2006-1,
BSABS 2006-HE2,
BSABS 2005-HE12
Matthew E. Perkins
Samuel L. Molinaro, Jr.
Thomas F. Marano
Kim Lutthans
Katherine Garniewski
Joseph T. Jurkowski, Jr.
Matthew E. Perkins
Samuel L. Molinaro, Jr.
Thomas F. Marano
Kim Lutthans
Katherine Garniewski
333-
120916 12/1/2004 12/14/2004 SAMI GPMF 2005-AR5,
BALTA 2005-10
Jeffrey L. Verschleiser
Michael B. Nierenberg
Jeffrey Mayer
Thomas F. Marano
Jeffrey L. Verschleiser
Michael B. Nierenberg
Jeffrey Mayer
Thomas F. Marano
333-
109318 9/30/2003 2/10/2004 Long Beach
Securities
LBMLT 2005-3,
LBMLT 2006-WL1,
LBMLT 2006-1,
LBMLT 2006-WL2,
LBMLT 2006-WL3,
LBMLT 2006-2,
LBMLT 2006-3
Craig S. Davis
Marangal I. Domingo
Troy A. Gotschall
Art Den Heyer
Stephen Lobo
David H. Zielke
Craig S. Davis
Marangal I. Domingo
Troy A. Gotschall
Art Den Heyer
Stephen Lobo
333-
103345 2/20/2003 3/7/2003 WaMu
Securities
WMALT 2005-9,
WMALT 2005-10
Michael J. Kula
Craig S. Davis
Marangal I. Domingo
Marc K. Malone
Michael L. Parker
Thomas G. Lehmann
Megan M. Davidson
Michael J. Kula
Craig S. Davis
Marangal I. Domingo
Marc K. Malone
Michael L. Parker
Thomas G. Lehmann
Megan M. Davidson
333-
124934 5/13/2005 5/31/2005
Aegis Asset
Backed
Securities
Corp.
AABST 2005-5
D. Richard Thompson
Pat Walden
Orlando Figueroa
D. Richard Thompson
Pat Walden
Orlando Figueroa
333-
121581 12/31/2004 Not applicable
American
Home
Mortgage
Securities
LLC
AHM 2005-1
Michael Strauss
Stephen Hozie
Thomas McDonagh
Alan Horn
Not applicable
333-
131895 2/16/2006 3/17/2006 Argent
Securities Inc. ARSI 2006-M2
Adam J. Bass
John P. Grazer
Andrew L. Stidd
Adam J. Bass
John P. Grazer
Andrew L. Stidd
333-
87146 4/29/2002 6/6/2002
Bond
Securitization,
LLC
CBASS 2006-CB2
James R. Pomposelli
Christine E. Cole
Dean Christianson
Benjamin B. Abedine
James R. Pomposelli
Christine E. Cole
Dean Christianson
Benjamin B. Abedine
44
SEC File
Number
Date
Registration
Statement
Filed
Date(s)
Amended
Registration
Statements
Filed
Registrant(s) Related Certificates Signatories of
Registration Statement
Signatories of
Amendments
333-
136741 8/18/2006 9/18/2006
Bond
Securitization,
LLC
CBASS 2006-CB7
David M. Duzyk
Christian Greco
Benjamin B. Abedine
Christine E. Cole
Orlando Figueroa
David M. Duzyk
Christian Greco
Benjamin B. Abedine
Christine E. Cole
Orlando Figueroa
333-
125734 6/10/2005 6/22/2005
People’s
Choice Home
Loan
Securities
Corp.
PCHLT 2005-4 Neil Kornswiet
Brad Plantiko
Neil Kornswiet
Brad Plantiko
116. The Prospectus Supplement for each Securitization describes the underwriting
guidelines that purportedly were used in connection with the origination of the underlying
mortgage loans. In addition, the Prospectus Supplements purport to provide accurate statistics
regarding the mortgage loans in the collateral group and the entire securitization, including the
ranges of and weighted average FICO credit scores of the borrowers, the ranges of and weighted
average loan-to-value ratios of the loans, the ranges of and weighted average outstanding
principal balances of the loans, the geographic distribution of the loans, the extent to which the
loans were for purchase or refinance purposes, information concerning whether the loans were
secured by a property to be used as a primary residence, second home, or investment property,
and information concerning whether the loans were delinquent.
117. The Prospectus Supplements associated with each Securitization were
AZ some interesting information, alot of JPM and WAMU stuff.
https://www.fhfa.gov/SupervisionRegulation/LegalDocuments/Documents/Litigation/FHFA_v_JP_Morgan_Complaint.pdf
IR Contacts
Company
Washington Real Estate Investment Trust
1775 Eye Street NW
Suite 1000
Washington, DC 20006
Toll-Free: 800-565-9748
T: 202-774-3200
Investor Relations
Amy Hopkins
Vice President, Investor Relations
T: 202-774-3200
ahopkins@washreit.com
Transfer Agent
Computershare
P.O. Box 505000
Louisville, KY 40233
T: 800-519-3111
F: 781-575-3605
shareholder@computershare.com
AZ i spoke to my brokerage firm waited for hours, regarding escrows. at the end they gave me a site to contact https://ir.washreit.com/
they told me they were instructed by this company to remove escrows from everyones accounts, Anyone ever do a follow up on this, could this be the wmi protfolio?
just sharing information please let me know your thoughts AZ
Federal Reserve - Finance and Economics Discussion Series ...https://www.federalreserve.gov › feds › filesPDF
by YS Kim · 2018 · Cited by 57 — SIVs in the pre-crisis period, only two, Nationstar Mortgage and ... service in excess of $600 billion in mortgages
Announcement - Servicer: Moody's assigns an SQ2- to Nationstar Mortgage as a servicer of prime, subprime and special servicer of mortgage loansGlobal Credit Research - 24 Feb 2021U.S. Residential Mortgage Servicer Assessment ActionsNew York, February 24, 2021 -- Moody's Investors Service has assigned Nationstar Mortgage LLC (Nationstar) d/b/a Mr. Cooper a servicer quality assessment of SQ2- as a primary servicer of prime, subprime and as a special servicer of residential mortgage loans.As of December 2020, the company's servicing portfolio totaled approximately $626 billion in unpaid principal balance. Nationstar is the largest non-bank residential mortgage servicer in the U.S.ASSESSMENT RATIONALEWe assess the company's collection abilities as above average. Nationstar's collection performance metrics were above average for the review when compared to peers. The company uses diverse borrower contact strategies which include text, email and web chat. Customer service agents utilize a web portal that includes a borrower interview tool with compliance requirement protocols built in. Call center metrics for the company were stressed due to the COVID-19 pandemic in March and April 2020, but the metrics normalized during subsequent months.We view Nationstar's loss mitigation abilities as above average. Nationstar maintains solid loss mitigation technology including their proprietary decisioning system REMEDY. For borrowers affected by COVID-19, Nationstar automated the forbearance request process through its interactive voice response (IVR) system and website. The company demonstrates above average modification performance when compared to peers.We view the company's foreclosure and REO timeline management as above average. Nationstar utilizes LPS desktop for communication with its attorney network, and monthly scorecards to monitor the performance of attorneys. During the review period, loans in foreclosure and REO were placed on hold to comply with investor and regulatory COVID-19 moratoriums.We view the company's loan administration function as average. Nationstar uses a proprietary system for investor reporting, IRIS, that supports all required remittance types and investor accounting protocols. The company successfully implemented investor changes necessary for COVID-19 reporting. During the review period Nationstar implemented a new proprietary loan boarding tool helping to reduce boarding timelines.We view Nationstar's servicing stability as below average. The stability assessment incorporates the corporate family rating (B2 -- Stable Outlook) for Nationstar Mortgage Holdings Inc. Nationstar has an experienced senior management team and continues to invest in technology. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the company successfully transitioned the majority of servicing employees to a remote working environment.The framework used in this analysis was "Servicer Quality Assessments for Servicers of Residential Mortgages" published in December 2019 and available at https://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBS_1122183. Alternatively, please see the Framework list at https://www.moodys.com/research/List-of-NCRA-Frameworks--PBC_1178235 for a copy of this framework. Please see www.moodys.com for any updates on changes to the lead rating analyst and to the Moody's legal entity that has issued the rating.This publication does not announce a credit rating action. For any credit ratings referenced in this publication, please see the ratings tab on the issuer/entity page on www.moodys.com for the most updated credit rating action information and rating history. Francis Wissman Vice President - Senior Analyst Structured Finance Group Moody's Investors Service, Inc. 250 Greenwich Street New York, NY 10007 U.S.A. JOURNALISTS: 1 212 553 0376 Client Service: 1 212 553 1653 William Fricke VP - Senior Credit Officer Structured Finance Group JOURNALISTS: 1 212 553 0376 Client Service: 1 212 553 1653 Releasing Office: Moody's Investors Service, Inc. 250