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Prosecutor asks 7 years jail for ex-governor
Posted on September 15, 2016 in Panama
MOVES BY lawyers for former Coclé Governor Richard Fifer to evade trial were rejected on Wednesday September 14, and the prosecutor is calling for a seven year sentence.
He is charged with allegedly failing to pay required Social Security fees on behalf of the workers of the mining company Petaquilla Gold.
Judge María Isabel Pedreshi set the trial for Nov. 29.
Sixth Anti-Corruption Prosecutor Aurelio Vásquez has requested a sentence of seven years, and asked the judge to continue the order for Fifer to remain in the country.
Vásquez said there are 24 witnesses in the case and a substantial amount of records that will be introduced into evidence.
Defense attorneys presented two motions, one to dismiss the charge and another to suspend the hearing.
The lawyers made the argument that Fifer was not the head of the company when the payments were supposed to be made, which was October 2013 to January 2015.
Lawyer Tomás Gondola said that the defendant was seeking a suspension in the case so he could arrange payments to Social Security.
Representatives of Social Security testified at the hearing that no arrangements for repayment have been made by Fifer.
Both motions were rejected.
You're right there up 6 percent today on volume of 500 shares.
Persons invested $6,328 today. Can't be all bad. It would be nice if someone who drives by the plant on the way to FQ would post and tell us if anything is going on such as maintenance or start-up work.
Hope there's still a security guard or locals will start dismantling the plant - for all we know it might already have happened.
I believe he was banned from investor hub as savio. Might still be around under some other name.
Savlo Monday, 11/28/11 10:14:37 PM
Re: JustForFun7 post# 11738
Post # of 26430
Even if POG will be at $2500, this pig will be in low 30 cents to 5 cents range and forget about your dream of PDI it will never gone a happen.
So PTQ was declared bankrupt. The article indicates the concrete company withdrew from the court case because the company thought they had a better chance of collecting if PTQ started up production again. That means that the assets weren't near enough to cover back wages other debts. No surprise there.The concrete company probably would have gotten pennies on the dollar in bankruptcy. That means there's still a lot of other debt that will have to be paid off before they build up any cash flow to avoid going into bankruptcy again. Need to see financial statements after they get the $25 million. Don't they get another $5 million from the FQ deal in July? No way to tell if PTQ will stay above water.
Isn't there suppose to be an annual general meeting where stockholders can vote on retaining the BoD? Did I miss it?
Why haven't the major stockholders demanded a meeting and voted the bums out? Does the TSX require an annual general meeting?
Are the major stockholders content with what's going on?
I don't believe that I'll ever get my money back but I would like to know what really happened.
NCOUVER, BRITISH COLUMBIA--(Marketwired - Jan. 16, 2015) - Petaquilla Minerals Ltd. ("Petaquilla" or the "Company") (TSX:PTQ)(OTCBB:PTQMF)(FRANKFURT:P7Z) announces further to its press release dated January 8, 2015 that on January 15, 2015 it signed an investment trust profit sharing facility at 60% Petaquilla Minerals and 40% Baseline Financial Group, SA. 10% of the profit will go towards the administration of the trust.
This will ensure the optimization and development of the gold processing project in Molejon, Province of Colon, Republic of Panama. Baseline Financial Group, SA, provides a facility of twenty-five million dollars (USD$25,000,000.00), for the initiation of gold production operations which is slated to start February 1, 2015. This financing will provide the resources necessary to ensure that the company expeditiously moves towards finalizing its financial statements for FY2014 and other regulatory requirements.
About Petaquilla Minerals Ltd. - Petaquilla is a growing, diversified gold producer committed to maximizing shareholder value through a strategy of efficient production, targeted exploration and select acquisitions. The Company operates a surface gold processing plant at its Molejon Gold Project, located in the south central area of Panama. In addition, the Company has exploration operations at its wholly-owned Lomero-Poyatos project located in the northeast part of the Spanish/Portuguese (Iberian) Pyrite Belt and several other exploration licenses in Iberia.
Forward-Looking Statements: Certain statements contained in this press release constitute forward-looking statements. The use of any of the words "anticipate", "continue", "estimate", "expect", "may", "will", "project", "should", "believe" and "confident" and similar expressions are intended to identify forward-looking statements. Petaquilla believes that the expectations reflected in these forward-looking statements are reasonable but no assurance can be given that these expectations will prove to be correct and such forward-looking statements included in, or incorporated by reference into, this press release should not be unduly relied upon. These statements speak only as of the date of this press release. Petaquilla undertakes no obligation to publicly update or revise any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise.
On behalf of the Board of Directors of
PETAQUILLA MINERALS LTD.
Richard Fifer, Executive Chairman
NO STOCK EXCHANGE HAS APPROVED OR DISAPPROVED THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN.
Petaquilla Minerals Ltd.
(604) 694-0021 or Toll free: 1-877-694-0021
(604) 694-0063
www.petaquilla.com
image: http://at.marketwire.com/accesstracking/AccessTrackingLogServlet?docid=0987986001&sourceType=1
Didn't Carlosec say that MJK was really Fifer's sister? Probably was.
The required financial reports not being filed might have to do with not having the funds to pay the auditors. That's a scary thought as they recently received $50 million.
Delisting review due tomorrow, then Financial Statements two weeks later. Let's hope for some good news before the end of the year.
Go to this website for news on Spain:
http://www.kdl.com.au/kimberley-diamonds-snaps-spanish-gold-project/
Good my name not be revealed because all employees have threatened to the point that if we changed we fired union ... I'm really tired of how this company is going, everything is cronyism and robadera, starting with Batista who was the general manager of this company, not to mention the Carrizo family one of the sons of the alleged Petauqilla Minerals President Lydia Reed, which he was selling water bottles to the company and one of our fellow plant realized filling water bottles with tap water, the other son gabriel reed when buying land and sold part of Minera Panama petaquilla they realized the amount of theft that made but nobody says anything.
Here Penonome know everything, this is the height, they made their silver rib investors who trusted Richard Fifer. Mrs. Reed is in that position because he threatened to lock you Richard Fifer, as it has a relative in the court that has endured its files for THIEF, and have amanazado.
The Sitraemip union is composed of pure friends Richard Fifer, the Alvarez, are close friends of Richard Fifer's why they do not want there another union, because they do everything Richard Fifer ordered, this is how Richard Fifer has this company with pure friends who cover their misdeeds, restaurants here in Penonome, nurseries, your child lands are paid through petaquilla foundation and who audits? pure friends Richard Fifer, companies that cover everything, so they do not realize the theft does, the employees of their home are paid by petaquilla, all disguises travez foundation, that's why I have no money the company I began to bring carriages, buses, boats, all worth millions, only audited and veram, that? to leave them lying in the back yard here in santa ana, prefer wasting money to pay investors who trusted his word.
Then I began to send their employees to Spain to train, buy horses with silver petaquilla Foundation, brought statues of Mexico with silver petaquilla all his masterpieces do not come out of pocket but fools investors who see the actually. He made his money with Geo-info, here we are without our fortnight without insurance, I can no longer be listed on the insurance because we are delinquent.
Petaquilla has indebted to Geo-Info, the private company that is also broken, sending airplanes to fly to? anything that serves only to bill and invoice crazy projects, petaquilla keeps; Petarmigan the helicopters, which were coming to look for any stupidity, even for shit in the same miramar and so must you. Wasted money and will continue wasting money. To this man urgently need to audit. His ex-wife Janet tried to give him away because poor they left on the street without a penny, after I use it and fell in love the shot on the street, while he spent his travel with friends cogiendose whores and inhaling cocaine, could go and on but not acabaria.
Lords investor Richard Fifer have to remove it if they want to recover their investments, and will continue stealing stolen. These projects in Spain where ruined this company, all on the ground know that eight ingots were removed and 2 were lost, then sent the money to canda and money Richard Fifer and his friends were distributed in Spain 40 million were sent to? then lose consecion according consecion this website is owned by another company and not directly from us http://www.infomine.com/index/properties/LOMERO-POYATOS.html, gave us crap food on-site plant, especially for what? Graffiti where he was pdi is Richard Fifer, santa ana they is Richard Fifer, where visitation is Richard Fifer fall, the company that ace tests is Richard Fifer, helicopters, geo-info, companies in Spain are Richard Fifer, the man becomes a millionaire and nobody audits and consigie up a company to defraud because we owe our lives thanks to mismanagement, bring Richard Fifer auditors but can not manipulate, always saved everything has a thousand foundations ......
NATIONAL POLICY 12-203
CEASE TRADE ORDERS FOR CONTINUOUS DISCLOSURE DEFAULTS
1.1 What is the purpose of the policy?
This policy provides guidance to issuers, investors and other market participants as to how the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA or we) will generally respond to certain types of serious continuous disclosure defaults (referred to as specified defaults in this policy) by a reporting issuer.
The policy provides guidance on the following questions:
1. When will a CSA securities regulatory authority or regulator (a CSA regulator) respond to a specified default by issuing a cease trade order (CTO)? What do we mean by the term “CTO”? Why do we issue CTOs?
2. When will a CSA regulator respond to a specified default by issuing a management cease trade order (MCTO)? What do we mean by the term “MCTO”? Why do we issue MCTOs?
3. If a CSA regulator issues an MCTO, what other actions will we ordinarily take in these circumstances? What do we expect from defaulting reporting issuers in these circumstances?
The guidance in this policy represents general guidance only. Each CSA regulator will decide how to respond to a specified default, including whether to issue a CTO (and if so, whether to issue a general CTO or an MCTO), on a case-by-case basis after considering all relevant facts and circumstances.
1.2 What is the scope of the policy?
(a) Application
This policy describes how the CSA regulators will ordinarily respond to a specified default by a reporting issuer. The term “specified default” is defined in part 2 of this policy and is based on the harmonized list of deficiencies developed by the CSA and described in CSA Notice 51-322 Reporting Issuer Defaults (CSA Notice 51-322). This notice describes the list of deficiencies that will generally result in a reporting issuer being noted in default of the securities laws of a particular jurisdiction.
The definition of “specified default” does not include certain defaults described in CSA Notice 51-322, such as a failure to file a material change report, or a failure to file technical disclosure or other reports required by National Instrument 43-101 Standards of Disclosure for Mineral Projects (NI 43-101) or National Instrument 51-101 Standards of Disclosure for Oil and Gas Activities (NI 51-101).
We have omitted these items from the definition because these filings will generally be non-periodic in nature, and in some cases it may be unclear whether the issuer has triggered a filing requirement. However, a CSA regulator may apply this policy if a reporting issuer is in default of a continuous disclosure requirement that is not included in the definition of specified default.
Similarly, a CSA regulator may apply this policy if a reporting issuer has made a required filing but the required filing is deficient in terms of content (a content deficiency). Examples of content deficiencies are set out in section 2 of CSA Notice 51-322.
(b) Mutual reliance principles
In deciding how to respond to a specified default, the CSA regulators will generally follow principles of mutual reliance. The issuer’s principal regulator (PR) will normally be the one to decide whether to issue a CTO. The determination as to which regulator will act as PR will be based upon the principles set out in part 3 of National Policy 11-203 Process for exemptive relief applications in multiple jurisdictions (NP 11-203). This means that the PR will usually be the regulator in the jurisdiction where the reporting issuer’s head office is located.
An issuer that wishes to apply for an MCTO under this policy must apply in the issuer’s PR jurisdiction and send a copy of the application to the non-principal regulators in each other jurisdiction in which it is a reporting issuer. The issuer’s PR will determine whether to issue a general CTO or an MCTO and, in the case of the latter, the appropriate scope of the MCTO. Non- principal regulators will ordinarily make the same decision as the PR on these questions. However, each regulator may still impose a general CTO if it believes it is appropriate.
August 29, 2008 (2008) 31 OSCB 8384
Rules and Policies
(c) MCTOs issued under this policy are not a “penalty” or “sanction” for disclosure purposes
The CSA regulators do not consider MCTOs issued under this policy to be a “penalty or sanction” for the purposes of disclosure obligations in Canadian securities legislation relating to penalties or sanctions. They are not issued as part of an enforcement process and the regulators do not intend them to suggest a finding of fault or wrongdoing on the part of any individual named in the MCTO. For example, a defaulting issuer’s board of directors might invite an individual to serve as an officer or director of the issuer to assist the issuer in remedying its default. The individual might have no prior involvement with the defaulting reporting issuer. The fact that the PR may subsequently name the individual in an MCTO does not mean the individual had any responsibility for the default, which occurred before the individual joined the issuer.
However, issuers are required to disclose MCTOs issued under this policy in accordance with the following disclosure requirements:
• • • •
Section 16.2 of Form 41-101F1 Information Required in a Prospectus, Item 16 of Form 44-101F1 Short Form Prospectus, Subsection 10.2(1) of Form 51-102F2 Annual Information Form, and Subsection 7.2 of Form 51-102F5 Information Circular.
If an issuer is required to include disclosure of an MCTO in a public filing, the issuer may supplement the disclosure with additional information explaining the circumstances of the MCTO.
(d) Regulators may consider other action, including enforcement action
If a reporting issuer is in default of a continuous disclosure requirement, the CSA regulators may also consider taking enforcement action against the reporting issuer, the directors and officers of the reporting issuer, or any other responsible party. Accordingly, nothing in this policy should be interpreted as limiting the discretion of the CSA regulators in responding to such a default through enforcement action.
Part 2 – Definitions and Interpretation
In this policy:
“alternative information guidelines” means the guidelines relating to a default announcement and default status report described in part 4 of this policy;
“cease trade order” and “CTO” mean an order under a provision of Canadian securities legislation, set out in Appendix A, that prohibits trading in securities of a reporting issuer, whether direct or indirect, by the persons or companies identified in the order, for such period as is specified in the order;
“default announcement” means a news release and report as described in section 4.3 of this policy; “default status report” means a news release as described in section 4.4 of this policy;
“management cease trade order” and “MCTO” mean a CTO issued under this policy that prohibits trading in securities of a reporting issuer, whether direct or indirect, by
(a) the chief executive officer (CEO) of the reporting issuer,
(b) the chief financial officer (CFO) of the reporting issuer,
(c) at the discretion of the PR, the members of the board of directors of the reporting issuer or other persons or companies who had, or may have had, access directly or indirectly to any material fact or material change with respect to the reporting issuer that has not been generally disclosed, and
(d) in the case of a reporting issuer that does not have a CEO, CFO and/or a board of directors, individuals who perform similar functions to any of such positions;
“principal regulator” and “PR” mean an issuer’s principal regulator as determined in accordance with part 3 of National Policy 11- 203 Process for exemptive relief applications in multiple jurisdictions (NP 11-203).
August 29, 2008 (2008) 31 OSCB 8385
Rules and Policies
“specified default” means a failure by a reporting issuer to comply with a specified requirement; and “specified requirement” means the requirement to file within the time period prescribed by securities legislation
(a) annual financial statements;
(b) interim financial statements;
(c) annual or interim management's discussion and analysis (MD&A) or annual or interim management report of fund performance (MRFP);
(d) annual information form (AIF); or (e) certification of filings under Multilateral Instrument 52-109 Certification of Disclosure in Issuers' Annual and
Interim Filings.
In certain jurisdictions, the CSA regulators may issue cease trade orders and management cease trade orders that prohibit both trading in and acquisitions of securities of a reporting issuer. In these jurisdictions, references in this policy to a “trade” refers to both a trade in or acquisition of securities of the reporting issuer.
In Quebec, “trade” is not defined in the Securities Act (QSA). This policy covers all securities transactions that may be the object of an order provided for in paragraph 3 of section 265 of the QSA.
Part 3 – Regulatory responses to a specified default
3.1 Issuance of a general CTO or an MCTO
In the jurisdictions where the issuer is a reporting issuer, the CSA regulators will respond to a specified default by noting the issuer in default on their default lists. For more information about the CSA default lists, please refer to CSA Notice 51-322.
The CSA regulators will then ordinarily respond to a specified default in one of two ways:
• The issuer’s PR may issue a CTO.
• Alternatively, if an issuer applies under part 4 of this policy, and demonstrates that it is able to comply with this policy, the issuer’s PR may issue an MCTO instead.
The issuer’s PR will decide whether to proceed with a CTO (including whether to issue an MCTO) after considering the principles, factors and criteria described in part 4 of this policy and any other facts and circumstances the PR considers relevant. If the issuer’s PR decides an MCTO is appropriate, it will similarly decide whether to extend it to the issuer’s board of directors or other persons or companies.
If the issuer’s PR issues a CTO, the non-principal regulators in the jurisdictions in which the issuer is a reporting issuer will generally issue similar CTOs to ensure the CTO is effective in their jurisdictions. If the issuer’s PR issues an MCTO, the non- principal regulators in the jurisdictions in which the issuer is a reporting issuer will generally issue similar MCTOs in respect of persons or companies named in the MCTO who reside in their jurisdiction.
The CSA regulators will generally not grant exemptive relief to a reporting issuer to extend a continuous disclosure filing deadline to enable an issuer to avoid a default. The deadlines relating to the specified requirements represent the CSA’s view as to reasonable and appropriate deadlines that should apply to reporting issuers in a consistent manner. While we recognize that issuers may sometimes face difficulties in complying with filing deadlines due to circumstances beyond their control, we do not believe it is appropriate to vary a filing deadline simply to allow an issuer to avoid being in default. The CSA regulators will consider the issuer’s circumstances in deciding what action, if any, is appropriate to respond to a default.
If a defaulting reporting issuer is insolvent and is the subject of a stay of proceedings or similar order under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended, or the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, as amended, or similar legislation, the CSA regulators will generally note the issuer in default but take no other action until the relevant stay is lifted, provided the issuer complies with the alternative information guidelines. In situations where this is not the case, or where the default is expected to continue for an extended period, the CSA regulators will determine whether further action is warranted after considering all relevant factors and circumstances.
August 29, 2008 (2008) 31 OSCB 8386
Rules and Policies
3.2 Why do we issue cease trade orders in response to a specified default?
Historically, if a reporting issuer has failed to comply with a specified requirement, such as the requirement to file audited annual financial statements, the CSA regulators have generally responded to this default by issuing a CTO.
The CSA regulators have historically taken this action for the following reasons:
• Without adequate continuous disclosure, there may not be sufficient information in the securities marketplace to properly support informed trading decisions regarding securities of the issuer.
• The integrity and fairness, or confidence in the integrity and fairness, of the capital markets, may be compromised if trading in securities of the reporting issuer is permitted to continue during the period of default (when there is heightened potential that some people may have access to information that would normally be reflected in the continuous disclosure document that the reporting issuer is in default of filing).
We acknowledge that a CTO can impose a burden on issuers and investors because
• existing investors are unable to sell their securities, and prospective investors are unable to purchase securities of the issuer, while the CTO remains in effect, and
• issuers are generally unable to access financing while the CTO remains in effect.
Nevertheless, if a reporting issuer is in default of a specified requirement, our overriding concern is generally investor protection. Investors and prospective investors should be able to make an informed investment decision about the securities of the defaulting reporting issuer.
The practice of responding to a specified default with a CTO has a significant positive effect on general compliance. The prospect of a CTO creates a strong incentive for the reporting issuer’s management to ensure that the reporting issuer does not go into default. Similarly, the issuance of a CTO once the issuer is in default creates a strong incentive on the part of management to diligently rectify the filing default.
Finally, a CTO represents a rapid, public response by the CSA regulators to a serious continuous disclosure default by a reporting issuer. This sends a message to issuers and investors that filing deadlines are important and that there will be serious consequences for a failure to file, helping to preserve integrity and fairness in the securities marketplace.
Part 4 – Applications for an MCTO as an alternative to a general CTO
4.1 Eligibility criteria
A CTO is an appropriate response to a specified default that is not likely to be rectified within a relatively short time and where the circumstances leading to the default are likely to continue. These circumstances include issuers that no longer have an active business, are insolvent, or have lost a majority of their board of directors.
If the outstanding filing is expected to be filed relatively quickly, and the default is not expected to be recurring, an MCTO may be an appropriate response to the default.
Issuers satisfying all of the following criteria are usually eligible for an MCTO:
August 29, 2008
(2008) 31 OSCB 8387
•
• •
•
The outstanding filings will be filed as soon as they are available and within a reasonable period. In most cases, we expect this to be within two months. However, in exceptional circumstances, as determined by the PR, we may permit an issuer to take longer than two months to address the default.
The issuer is generating revenue from its principal business or, if it is in the development stage, the issuer is actively pursuing the development of its products or properties.
The issuer has the necessary financial and human resources, including a reasonable number of directors and officers in place, to address the default in a timely and effective manner and comply with all other continuous disclosure requirements (other than requirements reasonably linked to the specified default) for the duration of the default.
The issuer’s securities are listed on a Canadian stock exchange and there is an active, liquid market for those securities. Thinly traded issuers will generally not be considered eligible for an MCTO.
Rules and Policies
• The issuer is not on the defaulting reporting issuer list in any CSA jurisdiction for any reason other than the failure to comply with the specified requirement (and any other requirement that is reasonably linked to the specified requirement).
4.2 Contents of application
If an issuer satisfies the eligibility criteria set out above, it should contact its PR at least two weeks before the due date for the required filings and apply in writing for an MCTO instead of a general CTO against the issuer.
We acknowledge that there will be situations where an issuer, notwithstanding the exercise of reasonable diligence, will be unable to determine whether it can comply with a specified requirement at least two weeks before its due date. However, we believe that, in most cases, an issuer exercising reasonable diligence should be able to make this determination at least two weeks in advance of the deadline.
If an issuer, notwithstanding the exercise of reasonable diligence, is not able to make this determination at least two weeks before its due date, the issuer should include a brief explanation of the reasons for the delayed filing in its application.
In its application, the issuer should
• identify the specified default, the reasons for the default and the anticipated duration of the default;
• explain how the issuer satisfies each of the eligibility criteria described above;
• set out a detailed remediation plan that explains how the issuer proposes to remedy the default and includes a realistic timetable for remedying the default;
• include consents signed by the CEO and the CFO (or equivalent) to the issuance of an MCTO (see Appendix C);
• include a copy of the proposed or actual default announcement (see section 4.3); • confirm that the issuer will comply with the alternative information guidelines described in sections 4.3 and 4.4
of this policy; • include a copy of the issuer undertaking described in section 4.7 of this policy; and • briefly describe the issuer’s blackout policies and other policies and procedures relating to insider trading.
The issuer should send copies of the application to the regulators in all jurisdictions in which the issuer is a reporting issuer.
We will consider an issuer’s history of complying with its continuous disclosure obligations when evaluating the issuer’s request for an MCTO.
4.3 Alternative information guidelines – Default Announcement
If a reporting issuer determines that it will not comply, or subsequently determines that it has not complied, with a specified requirement, this will often represent a material change that the issuer should immediately communicate to the securities marketplace by way of a news release and material change report in accordance with part 7 of NI 51-102 Continuous Disclosure Obligations. In determining whether a failure to comply with a specified requirement is a material change, the issuer should consider both the events leading to the failure and the failure itself.
If the circumstances leading to the default, or the default, do not represent a material change, the issuer should nevertheless consider whether the circumstances involve important information that should be immediately communicated to the marketplace by way of news release.
The regulators will generally not exercise their discretion to issue an MCTO unless the issuer issues and files a default announcement containing the information set out below. If the default involves a material change, the material change report may contain this information, in which case a separate default announcement is not necessary. The default announcement should be authorized by the CEO or the CFO (or equivalent) of the reporting issuer, be approved by the board or audit committee and be prepared and filed with the CSA regulators on SEDAR in the same manner as a news release and material change report referred to in part 7 of NI 51-102. An issuer will usually be able to determine that it will not comply with a specified requirement at least two weeks before its due date and, as soon as it makes this determination, should issue the default announcement.
August 29, 2008 (2008) 31 OSCB 8388
Rules and Policies
The default announcement should:
(i) identify the relevant specified requirement and the (anticipated) default;
(ii) disclose in detail the reason(s) for the (anticipated) default;
(iii) disclose the current plans of the reporting issuer to remedy the default, including the date it anticipates remedying the default;
(iv) confirm that the reporting issuer intends to satisfy the provisions of the alternative information guidelines so long as it remains in default of a specified requirement;
(v) disclose relevant particulars of any insolvency proceeding to which the reporting issuer is subject, including the nature and timing of information that is required to be provided to creditors, and confirm that the reporting issuer intends to file with the CSA regulators throughout the period in which it is in default, the same information it provides to its creditors when the information is provided to the creditors and in the same manner as it would file a material change report under part 7 of NI 51-102; and
(vi) subject to section 4.5 of this policy, disclose any other material information concerning the affairs of the reporting issuer that has not been generally disclosed.
A default announcement is not needed if the issuer is in default of a previous specified requirement, has followed the provisions of section 4.3 regarding a default announcement of that earlier default and is complying with the provisions of section 4.4 regarding default status reports.
4.4 Alternative information guidelines – Default Status Reports
After the default announcement, and during the period of the MCTO, the regulators will generally exercise their discretion to issue a general CTO unless the defaulting reporting issuer issues bi-weekly default status reports, in the form of news releases, containing the following information:
(i) any material changes to the information contained in the default announcement or subsequent default status reports, including a description of all actions taken to remedy the default and the status of any investigations into any events which may have contributed to the default;
(ii) particulars of any failure by the defaulting reporting issuer in fulfilling its stated intentions with respect to satisfying the provisions of the alternative information guidelines;
(iii) information regarding any (anticipated) specified default subsequent to the default which is the subject of the default announcement; and
(iv) subject to section 4.5 of this policy, any other material information concerning the affairs of the reporting issuer that has not been generally disclosed.
Where there are no changes otherwise required to be disclosed in items (i) to (iv), this fact should be disclosed in a default status report.
To keep the market continuously informed of any developments during the period of default, the issuer should issue default status reports every two weeks following the default announcement. If a CSA regulator, at any time, issues a general CTO against an issuer, default status reports will no longer be necessary.
Every default status report should be prepared, authorized, filed and communicated to the securities marketplace in the same manner as that specified in section 4.3 for a default announcement.
4.5 Confidential material information
The alternative information guidelines in this policy supplement the material change reporting requirements in NI 51-102 and should be interpreted in a similar manner. Similar to the procedures in NI 51-102, an issuer may omit confidential material information from default status announcement or default status reports if in the opinion of the issuer, and if that opinion is arrived at in a reasonable manner, disclosure of the applicable material information would be unduly detrimental to the interests of the reporting issuer.
August 29, 2008 (2008) 31 OSCB 8389
Rules and Policies
4.6 Compliance with other continuous disclosure requirements
The alternative disclosure described in sections 4.3 and 4.4 of this policy supplement the issuer’s disclosure record during the period of default. It does not provide an alternative to the continuous disclosure requirements under Canadian securities legislation.
If a reporting issuer is in default of a specified requirement, the issuer must still comply with all other applicable continuous disclosure requirements, other than requirements reasonably linked to the specified requirement in question. For example, an issuer that has not filed its financial statements on time will also be unable to comply with the requirement to file management’s discussion and analysis under NI 51-102. However, failure to comply with a requirement to file audited financial statements in accordance with the requirements of part 4 of NI 51-102 does not excuse compliance with other requirements of NI 51-102 such as the requirement to file an Annual Information Form in accordance with part 6 of NI 51-102 or material change reports in accordance with part 7 of NI 51-102.
4.7 Issuer undertaking to cease certain trading activities
The reporting issuer should include with the application an undertaking that, for so long as the issuer is in default of the specified requirement in question, the issuer will not, directly or indirectly, issue securities to or acquire securities from an insider or employee of the issuer except in accordance with legally binding obligations to do so existing as of the date of the continuous disclosure default. The issuer should address the undertaking to the securities regulatory authorities of each jurisdiction in which the issuer is a reporting issuer.
4.8 Information respecting defaulting reporting issuers subject to insolvency proceedings
As explained in section 3.1, if a defaulting reporting issuer is insolvent and under Court protection, the CSA will generally note the issuer in default but take no other action until the relevant stay is lifted provided the issuer complies with the alternative information guidelines.
If a defaulting reporting issuer is the subject of insolvency proceedings but not under court protection, we will consider an application for an MCTO in cases where
(a) the (b) the (c) the
(i) (ii) (iii)
(iv)
issuer retains title to its assets, issuer’s directors and officers continue to manage the affairs of the issuer, and issuer
files a default announcement, files default status reports, files a report disclosing the information it provides to its creditors • simultaneously with delivery to its creditors, and • in the same manner as a report of a material change referred to in part 7 of NI 51-102; and otherwise complies with this policy.
chooses to file the information provided to creditors with a material change report, then, for purposes of filing on
If the issuer SEDAR, this must be contained in the same electronic document as the material change report.
4.9 Financial information in default announcements and default status reports
Any unaudited financial information that is communicated to the marketplace should, except in certain circumstances involving insolvency, be directly derived from financial statements prepared and presented in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. In default announcements and default status reports, this information should be accompanied by cautionary language that the information has been prepared by management of the defaulting reporting issuer and is unaudited.
4.10 Default correction announcement
Once the specified default is remedied, the reporting issuer should consider communicating that information to the securities marketplace in the same manner as that specified in this policy for a default announcement.
August 29, 2008 (2008) 31 OSCB 8390
Rules and Policies
Part 5 – Trading by management and other insiders during the period of default
Issuers in default of a specified requirement should closely monitor and generally restrict trading by management and other insiders due to the increased risk that such persons may have access to material undisclosed information. Such information may include information that would otherwise have been reflected in the continuous disclosure filing that is the subject of the default, information about any investigation into the events that may have led to the default, and information about the status of remediation activities.
We remind management and other insiders that they should carefully consider the insider trading prohibitions under securities legislation before entering into any transaction involving securities of the issuer in default.
The CSA have articulated in National Policy 51-201 Disclosure Standards detailed best practices for issuers for disclosure and information containment and have provided an interpretation of insider trading laws. Issuers should adopt written disclosure policies to assist directors, officers and employees and other representatives in discharging timely disclosure obligations. Written disclosure policies should also provide guidance on how to maintain the confidentiality of corporate information and to prevent improper trading on inside information. Adopting the CSA best practices may assist issuers to take all reasonable steps to preserve the confidentiality of non-public information.
We also remind issuers and other market participants that an officer or other insider of a reporting issuer in default will generally be unable to sell securities acquired from the issuer on an exempt basis because of the resale restrictions in section 2.5(2)(7) and s. 2.6(3)(5) of National Instrument 45-102 Resale of Securities.
Part 6 – Effect of a CTO issued by a regulator in one jurisdiction on trading in another jurisdiction
Presently, all marketplaces (including exchanges, alternative trading systems and quotation and trade reporting systems) in Canada have retained Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada (IIROC) as their regulation services provider. Under the Universal Market Integrity Rules (UMIR), which have been adopted by IIROC, if a securities commission issues a CTO with respect to an issuer whose securities are traded on a marketplace, IIROC imposes a regulatory halt on trading of those securities on all marketplaces for which IIROC acts as the regulation services provider. Such halt is taken whether or not the CSA regulator that issued the CTO is the PR of the issuer and once the halt is imposed by IIROC, no person subject to UMIR may trade those securities on any marketplace in Canada, over-the-counter or on a foreign organized regulated market. Therefore, the remainder of the guidance in this part deals with market participants who are not otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of IIROC.
Market participants should be cautious about trading in a security in one jurisdiction if a CSA regulator in another jurisdiction has issued a CTO. In most cases, if an issuer's PR issued a CTO in response to a failure by the issuer to comply with a material continuous disclosure requirement, the non-principal regulator will issue a reciprocal CTO on similar terms and conditions.
Continuous disclosure obligations reflect the minimum requirements we feel are necessary to generate sufficient public disclosure to permit investors to make informed investment decisions. The issuance of a CTO by the issuer's PR will generally mean that an issuer has not met the required standard and that there is a significant risk of harm to investors if trading is allowed to continue. Accordingly, market participants should carefully consider the existence of the material continuous disclosure default, and the determination of the issuer's PR, before effecting a trade in a non-principal regulator jurisdiction. Although a trade in one jurisdiction may not violate a CTO in another jurisdiction, the trading activity may still be contrary to the public interest and therefore subject to enforcement or other administrative proceedings.
If a market participant intends to execute a trade in securities of a cease-traded issuer on an exchange or marketplace outside of Canada, the market participant should carefully consider whether the trade may nevertheless be considered to be or include a trade within one or more jurisdictions in Canada where a CTO is in effect. For example, a transaction may be a trade in another jurisdiction if "acts in furtherance of the trade" occur within that jurisdiction. A transaction may also be a trade in another jurisdiction if there are connecting factors or other facts and circumstances that indicate that the securities may not "come to rest" outside Canada but may be resold to investors in a jurisdiction where a CTO is in effect.
Part 7 – Effective date
This policy comes into force on September 1, 2008.
NATIONAL POLICY 12-202
REVOCATION OF A COMPLIANCE-RELATED CEASE TRADE ORDER
Part 1 Introduction
This policy provides guidance for issuers that are subject to a CTO (as defined below) issued as a result of failing to comply with continuous disclosure requirements.
This policy explains what an issuer should do to apply for a partial or full revocation of a CTO. It describes what the issuer should file, the general type of review that the securities regulatory authorities (or "we") will perform, and explains some of the factors that we will consider when determining whether to grant a full or partial revocation of the CTO.
Although this policy provides guidance to issuers applying for a revocation order, the policy also applies, where the context permits, to a securityholder or other party applying for a revocation order.
Part 2 Definitions
In this policy:
"annual meeting requirement" means the requirement in applicable corporate legislation or any equivalent non-corporate requirement to hold an annual meeting of securityholders;
"application" means an application for a partial or full revocation of a CTO submitted to the applicable jurisdictions (see Appendix A for section references); in British Columbia, if the CTO has been in effect for 90 days or less, the filing of the required continuous disclosure documents constitutes the application;
"CTO" means a cease trade order issued against an issuer or its management or insiders prohibiting trading in the securities of the issuer as a result of a failure to comply with continuous disclosure requirements;
"MD&A" means management's discussion and analysis as defined in National Instrument 51-102 Continuous Disclosure Obligations;
"MI 52-109" means Multilateral Instrument 52-109 Certification of Disclosure in Issuers' Annual and Interim Filings;
"MRFP" means management's report on fund performance as defined in National Instrument 81-106 Investment Fund Continuous Disclosure; and
"partial revocation order" means an order that permits one or more issuers or individuals to conduct specific trades when a CTO is in effect.
In Quebec, "trade" is not defined in the Securities Act ("QSA"). This policy covers all securities transactions that may be the object of an order provided for in paragraph 3 of section 265 QSA.
Terms defined in National Instrument 14-101 Definitions have the same meaning in this policy.
Part 3 Qualification and Criteria for Revocation
3.1 Full revocations
(1) Filing requirements
Generally, we will not exercise our discretion to grant a full revocation order, subject to subsections 3.1(2) and 3.1(3), unless the issuer has filed all of its outstanding continuous disclosure. The most common deficiencies relate to disclosure required under:
(a) National Instrument 51-102 Continuous Disclosure Obligations;
(b) Multilateral Instrument 52-109 Certification of Disclosure in Issuers' Annual and Interim Filings;
(c) National Instrument 81-106 Investment Fund Continuous Disclosure;
(d) National Instrument 43-101 Standards of Disclosure for Mineral Projects;
(e) National Instrument 51-101 Standards of Disclosure for Oil and Gas Activities;
(f) Multilateral Instrument 52-110 Audit Committees or BC Instrument 52-509 Audit Committees, as applicable; and
(g) National Instrument 58-101 Disclosure of Corporate Governance Practices.
(2) Exceptions to interim filing requirements
In exercising our discretion to revoke a CTO, we may elect not to require the issuer to file certain outstanding interim financial statements, interim MD&A, interim MRFP or interim certificates under MI 52-109, subject to subsection 3.1(3), if the issuer has filed:
(a) all outstanding audited annual financial statements, annual MD&A, annual MRFP and annual certificates under MI 52-109 required to be filed under applicable securities legislation;
(b) all outstanding annual information forms, information circulars and material change reports required to be filed under applicable securities legislation; and
(c) all outstanding interim financial statements (which include the applicable comparatives from the prior fiscal year), interim MD&A, interim MRFP and interim certificates under MI 52-109 for all interim periods in the current fiscal year required to be filed under applicable securities legislation.
(3) Exceptions to annual filing requirements
In certain cases, an issuer seeking a revocation order may consider that the length of time that has elapsed since the date of the CTO may make the preparation and filing of all outstanding disclosure impractical, or of limited use to investors. This may particularly apply to disclosure for periods that ended more than three years before the date of the application, or periods prior to a significant change in the issuer's business. An issuer seeking a revocation order in these circumstances should make detailed submissions explaining its position. In appropriate cases, we will consider whether the filing of certain outstanding disclosure might not be necessary as a precondition of a revocation order. The factors we may consider include:
(a) age of information to be contained in the continuous disclosure filing -- information from older periods may be less relevant than information from more recent periods;
(b) access to records -- lack of access to records may hinder compliance with some filing requirements;
(c) activity during the period -- if an issuer was inactive or changed its business at any time while it was cease-traded, disclosure of information from or prior to this time may be less relevant;
(d) length of time the CTO has been in effect; and
(e) whether the historical disclosure relates to significant transactions or litigation.
We generally consider that disclosure for periods within the most recent three financial years of the issuer provides useful information for investors. We generally do not consider the time and cost required to prepare disclosure to be a compelling factor in our determination of the disclosure to be provided in connection with an application to revoke a CTO.
The pictures and info related to mining operations. At least they have some experience in gold mining.
What I don't get is the relationship between Powerblue and Imppetrol. You would think Powerblue would be the head honco with Imppetrol as the sub. Powerblue has all the assets it seems. Maybe the way they're set up has something to due with taxes in Peru or legal liability.
Go to www.powderblueenter.com for website of our new partners. It is interesting.
These guys must be rolling in dough. Just formed another company a month ago.
Aaa Motor, LLC is a Florida Domestic Limited-Liability Company filed on September 19, 2014. The company's filing status is listed as Active and its File Number is L14000147429.
The Registered Agent on file for this company is Miranda Jose and is located at 3160 Sw 8th Miami, FL 33135. The company's principal address is 3160 Sw 8th St Miami, FL 33135 and its mailing address is 3160 Sw 8th St Miami 33135.
The company has 2 principals on record. The principals are Raul A Cabral from Miami FL and Jose Miranda from Miami FL.
Company Information
Company Name: AAA MOTOR, LLC
File Number: L14000147429
Filing State: Florida (FL)
Filing Status: Active
Filing Date: September 19, 2014
Company Age: 1 Month
Registered Agent:
Miranda Jose
3160 Sw 8th
Miami, FL 33135
Principal Address:
3160 Sw 8th St
Miami, FL 33135
Mailing Address:
3160 Sw 8th St
Miami, 33135
Company Contacts
RAUL A CABRAL
Managing Member
3160 Sw 8th St
Miami, FL 33135
JOSE MIRANDA
Managing Member
3160 Sw 8th St
Miami, FL 33135
Officers | Florida (Home State)
Florida Dept. of State Data updated June 25, 2014
Name Title Address
FERNANDO ALESSI President 3160 SW 8TH STREET
MIAMI , FL 33135
Officer Report
JOSE MIRANDA, SR. VP 3160 SW 8TH STREET
MIAMI , FL 33135
Business Registration | Florida (Home State)
Florida Dept. of State Data updated June 25, 2014
Business Registration
Business Name: IMPPETROL INVESTMENT, INC.
Business Type: For-Profit Corporation
Citizenship: Domestic
State of Incorporation: FL
Principal Address: 3160 SW 8TH STREET
MIAMI, FL 33135
Filing Status: Active
Document Number: P12000013820
Filing Date: 02/09/2012
Old but still interesting:
Peru Bonds Rally After Moody’s Upgrades Credit Rating
By John Quigley Jul 3, 2014 3:07 PM ET
Peruvian bonds rose the most in the Americas after Moody’s Investors Service raised the nation’s credit rating by two levels, citing falling debt and reduced dependence on metal exports.
The price of the government’s notes due 2025 jumped 0.93 cent to 132.68 cents per dollar at 2:02 p.m. in Lima, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. The yield fell nine basis points, or 0.09 percentage point, to 3.71 percent.
Peru’s rating was increased to A3, the seventh-highest investment grade and in line with Mexico, while three steps below Chile. Moody’s said yesterday the reason for the upgrade was the improvement in the government’s balance sheet as well as expectations for faster growth and the impact of initiatives to bolster competitiveness.
The two-step rating increase “was 100 percent unexpected” and will probably bolster overseas demand for Peru’s debt, Walther Benavides, head of fixed-income trading at BBVA Banco Continental in Lima, said an e-mailed response to questions.
The cost to insure Peru’s debt against default for five years with credit swaps dropped three basis points, or 0.03 percentage point, to 81 basis points, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. The sol rose 0.5 percent to 2.777 per U.S. dollar.
President Ollanta Humala on June 11 announced legislation to forgive some back taxes, accelerate public works and boost investment in mining, hydrocarbons and telecommunications.
Following posted on web:
We own South American Goverment Bonds (Peru) in the amount of 655 Million with non Banking SKR looking for a line of credit and or PPP Alluvial Gold Mine in South America (Peru) with large reserve already tested and prove it in running operations looking for Partnership, JV, either with equity and or dept and or prepayment sales. Investment range 1 to 5 Million Dollars.
Seems to say they want to buy a gold mine for the price of 1 to 5 million dollars in Peru. Doesn't tie in with the $60 million they plan to loan us. Hard to figure what they want to do - provide line of credit to a producing gold mine or buy the mine outright.
Don't know what the rating is for Peruvian Bonds is. Guess I'll look it up.
Yes its sad to realize that we've been lied to all along. Everything has fallen apart. The SP is below every warrant and option exercise price. Officers are still getting paid and are only releasing information when required by law. The $50 million is gone by now with nothing to show for it. We don't even have a moderator for this board. Doubt we'll have a chance to vote the bums out as the company will probably be bankrupt by end of year. Year-end financials due out by Monday. Only thing of interest will be subsequent events. This sucks!
New front page of website. Still saying PDI shares are coming:
Petaquilla Minerals Ltd. is a gold producer that operates its wholly owned Molejon gold mine in Panama and owns exploration and development stage projects in Spain and Portugal. The Molejon mine commenced commercial production in January 2010 and has production capacity of approximately 3,500 tonnes per day. The mine is located in the Donoso District, Colon Province of Panama, 130 kilometres west of Panama City and is adjacent to First Quantum Minerals Ltd.’s world-class $6.5 billion Capex Cobre Panama copper project.
The Lomero-Poyatos Project is a polymetallic deposit located near Huelva in the Andalusia autonomous community of Spain in the prolific Iberian Pyrite Belt, which extends from southwestern Spain into Portugal. The Company also is moving forward with the nearby San Telmo project, which was historically mined for principally zinc and some gold credits in the 1960s. The Portuguese gold projects, Banjas and Jales-Gralheira, are formerly producing mines located near the Oporto region.
Panama Development of Infrastructures, S.A. (“PDI”) is the wholly owned infrastructure, mining services and construction subsidiary of Petaquilla Minerals Ltd. PDI is an active participant in Panama’s infrastructure industry and is well positioned in the emerging mining services sector. PDI is currently engaged in aggregate mining and sales. The company is analyzing new business opportunities to increase PDI’s portfolio of projects and to resume its plans to spin out PDI to Petaquilla shareholders with plans to go public 12 months after the spin out.
Maybe the year-end financials are coming out early.
Hard to say what caused it. 5 times volume in Canada and 2 times volume in U.S. Still not volume large enough to indicate something major has changed. Could get a PR on what will be done with the $50 million just received. Should have gotten it by now and if not, should have to disclosed as a major event. Gold price is creeping higher. Might save the company if it gets to $1,500. Would be nice if Jaywalker would give us an update on what's happening at the plant.
German Investor, have you seen the drilling results from Portugal and Spain? If yes, can you tell us inferred amounts of gold? Thank you
Danka for your thoughtful posts. You say that moving the mill to Spain won't work because the ore is a different type. Last year, or the year before, didn't the company announce that it was going to ship ore from Spain to Panama for processing? Wouldn't that be the same thing, the Spanish ore couldn't be processed with the existing equipment at the plant? Was the company just pulling our leg again and knew it couldn't be done?
Seems to me, there's not much left in Panama but some heap-leaching of low-grade ore. All I think the Panama Government wants from us is a clean up of Mojelon after it closes down. FQ can afford to "give something back", we can't.
I assume ANATI covers the movement of earth so I'm also assuming they met about building the leach pads and containing the cyanide runoff. Is this a reasonable assumption?
Ptygold, Have you heard anything about what's holding up the 2015 forecast?
You have been right many times Ptygold. Thanks for your postings. Digitec says another shoe to drop this week. Have you heard any rumors of something big happening? Are you selling or do you think we can come back?
I though this deal provided enough money to restart the operations. Now we need $20 million to start? If we can't get the $20 million loan, wouldn't we be out of business?
Haven't we already been squashed like a bug?
God Bless you if you can do it. I'm in.
I'm confused about what we still own in Panama: MJK posted:
mjkiii Thursday, 05/08/14 06:35:20 PM
Re: german_investor post# 24914
Post # of 24989
Obviously higher only confused clueless doubt.
1. No Dilution, Debt, or fees, More money than current market cap.
2. $0.275 money coming in to resume production.
3. Major gold deposits (Oro del Norte & Pamilla) kept.
4. PDI kept.
5. TERMINATION OF UNPROFITABLE AGGREGATE AGREEMENT!
6. Major exploration concessions kept.
7. Molejon kept.
8 Portugal kept.
9. LP kept.
Others are saying we lost the mining rights to all concessions except the Molejon mine. Do we still have the rights to Oro del Norte & Pamilla? If yes, does the 5 year plant operation period include the gold from those two concessions? Wasn't there copper that was valuable too.
There were 4 other candidates who got the other 2%.of the vote.
I assume he is talking about the election results.
Actually the private board has been very informative. I believe it will get better as time goes on. There are no attacks on the board, no name calling, which is refreshing. The posts are not that all supportive of management but offer a realistic view of what's going on. It's too bad if you can't get on because it would give you more information than you now have.
From Stockhouse:
new presentation posted on website
Mentions a preliminary license issued in February.
Also provides updates re: timelines, and mentions news of drilling activity this year too (which presumably is going to go into the definitive feasability paper too).
As for article, am surprised it had such a negative effect on the stock. You can't build a dam, then punish the mine for the issues of the dam. And you cannot act as if Belo Sun reneged on their promise to build a school, etc, for the locals, as Belo Sun first needs money to do that, and they won't get money without first getting the mine into production.
Did the locals expect an equity raise from Belo Sun that would be devoted to building new houses and a school for these locals before they even got the permits to build the mine? Did the writer of the article expect that too?
Starting to root for Belo Sun for different reasons than when I started investing in them, and definitely see this week as a great buying opportunity.
Read more at http://www.stockhouse.com/companies/bullboard/v.bsx/belo-sun-mining-corp#eZ7Odmwu167MGoel.99
Progafa: are you still around?