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One of your previous posts was bang on:
Yep, another supposed victim of the ludicrous *naked* short sellers from Mars CONspiracy theory bites the dust.
Turns out all along it was just another penny stock scam with paid promoters running >>interference<< for the crooks behind it while they dumped their free shares hand-over-fist into any volume those same *promoters* could generate.
http://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/read_msg.aspx?message_id=111951059
"LGHS revoked"
Must be those gosh-darned *entities* acting in conspiracy with the >>dolts<< at the SEC to keep this fine company down.
Oh, it was illiquid long before that. Just another messy China company. Probably if the SEC had spent any time on their accounting they'd have found lots of hanky-panky.
LGHS was essentially illiquid for over a year but I wonder why certain *caveats* weren't met when I posted on Feb 22 that Longhai Steel was severely delinquent in their filing obligations and the stock was at risk of an SEC Suspension.
Had *caveats* been met there should have been a sell-off to avoid getting caught in the Suspension.
Oh well.....maybe the SEC is wrong, dagnabbit.
Sadly, the rose coloured glasses are worn much longer than logic and reality dictates.
Seen it too many times.
Enjoy your weekend and GLTA!
Yep. It was *game over* a long time ago, but some just can't see it.
Yes, another pumped up scam play by well known "traders" here.
Sad to see but never surprised.
GLTA!
And so we bid adieu to yet another piece of worthless junk...
Yep, another supposed victim of the ludicrous *naked* short sellers from Mars CONspiracy theory bites the dust.
Turns out all along it was just another penny stock scam with paid promoters running >>interference<< for the crooks behind it while they dumped their free shares hand-over-fist into any volume those same *promoters* could generate.
LGHS SEC Suspension for Financials delinquencies:
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/suspensions/2015/34-74548.pdf
Order:
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/suspensions/2015/34-74548-o.pdf
Admin Proceeding:
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/34-74549.pdf
LGHS is severely delinquent (Nov 2012) in filing their Financials and corporate filing obligations to the SEC. On Feb. 20, 2015 the SEC suspended 8 stocks from the Delinquent SEC Filers list, and it is likely that more delinquent Filers will be suspended.
Since Jan 1st, 2010 the SEC has suspended over 1290 stocks for Financials delinquencies. All of those Suspended stocks had their stock registrations revoked.
Shareholders should contact the company and pressure the Mgmt to file their delinquent Financials because ALL shareholders would be wiped out IF the SEC suspends the stock.
LGHS is on the list of delinquent filers:
http://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/read_msg.aspx?message_id=110680509
In China, Beijing Fights Losing Battle to Rein In Factory Production
Some Chinese Localities Stymie Efforts to Curb Industrial Overcapacity and Pollution
XINGTAI, China—The "steel king" of this drab city in northeast China was forced to shut down his mill and furlough some 3,000 workers without pay last November after the company's banks cut off funding.
It was a big blow for the magnate, Wang Chaojun. But it was a triumph for Beijing, which last year moved to stem excess factory production that is weighing on the economy and turning Chinese skies gray with smog. The banks, in fact, withdrew the loans, totaling $177 million, because of the central government's call to streamline the steel business.
Now, just eight months later, Mr. Wang is preparing to reignite his blast furnaces. His unlikely savior: the Chinese government, in this case the city of Xingtai, which is arranging a merger to put Mr. Wang back in business. "The local government is trying to help us resume production as soon as possible," says Mr. Wang, chairman of Longhai Steel Group.
China's most-senior leaders say they mean business when it comes to reducing industrial overproduction, which is becoming a big worry for the country as it downshifts to slower economic growth. Unneeded factories are sapping corporate profits, wasting money and worsening pollution. But leaders are running into determined opposition—from the thousands of government officials charged with carrying out Beijing's plans.
While a tug of war between local officials and China's regimes isn't as unusual as some Westerners might think, this one has already featured a rare public scolding from Beijing as well as the televised spectacle of a province blowing up furnaces without really reducing production. The stakes behind this battle are high: economists and Chinese officials say China needs to remake its economy to become less dependent on investment in capital-intensive, highly polluting industries and more on consumer spending and service industries. But to do so it will have to convince localities that are more concerned about protecting jobs and businesses.
"Don't think just of the central government" when considering Chinese economic policy, says John Zhao, chief executive of Hony Capital, a private-equity firm in Beijing. "China has 30-some provinces and powerful cities and they all run their own economic policies."
The changes are just part of the central government's economic reforms, many of which could be more difficult than controlling capacity. Beijing's agenda includes restructuring inefficient state-owned firms, revamping China's agricultural land system and remaking the tax system. Those changes also pit the central government against local officials and their allies in industry.
China's finance minister, Lou Jiwei, said that China's problems with excess capacity were discussed last week during the annual talks between the two nations, called the Strategic & Economic Dialogue. "The key is for China to take a market-based approach to digesting overcapacity," Mr. Lou said at a press briefing. A U.S. Treasury official said that resolving the problem would "foster competition and level the playing field for U.S. firms" that compete with Chinese manufacturers.
Shutting down excess capacity presents severe problems for local leaders, including unemployment, flagging government revenue and a growing number of defaults. And since local governments get the bulk of their industrial taxes from factory production, not profit, they have an incentive to keep companies operating even if they are in the red.
In a surprisingly strong rebuff, Premier Li Keqiang brought up the issue at a meeting of the State Council, the Chinese government's top decision-making body, accusing local governments of dragging their feet on reform policies. "Some [local] government officials hold the belief that doing nothing is better than doing something wrong," Mr. Li said, according to an account posted on the Chinese government's website.
Excess capacity is the difference between a factory's potential output and its actual production. The more a factory uses its machinery, the more efficiently it runs, with costs for rent, power, and other overhead spread across more products. Economists say healthy, profitable industries run at around 85% capacity utilization. Yet China's capacity utilization across all industries barely tops 70%, the International Monetary Fund says.
Many of China's industrial giants assumed the country would keep growing at double-digit rates indefinitely, allowing it to absorb extra capacity. But when the economy slowed to closer to 7.5%, mills choked with metal. "You can't overstate the urgency to tackle the overcapacity problem now," says Li Xinchuang, chairman of China Metallurgical Industry Planning and Research Institute, a state think tank that helped draft Beijing's policy to shrink the steel industry.
China's gross domestic product in the second quarter rose 7.5% from a year earlier, up from 7.4% growth in the first quarter, China's National Bureau of Statistics said Wednesday morning.
In a statement to The Wall Street Journal, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, which oversees the steel industry, said various levels of government are "in the process of implementing" reductions in overcapacity and that there are initial signs of progress. Still, according to China's National Bureau of Statistics, about one-third of steel, aluminum and cement makers lost money in the first quarter of 2014.
Companies stay afloat by borrowing, adding to China's rapidly-growing debt levels. The steel industry alone has some $480 billion in outstanding debt—more than twice the amount of five years ago, estimates the China Iron and Steel Association. Half of the debt consists of bank loans. Banks, including his own, "are feeling pressure" from the inability of steel companies to repay loans, says Xiang Songzuo, chief economist at Agricultural Bank of China Ltd. 601288.SH 0.00%
Last year, China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology named 19 industries marked by overcapacity, up from three a decade earlier. The State Council approved plans to reduce production in at least five of those industries: cement, aluminum, sheet glass, shipbuilding and steel. But prices and profit margins have since fallen in the targeted industries, a possible sign that excess capacity is still increasing, economists say.
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in Paris forecasts that steel capacity in China will expand, rather than contract, this year and next, though at a slower pace than it has since 2011. China's excess steel capacity has quadrupled since 2006 and now accounts for more than a third of spare capacity globally, the organization says.
China's steel industry is now so vast and uncoordinated that government officials don't even know how many steel companies there are in the country—about 1,200 is the best guess. Beijing wants to cut 80 million tons of excess capacity by 2017.
Three-quarters of the cutbacks are supposed to come from Hebei, a Nebraska-sized province of 73 million people that rings Beijing like a choke collar and which provides a good vantage point for watching Beijing try to impose its policies.
An industrial powerhouse, Hebei produces about 190 million tons of crude steel a year, about twice as much as the entire U.S. It is also home to seven of China's 10 most-polluted cities, according to Chinese government statistics. Xingtai, China's most-polluted city, is encircled by dozens of steel mills, cement plants and coal pits. Its roads are wetted down to keep coal and steel dust from escaping into the air, but soot still coats the hands of visitors.
Hebei officials argue it is unfair to put so much of the capacity-cutting burden on them. Should Hebei meet its reduction targets, it would reduce tax receipts by about 10% and put 200,000 people out of work, Hebei estimates.
Eager to appear compliant with Beijing's rules, though, Hebei late last year staged an event called "Operation Sunday" in which it dispatched demolition squads to blow up blast furnaces owned by 15 mills. Video of imploding furnaces was broadcast on state television. The razing reduced the province's steelmaking capacity by 6.8 million tons, Hebei said, nearly half the province's annual goal.
Or so it seemed. All of the furnaces targeted for destruction turned out to be so outmoded that the companies that owned them didn't consider them spare capacity, steel-industry officials say, meaning they didn't help reduce the province's extra volume.
"Do any of the blasted furnaces affect capacity at all?" asked Du Wenhua, marketing chief of Jinan Steel Group, a big steel company in Jinan, east of Hebei. "No. They have been in limbo for a long time." Press officials in the Hebei provincial government declined to comment, as did the central government.
Hebei's steel production declined by 4.7%, or two million tons, in the first quarter compared with a year earlier, according to the China Iron and Steel Association. But that didn't necessarily come from destroying spare capacity. Some mills are producing less because of weaker demand, even as they maintain their capacity, while overall Chinese production keeps climbing.
Since 2000, Beijing has told Hebei to cut capacity several other times, but local officials each time rebuffed the plans. When China's planning agency ordered smaller blast furnaces be closed in 2009, for instance, Hebei Tianzhu Iron & Steel Group in Tangshan dismantled four of them and won a $785,000 bonus for doing so from the central government. The steelmaker then turned around and built a much larger blast furnace. "We didn't waste the money, but used it to expand our production capacity," says a company official, who declined to be identified.
Beijing leaders say this time will be different. Late last year, Communist Party chief Xi Jinping told local officials in Hebei that they must force through changes, even though "many will hurt the interests of someone," according to Xinhua, China's state-controlled news agency.
Premier Li, meanwhile, declared a "war on pollution" in March, which includes steep cuts in some industrial output. China plans to introduce its toughest environmental law next year, which would subject polluters to heavy fines or, for the first time, imprisonment.
Yet knowing exactly what Beijing wants can be hard sometimes. In early June, Mr. Li appeared to give local officials wiggle room by saying they would still be judged on whether they hit economic growth targets. The simplest way to do that would be to let factories keep churning out steel and other commodities.
In Xingtai, the soot-covered city of 500,000, steel magnate Mr. Wang is one of the city's largest taxpayers. Described by local media as a "steel king," the onetime steel trader built Longhai Steel from a dilapidated mill into a local giant that in the mid-2000s generated more than $1.6 billion in annual revenue and employed 4,000, according to Mr. Wang's colleagues.
But starting with the global recession, the 59-year-old had a harder time turning a profit. In 2010, he transferred a 10% stake in his company to state-owned Hebei Iron & Steel, which was scooping up companies under Beijing orders to consolidate the steel industry into 10 megacompanies.
Three years later, when Beijing changed course and told state-owned steel mills to slim down, Hebei Iron & Steel severed ties with Longhai, along with other privately owned steelmakers. Around the same time, three banks pulled their loans to Longhai.
The divestiture helped Hebei Steel argue to Beijing that it had reduced steel capacity by 10 million tons, a person with direct knowledge of the company said, even though the company hadn't actually added or subtracted any production through consolidation and divestitures. Press officials at Hebei Iron & Steel declined to comment.
Left without a patron, Longhai foundered and shut operations late last year. The only sign of action in the sprawling mill during a recent visit was in the company's executive building, where several managers anxiously waited for calls from the city government.
A telephone rang with a Wall Street Journal reporter nearby. A Longhai manager answered, talked excitedly and relayed the news. The city government had summoned another prominent local steel boss, Ding Liguo, to discuss a merger.
Mr. Ding's Delong Holdings Ltd. B1N.SG -3.57% , a Singapore-listed company, had its own problems. Its big Xingtai mill is located within 12 miles of city center, which Xingtai's environmental department decreed was too close to continue operations.
Mr. Ding, who wouldn't comment on negotiations with the local government, would have to move his mill—an expensive prospect—face possible closure or work out a deal with the city.
Longhai had already closed 2.6 million tons of steelmaking capacity, an amount similar to Delong's. Closing them both would mean Hebei would be one-third of the way to its 2014 goal of reducing steel capacity. But it would also mean a big hit to Xingtai's finances in lost taxes. Delong's finances were also intertwined with others in the steel industry, so a default could set off a wave of repayment failures.
Longhai's Mr. Wang said the two companies have signed a preliminary agreement to merge, and figures the government's backing will help him get financing he needs to restart his mill. Local government officials and advisers say if the deal were to fall through, they are committed to getting Longhai another partner so it could resume production. A senior Delong executive in Xingtai would say only the company is in talks with Longhai and doesn't have "detailed plans" to merge.
A merged Longhai-Delong steel company would retain its 5.2 million tons of steel capacity, says Mr. Wang. "We've told our employees to stay at home and wait to hear from us," Mr. Wang says.
http://online.wsj.com/articles/in-china-beijing-fights-losing-battle-to-rein-in-factory-production-1405477804
"I hope, pray... Someday something happens here...again..."
Me too.
Specifically SEC action against the crooks behind this scam and their accomplices who ran intereference for them by falsely claiming a naked short conspiracy against LGHS while all the time everybody knew it was crooked insiders dumping their free shares.
That time may come sooner rather than later.
Thanks for posting.... I hope, pray... Someday something happens here...again...
LGHS >> MM MONTHLY >> APRIL 2014 NITE $0.05 1,265 OTO 04/22
Total Share Volume 1,530
Knight Capital Americas LLC 1,265
VFIN
vFinance Investments, Inc. 265
link
LGHS >> trades >> 2014
$0.05 265 OTO 04/02
$0.07 10,000 OTO 03/25
$0.05 10,000 OTO 03/25
$0.05 17,460 OTO 03/25
$0.05 1,000 OTO 03/24
$0.05 5,000 OTO 03/21
$0.05 2,000 OTO 03/21
$0.05 2,000 OTO 03/21
$0.044 40 OTO 03/21
$0.05 2,400 OTO 03/14
$0.05 2,000 OTO 03/13
$0.05 1,600 OTO 03/13
$0.042 24,200 OTO 03/06
$0.04 1,500 OTO 02/28
$0.04 4,000 OTO 02/10
$0.045 4,400 OTO 01/22
$0.04 100 OTO 01/15
$0.03 8 OTO 01/14
$0.03 32,425 OTO 01/09
==
4kids
all jmo
Why savvy investors worry about probable scams like LGHS:
Iroquois -LGHS "investors" - are no stranger to the good ol' pump and dumperooni:
http://www.thestockadvisor.com/featured/022210NCEN.html
Mind you, Josh Silverman is just the kind of stand-up guy you might expect to be involved in the shady world of Chinese-originated VIE's:
http://www.checkfundmanager.net/diligence/?p=1755
http://www.thestreet.com/story/10229586/1/new-exposure-for-hedge-funds-strip-joints.html
http://www.bizapedia.com/tn/IROQUOIS-FUND-LP.html
You can be sure that a hedge fund like Iroquois will make money on a share offering from an OTC Bulletin board penny stock like LGHS, no mater which way the stock price goes. It's what hedge funds do best, after all:
"The selling stockholders may use any one or more of the following methods when selling shares:
..........
• to cover short sales made after the date that this registration statement is declared effective by the SEC"
You have to wonder why an allegedly highly successful and profitable company like LGHS - according to its filings, it's successful anyway, although that doesn't stop it going cap in hand to various hedge funds for financing on unfavorable terms - needs an S-1 registration at all.
Talking about Chinese VIEs like LGHS, here's why savvy investors are very very nervous about them:
"Fraud Heightens Jeopardy of Investing in Chinese Companies By STEVEN M. DAVIDOFF
DealBook
New York Times
April 24, 2012, 5:40 pm
You might think that if you bought shares of a Chinese company that was listed on an American stock market, you would actually own a piece of that company.
Unfortunately, it is not that simple. The recent cases of the ChinaCast Education Corporation and the Sino-Forest Corporation show that in many instances, foreign investors in Chinese companies might have bought shares that don’t really represent much. It’s a problem that has the potential to extend to even the soundest Chinese company listed in the United States.
The ChinaCast case is not the most egregious, but it is certainly the most scandalous. In March, its chief executive, Ron Chan, was ousted in a battle for shareholder control of the company. An American investor succeeded not only in replacing Mr. Chan, but also in obtaining control of the ChinaCast board.
Yet that turned out to be only the beginning of the battle.
Last week, ChinaCast disclosed that it could not find its company seals, or authorized signatures, for its Chinese subsidiary. Seals are necessary for ChinaCast’s Chinese subsidiary to undertake any business in China. Without them, ChinaCast can’t sign contracts or even pay employees. In other words, China appears to have “Lord of the Rings” corporate governance — one seal to rule them all.
Mr. Chan was believed to have possession of them but now claims to know nothing.
Two of the universities owned by ChinaCast appear to have been transferred to ChinaCast’s former chief investment officer and president of its Chinese operations. And last week, according to the board, about a dozen people broke into the company’s Shanghai office and stole a number of documents and computers.
ChinaCast has a revolt on its hands that it is finding difficult to quell.
One reason that ChinaCast is having a problem is that shareholders did not actually buy an interest in its operations. Instead, to avoid Chinese restrictions on foreign investment, ChinaCast’s shareholders invested in a United States company that has contractual arrangements with a Chinese company. But the Chinese company remains in the ownership of Chinese citizens.
The problem with this structure, known as a variable interest entity, is that it may be illegal under Chinese law and has been criticized by Chinese regulators. Even if it is legal, if the Chinese owners decide to go rogue, the United States-listed entity must sue and obtain a judgment from a Chinese court to enforce these dubious contracts. Good luck with that. Such a litigation can take a long time to resolve, if ever.
In ChinaCast’s case, it can’t do anything until it has control of the corporate seals, but under Chinese law it needs them to sue to recover them. In the meantime, the operators of the Chinese subsidiary can take full advantage of the situation.
Unfortunately, ChinaCast is not the only Chinese company with dubious claims to its assets.
Sino-Forest, listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange, is the most prominent Chinese company to experience this problem. Last summer, Sino-Forest was accused by Muddy Waters Research of fraudulent accounting with respect to timber lands. At the time of the report, SinoForest had a $4 billion market capitalization.
A subsequent report by an independent committee of directors denied that there was a practice of fraud at the company, but also acknowledged that much of Sino-Forest’s property was held through a variable interest entity, or otherwise under contractual rights without an actual title.
Sino-Forest has filed for bankruptcy in Canada. Its assets far exceed its liabilities, but shareholders are likely to end up with nothing, in part because Sino-Forest’s rights to its assets are tenuous at best.
The variable interest entity structure may be the root of the problem when foreign investors own shares in Chinese companies, but it is only part of it. The norms for business are different in China, and enforcing legal contracts or rights is sometimes impossible. Legal title to assets is often not formalized, and even when it is, Chinese executives can use the lack of rule of law to take advantage of foreign shareholders.
Other disputes show that ownership of assets in China can be fleeting.
Yahoo got into a tussle with Jack Ma, the chairman and chief executive of the Alibaba Group, in which Yahoo has a substantial interest, when he transferred Alibaba’s online payment platform, Alipay, to a private company controlled by him. Mr. Ma and Yahoo eventually resolved their disputes, but the transfer was a warning sign that Mr. Ma was willing to take all steps to ensure that the only buyers for Yahoo’s Chinese assets were Mr. Ma and his co-investors.
In the case of Nasdaq-listed GigaMedia, a Singapore-based online gaming company, it wasn’t the variable interest entity structure that did the company in. Instead, the head of its Chinese business simply made off with the seals for GigaMedia’s Chinese company and transferred ownership of the assets. GigaMedia appears to have given up on getting the business back.
And it’s not just a few bad apples. At least 105 Chinese companies listed in the United States have been delisted, are under investigation or have financial problems, according to The Pittsburgh Tribune-Review.
Even when there is no suggestion of fraud, the wide use of the variable interest entity structure by Chinese companies listed on United States stock markets should trouble investors.
The structure is used by a number of prominent Chinese Internet companies including Ren-Ren, Baidu.com and Sohu.com. In most cases, the actual Chinese assets are held by the company’s executives. Ren-Ren’s Chinese assets, for example, are 99 percent owned by Ren-Ren’s founder and his wife. This puts these executives in prime position to fend off any challenges by foreign shareholders.
Investors seem to heed the warning signs only half-heartedly. The recent Chinese initial public offering of VIPshop and the pending I.P.O. of AdChina both use the variable interest entity structure. AdChina disclosed that if the parties controlling its Chinese operations “fail to perform their obligations under their agreements with us, we may have to rely on legal remedies” under People’s Republic of China law “which may not be effective.”
VIPshop’s I.P.O. had top-tier underwriters, including Goldman Sachs. But don’t depend on the underwriters to stick around to make sure that American shareholders can enforce their rights. After an I.P.O., the underwriters tend to disappear.
This is not just a problem of a questionable legal structure, but Wall Street’s apparent willingness to ignore the fact that investors in the United States have tenuous claims when they buy shares in Chinese companies. And underwriters and Chinese issuers have taken advantage of the hunger for Chinese stocks.
The Securities and Exchange Commission and Washington seem to be almost as absent. The S.E.C. just brought charges against one Chinese issuer, SinoTech Energy, claiming it overstated its assets. The regulator has issued a warning about investing in Chinese companies listed on American stock exchanges, but the conduct in the ChinaCast case appears to be outright fraud. The agency simply has not followed up aggressively in most of these cases, most likely because it is overwhelmed with other tasks. The United States government has also not pressed China to vigorously and quickly enforce its own laws to help American shareholders.
Here lies the ultimate lesson. An investment in Chinese companies is really an investment in the people who run these companies. While some, if not most, of these executives are well intentioned, there seems be a lot of suspicious activity out there. Even more so, when those executives are threatened, they can use the weak legal structures and rule of law to maintain control of their companies. And heaven forbid they should steal the seals.
For American investors, it may be that the risks are worth the potential gains in investing in China, but don’t say you haven’t been warned.
Steven M. Davidoff, writing as The Deal Professor, is a commentator for DealBook on the world of mergers and acquisitions."
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/24/fraud-heightens-jeopardy-of-investing-in-chinese-companies/?smid=tw-nytimesdealbook&seid=auto
And then there's this highly relevant article:
http://www.forbes.com/sites/eamonnfingleton/2012/12/04/this-is-big-the-sec-at-last-takes-the-lid-off-china-stock-scams/
The only *pattern* with LGHS is that it's one of a rather large number of Chinese VIE scams that I warned about for a long time, while others ran interference for the scamsters behind it.
Those who listened to me saved themselves from losses of 95% or more of their initial stake.
Those who preferred to believe nonsensical stories about naked shorts and wicked market makers didn't.
It's the same story on most penny stock scams, especially highly risky propositions like Chinese-run LGHS.
There's no mystery, no manipulation of the LGHS pps, or world wide conspiracy to defraud plucky penny stock speculators.
It was obvious from the get-go that LGHS was yet another Chinese VIE scam, run by crooks and with other crooks running interference for them.
All the rest is pure unsupported fantasy.
Longhai Steel, Inc.??? Really???
How eye opening..
Thank-you for the monthly update...interesting to see what nite is up to as we move forward...
LGHS >> MM MONTHLY >> JAN 2014 NITE
Total Share Volume 36,933
Knight Capital Americas LLC 36,833
CSTI
CANACCORD GENUITY INC. 100
link
Nite's % for the month = 99.72% (out of 2 MMs)
reminder *threshold* triggered in early Dec 2013
that carried over into Jan 2014 (12.6.13 - 1.6.14)
http://www.otcmarkets.com/stock/LGHS/short-sales
hmmmm
=
4kids
all jmo
There's no mystery, no manipulation of the LGHS pps, or world wide conspiracy to defraud plucky penny stock speculators.
It was obvious from the get-go that LGHS was yet another Chinese VIE scam, run by crooks and with other crooks running interference for them.
All the rest is pure unsupported fantasy.
LGHS >> MM MONTHLY >> DEC 2013 NITE
Total Share Volume 76,967
Knight Capital Americas LLC 31,007
CDEL
Citadel Securities LLC 26,060
MAXM
Maxim Group LLC 10,000
VFIN
vFinance Investments, Inc. 6,000
ETRF
G1 Execution Services, LLC. 3,600
CSTI
CANACCORD GENUITY INC. 300
link
NITE's percentage for the month >> 40.28%
but notice that *threshold* was triggered early in DEC 2013
12.6.13 to be precise .. and has *shown* non stop since then
link
from that $for profit site ..
http://www.otcmarkets.com/market-activity/reg-sho-otc
hmmmm
=
4kids
all jmo
to each their own
risk is inherent in any *equity*
it's a given based on serial orchestration
i just noted LGHS triggering *threshold*
one day a pattern doesn't make
but i'm always curious to see if a one off >> or not
first *round* of threshold >> almost always leads to a second *round*
but it's the third round that is the *charm* (signal)
you have a good one
=
4kids
all jmo
The only *pattern* with LGHS is that it's one of a rather large number of Chinese VIE scams that I warned about for a long time, while others ran interference for the scamsters behind it.
Those who listened to me saved themselves from losses of 95% or more of their initial stake.
Those who preferred to believe nonsensical stories about naked shorts and wicked market makers didn't.
It's the same story on most penny stock scams, especially highly risky propositions like Chinese-run LGHS.
speaking of holes >>
let's see if 1 day is a one off or turns into an ongoing *pattern*
LGHS >> triggered threshold (12.6.13)
http://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/read_msg.aspx?message_id=94745957
=
4kids
all jmo
"Interesting.... Knight is busy... Why?..."
Because it's a Market Maker. That's pretty obvious really.
What's even more obvious is that LGHS is yet another Chinese VIE scam, just as I posted about two years and a dollar ago.
There's no need to comjure up the bogeyman on this or any other penny stock in a similar positition.
The plain truth is that LGHS was a successful criminal conspiracy to steal fromn the naive and gullible. Simple.
because nite (and the occasional reset partner) >> digs the hole deep
and then waits to see if they can *outlast* >> both retail and mgmt
re: OTC >> odds run in their favor ..
watching LGHS *volume* and pps shake out/take down
more than welcome .. same time each month :)
===
4kids
all jmo
Interesting.... Knight is busy... Why?...
Thanks Fourkids for the update.
LGHS >> MM MONTHLY >> NOV 2013 NITE $0.03 8,333 OTO 11/26 Date Open High Low Close Volume
Total Share Volume 377,988
Knight Capital Americas LLC 269,288
ETRF
G1 Execution Services, LLC. 55,700
CSTI
CANACCORD GENUITY INC. 33,000
VNDM
Vandham Securities 10,000
CDEL
Citadel Securities LLC 10,000
Nite's *turn* >> 71.24% (out of 5 MMs' reporting)
link
LGHS >> trades >> NOV 2013 (from 11.14)
$0.04 2,800 OTO 11/26
$0.03 25,000 OTO 11/26
$0.03 25,000 OTO 11/26
$0.03 8,700 OTO 11/26
$0.037 21,300 OTO 11/26
$0.037 35,350 OTO 11/26
$0.0371 10,000 OTO 11/26
$0.037 10,000 OTO 11/26
$0.037 25,000 OTO 11/26
$0.037 3,300 OTO 11/21
$0.045 4,000 OTO 11/20
$0.035 15,553 OTO 11/19
$0.04 10,000 OTO 11/19
$0.04 10,000 OTO 11/19
$0.05 2,340 OTO 11/19
$0.05 10,000 OTO 11/19
$0.05 10,000 OTO 11/19
$0.05 10,000 OTO 11/19
$0.05 10,000 OTO 11/19
$0.05 350 OTO 11/19
$0.0501 3,000 OTO 11/15
$0.0501 1,000 OTO 11/15
$0.0501 10,000 OTO 11/15
$0.051 9,500 OTO 11/15
$0.0522 4,000 OTO 11/15
$0.0526 4,400 OTO 11/15
$0.059 1,950 OTO 11/15
$0.0601 10,000 OTO 11/14
$0.066 2,000 OTO 11/14
historical >> 11.2013
11/29/13 N/A N/A N/A 0.03 0
11/27/13 N/A N/A N/A 0.03 0
11/26/13 0.037 0.04 0.03 0.03 171,483
11/25/13 N/A N/A N/A 0.037 0
11/22/13 N/A N/A N/A 0.037 0
11/21/13 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037 3,300
11/20/13 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 4,000
11/19/13 0.05 0.05 0.035 0.035 78,243
11/18/13 N/A N/A N/A 0.0501 0
11/15/13 0.059 0.059 0.0501 0.0501 33,850
11/14/13 0.07 0.07 0.0601 0.0601 32,000
11/13/13 N/A N/A N/A 0.07 0
11/12/13 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 3,000
11/11/13 N/A N/A N/A 0.08 0
11/08/13 0.096 0.096 0.08 0.08 41,450
11/07/13 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 10,662
11/06/13 N/A N/A N/A 0.105 0
11/05/13 N/A N/A N/A 0.105 0
11/04/13 N/A N/A N/A 0.105 0
11/01/13 N/A N/A N/A 0.105 0
link back for prior months' data ..
=
4kids
all jmo
Thank-you, i look forward to your post, as it seems to be the only one each month.I'm sorry you are so busy but that's a good thing, right ?
greenlife >> i just posted the LGHS OCT 2013 data
i've had very limited time for months now
glty ..
===
4kids
all jmo
LGHS >> MM MONTHLY >> OCT 2013 VNDM $0.105 10,000 OTO 10/30 $0.12 400 OTO 09/30
Total Share Volume 86,250
Vandham Securities 50,000
NITE
Knight Capital Americas LLC 32,250
ETRF
G1 Execution Services, LLC. 2,000
CANT
Cantor, Fitzgerald & Co. 2,000
hmmm .. vndm did 57.97% for the month .. hmmm
http://www.otcbb.com/asp/tradeact_mv.asp?SearchBy=issue&Issue=lghs&SortBy=volume&Month=10-1-2013&IMAGE1.x=18&IMAGE1.y=10
LGHS >> trades >> OCT 2013
$0.10 20,000 OTO 10/29
$0.105 20,000 OTO 10/29
$0.11 10,000 OTO 10/28
$0.102 4,200 OTO 10/28
$0.11 5,000 OTO 10/28
$0.121 5,000 OTO 10/28
$0.12 2,000 OTO 10/22
$0.12 2,000 OTO 10/22
$0.13 5,000 OTO 10/22
$0.13 1,000 OTO 10/22
$0.125 2,050 OTO 10/08
and prior LGHS trades back to 8.19.13
$0.12 611 OTO 09/26
$0.13 2,000 OTO 09/20
$0.13 2,500 OTO 09/16
$0.13 1,500 OTO 09/13
$0.13 5,000 OTO 09/12
$0.13 5,000 OTO 09/12
$0.13 1,000 OTO 09/11
$0.13 4,500 OTO 09/11
$0.13 1,000 OTO 08/30
$0.13 4,900 OTO 08/30
$0.13 4,500 OTO 08/29
$0.13 825 OTO 08/26
$0.13 3,000 OTO 08/26
$0.13 6,700 OTO 08/26
$0.105 5,000 OTO 08/23
$0.105 5,000 OTO 08/23
$0.10 500 OTO 08/19
link back for prior months' data ..
===
4kids
all jmo
We are still at . 10... Not. In trips .....or halted so....
"I hope someday we have financials....."
You won't. LGHS was a Chinese VIE scam from start to finish as I pointed out all along. There was never any market maker manipulation or mysterious signals.
LGHS was just a pump and dump scam facilitated by stock promoters running interference.
"I hope someday we have financials....."
You won't. LGHS was a Chinese VIE scam from start to finish as I pointed out all along. There was never any market maker manipulation or mysterious signals, as I think we all knew at the time.
LGHS was just a pump and dump scam facilitated by the usual folk running interference.
Thank-you... I hope someday we have financials.....
LGHS >> MM MONTHLY >> SEP 2013 NITE
Total Share Volume 22,511
Knight Capital Americas LLC 18,011
ETRF
G1 Execution Services, LLC. 4,500
http://www.otcbb.com/asp/tradeact_mv.asp?SearchBy=issue&Issue=lghs&SortBy=volume&Month=9-1-2013&IMAGE1.x=-790&IMAGE1.y=-191
hmmm ..
link back for prior months' data
====
4kids
all jmo
LGHS >> MM MONTHLY >> AUG 2013 NITE
Total Share Volume 101,399
Knight Capital Americas LLC 46,673
CDEL
Citadel Securities LLC 27,300
ETRF
G1 Execution Services, LLC. 18,415
CSTI
CANACCORD GENUITY INC. 8,000
VFIN
vFinance Investments, Inc. 1,011
http://www.otcbb.com/asp/tradeact_mv.asp?SearchBy=issue&Issue=lghs&SortBy=volume&Month=8-1-2013&IMAGE1.x=28&IMAGE1.y=3
link back for prior months' data
===
4kids
all jmo
LGHS >> MM MONTHLY >> JUL 2013 NITE
Total Share Volume 118,722
Knight Capital Americas LLC 83,262
ETRF
G1 Execution Services, LLC. 20,320
BMAK
BMA SECURITIES 10,000
CSTI
CANACCORD GENUITY INC. 2,690
VFIN
vFinance Investments, Inc. 2,450
http://www.otcbb.com/asp/tradeact_mv.asp?SearchBy=issue&Issue=lghs&SortBy=volume&Month=7-1-2013&IMAGE1.x=-790&IMAGE1.y=-191
link back for prior months' data ..
===
4kids
all jmo
We seem to be inching our way up a little every day... maybe some news soon or financials..?
Another day green... Please, please give us fins.... It's nice to see green ...but I need proof we are still here..now!
LGHS >> MM MONTHLY >> JUN 2013 NITE
Total Share Volume 130,919
Knight Capital Americas LLC 106,939
ETRF
G1 Execution Services, LLC. 18,740
BMAK
BMA SECURITIES 2,690
ATDF
AUTOMATED TRADING DESK FINANC 2,450
CANT
Cantor, Fitzgerald & Co. 100
http://www.otcbb.com/asp/tradeact_mv.asp?SearchBy=issue&Issue=lghs&SortBy=volume&Month=6-1-2013&IMAGE1.x=14&IMAGE1.y=5
link back for prior months' data ..
===
4kids
all jmo
Thanks again... Still ... Is there something still here? Remains to be seen.... Hopeful but doubtful.
LGHS >> trading data can be found via quote media
http://www.quotemedia.com/results.php?qm_page=29240&qm_symbol=lghs
===
4kids
all jmo
"nonsense
what is interesting to me is just how
conservative this co. was previously
i have to say i did wonder about the
*hiring* >> done >> and the *volume*
that followed that >> promotion
because it didn't fit the MO of this co.
time will tell"
Time has *told*.
What I and other skeptics wrote wasn't "nonsense", and the story about naked or other shorting turned out to be complete garbage as usual.
LGHS was a scheme to steal money from retail investors in the US, and the crooks behind it were given cover and bogus legitimacy by the usual penny stock scam apologists who used baseless and ridiculous conspiracy theories to gull the naive.
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Company Website: http://www.longhaisteelinc.com/
Company Information: Investor Presentation Package 2011
NASDAQ Offering
Authorized: 100M
Outstanding: 10,000,418
Interwest Transfer Company, Inc.
1981 Murray Holladay Road, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84117
Phone: (801)272-9294
Fax: (801)277-3147
Financial Information per last 10Q (Q3: 9-30-11):
Assets: $95M
Liabs: $44M
Net Worth: $51M
Shareholders Equity: $51M = $5.07/share
Last Q Revenues: $119M
Last Q Net Income: $979K = .10/share
Through its Chinese operating company, Longhai manufactures steel wire products in diameters from 6.5 to 10 millimeters on two wire production lines that have a total annual capacity of about 900,000 metric tons.
Longhai's output is sold to several distributors who transport the wire to nearby wire processing companies that make a variety of products including screws, nails, and wire mesh used to reinforce concrete and for fencing.
Longhai manufactures on demand. Sales prices are set at the market price for wire on a daily basis. Customers usually prepay with their orders, then the final prices are adjusted to the market price on the day of pickup by the customer. This allows Longhai to maintain low inventory of both wire and raw materials and minimizes its exposure to commodity price volatility. To increase sales and be price competitive, Longhai occasionally offers discounted wholesale prices.
Sales efforts are directed toward developing and sustaining long-term relationships with customers who are able to purchase in large quantities. In 2010, Longhai's top five distributors accounted for about 40% of our sales.
Longhai's production facilities, located in Xingtai, Hebei province, cover 107,000 square meters. The plant includes a single steel furnace with its coarse and intermediate rolling mills that then feeds two precise wire rolling and drawing lines that create the finished products. This design yields high quality, high volume, and competitive manufacturing costs per ton.
http://www.longhaisteelinc.com/corporate-info/management-team
Mr. Chaojun Wang
Chairman and CEO
Mr. Wang has served as our Chairman and Chief Executive Officer since March 2010, has served as the Chief Executive Officer of our Chinese operating company since its inception in 2008, and has served as Chairman of the Longhai Steel Group, our former parent company, since 1999. Mr. Wang is a member of the local parliament. He holds a Bachelor's degree in Enterprise Management from the Shijiazhuang Railway College. Born in 1955, he is 55 years old.
Mr. Heyin Lv
Chief Financial Officer
Mr. Lv joined Xingtai Longhai Steel Group Co., Ltd., the Company's then parent company in April 2008. He was later appointed as the Chief Financial Officer of Xingtai Longhai Wire Rod Co., Ltd., the Company's operating subsidiary, and served from August 2008 to July 2011. He was responsible for financial reporting, financial planning and analysis, budgeting and treasury management. From 2007 to March 2008, Mr. Lv was an auditor with Xingtai Zhengda Audit Firm. In 2006, Mr. Lv was the Financial Director of Hebei Xingda Group, responsible for financial reporting and treasury management. From 2001 to 2005, Mr. Lv served as the Financial Manager for Xingtai Century Auto Trading Co., Ltd., responsible for financial reporting and financing. Mr. Lv graduated from Xingtai Accounting and Trade School and earned a bachelor's degree in Accounting. He is a Certified Public Accountant in China.
DAILY CHART
WEEKLY CHART
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Tue, May 21, 2013 12:00 - Longhai Steel, Inc. (LGHS: OTC Link) - Venue Change - The symbol, LGHS, no longer trades on OTC Link/FINRA BB. As of Tue, May 21, 2013, LGHS trades on OTC Link. You may find a complete list of venue changes at otcmarkets.com. |
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