Register for free to join our community of investors and share your ideas. You will also get access to streaming quotes, interactive charts, trades, portfolio, live options flow and more tools.
~Just Updated https://www.pacermonitor.com/public/case/28055647/EXXON_MOBIL_CORPORATION_v_CORPORACION_CIMEX_SA_et_al
Monday, December 14, 2020
Defendant
CORPORACION CIMEX S.A.
Defendant
UNION CUBA-PETROLEO
Plaintiff
EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION
Represented By
Jared R. Butcher
Steptoe & Johnson LLP
Supercalifrazalistc
XOM
There is no other Claim on the Market with a Government Guarantee of Settlement and Valuation with incurring associated annual interest
~ Absolutely unheard of claim for real estate the size of the city of Philadelphia with Businesses and property's attached to the ownership
~ Certified by the foreign claims settlement commission of the united states
~ Encoded into LAW through the Helms Burton ACT
~ You would hard pressed to find a lower share structure than this GEM
GO FRAZ
ONLY 574,484 shares https://www.otcmarkets.com/stock/FRAZ/security
The BEST Stock You'll Ever OWN!!
https://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/read_msg.aspx?message_id=159252868
Pujol Moreira, et al v. Societe Generale, S.A. et al
https://www.pacermonitor.com/public/case/37042352/Pujol_Moreira,_et_al_v_Societe_Generale,_SA_et_al
Defendant
Societe Generale, S.A. SCGLY
Defendant
BNP Paribas, S.A. BNPQY
looks like you got it...
Go USA
what Makes FRAZ extra special in my eyes is the fact it has what reads to me as government guarantee in two forms
~ 1 its certified with foreign claims settlement commission
~ 2 it's codified into law through the Helms Burton Act either through right of private action or not it's a future pay day no matter what
~ and if they use the fines collected over the years to compensate the victims we have at the very least the absolute rock bottom minimum we can receive .028% portion of the almost $14Billion collected is $392M/574484 =
no one thought SECI would trade at $100 when it was $1(except for a few) but now it is so will FRAZ without doubt in my mind only wish I knew of the amazing SECI DD earlier
Go FRAZ
PCHM
found out late after you came on this board but I got 1 share SECI ( whish I would Have know sooner ) and happy to see it going as a testament of what will happen to FRAZ It always makes me happy to see prosperity
Don't tell me you buy some SECI way back.
Galileans were blind to see that one of their own could be capable of producing miracles https://www.liferunners.org/luke-424-miracles/
Some VERY Good Updtaes: Libertad Act Lawsuit Update: 4 Of 29 Cases On Appeal... Is U.S. Supreme Court The Eventual Destination?
October 11, 2020
JAVIER GARCIA-BENGOCHEA V. CARNIVAL CORPORATION D/B/A/ CARNIVAL CRUISE LINE, A FOREIGN CORPORATION [1:19-cv-21725 Southern Florida District; 20-12960 11th Circuit Court of Appeals] CCL
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Creed & Gowdy (plaintiff- appellate)
Jones Walker (defendant)
Boies Schiller Flexner LLP (defendant)
Akerman (defendant)
ROBERT M. GLEN V. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., [1:19-cv-23994 Southern Florida District; 4:20-cv-00482-A Transferred To Northern Texas District; 5th Circuit Court of Appeals 20-10903] AAL
Reid Collins & Tsai (plaintiff)
Ewusiak Law, P.A. (plaintiff)
Jones Day (defendant)
Kelly Hart & Hallman LLP (defendant)
DANIEL A. GONZALEZ VS. AMAZON.COM, INC., AND SUSSHI INTERNATIONAL, INC., D/B/A/ FOGO CHARCOAL [1:19-cv-23988; Southern Florida District; 20-12113-F 11th Circuit Court of Appeals] AMZN
Cueto Law Group, P.L. (plaintiff)
Wicker Smith O’Hara McCoy & Ford (defendant- Susshi International)
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius (defendant- Amazon)
MARIO DEL VALLE, ENRIQUE FALLA, MARIO ECHEVARRIA V. EXPEDIA, INC., HOTELS.COM L.P., HOTELS.COM GP, ORBITZ, LLC, BOOKING.COM B.V., BOOKING HOLDINGS INC. Initial defendants were: TRIVAGO GMBH, BOOKING.COM B.V., GRUPO HOTELERO GRAN CARIBE, CORPORACION DE COMERCIO Y TURISMO INTERNACIONAL CUBANACAN S.A., GRUPO DE TURISMO GAVIOTA S.A., RAUL DOE I-5, AND MARIELA ROE 1-5, [1:19-cv-22619 Southern Florida District; 20-12407 11th Circuit Court of Appeals] BKNG TRVG
Rivero Mestre LLP (plaintiff)
Manuel Vazquez, P.A. (plaintiff)
Baker & McKenzie, PPL (defendant)
Scott Douglass & McConnico (defendant)
Akerman (defendant)
https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2020/10/11/libertad-act-lawsuit-update-4-of-29-cases-on-appeal
Supercalifrazalistic
PLUS+1 29 Lawsuits Filed (11 Certified Claimants & 17 Non-Certified Claimants)
NEWEST ONE :
LUIS MANUEL RODRIGUEZ, MARIA TERESA RODRIGUEZ, a/k/a MARIA TERESA LANDA, ALFREDO RAMON FORNS, RAMON ALBERTO RODRIGUEZ, RAUL LORENZO RODRIGUEZ, CHRISTINA CONROY, and FRANCISCO RAMON RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiffs, v. IMPERIAL BRANDS PLC, CORPORACIÓN HABANOS, S.A., WPP PLC, YOUNG & RUBICAM LLC, and BCW LLC, a/k/a BURSON COHN & WOLFE LLC [1:20-cv-23287; Southern Florida District].
Berenthal & Associates (plaintiff)
Rodriguez Tramont & Nunez (plaintiff)
Nelson Mullins (defendant)
Allen & Overy (defendant)
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr (defendant)
Broad & Cassel (defendant)
Akerman (defendant)
list of the other 28
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/563a4585e4b00d0211e8dd7e/t/5f7f1cbb682e9b7ff3c70321/1602165947990/Libertad+Act+Filing+Statistics.pdf
WILLIAM H. CLAFLIN ET AL V. LAFARGEHOLCIM LTD; INVERSIONES IBERSUIZAS S.A.;
HOLCIM TRADING SA (F/K/A) UNION MARITIMA INTERNACIONAL SA; DE RUITER
OUDERLANDE B.V.; LAS PAILAS DE CEMENTO S.A.U.; and UNKNOWN SUBSIDIARY OF
THE LAFARGEHOLCIM GROUP [1:20-cv-23787; Southern Florida District].
Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP (plaintiff)
Roig Lawyers (plaintiff)
OSVALDO SOTO V. BOOKING.COM B.V. AND BOOKING HOLDINGS INC. [1:20-cv-24044;
Southern Florida District]
Rivero Mestre LLP (plaintiff)
NORTH AMERICAN SUGAR INDUSTRIES INC., V. XINJIANG GOLDWIND SCIENCE &
TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD., GOLDWIND INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS (HK) LTD., DSV AIR
& SEA INC., BBC CHARTERING USA, LLC, and BBC CHARTERING SINGAPORE PTE LTD.,
[1:20-cv-22471; Southern Florida District].
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher (plaintiff)
Mandel & Mandel (plaintiff
Morgan, Lewis & Bochius (defendant)
Akerman (defendant)
Hogan Lovells LLP (defendant)
JOHN S. SHEPARD FAMILY TRUST, THROUGH JOHN S. SHEPARD AND LAWRENCE
JAFFE, AS CO-TRUSTEES, V. NH HOTELS USA, INC., NH HOTEL GROUP, S.A., AND JOLLY
HOTELS U.S.A., INC. [1-19-cv-09026; Southern District New York]. Case dismissed by plaintiff
without prejudice on 26 February 2020.
Aronovitz Law (plaintiff)
Kantrowitz, Goldhamer, & Graifman (plaintiff)
Bracewell (defendant)
Bird & Bird (defendant)
Law Offices of Robert L. Muse (defendant)
SUCESORES DE DON CARLOS NUNEZ Y DONA PURA GALVEZ, INC., BDA BANO NUNEZ
V. SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE, S.A., D/B/A SG AMERICAS, INC.; THE BANK OF NOVA SCOTIA,
D/B/A SCOTIA HOLDINGS (US) INC., A/K/A THE BANK OF NOVA SCOTIA, MIAMI
AGENCY; THE NATIONAL BANK OF CANADA, D/B/A NATIONAL BANK OF CANADA
FINANCIAL GROUP, INC.; AND BANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA ARGENTARIA, S.A., D/B/A
BBVA, USA., [1:19-cv-22842; Southern Florida District]. NOTE: Case transferred to New York
Southern District On 2 February 2020 [1:20-cv-00851]. Current defendants Societe Generale, S.A. and
BNP Paribas, S.A.
Kozyak Tropin & Throckmorton, LLP (plaintiff)
Law Offices Of Paul Sack P.A. (plaintiff)
MoloLamken LLC (plaintiff)
Mayer Brown LLP (defendant)
ReedSmith LLP (defendant)
Astigarraga Davis Mullins & Grossman (defendant)
DIEGO TRINIDAD v. EXPEDIA, INC., HOTELS.COM L.P., HOTELS.COM GP, LLC, ORBITZ,
LLC, BOOKING.COM B.V., BOOKING HOLDINGS INC. [1:19-cv-22629; Southern Florida
District]
Rivero Mestre (plaintiff)
Manuel Vazquez (plaintiff)
Akerman LLP (defendant- Expedia Group, Inc., Expedia, Inc.)
Scott Douglass & McConnico LLP (defendant- terminated 2/12/20))
Baker & McKenzie (defendant- Booking Holdings, Inc., Booking.com B.V.)
MARICELA MATA, ET. AL., V. MELIA HOTELS INTERNATIONAL, S.A., ET AL. [1:19-cv22529; Southern Florida District]. NOTE: On 2 January 2020, thirty-five plaintiffs were dismissed, and
eight defendants were dismissed without prejudice Melia Hotels International, S.A.; Melia Hotels USA
LLC, Trivago GMBH, Grupo Hotelero Gran Caribe, Corporacion de Comercio y Turismo Internacional
Cubanacan S.A.; Grupo de Turismo Gaviota S.A.; Raul Doe 1-5, and Mariela Roe 1-5. The case is now
known as Maricela Mata, et al. v. Expedia, Inc., et. al.
Rivero Mestre LLP (plaintiff)
Manuel Vazquez, P.A. (plaintiff)
Arent Fox (defendant- Melia Hotels)
Coffey Burlington, P.P. (defendant- Melia Hotels)
Akerman LLP (defendant) for Expedia, Inc.; Hotels.com L.P.; Hotels.com GP, LLC; Orbitz, LLC; and
Travelocity.com, LP
Scott Douglass & McConnico LLP (defendant) for Expedia, Inc.; Hotels.com L.P.; Hotels.com GP, LLC;
Orbitz, LLC; and Travelocity.com, LP
Baker & McKenzie LLP (defendant) for Booking Holdings Inc. and Booking.com B.V.
HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION V. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE HOLDINGS, LTD. [1:19-
cv-23591; Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Hogan Lovells US LLP (defendant)
HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION VS. ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD. [1:19-cv-23590;
Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Holland & Knight (defendant)
HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION V. MSC CRUISES SA CO, AND MSC CRUISES (USA) INC.
[1:19-cv-23588; Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Venable (defendant)
HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION VS. CARNIVAL CORPORATION D/B/A/ CARNIVAL
CRUISE LINES [1:19-cv-21724; Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Jones Walker (defendant)
Boies Schiller Flexner LLP (defendant)
Akerman (defendant)
JAVIER GARCIA-BENGOCHEA V. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE HOLDINGS, LTD. [1:19-cv23593; Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Hogan Lovells US LLP (defendant)
JAVIER GARCIA-BENGOCHEA V. CARNIVAL CORPORATION D/B/A/ CARNIVAL CRUISE
LINE, A FOREIGN CORPORATION [1:19-cv-21725 Southern Florida District; 20-12960 11th
Circuit Court of Appeals]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Creed & Gowdy (plaintiff- appellate)
Jones Walker (defendant)
Boies Schiller Flexner LLP (defendant)
Akerman (defendant)
JAVIER GARCIA-BENGOCHEA VS. ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD. [1:19-cv-23592;
Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Holland & Knight (defendant)
ROBERT M. GLEN V. EXPEDIA GROUP, INC., EXPEDIA GROUP, INC., TRIP ADVISOR LLC,
TRIP ADVISOR, INC., ORBITZ, LLC, TRIP NETWORK, INC. D/B/A CHEAPTICKETS,
KAYAK SOFTWARE CORPORATION, BOOKING HOLDINGS, INC., HOTELS.COM GP, LLC,
HOTELS.COM L.P., TRAVELSCAPE LLC D/B/A TRAVELOCITY [1:19-cv-01809; Delaware
District]
Reid Collins & Tsai (plaintiff)
Rosenthal, Monhait & Goddess, P.A. (plaintiff; law firm since closed; replaced by Andrews & Springer)
Ewusiak Law, P.A. (plaintiff)
Andrews & Springer (plaintiff)
Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell (defendant- Booking Holdings & Kayak Software Corporation)
Baker & McKenzie (defendant- Booking Holdings & Kayak Software Corporation)
Scott Douglass & McConnico (defendant- Expedia, Inc.; Expedia Group, Inc.; Hotels.com, L.P.;
Hotels.com GP, LLC; Travelscape LLC d/b/a/ Travelocity; Orbitz, LLC; Trip Network, Inc. d/b/a/ Cheap
Tickets)
Potter Anderson & Corroon (defendant- TripAdvisor)
Ballard Spahr LLP (defendant- Expedia, Inc.; Expedia Group, Inc.; Hotels.com, L.P.; Hotels.com GP, LLC;
Travelscape LLC d/b/a/ Travelocity; Orbitz, LLC; Trip Network, Inc. d/b/a/ Cheap Tickets)
ROBERT M. GLEN V. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., [1:19-cv-23994 Southern Florida District;
4:20-cv-00482-A Transferred To Northern Texas District; 5th Circuit Court of Appeals 20-10903]
Reid Collins & Tsai (plaintiff)
Ewusiak Law, P.A. (plaintiff)
Jones Day (defendant)
Kelly Hart & Hallman LLP (defendant)
ROBERT M. GLEN VS. TRIPADVISOR LLC, TRIPADVISOR, INC., ORBITZ, LLC, TRIP
NETWORK, INC. D/B/A CHEAPTICKETS, KAYAK SOFTWARE CORPORATION, BOOKING
HOLDINGS, INC., EXPEDIA, INC., EXPEDIA GROUP, INC., HOTELS.COM, L.P.,
HOTELS.COM GP, LLC, and TRAVELSCAPE LLC D/B/A TRAVELOCITY [2:19-cv-01683;
Nevada District] On 16 December 2019, plaintiff requested dismissal without prejudice, which was
granted; action consolidated with 1:19-cv-01809 in Delaware District
Rice Reuther Sullivan & Carroll, LLC (plaintiff)
Reid Collins & Tsai LLP (plaintiff)
ROBERT M. GLEN V. EXPEDIA, INC.; EXPEDIA GROUP, INC.; HOTELS.COM, L.P.; AND
HOTELS.COM GP, LLC [2:19-cv-01538; Washington Western District]
Pacifica Law Group LLP (plaintiff)
Reid Collins & Tsai LLP (plaintiff)
ROBERT M. GLEN V. VISA, INC., VISA U.S.A., INC., VISA INTERNATIONAL SERVICE
ASSOCIATION, MASTERCARD INCORPORATED, MASTERCARD INTERNATIONAL
INCORPORATED [1:19-cv-01870; Delaware District]
Reid Collins & Tsai LLP (plaintiff)
Andrews & Springer LLC (plaintiff)
Sidley Austin LLP (defendant- Mastercard)
Akerman (defendant- Visa)
Ballard Shahr LLP (defendant- Visa)
Young, Conaway, Stargatt & Taylor (defendant- Mastercard)
HEREDEROS DE ROBERTO GOMEZ CABRERA, LLC v. TECK RESOURCES LIMITED
[1:20-cv-21630; Southern Florida District]
Hirzel Dreyfuss & Dempsey, PLLC (plaintiff)
Roig & Villarreal, P.A. (plaintiff)
Law Office of David A. Villarreal, P.A. (plaintiff)
EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION V. CORPORACION CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba), CORPRACION
CIMEX, S.A. (Panama), AND UNION CUBA-PETROLEO [1:19-cv-01277; Washington DC]
Steptoe & Johnson (plaintiff)
Rabinowitz, Boudin, Standard, Krinsky & Lieberman, P.C. (defendant)
DANIEL A. GONZALEZ VS. AMAZON.COM, INC., AND SUSSHI INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
D/B/A/ FOGO CHARCOAL [1:19-cv-23988; Southern Florida District]
Cueto Law Group, P.L. (plaintiff)
Wicker Smith O’Hara McCoy & Ford (defendant- Susshi International)
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius (defendant- Amazon)
MARIO ECHEVARRIA, ESTHER SANCHEZ, CONSUELO CUEVAS, AND CARMEN
FLORIDO V. EXPEDIA, INC., TRIVAGO GMBLJ, A GERMAN LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANY, BOOKING.COM B.V., A DUTCH LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, GRUPO
HOTELERO GRAN CARIBE, CORPORACION DE COMERCIO Y TURISMO
INTERNACIONAL CUBANACAN S.A., GRUPO DE TURISMO GAVIOTA S.A., RAUL DOE 1-5,
AND MARIELA ROE 1-5, [1:19-cv-22620; Southern Florida District]
Rivero Mestre LLP (plaintiff)
Manuel Vazquez, P.A. (plaintiff)
Baker & McKenzie (defendant- Booking Holdings, Inc., Booking.com B.V.)
Scott Douglas & McConnico LLP (defendant- Expedia, Inc., Hotels.com GP, LLC, Hotels.com L.P.,
Orbitz, LLC)
Akerman LLP (defendant- Expedia, Inc., Hotels,com GP, LLC, Hotels.com L.P., Orbitz, LLC)
MARIO ECHEVARRIA, ESTHER SANCHEZ, CONSUELO CUEVAS, AND CARMEN
FLORIDO V. EXPEDIA, INC., HOTELS.COM L.P., HOTELS.COM GP, LLC, ORBITZ, LLC,
BOOKING.COM B.V., AND BOOKING HOLDINGS, INC. Initial defendants were: TRIVAGO
GMBH, BOOKING.COM B.V., GRUPO HOTELERO GRAN CARIBE, CORPORACION DE
COMERCIO Y TURISMO INTERNACIONAL CUBANACAN S.A., GRUPO DE TURISMO GAVIOTA
S.A., RAUL DOE I-5, AND MARIELA ROE 1-5, [1:19-cv-22621; Southern Florida District]
Rivero Mestre LLP (plaintiff)
Manuel Vazquez, P.A. (plaintiff)
Baker & McKenzie, LLP (defendant- Booking Holdings, Booking.com. B.A.)
MARIO DEL VALLE, ENRIQUE FALLA, MARIO ECHEVARRIA V. EXPEDIA, INC.,
HOTELS.COM L.P., HOTELS.COM GP, ORBITZ, LLC, BOOKING.COM B.V., BOOKING
HOLDINGS INC. Initial defendants were: TRIVAGO GMBH, BOOKING.COM B.V., GRUPO
HOTELERO GRAN CARIBE, CORPORACION DE COMERCIO Y TURISMO INTERNACIONAL
CUBANACAN S.A., GRUPO DE TURISMO GAVIOTA S.A., RAUL DOE I-5, AND MARIELA ROE
1-5, [1:19-cv-22619 Southern Florida District; 20-12407 11th Circuit Court of Appeals]
Rivero Mestre LLP (plaintiff)
Manuel Vazquez, P.A. (plaintiff)
Baker & McKenzie, PPL (defendant)
Scott Douglass & McConnico (defendant)
Akerman (defendant)
JOSE RAMON LOPEZ REGUEIRO V. AMERICAN AIRLINES INC. AND LATAM AIRLINES
GROUP, S.A. [1:19-cv-23965; Southern Florida District]
Rivero Mestre LLP (plaintiff)
Manuel Vazquez, P.A. (plaintiff)
Jones Day (defendant)
Akerman (defendant)
MARIA DOLORES CANTO MARTI, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATES
OF DOLORES MARTI MERCADE AND FERNANDO CANTO BORY V. IBEROSTAR
HOTELES Y APARTAMENTOS SL [1:20-cv-20078; Southern Florida District]
Zumpano Patricios P.A. (plaintiff)
Bird & Bird (defendant)
Holland & Knight (defendant)
MARLENE CUETO IGLESIAS AND MARIAM IGLESIAS ALVAREZ V. PERNOD RICARD
[1:20-cv-20157; Southern Florida District]
IPS Legal Group, P.A. (plaintiff)
Law Offices of Andre G. Raikhelson LLC (plaintiff)
Ainsworth & Clancy PLLC (plaintiff)
Carlton Fields P.A. (defendant)
Carlton Fields Jorden Burt, P.A. (defendant)
Supercalifrazalistic
28 Lawsuits Filed (11 Certified Claimants & 17 Non-Certified Claimants)
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/563a4585e4b00d0211e8dd7e/t/5f7f1cbb682e9b7ff3c70321/1602165947990/Libertad+Act+Filing+Statistics.pdf
WILLIAM H. CLAFLIN ET AL V. LAFARGEHOLCIM LTD; INVERSIONES IBERSUIZAS S.A.;
HOLCIM TRADING SA (F/K/A) UNION MARITIMA INTERNACIONAL SA; DE RUITER
OUDERLANDE B.V.; LAS PAILAS DE CEMENTO S.A.U.; and UNKNOWN SUBSIDIARY OF
THE LAFARGEHOLCIM GROUP [1:20-cv-23787; Southern Florida District].
Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP (plaintiff)
Roig Lawyers (plaintiff)
OSVALDO SOTO V. BOOKING.COM B.V. AND BOOKING HOLDINGS INC. [1:20-cv-24044;
Southern Florida District]
Rivero Mestre LLP (plaintiff)
NORTH AMERICAN SUGAR INDUSTRIES INC., V. XINJIANG GOLDWIND SCIENCE &
TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD., GOLDWIND INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS (HK) LTD., DSV AIR
& SEA INC., BBC CHARTERING USA, LLC, and BBC CHARTERING SINGAPORE PTE LTD.,
[1:20-cv-22471; Southern Florida District].
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher (plaintiff)
Mandel & Mandel (plaintiff
Morgan, Lewis & Bochius (defendant)
Akerman (defendant)
Hogan Lovells LLP (defendant)
JOHN S. SHEPARD FAMILY TRUST, THROUGH JOHN S. SHEPARD AND LAWRENCE
JAFFE, AS CO-TRUSTEES, V. NH HOTELS USA, INC., NH HOTEL GROUP, S.A., AND JOLLY
HOTELS U.S.A., INC. [1-19-cv-09026; Southern District New York]. Case dismissed by plaintiff
without prejudice on 26 February 2020.
Aronovitz Law (plaintiff)
Kantrowitz, Goldhamer, & Graifman (plaintiff)
Bracewell (defendant)
Bird & Bird (defendant)
Law Offices of Robert L. Muse (defendant)
SUCESORES DE DON CARLOS NUNEZ Y DONA PURA GALVEZ, INC., BDA BANO NUNEZ
V. SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE, S.A., D/B/A SG AMERICAS, INC.; THE BANK OF NOVA SCOTIA,
D/B/A SCOTIA HOLDINGS (US) INC., A/K/A THE BANK OF NOVA SCOTIA, MIAMI
AGENCY; THE NATIONAL BANK OF CANADA, D/B/A NATIONAL BANK OF CANADA
FINANCIAL GROUP, INC.; AND BANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA ARGENTARIA, S.A., D/B/A
BBVA, USA., [1:19-cv-22842; Southern Florida District]. NOTE: Case transferred to New York
Southern District On 2 February 2020 [1:20-cv-00851]. Current defendants Societe Generale, S.A. and
BNP Paribas, S.A.
Kozyak Tropin & Throckmorton, LLP (plaintiff)
Law Offices Of Paul Sack P.A. (plaintiff)
MoloLamken LLC (plaintiff)
Mayer Brown LLP (defendant)
ReedSmith LLP (defendant)
Astigarraga Davis Mullins & Grossman (defendant)
DIEGO TRINIDAD v. EXPEDIA, INC., HOTELS.COM L.P., HOTELS.COM GP, LLC, ORBITZ,
LLC, BOOKING.COM B.V., BOOKING HOLDINGS INC. [1:19-cv-22629; Southern Florida
District]
Rivero Mestre (plaintiff)
Manuel Vazquez (plaintiff)
Akerman LLP (defendant- Expedia Group, Inc., Expedia, Inc.)
Scott Douglass & McConnico LLP (defendant- terminated 2/12/20))
Baker & McKenzie (defendant- Booking Holdings, Inc., Booking.com B.V.)
MARICELA MATA, ET. AL., V. MELIA HOTELS INTERNATIONAL, S.A., ET AL. [1:19-cv22529; Southern Florida District]. NOTE: On 2 January 2020, thirty-five plaintiffs were dismissed, and
eight defendants were dismissed without prejudice Melia Hotels International, S.A.; Melia Hotels USA
LLC, Trivago GMBH, Grupo Hotelero Gran Caribe, Corporacion de Comercio y Turismo Internacional
Cubanacan S.A.; Grupo de Turismo Gaviota S.A.; Raul Doe 1-5, and Mariela Roe 1-5. The case is now
known as Maricela Mata, et al. v. Expedia, Inc., et. al.
Rivero Mestre LLP (plaintiff)
Manuel Vazquez, P.A. (plaintiff)
Arent Fox (defendant- Melia Hotels)
Coffey Burlington, P.P. (defendant- Melia Hotels)
Akerman LLP (defendant) for Expedia, Inc.; Hotels.com L.P.; Hotels.com GP, LLC; Orbitz, LLC; and
Travelocity.com, LP
Scott Douglass & McConnico LLP (defendant) for Expedia, Inc.; Hotels.com L.P.; Hotels.com GP, LLC;
Orbitz, LLC; and Travelocity.com, LP
Baker & McKenzie LLP (defendant) for Booking Holdings Inc. and Booking.com B.V.
HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION V. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE HOLDINGS, LTD. [1:19-
cv-23591; Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Hogan Lovells US LLP (defendant)
HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION VS. ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD. [1:19-cv-23590;
Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Holland & Knight (defendant)
HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION V. MSC CRUISES SA CO, AND MSC CRUISES (USA) INC.
[1:19-cv-23588; Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Venable (defendant)
HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION VS. CARNIVAL CORPORATION D/B/A/ CARNIVAL
CRUISE LINES [1:19-cv-21724; Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Jones Walker (defendant)
Boies Schiller Flexner LLP (defendant)
Akerman (defendant)
JAVIER GARCIA-BENGOCHEA V. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE HOLDINGS, LTD. [1:19-cv23593; Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Hogan Lovells US LLP (defendant)
JAVIER GARCIA-BENGOCHEA V. CARNIVAL CORPORATION D/B/A/ CARNIVAL CRUISE
LINE, A FOREIGN CORPORATION [1:19-cv-21725 Southern Florida District; 20-12960 11th
Circuit Court of Appeals]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Creed & Gowdy (plaintiff- appellate)
Jones Walker (defendant)
Boies Schiller Flexner LLP (defendant)
Akerman (defendant)
JAVIER GARCIA-BENGOCHEA VS. ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD. [1:19-cv-23592;
Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Holland & Knight (defendant)
ROBERT M. GLEN V. EXPEDIA GROUP, INC., EXPEDIA GROUP, INC., TRIP ADVISOR LLC,
TRIP ADVISOR, INC., ORBITZ, LLC, TRIP NETWORK, INC. D/B/A CHEAPTICKETS,
KAYAK SOFTWARE CORPORATION, BOOKING HOLDINGS, INC., HOTELS.COM GP, LLC,
HOTELS.COM L.P., TRAVELSCAPE LLC D/B/A TRAVELOCITY [1:19-cv-01809; Delaware
District]
Reid Collins & Tsai (plaintiff)
Rosenthal, Monhait & Goddess, P.A. (plaintiff; law firm since closed; replaced by Andrews & Springer)
Ewusiak Law, P.A. (plaintiff)
Andrews & Springer (plaintiff)
Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell (defendant- Booking Holdings & Kayak Software Corporation)
Baker & McKenzie (defendant- Booking Holdings & Kayak Software Corporation)
Scott Douglass & McConnico (defendant- Expedia, Inc.; Expedia Group, Inc.; Hotels.com, L.P.;
Hotels.com GP, LLC; Travelscape LLC d/b/a/ Travelocity; Orbitz, LLC; Trip Network, Inc. d/b/a/ Cheap
Tickets)
Potter Anderson & Corroon (defendant- TripAdvisor)
Ballard Spahr LLP (defendant- Expedia, Inc.; Expedia Group, Inc.; Hotels.com, L.P.; Hotels.com GP, LLC;
Travelscape LLC d/b/a/ Travelocity; Orbitz, LLC; Trip Network, Inc. d/b/a/ Cheap Tickets)
ROBERT M. GLEN V. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., [1:19-cv-23994 Southern Florida District;
4:20-cv-00482-A Transferred To Northern Texas District; 5th Circuit Court of Appeals 20-10903]
Reid Collins & Tsai (plaintiff)
Ewusiak Law, P.A. (plaintiff)
Jones Day (defendant)
Kelly Hart & Hallman LLP (defendant)
ROBERT M. GLEN VS. TRIPADVISOR LLC, TRIPADVISOR, INC., ORBITZ, LLC, TRIP
NETWORK, INC. D/B/A CHEAPTICKETS, KAYAK SOFTWARE CORPORATION, BOOKING
HOLDINGS, INC., EXPEDIA, INC., EXPEDIA GROUP, INC., HOTELS.COM, L.P.,
HOTELS.COM GP, LLC, and TRAVELSCAPE LLC D/B/A TRAVELOCITY [2:19-cv-01683;
Nevada District] On 16 December 2019, plaintiff requested dismissal without prejudice, which was
granted; action consolidated with 1:19-cv-01809 in Delaware District
Rice Reuther Sullivan & Carroll, LLC (plaintiff)
Reid Collins & Tsai LLP (plaintiff)
ROBERT M. GLEN V. EXPEDIA, INC.; EXPEDIA GROUP, INC.; HOTELS.COM, L.P.; AND
HOTELS.COM GP, LLC [2:19-cv-01538; Washington Western District]
Pacifica Law Group LLP (plaintiff)
Reid Collins & Tsai LLP (plaintiff)
ROBERT M. GLEN V. VISA, INC., VISA U.S.A., INC., VISA INTERNATIONAL SERVICE
ASSOCIATION, MASTERCARD INCORPORATED, MASTERCARD INTERNATIONAL
INCORPORATED [1:19-cv-01870; Delaware District]
Reid Collins & Tsai LLP (plaintiff)
Andrews & Springer LLC (plaintiff)
Sidley Austin LLP (defendant- Mastercard)
Akerman (defendant- Visa)
Ballard Shahr LLP (defendant- Visa)
Young, Conaway, Stargatt & Taylor (defendant- Mastercard)
HEREDEROS DE ROBERTO GOMEZ CABRERA, LLC v. TECK RESOURCES LIMITED
[1:20-cv-21630; Southern Florida District]
Hirzel Dreyfuss & Dempsey, PLLC (plaintiff)
Roig & Villarreal, P.A. (plaintiff)
Law Office of David A. Villarreal, P.A. (plaintiff)
EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION V. CORPORACION CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba), CORPRACION
CIMEX, S.A. (Panama), AND UNION CUBA-PETROLEO [1:19-cv-01277; Washington DC]
Steptoe & Johnson (plaintiff)
Rabinowitz, Boudin, Standard, Krinsky & Lieberman, P.C. (defendant)
DANIEL A. GONZALEZ VS. AMAZON.COM, INC., AND SUSSHI INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
D/B/A/ FOGO CHARCOAL [1:19-cv-23988; Southern Florida District]
Cueto Law Group, P.L. (plaintiff)
Wicker Smith O’Hara McCoy & Ford (defendant- Susshi International)
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius (defendant- Amazon)
MARIO ECHEVARRIA, ESTHER SANCHEZ, CONSUELO CUEVAS, AND CARMEN
FLORIDO V. EXPEDIA, INC., TRIVAGO GMBLJ, A GERMAN LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANY, BOOKING.COM B.V., A DUTCH LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, GRUPO
HOTELERO GRAN CARIBE, CORPORACION DE COMERCIO Y TURISMO
INTERNACIONAL CUBANACAN S.A., GRUPO DE TURISMO GAVIOTA S.A., RAUL DOE 1-5,
AND MARIELA ROE 1-5, [1:19-cv-22620; Southern Florida District]
Rivero Mestre LLP (plaintiff)
Manuel Vazquez, P.A. (plaintiff)
Baker & McKenzie (defendant- Booking Holdings, Inc., Booking.com B.V.)
Scott Douglas & McConnico LLP (defendant- Expedia, Inc., Hotels.com GP, LLC, Hotels.com L.P.,
Orbitz, LLC)
Akerman LLP (defendant- Expedia, Inc., Hotels,com GP, LLC, Hotels.com L.P., Orbitz, LLC)
MARIO ECHEVARRIA, ESTHER SANCHEZ, CONSUELO CUEVAS, AND CARMEN
FLORIDO V. EXPEDIA, INC., HOTELS.COM L.P., HOTELS.COM GP, LLC, ORBITZ, LLC,
BOOKING.COM B.V., AND BOOKING HOLDINGS, INC. Initial defendants were: TRIVAGO
GMBH, BOOKING.COM B.V., GRUPO HOTELERO GRAN CARIBE, CORPORACION DE
COMERCIO Y TURISMO INTERNACIONAL CUBANACAN S.A., GRUPO DE TURISMO GAVIOTA
S.A., RAUL DOE I-5, AND MARIELA ROE 1-5, [1:19-cv-22621; Southern Florida District]
Rivero Mestre LLP (plaintiff)
Manuel Vazquez, P.A. (plaintiff)
Baker & McKenzie, LLP (defendant- Booking Holdings, Booking.com. B.A.)
MARIO DEL VALLE, ENRIQUE FALLA, MARIO ECHEVARRIA V. EXPEDIA, INC.,
HOTELS.COM L.P., HOTELS.COM GP, ORBITZ, LLC, BOOKING.COM B.V., BOOKING
HOLDINGS INC. Initial defendants were: TRIVAGO GMBH, BOOKING.COM B.V., GRUPO
HOTELERO GRAN CARIBE, CORPORACION DE COMERCIO Y TURISMO INTERNACIONAL
CUBANACAN S.A., GRUPO DE TURISMO GAVIOTA S.A., RAUL DOE I-5, AND MARIELA ROE
1-5, [1:19-cv-22619 Southern Florida District; 20-12407 11th Circuit Court of Appeals]
Rivero Mestre LLP (plaintiff)
Manuel Vazquez, P.A. (plaintiff)
Baker & McKenzie, PPL (defendant)
Scott Douglass & McConnico (defendant)
Akerman (defendant)
JOSE RAMON LOPEZ REGUEIRO V. AMERICAN AIRLINES INC. AND LATAM AIRLINES
GROUP, S.A. [1:19-cv-23965; Southern Florida District]
Rivero Mestre LLP (plaintiff)
Manuel Vazquez, P.A. (plaintiff)
Jones Day (defendant)
Akerman (defendant)
MARIA DOLORES CANTO MARTI, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATES
OF DOLORES MARTI MERCADE AND FERNANDO CANTO BORY V. IBEROSTAR
HOTELES Y APARTAMENTOS SL [1:20-cv-20078; Southern Florida District]
Zumpano Patricios P.A. (plaintiff)
Bird & Bird (defendant)
Holland & Knight (defendant)
MARLENE CUETO IGLESIAS AND MARIAM IGLESIAS ALVAREZ V. PERNOD RICARD
[1:20-cv-20157; Southern Florida District]
IPS Legal Group, P.A. (plaintiff)
Law Offices of Andre G. Raikhelson LLC (plaintiff)
Ainsworth & Clancy PLLC (plaintiff)
Carlton Fields P.A. (defendant)
Carlton Fields Jorden Burt, P.A. (defendant)
Supercalifrazalistic
the original claim FCSC Certified
Claim NOo CU©1393
Claim NOo CU~1394
Claim NOo CU~1395
Claim NOo CU=1396
Claim NOo CU~1397
Decision No° CU©3836
Compania Azucarera Soledad, S.A. Former Sugar Operations
https://www.justice.gov/fcsc/cuba/documents/1-1500/1393-1394-1395-1396-1397.pdf
LafargeHolcim Of Switzerland Sued For US$270+ Million By Certified Claimant In Libertad Act Lawsuit
October 07, 2020
$3B after interest and trebling
https://www.pacermonitor.com/public/case/36228448/Claflin_et_al_v_LafargeHolcim_Ltd_et_al
Excerpts From Complaint
the Floor is now $.5B the lowest rock bottom value this will ever have ....
https://www.otcmarkets.com/stock/FRAZ/security
transfer agent: computershare
Outstanding: 574,484 10/05/2020
and the meter is running ticking up up up
How Cheap is Cheap time will reveal Bookmark this page ....
Go FRAZ Go GO GO
SECI PCHM VERI Good!
Booking.com & Booking Holdings Again Defendants In Another Libertad Act Lawsuit: "Copacabana Hotel"
October 07, 2020 BKNG
https://www.pacermonitor.com/public/case/36534350/Soto_v_Bookingcom_BV_et_al
https://dockets.justia.com/docket/florida/flsdce/1:2020cv24044/578998
Excerpts From Complaint
The Soto family owned several business ventures throughout Cuba, including the famous oceanfront Copacabana Hotel2 “Copacabana”), located at Avenida Primera between 44 and 46 streets, in Havana, Cuba. The Copacabana was inaugurated in 1955, and after Fidel Castro seized power and established a communist government in Cuba in 1959, the Copacabana was confiscated along with the Soto family’s other properties and business ventures in 1961. This forced the Soto family to flee their native country to the United States.
After seizing the Copacabana from the Soto family, the Cuban government, together with Be Live Hotels S.L. and the defendants, exploited and benefitted from the Copacabana for decades without the consent of the Soto family and without paying them any compensation whatsoever. Defendants continue to offer the Copacabana to Floridians3 through their interactive websites, emails directly targeting Floridians, marketing campaigns in Florida, and through work done in their Florida offices. Osvaldo N. Soto now sues to right the defendants’ unlawful trafficking in his property and for just compensation.
On November 22, 2019, Soto informed defendants of his intent to commence an action unless defendants ceased to traffic the Copacabana. See Composite Exhibit D. Despite being on actual notice, defendants continued to market and make reservations at the Copacabana on their websites for their economic benefit.
26. Soto was not eligible to file a claim with the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission under Title V of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 (22 U.S.C. § 1643, et seq.), because he was not a U.S. citizen when the Copacabana was confiscated.
27. The Copacabana has not been the subject of a certified claim under Title V of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 (22 U.S.C. § 1643 et seq.).
28. Soto has been injured by defendants’ trafficking in the Copacabana without his permission and without paying him any compensation.
FRAZ Up UP UP....
PCHM SECI
LafargeHolcim Of Switzerland Sued For US$270+ Million By Certified Claimant In Libertad Act Lawsuit
October 07, 2020
https://www.pacermonitor.com/public/case/36228448/Claflin_et_al_v_LafargeHolcim_Ltd_et_al
Excerpts From Complaint
Plaintiffs bring this action to recover treble damages, interest, costs, and attorneys’ fees under the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6021, et seq. (the “Helms-Burton Act”) against Defendants LafargeHolcim, De Ruiter, Las Pailas, and the Unknown Subsidiary for trafficking in property which was confiscated by the Cuban Government on or after January 1, 1959 and as to which Plaintiffs own 100% of the claims as certified by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (“FCSC”).
Cuba converted the Confiscated Soledad Property into the Carlos Marx cement plant, which utilizes and benefits from the Confiscated Soledad Property, including its rivers, railroads, limestone, and other infrastructure.
11. Defendants used a complex web of shell entities and transactions designed, until very recently, to conceal the fact that LafargeHolcim has partially owned and operated and profited from the Carlos Marx cement plant in partnership with the Cuban government since 2000.
Plaintiffs, who now own the FCSC Certified Claims to the Confiscated Soledad Property, seek treble money damages, interest, costs, and attorneys’ fees against certain Defendants for trafficking in the Confiscated Soledad Property as defined by the Helms-Burton Act.
The clear and convincing evidence demonstrates that the current fair market value of the Confiscated Soledad Property is greater than the amount of the FCSC Certified Claims plus interest. Therefore, Plaintiffs are entitled to recover the current fair market value of the property, which is estimated to be $270 million, plus attorneys’ fees, interest, and costs.
In fact, in 2000, prior to LafargeHolcim’s (then known as Holderbank) investment in Cuba, LafargeHolcim sought legal advice from a U.S. law firm about the effect of the Helms-Burton Act and the FCSC Certified Claims on its then potential investment in, modernization of, and management of the Carlos Marx cement plant. LafargeHolcim’s U.S. law firm advised that investing in the cement plant without obtaining the authorization of the persons holding the FCSC Certified Claims would subject it to liability under the Helms-Burton Act. The U.S. law firm also advised LafargeHolcim that LafargeHolcim should not try to conceal its trafficking through the use of various corporate structures, for any such attempted concealment would not avoid said liability.
21. Contrary to its U.S. law firm’s advice, LafargeHolcim proceeded to traffic, knowingly and intentionally, in the Confiscated Soledad Property by affiliating with, using, and conspiring with the other Defendants to create and maintain a complex web of corporate structures, shell companies, and alliances designed to conceal, until recently, LafargeHolcim’s investment in and trafficking in the Confiscated Soledad Property.
22. Since 2000, LafargeHolcim has trafficked, knowingly and intentionally, in the Confiscated Soledad Property, seemingly confident that it would not be held accountable for its trafficking in any U.S. court. But LafargeHolcim has purposefully availed itself and sought the protection of the U.S. legal system, even as it took active steps to evade that system, including by filing a civil complaint in federal court and admitting on the record in that lawsuit that it, i.e., Defendant LafargeHolcim Ltd, which is based in Switzerland: (a) has extensive business operations in the United States, (b) is the United States’ leading cement producer, (c) offers waste management services in numerous cities throughout the United States, (d) recovers and recycles waste through co-processing at service locations across North America, and (e) has reached a significant number of consumers in the United States.
Oct7,2020Standing Helms-Burton Title III Matters
THIS SAY>> MEDIATION October 06, 2020 https://www.pacermonitor.com/public/case/28050396/Havana_Docks_Corporation_v_Carnival_Corporation
Mediator
Hon. Herbert Stettin
5401 Hammock Drive
Coral Gables, FL 33156
Havana Docks Corporation v. Carnival Corporation
Florida Southern District Court
Judge: Beth Bloom
Referred: Chris M Mcaliley
Case #: 1:19-cv-21724
Nature of Suit 890 Other Statutes - Other Statutory Actions
Cause 22:6082 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996
Go FRAZcisco Kid
PCHM
ADD another $6M into the growing heaping pile of cash that has been collected due to the Helms Burton Act [link] that can easily be used to compensate partially the victims[link] of the illegal taking of US nationals property
OFAC Enters $5,864,860 Settlement with Generali Global Assistance, Inc. for Apparent Violations of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations
October 01, 2020
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/gga_web_posting_10012020.pdf
https://www.advfn.com/stock-market/BIT/G/stock-price
FRAZadoodle
https://www.advfn.com/stock-market/BIT/G/stock-news/83381536/travel-services-provider-fined-5-9-million-for-cu
Next-Move-puts Title IV into Overdrive
just warming up this is just screen 1 of act 1 want see the whole show
as an example of how it might be used any country that allows travel to CUBA can be considered for exclusion from the U.S. denied access to second homes businesses visits ect.
putting the feet to the fire what would you rather support corruption or the free world personally I think the answer is simple
Helms–Burton Act
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Helms%E2%80%93Burton_Act
Summary
Title I strengthened sanctions against the current Cuban Government. Among many other provisions, it codified the U.S. embargo on trade and financial transactions which had been in effect pursuant to a Presidential proclamation since the Kennedy Administration.
Title II describes U.S. policy toward and assistance to a free and independent Cuba. It required the President to produce a plan for providing economic assistance to a transition or democratic government in Cuba. (The President delivered the plan to Congress in January 1997.)
Title III creates a private cause of action and authorizes U.S. nationals with claims to confiscated property in Cuba to file suit in U.S. courts against persons that may be "trafficking" in that property. The filing fee for the Title III action is set by US Courts at $6,458 (from December 2016),[7] a level that would discourage all but serious claims. The Act grants the President the authority to suspend the lawsuit provisions for periods of up to 6 months if it is necessary to the national interest of the United States and will expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba. Successive presidents have exercised this authority, most recently in June 2018,[8] pursuant to a non-binding declaration of intention in April 1997 that came out of a trade dispute with the European Union.[9] In 2019 President Trump allowed the suspension to expire, and Carnival Cruise was promptly sued under the act.[10]
Title IV requires the denial of visas to and exclusion from the U.S. of persons who, after March 12, 1996, confiscate or "traffic" in confiscated property in Cuba claimed by U.S. nationals. The objective of this provision is to protect the status of confiscated U.S. property and to support existing sanctions against the current regime. The State Department reviews a broad range of economic activity in Cuba to determine the applicability of Title IV. The results of this effort appear not only in the actual determinations of "trafficking," but also in the deterrent to investment in confiscated U.S. property and in the exacerbation of the uncertainty of investing in Cuba.[11]
Supercalifrazalistic
Update https://www.pacermonitor.com/public/case/28055647/EXXON_MOBIL_CORPORATION_v_CORPORACION_CIMEX_SA_et_al
Exxon Mobil Responds With 1,452 Pages To Cuba In Libertad Act Lawsuit
September 29, 2020
EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION v. CORPORACION CIMEX S.A. et al
District Of Columbia District Court
Judge: Amit P Mehta
Case #: 1:19-cv-01277
Nature of Suit 890 Other Statutes - Other Statutory Actions
Cause 28:1331 Fed. Question
Case Filed: May 02, 2019
Excerpts From Filing:
Congress did not intend Plaintiff’s claims to be barred by the FSIA. Section 302(c) of Title III states, “[e]xcept as provided in this chapter, provisions of Title 28 [which includes the FSIA] and the rules of the courts of the United States apply to actions under this section to the same extent as such provisions and rules apply to any other action brought under Section 1331 of title 28.” 22 U.S.C. § 6082(c)(1) (emphasis added).11 Thus, the FSIA applies only so long as it does not conflict with Title III, in which case Title III must control as Congress directed.12 Janko v. Gates, 741 F.3d 136, 139-40 (D.C. Cir. 2014). This conclusion accords with Congress’s finding that trafficking has direct effects in the U.S., 22 U.S.C. §§ 6081(2), (6), which satisfies the requirements for subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA and the personal jurisdiction requirements of this Court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(b), 1605(a)(2).
Defendants admit they are trafficking in the Confiscated Property. They admit that they use and benefit from the Confiscated Property through various commercial activities that supply Cuba’s domestic market for energy and petroleum products and that procure U.S. dollars and acquire U.S. products to sustain the Cuban economy. Measured in dollars, these commercial activities amount to billions in transactions annually. It is clear just from this introductory summary that Plaintiff has standing to bring these claims.
Defendants’ attempts to avoid liability fall flat. Their premise is that, notwithstanding sixty years of communist tyranny, Cuban entities operate independently; this is preposterous. Facing clear liability, Defendants argue sovereign immunity. But it is unavailable here for three reasons.
First, Title III expressly authorizes private civil suits in federal courts against “any person” including “any agency or instrumentality of a foreign state.” See 22 U.S.C. §§ 6023(1), (11). Title III’s exception to sovereign immunity for trafficking by state-owned entities is well founded in Congress’s findings that trafficking has direct effects on U.S. nationals in the U.S. See id. § 6081. Moreover, Congress mandated that Title III must be given priority over any potentially conflicting provisions, including the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”). See id. § 6082(c)(1).
Second, even if Title III did not include an express exception to immunity (which it does), the direct effects of trafficking would satisfy the commercial activity exception under the FSIA for activities that “cause[] a direct effect in the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). It is undisputed that the confiscated refinery and processing facilities are used for oil exploration and production of refined products that are then sold via a network of service stations in Cuba, which includes confiscated service stations operated by CIMEX and CUPET. Additionally, CUPET uses the Confiscated Property in oil exploration joint ventures with energy companies that compete directly with Plaintiff and other U.S. companies, and CUPET admits it has travelled to the U.S. to engage in lobbying and other activities to promote and facilitate its oil exploration work.
Third, because some of Defendants’ commercial activities are conducted in the U.S., the FSIA’s expropriation exception is also satisfied. See id. § 1605(a)(3). The first requirement—that Plaintiff’s claim relates to “rights in property taken in violation of international law”—is met because Plaintiff’s claim is based on Defendants’ trafficking in property that was unlawfully expropriated. The second requirement is satisfied because that property “is owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality”—here the Defendants. And the third requirement is also satisfied because “that agency or instrumentality [the Defendants] is engaged in a commercial activity in the United States” as explained in detail below. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss should be denied, or if necessary, jurisdictional discovery should be conducted.1
Plaintiff Exxon Mobil Corporation’s action fits squarely within the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (“LIBERTAD”)—also known as the Helms Burton Act. LIBERTAD was essentially designed to remedy the wrongs set forth in Plaintiff’s complaint. Defendants’ efforts to deny liability are nothing more than lawyerly ploys to avoid the obvious—Defendants continue to use and enjoy Plaintiff’s confiscated property without any compensation to (or authorization from) Plaintiff for over half a century.
Page 58- Any Juridical Separateness Should Be Disregarded to Prevent Injustice
“[T]he doctrine of corporate entity, recognized generally and for most purposes, will not be regarded when to do so would work fraud or injustice.” Bancec, 462 U.S. at 629. The exception applies in cases “where a foreign sovereign intentionally seeks to gain a benefit while using the legally separate status of its instrumentality as a shield to guard against concomitant costs or risks . . . where a sovereign otherwise unjustly enriches itself through the instrumentality . . . or where a sovereign uses its instrumentality to defeat a statutory policy.” DRC, Inc., 71 F. Supp. 3d at 218.
It is undisputed that Cuba profits from the commercial activities of CUPET and CIMEX and that some of those activities involve use of Plaintiff’s Confiscated Property, which violates Title III and the policy of “deny[ing] traffickers any profits from” economic exploitation of the Confiscated Property. See 22 U.S.C. § 6081(11). Defendants are tools of the Cuban State (Evora Decl. ¶¶ 24-25), and it would be unjust to allow Cuba to benefit from the ongoing violation of U.S. laws by Defendants, while hiding behind a façade of juridical separateness.
Page 59- Regardless, Defendants Have Minimum Contacts with the United States
As discussed, Defendants have minimum contacts by virtue of their commercial activities involving the U.S. and U.S. entities. Supra Section III(B)(2)(b). Personal jurisdiction is conferred on this Court so long as it “is consistent with the United States Constitution and laws.” Fed R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2)(B). In this Circuit, personal jurisdiction “turns on whether a defendant has sufficient contacts with the nation as a whole to satisfy due process,” which is the case when a defendant “purposefully directed” its activities at residents of the U.S., even if there is no physical conduct in the U.S.
Page 60- Defendants’ Motion for a More Definite Statement Should Be Denied
Defendants’ one-sentence “motion” (Mot. at 60) is insufficient to support a motion. Regardless, it is unnecessary since Defendants know what property was confiscated and how it is used. See Feldman v. C.I.A., 797 F. Supp. 2d 29, 42 (D.D.C. 2011).
Supercalifrazalistc
XOM
https://www.state.gov/addition-to-the-cuba-restricted-list/ President Trump has made it clear that he stands with the Cuban people in their longstanding struggle for freedom and against the communist regime in Havana. Adding AIS to the Cuba Restricted List furthers the Administration’s goal of preventing the Cuban military from controlling and benefiting from the flow of remittances that should instead benefit the Cuban people. The people should be able to receive funds from their family abroad without having to line the pockets of their oppressors.
Supercalifrazalistic
Wow Deet another great find. Hope the current administration retains control? Would hate to see these regs undone by a pro Castro regime.
AIS Financial Services In Cuba Sanctioned By U.S. Department Of State Due To Connection With Military
September 28, 2020
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1134
Treasury Amends Regulations to Restrict Revenue Sources to the Cuban Regime
September 23, 2020
SupercaliFRAZalistic
It’s going to happen'
— Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) September 23, 2020
This A Huge Big DEAL!! Mr. Mauricio Claver-Carone appointed to a five-year term as President of the forty-eight member Washington DC-based Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) September 16, 2020 https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2020/9/16/umrmpy25eigphg40xo7hm58spoljkc
Sept Update: Sucesores de Don Carlos Nunez y Dona Pura Galvez, Inc. v. Societe Generale, S.A.
https://www.pacermonitor.com/public/case/32146453/Sucesores_de_Don_Carlos_Nunez_y_Dona_Pura_Galvez,_Inc_v_Societe_Generale,_SA
100X Original Amount X5 of them 500X Original amount?
BBVA SCGLY BNPQY these 3 may have already made settlements NTIOF BNS ??? settlement[link]
Havana Docks Corporation v. Carnival Corporation (1:19-cv-21724)
Courts > Florida Southern District Court
Filed: May 01, 2019
Judge: Beth Bloom
Nature of Suit: Other Statutes - Other Statutory Actions
Cause: 22:6082 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996
Parties Matched: Havana Docks Corporation v. Carnival Corporation CCL
https://www.pacermonitor.com/public/case/28050396/Havana_Docks_Corporation_v_Carnival_Corporation
Havana Docks Corporation v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, LTD. (1:19-cv-23590)
Courts > Florida Southern District Court
Filed: Aug 27, 2019
Judge: Beth Bloom
Nature of Suit: Other Statutes - Other Statutory Actions
Cause: 22:6082 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996
Parties Matched: Havana Docks Corporation v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, LTD. RCL
https://www.pacermonitor.com/public/case/29762905/Havana_Docks_Corporation_v_Royal_Caribbean_Cruises,_LTD
Havana Docks Corporation v. MSC Cruises SA CO et al (1:19-cv-23588)
Courts > Florida Southern District Court
Filed: Aug 27, 2019
Judge: Beth Bloom
Nature of Suit: Other Statutes - Other Statutory Actions
Cause: 22:6082 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996
Parties Matched: Havana Docks Corporation v. MSC Cruises SA CO et al > MSC Cruises is the world's largest privately-held cruise line <
https://www.pacermonitor.com/public/case/29762447/Havana_Docks_Corporation_v_MSC_Cruises_SA_CO_et_al
Havana Docks Corporation v. Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Ltd. (1:19-cv-23591)
Courts > Florida Southern District Court
Filed: Aug 27, 2019
Judge: Beth Bloom
Nature of Suit: Other Statutes - Other Statutory Actions
Cause: 22:6082 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996
Parties Matched: Havana Docks Corporation v. Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Ltd. NCLH
https://www.pacermonitor.com/public/case/29762906/Havana_Docks_Corporation_v_Norwegian_Cruise_Line_Holdings,_Ltd
SupercaliFRAZalistic
Carnival Corp. cannot escape a lawsuit CCL
https://www.law360.com/internationaltrade/articles/1310001/carnival-can-t-slip-suit-over-use-of-confiscated-cuban-dock
FRAZerific
PCHM AMZN XOM ODP NCLH AAL
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/sanctions-trends-update-2020-22433/
Sanctions trends update 2020
Helms-Burton title III suits
MSC's Motion to Dismiss, is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED.
HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION v. MSC CRUISES SA CO.
Case No. 19-cv-23588-BLOOM/Louis.
HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. MSC CRUISES SA CO. and MSC CRUISES (USA) INC., Defendants.
United States District Court, S.D. Florida.
September 7, 2020.
ORDER
BETH BLOOM, District Judge.
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendants MSC Cruises SA Co. and MSC Cruises (USA) Inc. (collectively, "MSC") Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint, ECF No. [69] ("Motion"). Plaintiff Havana Docks Corporation ("Havana Docks" or "Plaintiff") filed its Response in Opposition, ECF No. [73] ("Response"), to which MSC filed a Reply, ECF No. [77] ("Reply"). MSC also submitted two Notices of Supplemental Authority in Support of its Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint, ECF Nos. [82] & [85], and Plaintiff submitted an additional Notice of Supplemental Authority, ECF No. [89]. The Court has carefully considered the Motion, all opposing and supporting submissions, the record in this case, and the applicable law, and is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons set forth below, MSC's Motion is denied.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The LIBERTAD Act
Since Fidel Castro seized power in Cuba in 1959, Cuba has been plagued by "communist tyranny and economic mismanagement," that has substantially deteriorated the welfare and health of the Cuban people. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021(1)(A), (2). The communist Cuban Government has systematically repressed the Cuban people through, among other things, "massive and systemic violations of human rights" and deprivations of fundamental freedoms, see id. §§ 6021(4), (24), and the United States has consistently sought to impose effective international sanctions for these violations against the Castro regime, see id. §§ 6021(8)-(10).
In 1996, Congress passed the Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C. § 6021, et seq. (the "LIBERTAD Act," "Title III," or the "Act"), commonly referred to as the Helms-Burton Act, "to strengthen international sanctions against the Castro government" and, relevant to the instant case, "to protect United States nationals against confiscatory takings and the wrongful trafficking in property confiscated by the Castro regime." 22 U.S.C. §§ 6022(2), (6). Under Title III of the Act, Congress denounced the Cuban Government's history of confiscating property of Cuban citizens and U.S. nationals, explaining that "[t]he wrongful confiscation or taking of property belonging to United States nationals by the Cuban Government, and the subsequent exploitation of this property at the expense of the rightful owner, undermines the comity of nations, the free flow of commerce, and economic development." 22 U.S.C. §§ 6081(2)-(3). The Act explains that foreign investors who traffic in confiscated properties through the purchase of equity interests in, management of, or entry into joint ventures with the Cuban Government to use such properties "complicate any attempt to return [these expropriated properties] to their original owners." Id. §§ 6081(5), (7). The LIBERTAD Act cautions that:
[t]his trafficking in confiscated property provides badly needed financial benefit, including hard currency, oil, and productive investment and expertise, to the current Cuban Government and thus undermines the foreign policy of the United States—
(A) to bring democratic institutions to Cuba through the pressure of a general economic embargo at a time when the Castro regime has proven to be vulnerable to international economic pressure; and
(B) to protect the claims of United States nationals who had property wrongfully confiscated by the Cuban Government.
Id. §§ 6081(6)(A)-(B).
Further, the lack of effective international remedies for the wrongful confiscation of property and for unjust enrichment from the use of that property by foreign governments at the expense of the rightful owners left U.S. citizens without protection against wrongful confiscations by foreign nations and their citizens. Id. § 6081(10). Congress therefore concluded that, "[t]o deter trafficking in wrongfully confiscated property, United States nationals who were the victims of these confiscations should be endowed with a judicial remedy in the courts of the United States that would deny traffickers any profits from economically exploiting Castro's wrongful seizures." Id. § 6081(11); see also 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(1)(A). As a result, in passing Title III of the LIBERTAD Act, "Congress created a private right of action against any person who `traffics' in confiscated Cuban property." Garcia-Bengochea v. Carnival Corp., 407 F.Supp.3d 1281, 1284 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (citing 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(1)(A); 22 U.S.C. § 6023(13)(A)).
Shortly after Helms-Burton was passed, however, the President invoked Title III's [suspension] provision, and Title III has since been waived every six months, . . . and has never effectively been applied. Odebrecht Const., Inc. v. Prasad, 876 F.Supp.2d 1305, 1312 (S.D. Fla. 2012). That changed on April 17, 2019, when the U.S. Department of State announced that the federal government will no longer suspend Title III. See U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo's Remarks to the Press (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.state.gov/remarks-to-the-press-11/.
Id.; see also 22 U.S.C. § 6085(c) (presidential power to suspend the right to bring a cause of action under Title III). On May 2, 2019, the suspension of claimants' rights to bring actions under Title III was lifted, enabling them to file suit against alleged traffickers.
B. This Case
On August 27, 2019, Havana Docks initiated this action against MSC pursuant to Title III of the LIBERTAD Act for MSC's alleged trafficking in property that was confiscated from Plaintiff by the Cuban Government in 1960. ECF No. [1]. On April 20, 2020, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, ECF No. [56],1 which alleges the following facts:
Havana Docks is a U.S. national, as defined by 22 U.S.C. § 6023(15), and is the rightful owner of an interest in and certified claim to certain commercial waterfront real property in the Port of Havana, Cuba, identified as the Havana Cruise Port Terminal (the Subject Property). ECF No. [56] ¶ 7. Plaintiff continuously owned, possessed, managed, and used the Subject Property from 1917 until the Cuban Government confiscated it in 1960, id. ¶ 8, and that, since the confiscation, the Subject Property has not been returned, nor has Havana Docks received adequate or effective compensation for the confiscation of the Subject Property, id. ¶¶ 9-10. Havana Docks' claim to the Subject Property has never been settled pursuant to any international claim settlement agreement or other settlement procedure. Id. ¶ 10.
Plaintiff's ownership interest in and claim to the Subject Property has been certified by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (the "FCSC") pursuant to the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, 22 U.S.C. § 1621, et seq. (the "Claims Settlement Act"). Id. ¶ 12.2 In the Certified Claim, a copy of which is attached to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, the FCSC found, based on the record before it, that:
[Havana Docks] obtained from the Government of Cuba the renewal of a concession for the construction and operation of wharves and warehouses in the harbor of Havana, formerly granted to its predecessor concessionaire, the Port of Havana Docks Company; that claimant acquired at the same time the real property with all improvements and appurtenances located on the Avenida del Puerto between Calle Amargura and Calle Santa Clara in Havana, facing the Bay of Havana; . . . and that claimant corporation also owned the mechanical installations, loading and unloading equipment, vehicles and machinery, as well as furniture and fixtures located in the offices of the corporation.
ECF No. [56-1] at 7. "The concession granted the Plaintiff a term of 99 years for the use of, improvement, construction upon, operation and management of the Subject Property," from which Havana Docks benefitted until 1960, when the Subject Property was confiscated by the Cuban Government, along with all of its other property interests. ECF No. [56] ¶ 15. "The concession never expired by its term." Id. Rather, when the Subject Property was confiscated, "Havana Docks still had a balance of 44 years of concessionary rights remaining . . . [and] Plaintiff has never received any compensation nor been indemnified for the expropriation of the Subject Property, including for the concession or any other property interests." Id. ¶¶ 15, 18.
Moreover, according to the Amended Complaint, beginning on or about December 2018, MSC "knowingly and intentionally commenced, conducted, and promoted their commercial cruise line business to Cuba using the Subject Property by regularly embarking and disembarking their passengers on the Subject Property without the authorization of Plaintiff or any U.S. national who holds a claim to the Subject Property." Id. ¶ 21. MSC has had constructive knowledge of Plaintiff's publicly available Certified Claim to the Subject Property since the FCSC completed the Cuban Claims Program on July 6, 1972. Id. ¶ 23. Moreover, MSC has "had actual knowledge of Plaintiff's [Certified Claim] . . . since at least February 11, 2019, due to a notice letter sent by Plaintiff to [MSC] pursuant to 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(3)(D)." Id. ¶ 24. "On information and belief, [MSC] trafficked in the Subject Property until June 2019." Id. ¶ 25. Thus, MSC is alleged to have knowingly and intentionally participated in, and profited from, the Cuban Government's confiscation and possession of the Subject Property without Plaintiff's authorization. Id. ¶ 22. Plaintiff further alleges that MSC's knowing and intentional conduct relating to the Subject Property constitutes "trafficking," as set forth under 22 U.S.C. § 6023(13)(A), and that MSC is liable to Havana Docks for all money damages allowed by statute. ECF No. [56] ¶¶ 26-27.
MSC now files the instant Motion asserting the following bases for dismissal: (1) Havana Docks lacks Article III standing to sue because it cannot allege injury in fact that is traceable to MSC's conduct; (2) Applying Title III to MSC's pre-May 2019 operations in Cuba violates the Ex Post Facto Clause because such application would be both retroactive and punitive; (3) Applying Title III to MSC's operations in Cuba violates the Due Process Clause because MSC was not given fair notice of its potential liability through the Act's retroactive application; (4) Title III's penalties are grossly excessive and arbitrary in violation of the Due Process Clause; and (5) Havana Docks has failed to sufficiently allege that MSC trafficked in each property interest contained within the Certified Claim. In its Response, Havana Docks takes the opposing position on each of MSC's bases for dismissal.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Article III Standing
One element of the case-or-controversy requirement under Article III of the United States Constitution is that plaintiffs "must establish that they have standing to sue." Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997). It is a threshold question of "whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues." Sims v. Fla. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 862 F.2d 1449, 1458 (11th Cir. 1989) (en banc). "`The law of Article III standing . . . serves to prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the political branches,' and confines the federal courts to a properly judicial role." Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)). Further, "standing requirements `are not mere pleading requirements but rather [are] an indispensable part of the plaintiff's case.'" Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1336 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). "Indeed, standing is a threshold question that must be explored at the outset of any case." Corbett v. Transp. Sec. Admin., 930 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Bochese v. Town of Ponce Inlet, 405 F.3d 964, 974 (11th Cir. 2005)), cert. denied, 140 S.Ct. 900 (2020). "In its absence, `a court is not free to opine in an advisory capacity about the merits of a plaintiff's claim.'" Id. (quoting Bochese, 405 F.3d at 974). "In fact, standing is `perhaps the most important jurisdictional' requirement, and without it, [federal courts] have no power to judge the merits." Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Bochese, 405 F.3d at 974).
[A]t an irreducible minimum, Art. III requires the party who invokes the court's authority to show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant, and that the injury fairly can be traced to the challenged action and is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.
Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (quoting Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979)). In other words, to establish standing, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) it "suffered an injury in fact that is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical;" (2) "the injury is fairly traceable to conduct of the defendant;" and (3) "it is likely, not just merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." Kelly v. Harris, 331 F.3d 817, 819-20 (11th Cir. 2003).
"The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of proving standing." Fla. Pub. Int. Rsch. Grp. Citizen Lobby, Inc. v. E.P.A., 386 F.3d 1070, 1083 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Bischoff v. Osceola Cty., 222 F.3d 874, 878 (11th Cir. 2000)). "If at any point in the litigation the plaintiff ceases to meet all three requirements for constitutional standing, the case no longer presents a live case or controversy, and the federal court must dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction." Fla. Wildlife Fed'n, Inc. v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 647 F.3d 1296, 1302 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing CAMP Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 451 F.3d 1257, 1277 (11th Cir. 2006)). "In assessing the propriety of a motion for dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), a district court is not limited to an inquiry into undisputed facts; it may hear conflicting evidence and decide for itself the factual issues that determine jurisdiction." Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Collins, 921 F.2d 1237, 1243 (11th Cir. 1991). "When a defendant properly challenges subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) the district court is free to independently weigh facts, and `may proceed as it never could under Rule 12(b)(6) or Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.'" Turcios v. Delicias Hispanas Corp., 275 F. App'x 879, 880 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 F.3d 920, 925 (11th Cir. 2003)).
B. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion
A pleading must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although a complaint "does not need detailed factual allegations," it must provide "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that Rule 8(a)(2)'s pleading standard "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation"). In the same vein, a complaint may not rest on "`naked assertion[s]' devoid of `further factual enhancement.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (alteration in original) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. These elements are required to survive a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6) that requests dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
When reviewing a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a court, as a general rule, must accept the plaintiff's allegations as true and evaluate all plausible inferences derived from those facts in favor of the plaintiff. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. S. Everglades Restoration All., 304 F.3d 1076, 1084 (11th Cir. 2002). However, this tenet does not apply to legal conclusions, and courts "are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Thaeter v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff's Office, 449 F.3d 1342, 1352 (11th Cir. 2006). Moreover, "courts may infer from the factual allegations in the complaint `obvious alternative explanations,' which suggest lawful conduct rather than the unlawful conduct the plaintiff would ask the court to infer." Am. Dental Ass'n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 682).
A court, in considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "may consider only the complaint itself and any documents referred to in the complaint which are central to the claims." Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 959 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1997)); see also Maxcess, Inc. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 433 F.3d 1337, 1340 n.3 (11th Cir. 2005) ("[A] document outside the four corners of the complaint may still be considered if it is central to the plaintiff's claims and is undisputed in terms of authenticity." (citing Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125, 1135 (11th Cir. 2002))).
III. DISCUSSION
As noted, MSC's Motion asserts numerous bases for dismissal: (1) Havana Docks lacks Article III standing; (2) Applying Title III violates the Ex Post Facto Clause; (3) Applying Title III violates the Due Process Clause; (4) Title III imposes penalties for liability that are grossly excessive and arbitrary in violation of the Due Process Clause; and (5) Plaintiff failed to allege that MSC trafficked in each property interest listed in the Certified Claim. Plaintiff takes the opposing position on each of these bases for dismissal. The Court addresses each argument in turn.
A. Article III Standing
MSC first challenges Havana Docks' Article III standing, arguing Plaintiff cannot allege any concrete injury in fact that is fairly traceable to MSC's conduct. Havana Docks responds that it has sufficiently satisfied all of the Article III standing requirements at this stage in the litigation. MSC, in its Reply, contends that the only injury Havana Docks has asserted is the confiscation, which is only traceable to the Cuban Government, not to MSC, and that none of MSC's conduct harmed Plaintiff. MSC also submitted two Notices of Supplemental Authority in support of the Motion, which appended two recent cases that address Article III standing: Trichell v. Midland Credit Management, Inc., 964 F.3d 990 (11th Cir. 2020), and Glen v. American Airlines, Inc., No. 4:20-cv-482-A, 2020 WL 4464665, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2020). See ECF Nos. [82] & [85]. Similarly, Plaintiff submitted a Notice of Supplemental Authority in support of its argument that it has Article III standing: Cueto Iglesias v. Pernod Ricard, No. 20-cv-20157 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 17, 2020). See ECF No. [89].
As discussed above, Article III standing "is a doctrine rooted in the traditional understanding of a case or controversy." Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1547 (citing Raines, 521 U.S. at 820). "[T]he irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements," Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, namely, (1) injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and not conjectural; (2) causation or traceability; and (3) redressability. Corbett, 930 F.3d at 1232. "At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss [courts] `presum[e] that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.'" Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (quoting Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990)).
The Court will address each element of Article III standing individually below.
1. Injury in Fact
"The `foremost' standing requirement is injury in fact." Trichell, 964 F.3d at 996 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998)).
An injury in fact consists of an invasion of a legally protected interest that is both concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. [Lujan,] 504 U.S. at 560 (quotation marks omitted). A concrete injury must be de facto — that is, it must be real, and not abstract. Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (quotation marks omitted). A particularized injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way. Id. (quotation marks omitted). Each subsidiary element of injury — a legally protected interest, concreteness, particularization, and imminence — must be satisfied. See id. at 1545; [Lujan,] 504 U.S. at 560.
Id. at 996-97.
MSC argues Plaintiff cannot allege facts to support the elements of injury in fact — namely, a legally protected interest, concreteness, particularization, and imminence. See ECF No. [69] at 3-5; see also Trichell, 964 F.3d at 996-97 ("Each subsidiary element of injury . . . must be satisfied [for standing].").
First, legally protected interest. "No legally cognizable injury arises unless an interest is protected by statute or otherwise." Cox Cable Commc'ns, Inc. v. United States, 992 F.2d 1178, 1182 (11th Cir. 1993); see also Bochese, 405 F.3d at 980. "That `interest must consist of obtaining compensation for, or preventing, the violation of a legally protected right.'" Bochese, 405 F.3d at 980-81 (quoting Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 772 (2000)). Here, Havana Docks alleges it has a Certified Claim to the Subject Property, and that MSC trafficked in the Subject Property without authorization. Under the Act, trafficking in confiscated property is an invasion of a legally protected interest — i.e. a statutorily constructed property interest in the Subject Property, which conveys a right to prevent third-party use of the same. The remedy for the violation of that right is compensation from third parties for trafficking in the Subject Property. That the legal right and remedy at issue in this case are statutorily constructed does not sway the Court's analysis in favor of MSC, because, as discussed in the ensuing sections, Plaintiff's injury is concrete, particularized, and imminent.
Second, concreteness. Although a statutorily-constructed right may be insufficient to convey standing on its own,3 Trichell, 964 F.3d at 997 ("Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation." (quoting Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1549)), it is sufficient where the right is constructed to address a concrete harm. See also Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1549 ("Congress may elevate to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law." (alteration adopted; citation and internal quotation mark omitted)). As detailed above, Congress was prompted to enact Title III because the remedies for (1) the wrongful confiscation of property by foreign governments; and (2) the subsequent unjust enrichment and economic exploitation of that property by foreign investors at the expense of the rightful owners, were ineffective. 22 U.S.C. § 6081(10).4 Quite simply, the right identified by Congress was a property interest, and MSC presents no clear argument why an infringement on a property right lacks concreteness. MSC appears to argue that the injury here is not concrete because it began years ago when the Subject Property was initially confiscated by the Cuban Government. While the injury may have its origin in the confiscation, MSC does not explain how its continued use of the Subject Property makes Plaintiff's harm less tangible today. Stated otherwise, Havana Docks' injury is "real" because it is not receiving the benefit of its interest in the Subject Property and MSC's subsequent trafficking in the confiscated property has undermined Plaintiff's right to compensation for that expropriation
Moreover, MSC's Notices of Supplemental Authority, ECF Nos. [82] & [85], are inapposite. In particular, the facts of this case are distinguishable from those in Trichell because Havana Docks sufficiently alleges that MSC profited from its use of the Subject Property at Havana Docks' expense, ECF No. [56] ¶¶ 21-22, whereas Trichell involved a statutory violation without any corresponding concrete injury to the plaintiffs. Moreover, the district court in Glen v. American Airlines observed that the plaintiff admitted that neither the Cuban government's confiscation of the properties nor the hotels' operations constituted injuries in fact. Contrary to the conclusion in Glen v. American Airlines that the plaintiff had no standing because there was no allegation of concrete harm, the Court finds that the allegations of profiting from the use of property that was expropriated without obtaining consent or paying adequate compensation to the original owner is sufficient concrete harm for standing purposes. See, e.g., Glen v. Club Mediterranee S.A., 365 F.Supp.2d 1263, 1272 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (explaining that the injury to a plaintiff whose property was expropriated was a lack of compensation (citing Talenti v. Clinton, 102 F.3d 573, 578 (D.C. Cir. 1996)), aff'd, 450 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2006).
Third, particularity. Havana Docks argues its injury is particularized because the injury is entirely personalized to its interest in its Certified Claim to the Subject Property, and MSC does not contest this point. The Court concludes that Havana Docks' injuries here are particularized because, rather than presenting a generalized harm, Havana Docks' injury is entirely personalized to its interest in its Certified Claim to the Subject Property. See ECF No. [56] ¶¶ 12-17. Stated differently, Plaintiff seeks only to vindicate its own property rights in this action. Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1548 ("For an injury to be `particularized,' it `must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.'" (citation omitted)). This is sufficient for particularity.
Fourth, imminence. Although MSC raises no issue regarding imminence in this case, the Court nonetheless has an independent obligation to address all aspects of its jurisdiction. Imminence is satisfied where, as here, "both the challenged conduct and the attendant injury have already occurred." Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108, 1118 (9th Cir. 2017). Accordingly, Havana Docks' injury here is actual and not conjectural.
In sum, Havana Docks has alleged sufficient facts to recover monetary damages for the injuries it sustained as a result of MSC's unlawful trafficking in the Subject Property, to which it owns a Certified Claim.5
2. Causation
To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must also demonstrate that the injuries sustained are fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct.
To satisfy Article III's causation requirement, the [] plaintiffs must allege that their injuries are connect[ed] with the conduct of which [they] complain. Trump v. Hawai'i, 138 S.Ct. 2392, 2416 (2018). See also Duke Power Co. v. Envtl. Study Grp., 438 U.S. 59, 75 n.20 (1978) (explaining that Article III standing require[s] no more than a showing that there is a substantial likelihood of causation) (quotation marks omitted). Significantly, [p]roximate causation is not a requirement of Article III standing, which requires only that the plaintiff's injury be fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct. Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 134 n.6 (2014). [E]ven harms that flow indirectly from the action in question can be said to be `fairly traceable' to that action for standing purposes. Focus on the Family v. Pinellas Suncoast Transit Auth., 344 F.3d 1263, 1273 (11th Cir. 2003). A plaintiff therefore need not show (or, as here, allege) that the defendant's actions are the very last step in the chain of causation. [Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 168-69 (1997). See also Moody v. Warden, 887 F.3d 1281, 1285 (11th Cir. 2018)] (explaining that we must not confuse weakness on the merits with absence of Article III standing) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Wilding v. DNC Servs. Corp., 941 F.3d 1116, 1125-26 (11th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, No. 19-1185, 2020 WL 2814788 (2020).
"Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before." Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). In enacting Title III, Congress recognized that there exists a causal link between a claimant's injury from the Cuban Government's expropriation of their property and a subsequent trafficker's unjust enrichment from its use of that confiscated property. See 22 U.S.C. § 6081(10) (noting the lack of effective international remedies for the wrongful confiscation of property by foreign governments and the subsequent unjust enrichment by foreign investors from the use of that property at the expense of the rightful owners).
Thus, under Spokeo, Inc., any argument that the causal chain ceases with the Cuban Government falls short. MSC argues that Plaintiff's injury is not attributable to MSC's conduct, but rather to the Cuban Government's expropriation, and that the traceability prong of standing is therefore not met here. However, MSC's purported reliance on Trichell misses the mark because Trichell does not stand for the notion that such causal links are insufficient to establish Article III standing, where a concrete and particularized injury otherwise exists. Thus, the Court concludes that MSC's conduct of using and profiting from the Subject Property is fairly traceable to Plaintiff's claimed injuries. See Focus on the Family, 344 F.3d at 1273 ("[E]ven harms that flow indirectly from the action in question can be said to be `fairly traceable' to that action for standing purposes.").
3. Redressability
The final element of Article III standing is redressability.
The element of redressability requires that it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (internal quotation marks omitted). Redressability is established when a favorable decision would amount to a significant increase in the likelihood that the plaintiff would obtain relief that directly redresses the injury suffered. Mulhall v. UNITE HERE Local 355, 618 F.3d 1279, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). [Courts] must be able to ascertain from the record whether the relief requested is likely to redress the alleged injury, [Steele v. Nat'l Firearms Act Branch, 755 F.2d 1410, 1415 (11th Cir. 1985)]. . . . See [DiMaio v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 520 F.3d 1299, 1303 (11th Cir. 2008)] (dismissing complaint for lack of standing because it did not suggest in any way how [the] `injury' could be redressed by a favorable judgment).
Hollywood Mobile Estates Ltd. v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 641 F.3d 1259, 1266 (11th Cir. 2011).
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has explained that, where the injury alleged is a monetary injury, such an injury can be redressed by an award of compensatory damages. See, e.g., Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1324 (11th Cir. 2012) ("Plaintiffs allege a monetary injury and an award of compensatory damages would redress that injury."); see also Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300, 1310-11 (11th Cir. 2001) (explaining that even partial relief suffices for redressability).
Although MSC does not raise any challenge to the redressability prong of Plaintiff's Article III standing, the Court must nonetheless assure itself that redressability is met here. Havana Docks also notes that a favorable decision would directly redress its injury by compensating Plaintiff for the value of its interests in the Subject Property that were confiscated, and the Court agrees. Obtaining a favorable judgment would allow Plaintiff to recover monetary damages as provided by Title III—compensation which would sufficiently redress the harm Havana Docks suffered from the Cuban Government's confiscation of the Subject Property and MSC's subsequent unjust enrichment from the use of the confiscated property at Plaintiff's expense. See, e.g., Resnick, 693 F.3d at 1324 ("Plaintiffs allege a monetary injury and an award of compensatory damages would redress that injury."); Wilding, 941 F.3d at 1127 (same); Via Mat Int'l S. Am. Ltd. v. United States, 446 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2006) ("`Substantial economic harm is plainly the type of injury for which parties may seek redress in federal court.' The injury was `the direct result of "putatively illegal" [G]overnmental action in the form of an allegedly unlawful forfeiture. This injury would be redressed by a successful challenge to the forfeiture. Article III does not require more.'" (quoting United States v. Cambio Exacto, 166 F.3d 522, 528 (2nd Cir. 1999))). At this stage, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has sufficiently established the redressability requirement of Article III standing.
Based on the discussion above, the Court finds that Havana Docks has met its burden at this stage of establishing injury in fact, causation, and redressability, as required for Article III standing. As such, MSC's Motion is denied as it relates to Plaintiff's alleged lack of standing.
B. Ex Post Facto Clause
MSC argues that applying Title III to its pre-May 2019 conduct in Cuba would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. It urges that such an application would be retroactive, given the suspension of lawsuits under Title III since the LIBERTAD Act's enactment in 1996, and would impose treble damages that are so punitive as to constitute criminal penalties. Havana Docks responds that applying Title III to MSC would not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because there is no retroactive application—Title III was enacted in 1996 and has been in force since then, despite the suspension of Title III lawsuits from 1996 until 2019.
"The Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits Congress and state legislatures from enacting `any law which imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was committed; or imposes additional punishment to that then prescribed.'" Holland v. Governor of Ga., 781 F. App'x 941, 944 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. W.B.H., 664 F.3d 848, 852 (11th Cir. 2011)). "The presumption against the retroactive application of new laws is an essential thread in the mantle of protection that the law affords the individual citizen. That presumption `is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic.'" Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 439 (1997) (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994)). The ex post facto prohibition "is only one aspect of the broader constitutional protection against arbitrary changes in the law. In both the civil and the criminal context, the Constitution places limits on the sovereign's ability to use its lawmaking power to modify bargains it has made with its subjects." Id. at 440.
The Ex Post Facto Clause
prohibits [Congress] from enacting any law `which imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was committed; or imposes additional punishment to that then prescribed.' Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28 (1981) (quoting Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 325-26 (1867)). Thus, in order for a criminal or penal law to be ex post facto, it must be retroactively applied and must disadvantage the offender because it may impose greater punishment. Id. at 29. Furthermore, the law need not impair a vested right to be ex post facto; a violation may occur when the law merely alters penal provisions accorded by the grace of the legislature [.] Id. at 30. However, if a statute is merely procedural and does not affect the quantum of punishment attached to the crime, there is no ex post facto violation even when the statute is applied retroactively. Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293 (1977). The Ex Post Facto Clause operates not to protect an individual's right to less punishment, but rather as a means of assuring that an individual will receive fair warning of criminal statutes and the punishments they carry. Weaver, 450 U.S. at 28-30; Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 298.
Hock v. Singletary, 41 F.3d 1470, 1471-72 (11th Cir. 1995). "This prohibition applies only to criminal laws, not to civil regulatory regimes." Holland, 781 F. App'x at 944 (citing W.B.H., 664 F.3d at 852). Nonetheless, "the constitutional provision was intended to secure substantial personal rights against arbitrary and oppressive legislation, see Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U.S. 180, 183 (1915), and not to limit the legislative control of remedies and modes of procedure which do not affect matters of substance." Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 293 (quoting Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 171 (1925)).
Title III explicitly sets forth its effective date and the procedures regarding the president's suspension authority:
(a) In general
Subject to subsections (b) and (c), this subchapter and the amendments made by this subchapter shall take effect on August 1, 1996.
(b) Suspension authority
(1) Suspension authority
The President may suspend the effective date under subsection (a) for a period of not more than 6 months if the President determines and reports in writing to the appropriate congressional committees at least 15 days before such effective date that the suspension is necessary to the national interests of the United States and will expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba.
(2) Additional suspensions
The President may suspend the effective date under subsection (a) for additional periods of not more than 6 months each, each of which shall begin on the day after the last day of the period during which a suspension is in effect under this subsection, if the President determines and reports in writing to the appropriate congressional committees at least 15 days before the date on which the additional suspension is to begin that the suspension is necessary to the national interests of the United States and will expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba.
(c) Other authorities
(1) Suspension
After this subchapter and the amendments of this subchapter have taken effect—
. . . .
(B) the President may suspend the right to bring an action under this subchapter with respect to confiscated property for a period of not more than 6 months if the President determines and reports in writing to the appropriate congressional committees at least 15 days before the suspension takes effect that such suspension is necessary to the national interests of the United States and will expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba.
(2) Additional suspensions
The President may suspend the right to bring an action under this subchapter for additional periods of not more than 6 months each, each of which shall begin on the day after the last day of the period during which a suspension is in effect under this subsection, if the President determines and reports in writing to the appropriate congressional committees at least 15 days before the date on which the additional suspension is to begin that the suspension is necessary to the national interests of the United States and will expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba.
22 U.S.C. §§ 6085(a)-(c)(2). Thus, Title III specifies an effective date of August 1, 1996, and authorizes the president to suspend either the effective date of Title III or, after Title III takes effect, the right bring an action under Title III. Id.
On March 12, 1996, President Clinton signed the LIBERTAD Act into law. See Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-114, §§ 301-306, available at https://www.congress.gov/104/plaws/publ114/PLAW-104publ114.pdf; Statement on Signing the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, 1 Pub. Papers 433, 433 (Mar. 12, 1996), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PPP-1996-book1/pdf/PPP-1996-book1-doc-pg433.pdf ("Today I have signed into law [the LIBERTAD Act, which] . . . . creates a cause of action enabling U.S. nationals to sue those who expropriate or `traffic' in expropriated properties in Cuba. . . ."). Further, on July 16, 1996, President Clinton issued a statement, explaining in relevant part that:
Title III allows U.S. nationals to sue foreign companies that profit from American-owned property confiscated by the Cuban regime. The law also provides me with the authority to suspend the date on which Title III enters into force, or the date on which U.S. nationals can bring suit, if I determine that suspension is necessary to the national interest and will expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba. I have decided to use the authority provided by Congress to maximize Title III's effectiveness in encouraging our allies to work with us to promote democracy in Cuba.
I will allow Title III to come into force. As a result, all companies doing business in Cuba are hereby on notice that by trafficking in expropriated American property, they face the prospect of lawsuits and significant liability in the United States. This will serve as a deterrent to such trafficking, one of the central goals of the LIBERTAD Act.
At the same time, I am suspending the right to file suit for 6 months. . . .
. . . Our allies and friends will have a strong incentive to make real progress because, with Title III in effect, liability will be established irreversibly during the suspension period and suits could be brought immediately when the suspension is lifted. And for that very same reason, foreign companies will have a strong incentive to immediately cease trafficking in expropriated property, the only sure way to avoid future lawsuits.
. . . .
Today's action is the best way to achieve the bipartisan objectives we all share: to isolate the Cuban Government and to bring strong international pressure to bear on Cuba's leaders, while holding out the very real prospect of fully implementing Title III in the event it becomes necessary.
Statement on Action on Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1995, 2 Pub. Papers 1136, 1137-38 (July 16, 1996), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PPP-1996-book2/pdf/PPP-1996-book2-doc-pg1136.pdf (emphasis added) ("July 16, 1996, Statement"); see also Statement on Efforts To Bring Democracy to Cuba, 2 Pub. Papers 1299, 1299 (Aug. 16, 1996), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PPP-1996-book2/pdf/PPP-1996-book2-doc-pg1299.pdf ("On July 16, I decided to allow title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (LIBERTAD) to enter into force, putting companies doing business in Cuba on notice that by trafficking in expropriated properties they face the prospect of lawsuits in the United States. I also suspended the right to file suit for 6 months to allow us time to forge a common approach with our allies and trading partners to accelerate democratic transition in Cuba." (emphasis added)) ("August 16, 1996, Statement").
As these statements make clear, President Clinton explicitly and repeatedly indicated his intention to allow Title III to take effect, but to nevertheless suspend the right to bring an action under Title III with respect to confiscated property, as set forth in 22 U.S.C. § 6085(c). This suspension decision is entirely separate from the authority granted pursuant to § 6085(b) to suspend the effective date of Title III. Accordingly, pursuant to § 6085(a), Title III took effect on August 1, 1996. As a result, once in effect, Title III established that anyone who, "after the end of the 3-month period beginning on [August 1, 1996,]" traffics in confiscated property "shall be liable to any United States national who owns the claim to such property for money damages. . . ." 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
MSC argues that Title III is retroactive because the cause of action contained within Title III lay dormant, having no effect and carrying no legal consequences, until the suspension was lifted in May 2019. Thus, MSC contends that applying Title III to its pre-May 2019 operations in Cuba serves to attach new legal consequences to its conduct that did not previously exist at the time MSC engaged in this conduct. MSC also argues that it began its operations in Cuba based upon the federal government's explicit encouragement, and it relied on this encouragement and the continuous suspension of Title III in conducting its operations in Cuba. As such, MSC argues that it lacked adequate notice of the legal consequences of such conduct because Title III was consistently suspended for over twenty years.
"To fall within the ex post facto prohibition, a law must be retrospective—that is, `it must apply to events occurring before its enactment'—and it `must disadvantage the offender affected by it,' by altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime[.]" Lynce, 519 U.S. at 441 (quoting Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29) (citing Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 50 (1990)); see also United States v. Rosello, 737 F. App'x 907, 909 (11th Cir. 2018) ("Even if a `change in the law obviously ha[s] a detrimental impact upon the defendant, . . . the law [is] not ex post facto . . . [unless the law] ma[kes] criminal a theretofore innocent act, . . . aggravate[s] a crime previously committed, . . . provide[s] greater punishment, []or change[s] the proof necessary to convict.'" (quoting Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 293)).
An ex post facto inquiry . . . [focuses] not on whether a legislative change produces some ambiguous sort of `disadvantage,' . . . but on whether any such change alters the definition of criminal conduct or increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable. [Ca. Dep't of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 506 n.3 (1995)]. The Clause does not forbid[] any legislative change that has any conceivable risk of affecting a [litigant's] punishment. Id. at 508. Instead, the Clause prohibits only those retroactively applied laws that produce[] a sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes, id. at 509, or affects the quantum of punishment imposed, Dobbert v. Fla., 432 U.S. 282, 294 (1977). That prohibition operates not to protect an individual's right to less punishment, but rather as a means of assuring that an individual will receive fair warning of criminal statutes and the punishments they carry. Hock v. Singletary, 41 F.3d 1470, 1472 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 298, and Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-30 (1981)).
Rosello, 737 F. App'x at 908; see also Weaver, 450 U.S. at 30 (explaining that the central concerns of the Ex Post Facto Clause are "the lack of fair notice and governmental restraint when the legislature increases punishment beyond what was prescribed when the crime was consummated").
MSC's arguments regarding the retroactivity of Title III are misplaced and unsupported by law. Specifically, MSC's arguments that the application of Title III here would be retroactive are seemingly premised upon the incorrect contention that Title III was not in effect during its operation in Cuba, and that lifting the suspension in May 2019 caused Title III to take effect. This reading of Title III ignores the explicit language of the statutory text and the distinct provisions authorizing the president to either suspend the effective date of Title III or to suspend the right to bring an action under Title III, despite Title III's other provisions remaining in effect. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 6085(b), (c).
As noted above, Title III took effect on August 1, 1996, see id. § 6085(a), and liability for trafficking thus attached to conduct on confiscated property beginning on November 1, 1996 (i.e., three months after Title III's effective date), see § 6082(a)(1)(A). Likewise, President Clinton's statements regarding the actions taken pursuant to Title III of the Act further buttress the notion that liability for trafficking in confiscated property under Title III could be imposed for conduct occurring on or after November 1, 1996.6 Thus, contrary to its position in the Motion, MSC's alleged conduct on the Subject Property was not lawful prior to the suspension being lifted in May 2019. Instead, liability for trafficking under Title III attached beginning on November 1, 1996, and the consistent suspension of the right to bring an action under Title III did not affect this liability. In other words, MSC's alleged conduct in Cuba occurred after the enactment of Title III,7 and the penalty for liability has remained unchanged since Title III was enacted, thus putting traffickers on notice of their potential liability under § 6082(a)(1)(A) since Title III took effect in 1996. See Lynce, 519 U.S. at 441; see also Rosello, 737 F. App'x at 909. As such, the imposition of liability under Title III is not retroactive.
The ex post facto prohibition "operates not to protect an individual's right to less punishment, but rather as a means of assuring that an individual will receive fair warning of criminal statutes and the punishments they carry." Rosello, 737 F. App'x at 908 (quoting Hock, 41 F.3d at 1472). Because the Court concludes that the ex post facto concerns regarding fair notice and governmental restraint are satisfied here, MSC's Motion is denied on this ground.
C. Due Process Clause — Retroactivity and Fair Notice
MSC further argues that it lacked fair notice, as required under the Due Process Clause, of the possibility of Title III's retroactive application to its conduct in Cuba that occurred during the suspension period, or to its conduct that was licensed and encouraged by the federal government. As an initial matter, the Court notes that this due process argument is founded upon MSC's assumption that it is correct regarding the retroactive application of Title III to its conduct in Cuba—a theory the Court has already rejected. In particular, the Court has explained that, although the right to bring an action under Title III was suspended for over twenty years since the date of its enactment, neither the effective date of Title III nor the provision imposing liability for trafficking were suspended. Instead, Title III's suspension was solely limited to the timing of when claimants could file suit against traffickers in their confiscated property. President Clinton explained that his intent in allowing Title III to take effect, while also suspending the right to bring an action under Title III, was to incentivize foreign companies to immediately cease trafficking in confiscated property, or face liability under Title III once the suspension was lifted, and to promote the United States' foreign policy goals relating to Cuba. Throughout the suspension period, however, and upon the removal of the suspension, Title III's civil remedy that created liability for trafficking in confiscated property remained intact and in force. Thus, as MSC's due process arguments relate to the retroactive application of Title III to its conduct in Cuba, these arguments are without merit.
Moreover, with regard to MSC's contention it lacked fair notice that liability under Title III could be imposed for its conduct in Cuba due to the government's encouragement of relations with Cuba and Title III's consistent history of suspensions, the Court again remains unpersuaded. Neither the government's encouragement and licensure nor the history of suspending Title III is sufficient to establish a lack of fair notice under the Due Process Clause. "Generally, a legislature need do nothing more than enact and publish the law, and afford the citizenry a reasonable opportunity to familiarize itself with its terms and to comply." Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 532 (1982). "All persons are charged with knowledge of the provisions of statutes and must take note of the procedure adopted by them and when that procedure is not unreasonable or arbitrary there are no constitutional limitations relieving them from conforming to it." N. Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276, 283 (1925); see also Texaco, Inc., 454 U.S. at 532 n.25.
In altering substantive rights through enactment of rules of general applicability, a legislature generally provides constitutionally adequate process simply by enacting the statute, publishing it, and, to the extent the statute regulates private conduct, affording those within the statute's reach a reasonable opportunity both to familiarize themselves with the general requirements imposed and to comply with those requirements.
United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 108 (1985) (citing Texaco, Inc., 454 U.S. at 532; Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 243 (1944); N. Laramie Land Co., 268 U.S. at 283).
Despite the absence of any lawsuits being filed pursuant to Title III since its enactment, MSC was on notice of Title III's existence from the time it became law in 1996, and it had an obligation to familiarize itself with the mandates of Title III, especially once it began operating in Cuba. Locke, 471 U.S. at 108; Texaco, Inc., 454 U.S. at 532; N. Laramie Land Co., 268 U.S. at 283. Moreover, the government's encouragement to travel to Cuba and to increase commercial relations with Cuba does not in any way absolve MSC of its obligations to also comply with federal law—namely, by not trafficking in confiscated property without the consent of a Title III claimant. Thus, MSC has failed to meet its burden to demonstrate that the application of Title III to its conduct in Cuba constitutes a due process violation. See Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 729 (1984) ("It is by now well established that legislative Acts adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic life come . . . with a presumption of constitutionality, and that the burden is on one complaining of a due process violation to establish that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational way." (quoting Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976))). Accordingly, MSC's Motion is denied as to its first due process claim.
D. Due Process Clause — Grossly Excessive Penalty
MSC also argues that Title III's oppressive and excessive penalty violates due process, and it clarifies in its Reply that this challenge is both a facial and as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of Title III's penalty. In its Response, Havana Docks argues that an as-applied challenge to the excessiveness of a penalty is not ripe for this Court's review until after the penalty has been imposed. Moreover, with regard to the facial excessiveness challenge, Plaintiff contends, in part, that MSC cannot establish that the penalty for liability under Title III would be excessive in every possible application, as required to sustain a facial excessiveness challenge.
First, regarding the as-applied excessiveness challenge, the Court agrees with Havana Docks—Eleventh Circuit precedent dictates that such a challenge is not ripe at this juncture.
Ripeness doctrine originate[s] from the Constitution's Article III requirement that the jurisdiction of the federal courts be limited to actual cases and controversies. [Elend v. Basham, 471 F.3d 1199, 1204-05 (11th Cir. 2006)]. For a court to have jurisdiction, the claim must be sufficiently mature, and the issues sufficiently defined and concrete, to permit effective decisionmaking by the court. Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1524 (11th Cir. 1995). The ripeness doctrine protects federal courts from engaging in speculation or wasting their resources through the review of potential or abstract disputes. Digital Props., Inc. v. City of Plantation, 121 F.3d 586, 589 (11th Cir. 1997). A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Because the question of ripeness depends on the timing of the adjudication of a particular issue, see Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 140 F.3d 1392, 1403-04 (11th Cir. 1998), it applies differently to facial and as-applied challenges. A facial challenge asserts that a law always operates unconstitutionally, Black's Law Dictionary 223 (7th ed. 1999) (emphasis added); therefore, a facial challenge will succeed only if the statute could never be applied in a constitutional manner. DA Mortgage, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 486 F.3d 1254, 1262 (11th Cir. 2007). In the context of a facial challenge, a purely legal claim is presumptively ripe for judicial review because it does not require a developed factual record. See Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Chertoff, 452 F.3d 839, 854-55 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Solantic, LLC v. City of Neptune Beach, 410 F.3d 1250, 1274 (11th Cir. 2005); Roe No. 2 v. Ogden, 253 F.3d 1225, 1232 (10th Cir. 2001). An as-applied challenge, by contrast, addresses whether a statute is unconstitutional on the facts of a particular case or to a particular party. Black's Law Dictionary at 223. Because such a challenge asserts that a statute cannot be constitutionally applied in particular circumstances, it necessarily requires the development of a factual record for the court to consider. See Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1171 (11th Cir. 2000).
Harris v. Mexican Specialty Foods, Inc., 564 F.3d 1301, 1308 (11th Cir. 2009).
In addressing an as-applied due process challenge to the excessiveness of a statutory penalty in Harris, the Eleventh Circuit explained that "[w]hen a damages award is punitive in nature, it is subject to constitutional excessiveness review." Id. at 1309 (citing Johansen v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 170 F.3d 1320, 1334 (11th Cir. 1999)). These as-applied excessiveness challenges, however, are typically reviewed "after a jury has delivered a damages award," because a court's review otherwise requires a number of assumptions regarding the resolution of directly disputed issues. Id. (citing State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (finding that the jury's punitive damages award of $145 million was unconstitutionally excessive); Action Marine, Inc. v. Cont'l Carbon Inc., 481 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2007) (upholding a jury's punitive damages award of $17,500,000); Kemp v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 393 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 2004) (reducing a jury's punitive damages award of $1,000,000 to $250,000)).
In this case, it is apparent that any as-applied excessiveness challenge would require this Court to make numerous assumptions about factual issues that are still premature and in dispute (e.g., assuming that MSC's liability is proven at trial, assuming that all of MSC's defenses fail, and assuming the amount of damages awarded). As such, MSC's as-applied excessiveness challenge, like the one at issue in Harris, is not ripe for review at this stage. Id. at 1310.
MSC's facial excessiveness challenge also fails. Although the Motion contends that the penalty Title III generally imposes upon defendants for trafficking is arbitrary and excessive in violation of the Due Process Clause, MSC makes no attempt to address how Title III's statutory penalty always yields unconstitutionally excessive results, as required for a facial challenge. Rather, MSC broadly states that "Title III imposes penalties on defendants that are so disconnected from any actual damages they might cause to plaintiffs as to be irrational." ECF No. [69] at 19. Yet, "it is conceivable that in the future a party with actual harm that is difficult to compute will bring a case seeking statutory damages. In such a case, the actual harm might be very close to the statutory damages." Harris, 564 F.3d at 1313. Indeed, it is entirely plausible that a claimant under Title III might seek to recover statutory damages in an amount close to the amount of profits generated from a defendant's trafficking.8 Further, it is well settled that "[t]his mere possibility of a constitutional application is enough to defeat a facial challenge to the statute." Id. at 1313 (citing High Ol' Times, Inc. v. Busbee, 673 F.2d 1225, 1228 (11th Cir. 1982)). As such, MSC's facial and as-applied constitutional excessiveness challenges are both denied.
E. Failure to State a Claim
Finally, MSC briefly argues that Havana Docks has failed to sufficiently allege that it trafficked in all of the property interests memorialized in the Certified Claim—i.e., the securities, accounts receivable, debts of the Cuban Government, railroad tracks, office furniture, and the indemnity right—rather than just in the concession itself. Plaintiff, on the other hand, notes that liability under Title III attaches for trafficking in confiscated property, not in specific property interests.
The Court is unpersuaded by MSC's final argument here because this argument seemingly ignores the explicit language of the LIBERTAD Act, which defines "traffics" as follows:
a person traffics in confiscated property if that person knowingly and intentionally—
(i) sells, transfers, distributes, dispenses, brokers, manages, or otherwise disposes of confiscated property, or purchases, leases, receives, possesses, obtains control of, manages, uses, or otherwise acquires or holds an interest in confiscated property,
(ii) engages in a commercial activity using or otherwise benefiting from confiscated property, or
(iii) causes, directs, participates in, or profits from, trafficking (as described in clause (i) or (ii)) by another person, or otherwise engages in trafficking (as described in clause (i) or (ii)) through another person, without the authorization of any United States national who holds a claim to the property.
22 U.S.C. § 6023(13)(A) (emphasis added).
Moreover, as discussed above, Plaintiff has not only alleged MSC's purported trafficking in the Subject Property, see ECF No. [56] ¶¶ 21-27, but it has also explicitly delineated the various property interests encompassed in the Certified Claim, see id. ¶¶ 12-17 (describing the various confiscated property interests in the Subject Property), all of which constitute "confiscated property" under the Act. At this stage in the litigation, these allegations are sufficient to "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)); see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Therefore, MSC's Motion is denied as to this claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
[color=red]1. MSC's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. [69], is DENIED.
2. MSC is ordered to file its Answer to the Amended Complaint by no later than September 18, 2020.
3. Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Response to Notices of Supplemental Authority, ECF No. [86], is DENIED AS MOOT.
DONE AND ORDERED.[/color]
FootNotes
1. The Court previously provided a detailed review of the procedural history in this case and Havana Docks' related cases. Havana Docks Corp. v. MSC Cruises SA Co., No. 19-cv-23588, 2020 WL 2534295, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 17, 2020) ("MSC"), certificate of appealability denied, No. 19-cv-23588, 2020 WL 3451681 (S.D. Fla. June 24, 2020); see generally Havana Docks Corp. v. Carnival Corp., No. 19-cv-21724 (S.D. Fla. 2019) ("Carnival"); Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., No. 19-cv-23590 (S.D. Fla. 2019) ("Royal Caribbean"); Havana Docks Corp. v. Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Ltd., No. 19-cv-23591 (S.D. Fla. 2019) ("NCL"). As such, the Court will not repeat the history of this litigation in this Order, except where relevant to the instant Motion.
2. The Court will refer to Havana Docks' claim to the Subject Property, ECF No. [56-1], as the "Certified Claim" for the remainder of this Order.
3. The Court notes "njury in fact is a constitutional requirement, and `t is settled that Congress cannot erase Article III's standing requirements by statutorily granting the right to sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing.'" Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1547-48 (quoting Raines, 521 U.S. at 820 n.3); see also Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 497 (2009). "Even when [the] political branches appear to have granted [federal courts] jurisdiction by statute and rule, [federal courts] are still obliged to examine whether jurisdiction exists under the Constitution." Salcedo v. Hanna, 936 F.3d 1162, 1166 (11th Cir. 2019). Ultimately, "Congress' role in identifying and elevating intangible harms does not mean that a plaintiff automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right." Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1549. Rather, "Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation." Id. As explained in this section, the Court has examined the alleged rights and injuries and finds that Plaintiff has established an injury in fact.
4. Title III makes it clear that "[t]he wrongful confiscation or taking of property belonging to United States nationals by the Cuban Government, and the subsequent exploitation of this property at the expense of the rightful owner," 22 U.S.C. §§ 6081(2)-(3), by foreign investors who traffic in confiscated properties "complicate any attempt to return [these expropriated properties] to their original owners," id. §§ 6081(5), (7), and undermine U.S. foreign policy aiming "to protect the claims of United States nationals who had property wrongfully confiscated by the Cuban Government," id. § 6081(6)(B).
5. As the Eleventh Circuit explained in Glen, Title III's purpose is
to deter third party foreign investors from trafficking in the confiscated property (defined as purchas[ing] an equity interest in, manag[ing], or enter[ing] into joint ventures using property and assets some of which were confiscated from United States nationals.). See 22 U.S.C. § 6081(5), (6), (11). This purpose is achieved through the establishment of a new statutory remedy available (if not suspended) to United States nationals who were the victims of these confiscations . . . [to] deny traffickers any profits from economically exploiting Castro's wrongful seizures. 22 U.S.C. § 6081(11). The Helms-Burton Act refers to the property interest that former owners of confiscated property now have as ownership of a claim to such property. 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(1)(A). When (or if) the portion of Title III that allows private litigants to bring lawsuits becomes effective, actions brought pursuant to the new statutory scheme would be actions brought on a claim to the confiscated property against traffickers in the property. 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(4).
Glen v. Club Mediterranee, S.A., 450 F.3d 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2006) (footnote omitted).
6. See July 16, 1996, Statement, 2 Pub. Papers 1137 ("[W]ith Title III in effect, liability will be established irreversibly during the suspension period and suits could be brought immediately when the suspension is lifted. And for that very same reason, foreign companies will have a strong incentive to immediately cease trafficking in expropriated property, the only sure way to avoid future lawsuits." (emphasis added)); see also id. ("[F]or countries and foreign companies that take advantage of expropriated property the choice is clear: They can cease profiting from such property, they can join our efforts to promote a transition to democracy in Cuba, or they can face the risk of full implementation of Title III."); August 16, 1996, Statement, 2 Pub. Papers 1299 ("On July 16, I decided to allow title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (LIBERTAD) to enter into force, putting companies doing business in Cuba on notice that by trafficking in expropriated properties they face the prospect of lawsuits in the United States. I also suspended the right to file suit for 6 months to allow us time to forge a common approach with our allies and trading partners to accelerate democratic transition in Cuba." (emphasis added)).
7. Moreover, that MSC began its operations in Cuba at the encouragement and licensure of the federal government is of no moment. During all times relevant, including the period during which the government encouraged increased relations with Cuba under the Obama Administration, the LIBERTAD Act expressly made trafficking in confiscated property unlawful and imposed liability for such trafficking. Thus, the fact that MSC began conducting business in Cuba pursuant to this encouragement is not relevant to the Court's analysis. MSC's decision to operate in Cuba by trafficking in the Subject Property, which was previously confiscated by the Cuban Government, was independent from the encouragement it received from the federal government. Indeed, MSC could, in theory, have operated in Cuba at the encouragement of the government, while nonetheless avoiding liability under Title III by not conducting its operations on property that was confiscated by the Cuban Government or by obtaining Plaintiff's consent.
8. Moreover, the Supreme Court has explained that
the power of the state to impose fines and penalties for a violation of its statutory requirements is coeval with government; and the mode in which they shall be enforced, whether at the suit of a private party, or at the suit of the public, and what disposition shall be made of the amounts collected, are merely matters of legislative discretion. Nor does giving the penalty to the aggrieved [party] require that it be confined or proportioned to his loss or damages; for, as it is imposed as a punishment for the violation of a public law, the Legislature may adjust its amount to the public wrong rather than the private injury, just as if it were going to the state.
St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 66 (1919) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
SupercaliFRAZalistic
https://www.leagle.com/decision/infdco20200909832
I Agree, you can't really speculate ...
~ you can't really speculate the value when it's been actually certified by the United states Foreign claims and settlement commission Value At the Time Of taking https://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/read_msg.aspx?message_id=152486411
Adjusted for inflation, US$50,000,000.00 (3.70% per annum) in 1960 has a 2019 value of approximately US$427,267,000.01. The USFCSC authorized 6% per annum, meaning the 2019 value of US$50,000,000.00 is approximately US$1,649,384,000.54.
~ Not like the Congress didn't codify the certified claims into the law HELMS BURTON ACT https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Helms%E2%80%93Burton_Act
~ not like the FCSC haven't collected $14B in fines based on these claims that can easily be redirected into a victims funds true that they have not as of yet but... there is more than 1 mechanism of receiving compensation https://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/read_msg.aspx?message_id=157722113
~ there are several cases in court that I'm eyeballing closely I think a couple have made settlements already and due to NDA they cannot be spoken of in any public way the goal of any litigation is to produce a positive out come either through settlement or judgement one can take place rapidly and the other fast or slow but ultimately driving towards resolution https://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/read_msg.aspx?message_id=157308107
~ Also Pressure on this administration to demonstrate some kind of Resolve is Mounting Biggly just ahead of monumental Elections
FYI they just used some Venezuelan frozen funds to fund direct payments in Venezuela
THIS IS NOT YOUR FATHERS OLDSMOBILE
~ Low Float
this stock only exists for the purpose of compensation https://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/read_msg.aspx?message_id=157747496
Float is tighter than Fort Knox
PCHM
SupercaliFRAZalistic
this is just a notice of appearance. Not much will happen as a result, is that a correct?
Looks like it was filed recently, so an outcome is likely years away? And then there's' appeals, and all that....am I correct in thinking this?
Telephonic Conference 10:00a.m. August 26, 2020, before Judge Darrin P. Gayles. Counsel shall enter their appearances using the following dial-in information: Dial-in Number 888-273-3658; Access Code 7032614; Security Code 5170 .
NORTH AMERICAN SUGAR INDUSTRIES INC. Certified Claim No.CU -2 622
FOREIGN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT COMMISSION OF THE UNITED STATES
https://www.justice.gov/fcsc/cuba/documents/1501-3000/2622.pdf
North American Sugar Industries, Inc. v. Xinjiang Goldwind Science & Technology Co., Ltd. et al https://www.pacermonitor.com/public/case/34730416/North_American_Sugar_Industries,_Inc_v_Xinjiang_Goldwind_Science__Technology_Co,_Ltd_et_al
Defendant
BBC Chartering Singapore PTE Ltd.
Represented By
Naim Shakir Surgeon
Akerman LLP
contact info
Defendant
BBC Chartering USA, LLC
Represented By
Naim Shakir Surgeon
Akerman LLP
contact info
Defendant
DSV Air & Sea Inc.
Represented By
Sarah Jayne Cohen
Morgan Lewis Bockius, LLP
contact info
John M. Vassos
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP
contact info
Carl Valenstein
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP
contact info
Robert Mark Brochin
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP
contact info
Matthew Michael Papkin
Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP
contact info
Defendant
Goldwind International Holdings (HK) Ltd.
Represented By
Allen Paige Pegg
Hogan Lovells LLP
contact info
Richard C. Lorenzo
Hogan Lovells Us LLP
contact info
Defendant
Xinjiang Goldwind Science & Technology Co., Ltd.
Plaintiff
North American Sugar Industries, Inc.
Represented By
Rahim Moloo
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP
contact info
Casey Kyung-Se Lee
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP
contact info
Miguel A. Estrada
Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP
contact info
Audi K. Syarief
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP
contact info
David Scott Mandel
Mandel & Mandel LLP
contact info
Andrea E. Neuman
Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP
contact info
SupercaliFRAZalistic
from 2 separate articles this morning ...
Glad finally 574,484 O/S Confirmed on https://www.otcmarkets.com/stock/FRAZ/security I feel as though not many believed it or would not take the time to find it out by contacting Nick
They Have The Presidents Ear https://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/read_msg.aspx?message_id=157722113
[LINK] Understand The Money Already Exists https://www.justice.gov/fcsc/claims-against-cuba
PCHM
SupercaliFRAZalistic
updated ss 8/17/2020. looks like 300k float. nicehttps://www.otcmarkets.com/stock/FRAZ/security
yes agree, i remember the convos now. luv the low float on top
looks really thin all the way to double digits all I see
I totally understand why this peeks your interest anyone who has done enough reading gets it, anyone who has done the DD really gots it
easy deet.. we spoke months ago about this one, i dont remember
im lookin to buy not sell or bash
How many shares was that and what was the cost? I'm curious. Have been watching these two FRAZ and M*I for several years.
tons of DD In the I box and on the board lots has been answered already
in the words or the smartest trader I've had the privilege to learn from
want don't want the answer is at your fingers something like that
Followers
|
33
|
Posters
|
|
Posts (Today)
|
0
|
Posts (Total)
|
1343
|
Created
|
10/28/14
|
Type
|
Free
|
Moderators |
Volume | |
Day Range: | |
Bid Price | |
Ask Price | |
Last Trade Time: |