Simferopol—The white VW Transporter came to a halt on Gorky Street, in downtown Simferopol. Heavily armed men, some of them in black balaclavas, others wearing Cossack fur hats, jumped out of the van and rushed into the building next door. One of them stood guard, his handgun drawn, surveying the street nervously.
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“I am very much in favor of Crimea joining Russia,” one young Russian woman told me a few days ago in Simferopol. “What’s happening right now is wonderful, yet I also worry. What will happen to the media? I fear that our press will lose much of its freedom.”
Dimiter Kenarov is a freelance writer based in Sofia. Reporting for this article was funded by the Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting.
By Jonathan Marcus BBC diplomatic correspondent 1 April 2014 Last updated at 01:00
Russian troop deployments have suggested that they may go further than just Crimea
"Let's be clear from the outset. The Cold War is not back. Russia for all its military power and posturing is not the Soviet Union of old. This is not going to be a re-run of the ideological battle that divided the world for most of the last century."
That in a nutshell was the view of one senior Nato diplomat who I spoke to recently.
But something has changed in the wake of Russia's seizure of the Crimea and its continuing military threat to eastern Ukraine.
Moscow has broken with a pattern of behaviour that has characterised diplomacy in Europe since the end of the Cold War and arguably one that has held sway in western Europe since the collapse of Nazi Germany.
The idea that disputes will be settled by diplomacy rather than force; that the currency of power is increasingly economic might rather than military.
Worse still, Mr Putin's Kremlin speech some 10 days ago signalled that this might not end here. Russian spokesmen may say they have no desire to move troops into Ukraine but their deployments signal otherwise - and that is precisely what they are intended to do.
How far will Putin go?
Mr Putin's speech was significant not least because he looked to mean what he said. The French have a word for it - "revanchisme" - a term incorporating the concept of revenge or restitution after a humbling defeat; something France experienced at the hands of Prussia in 1870, and something that many Russians - certainly those in Mr Putin's circle - believe they suffered at the hands of the West with the collapse of the Soviet Union.
--- "Mr Putin's circle believe they suffered at the hands of the West" ---
Mr Putin signalled that Russia was back and that it intended to impose itself in its own back-yard and for many in Russia, Ukraine is the biggest back-yard of all.
Quite how far Mr Putin is prepared to go is unclear. But the threat is evident - to Ukraine; to Moldova (where there is the possibility of Russia seeking to formalise the take-over of the break-away enclave of Trans-Dniester). And if to Moldova where else ?
That is why countries like the three Baltic Republics are so relieved that they joined Nato 10 years ago. And that is why all of a sudden the protection and reassurance of its own members is so high on Nato's agenda.
Nato is expected to offer much more support to Ukraine's moribund military
The Atlantic Alliance cannot know the Kremlin's intentions. It can only look at capabilities and extrapolate from the signals and actions so far.
So what can Nato do? Its first step is to reassure its uneasy allies in northern Europe.
Support for Ukraine
In the first instance there could be a whole host of small military deployments to beef up the presence of Alliance units in the Baltic Republics and in Poland. Small-scale exercises could give an almost permanent Nato military presence in these countries for the immediate future if that is what Alliance leaders decide.
There is also going to be more support for Ukraine. Not to bring it into Nato's fold - the current Ukrainian government seems to have no desire to join the Alliance.
--- "Some critics have suggested that Nato expansion since the Cold War prompted Russia to act in Ukraine" ---
But Ukraine is a Nato partner. It has already had help with improving civil control over its military; with defence planning and so on. Expect more of this kind of help with potentially also non-lethal assistance to help make its largely moribund military more effective.
Nato is also signalling that its direction of travel will not change. Some critics have suggested that Nato expansion since the ending of the Cold War has in some sense prompted Russia to act in Ukraine; that it has provoked a sense of encirclement in Moscow.
Nato diplomats reject this out of hand. Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, in an article published on Tuesday in newspapers in all 12 of the countries who have joined Nato since the end of the Cold War, insists that enlargement has been good for Europe, for Nato, and for the new members themselves. He insists this process will continue and it is up to individual countries to determine their own alliances.
[ Mr. Rasmussen, i don't understand how you can reject the suggestion out of hand. Are you putting yourself in Putin's head? }
Both President Obama and Mr Rasmussen (L) have insisted that Nato is a force for peace
By coincidence this week's Nato meeting will mark a triple anniversary: 15 years since Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic joined the Alliance; 10 years since the accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia joined; and five years since Albania and Croatia acceded. It's an anniversary that Nato ministers will mark with a brief ceremony and its symbolism will not be lost on Moscow.
Above all, Nato ministers need to plan for the future.
Just how should the Alliance respond to the new wind blowing from Moscow?
"Cash-strapped European countries may have to look again at defence budgets"
Work will be commissioned this week that will feed in to the next Nato summit to be held in Wales in September.
The rules of the game
This will give direction and guidance to a series of studies. Just what will the future relationship between Nato and Russia be like? Is this a temporary cooling? Or as one Nato diplomat put it to me: Is the whole effort to build a partnership with Moscow in jeopardy?
If the security rules of the game have changed in Europe, what will be the military implications? Cash-strapped European countries may have to look again at defence budgets or, at the very least, take the pooling of capabilities more seriously.
The US will have to underscore its continuing commitment to European security in some tangible ways. There may need to be a different pattern of exercises. The force structure may need to be looked at too.
It simply will not be a case of business as usual, not because the Cold War is back, but because Nato's core purpose - the territorial defence of its own members - has suddenly become rather more important than it was a few weeks ago.
Russian-majority areas watch Moscow's post-Crimea moves
Moscow originally said it was intervening in Crimea because of concern over the ill-treatment of Russians there - they make up more than half the population. So could the same happen in other parts of the former Soviet Union?
Eastern Ukraine
Ever since Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych was ousted in February, there have been frequent pro-Russian demonstrations in Donetsk and other cities in eastern Ukraine. At least one person has been killed.
Russia has blamed far-right pro-Western demonstrators for escalating tensions there. Russian troops have staged military exercises near the border and remain in the area. It would not be difficult for them to move across into Ukraine itself.
If Russia is considering more territorial expansion, eastern Ukraine would be high on the list.
However, once the separatist genie is out of the bottle, it is hard to put back in. There is even a mock campaign for Donetsk to become part of the UK - the city was founded by a Welsh industrialist, John Hughes, in the 19th Century.
Attention has also focused on Trans-Dniester, a separatist region of Moldova that has already offered itself to Moscow. It proclaimed independence in 1990, but has never been recognised internationally. Trans-Dniester is majority Russian-speaking while most Moldovans speak Romanian.
Soldiers in the breakaway enclave of Trans-Dniester clean land at a military cemetery in the city of Tiraspol
There is also the southern pocket known as Gagauzia, an autonomous region of Moldova made up of four enclaves (population 160,000). The Gagauz are Turkic-speaking Orthodox Christians. In February 2014, Gagauzia held a referendum in which 98.4% of voters backed integration with a Russia-led customs union. The Moldovan government said the referendum was illegitimate.
Nato's commander in Europe warned Trans-Dniester could be Russia's next target. It already has 1,000 troops in the region, which borders Ukraine, near the city of Odessa.
Moldova is preparing to sign an association agreement with the EU, upping the diplomatic stakes if Russia did decide to annex Trans-Dniester.
In 2008, Russia fought a brief war in Georgia that ended with the breakaway of two areas, South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Although Moscow's stated aim was to protect Russian speakers, most residents are native speakers of Ossetian and Abkhaz respectively. However, many hold Russian passports and they are opposed to the Georgian government in Tbilisi.
Palm Sunday in the South Ossetian capital, Tskhinvali - neither a part of Russia nor fully independent
Abkhazia had already declared independence unilaterally in 1999.
Since then, the two enclaves have existed in a kind of grey zone - not recognised internationally, but not formally part of Russia.
Abkhazia shares a border with Russia - not far from Sochi, the site of the 2014 Winter Olympics. Security was tightened for the Games.
South Ossetia borders the Russian Federation at North Ossetia. All goods must come in via a tunnel under the Caucasus mountain range. Prices are high. Unemployment and corruption are widespread.
Russians account for about a third of the population in both Latvia and Estonia. The Baltic republics regained independence following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s.
Both Latvia and Estonia require knowledge of their languages for citizenship. Some Russian speakers born in the countries are either unable or unwilling to become citizens as a result.
Some in Latvia are concerned about what might befall areas with large Russian-speaking populations
Many Russian speakers complain of discrimination, saying strict language laws make it hard to get jobs.
In Lithuania, ethnic Russians make up about 5% of the population and there is no requirement for them to pass a language test.
In mid-March, the Kremlin expressed "outrage" at the treatment of ethnic Russians in Estonia - the same reason it gave for intervening in Crimea.
However, the Baltic states are members of both the EU and Nato. Any Russian incursion would have serious consequences. Article 5 of the Nato treaty says that an attack on one member state is an attack on all.
Poland and Baltics wary over Crimea - http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26526053 ________________________________________________________________________________________________
Northern Kazakhstan
Russians account for more than half the population in northern Kazakhstan which, like Crimea, was once a part of Russia itself.
Ties between the two go back to tsarist times, when northern cities such as Pavlodar and Uralsk were founded by the Russians as military outposts.
An actor dressed as the poet Pushkin greets the Russian and Kazakh presidents on a visit to Uralsk
Like Ukraine, Kazakhstan signed an agreement on nuclear disarmament in 1994 in exchange for protection. It has no port like Sevastopol in Crimea, but it does have the Baikonur space facility.
However, Kazakhstan already has close ties with Russia - it is one of two other members (along with Belarus) of Moscow's customs union.
Kazakhstan is remaining officially neutral in the matter of Ukraine, but has called for a peaceful resolution.
The percentage of ethnic Russians in central Asia ranges from 1.1% in Tajikistan to 12.5% in Kyrgyzstan. After independence in 1991, large numbers of Russians emigrated.
However, the Central Asian economies remain tied to Russia - both in terms of trade and remittances from migrants working there.
It seems unlikely that Moscow would seek to intervene in the region.
However, the post-Crimea turmoil could still have an effect, as the rouble falls and sanctions hit Russian businesses. Jobless migrants returning from Russia could cause trouble for the governments in Dushanbe or Bishkek.
Millions of Tajiks work in Russia as labourers, sending money home but often spending years away
Russia reaches deal on Tajik base - http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-19849247 ________________________________________________________________________________________________
Armenia and Azerbaijan
Armenia has no Russian population to speak of, and Azerbaijan has just 1%. Both countries tread a geopolitical tightrope between Russia and the West.
Like Ukraine, Armenia had been preparing to sign an association agreement with the EU. But in September, it announced it would be joining the Russian-led customs union instead.
Since Armenian independence in 1991, Russia has retained a military base at Gyumri.
Last September, Armenia's President Serzh Sarkisian (right, pink tie) jettisoned closer ties with the EU in favour of the customs union led by Russia and President Vladimir Putin (left)
Azerbaijan exports oil and natural gas to the EU and is less economically dependent. A pipeline that ends in Turkey allows it to skirt Russian territory.
Russia would like to keep both countries in its sphere of influence, but it is likely to use economic, rather than military, measures.
Belarus is already closely aligned with Moscow. Although about 8.3% of the population identify as Russian, more than 70% speak the language.
There is no reason why Russia would seek to intervene: the two governments could not be any closer. Belarus is in an economic union with Russia, and Russian is an official language.
Despite the end of the Soviet Union in 1991, Belarus and other former countries of the USSR continue to mark Defence of the Fatherland Day on 23 February each year
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