Oh YES.. it sounds as if He was/is a part of the Green REvolution
and he's still in trouble and of ALL things over voting in this most recent election, (found at the end of this post) .. but not under arrest, then or yet.
Khatami blames clerics for failure
The Guardian, 4 May 2004
Dan De Luce in Tehran
The Iranian president, Mohammad Khatami, yesterday defended his failed attempts to reform the country's theocracy and warned against the dangers of religious "despotism".
In a statement addressed to the country's youth, Mr Khatami alluded to his conservative opponents, saying: "The idea of implementing religious rule through despotism and by force and by ignoring people's demands is the wrong path."
In a 47-page "letter for the future", Mr Khatami said his government had stood for noble principles but had made mistakes and faced obstruction by hardline elements in the clerical establishment.
"Organised and shallow-minded methods to damage the public's opinion and dissuade it from reforms on the one hand, and hasty behaviour in the name of reforms on the other hand, are the two bitter historical phenomena of this period," he said.
Coinciding with his warning, the hardline judiciary told news agencies it had reinstated the death sentence against an academic who questioned the clergy's divine right to rule.
Hashem Aghajari, a wounded veteran of the Iran-Iraq war, was sentenced to death in 2002 for blasphemy after he argued that Islam should be reinterpreted by each new generation. The sentence sparked student protests and the judiciary rescinded the ruling.
In his philosophical essay, Mr Khatami cited the Aghajari case and said the original ruling was an "unfair sentence" by an "inexperienced judge".
The latest ruling seemed to contradict recent attempts by the authorities to defuse allegations of human rights abuses.
Mr Khatami said the conservatives had tried to co-opt much of the reformist agenda, which he saw as a sign for optimism. He said the cabinet had presided over an expansion in social freedom, with the authorities turning a blind eye to couples holding hands and women circumventing the Islamic dress code [ http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/may/04/iran?INTCMP=SRCH ]
WE can all just imagine had he been dealing with OUR President Obama rather than the 'other president' .. . who really was MUCH like the ONES in charge there now. That was who President Mohammad Khatami was forced to deal with BOTH there and HERE. .. thanks for the lesson in a short timed history ... ;)
There are TWO article dated 2012 .. and HE is still in trouble with the 'current' and upcoming 'regimes' ...
........just some snips here:
Iran election: Khatami's vote sparks claims of betrayal
guardian.co.uk, 5 Mar 2012
Saeed Kamali Dehghan
Reformist leader Mohammad Khatami criticised for participating in an election the opposition boycotted
…Iran election: Khatami's vote sparks claims of betrayal … Since voting in Iran's parliamentary vote on Friday, the former reformist president Mohammad Khatami has found himself in the middle of a heated controversy over his … Reformist leader Mohammad Khatami criticised for participating in an election the opposition boycotted…
Iran conducts 'grossly unfair' election amid sanctions and threat of war
guardian.co.uk, 2 Mar 2012
Saeed Kamali Dehghan
Tehran's attempt to portray vote - from which opposition was banned - as sign of unity derided by Human Rights Watch
… affiliated to the opposition, including former presidents Mohammad Khatami and Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, participated in the vote. Some believe they were forced to." In the past few decades I have always participated in elections held in this country…
Iranian election results suggest rocky time for Ahmadinejad
guardian.co.uk, 3 Mar 2012
Saeed Kamali Dehghan and agencies
Early returns show conservative rivals of president pulling ahead, with embarrassing defeat for his sister in one seat
…-event, although some Iranian politicians affiliated to the opposition, including former presidents Mohammad Khatami and Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, participated. Some believe they were forced to." In the past few decades I have always participated in elections…
Three Iranian journalists arrested in fresh crackdown
guardian.co.uk, 18 Jan 2012
Saeed Kamali Dehghan
Marzieh Rasouli, Parastoo Dokouhaki and Sahamoddin Bourghani had worked for reformist media outlets
… or permanently. As a result, Rasouli was among a group of journalists with little job security, often changing the publication she worked for after only a few months. During the presidency of the former reformist leader Mohammad Khatami, when newspapers enjoyed…
Daughter of former Iranian president sentenced to jail
guardian.co.uk, 3 Jan 2012
Saeed Kamali Dehghan
Ex-MP Faezeh Hashemi, whose views are close to the Green movement's, faces six months for 'spreading propaganda'
… – including former reformist president Mohammad Khatami – have also seen their websites subject to censorship.The sentencing of Hashemi Rafsanjani's daughter comes amid growing political tension before parliamentary elections in March, the first general…
Yes, Al Gore would have handled this situation .. and the World would be a different place today .. and We would NOT even be having the conversation ....our American Taleban & Israel would be screeching about some 'other' country or issue .. but NOT Iran..
Iran rounded up hundreds of Arabs to help the United States counter al Qaeda after the Sept. 11 attack after they crossed the border from Afghanistan, a former Bush administration official said Tuesday. Many were expelled, Hillary Mann Leverett said, and the Iranians made copies of almost 300 of their passports.
The copies were sent to Kofi Annan, then the secretary-general of the United Nations, who passed them to the United States, and U.S. interrogators were given a chance by Iran to question some of the detainees, Leverett said in an Associated Press interview.
Leverett, a Middle East expert who was a career U.S. Foreign Service officer, said she negotiated with Iran for the Bush administration in the 2001-3 period, and Iran sought a broader relationship with the United States. "They thought they had been helpful on al Qaeda, and they were," she said.
For one thing, she said, Iran denied sanctuary to suspected al Qaeda operatives.
Some administration officials took the view, however, that Iran had not acknowledged all likely al Qaeda members nor provided access to them, Leverett said.
Many of the expelled Arabs were deported to Saudi Arabia and other Arab and Muslim countries, even though Iran had poor relations with the Saudi monarchy and some other countries in the region, Leverett said. Iranians are Persian, not Arab, and most belong to the Shiite sect of Islam rather than the Sunni, the majority sect in most Arab countries.
James F. Dobbins, the Bush administration's chief negotiator on Afghanistan in late 2001, said Iran was "comprehensively helpful" in the aftermath of the 9-11 attack in 2001 in working to overthrow the Taliban militias' rule and collaborating with the United States to install the Karzai government in Kabul.
Iranian diplomats made clear at the time they were looking for broader cooperation with the United States, but the Bush administration was not interested, the author of "After the Taliban: Nation-Building in Afghanistan," said in a separate interview.
The Bush administration has acknowledged contacts with Iran over the years even while denouncing Iran as part of an "axis of evil" and declining to consider resumption of diplomatic relations.
"It isn't something that is talked about," Leverett said in describing Iran's role during a forum at the New America Foundation, a nonpartisan policy institute.
Leverett and her husband, Flynt Leverett, a former career CIA analyst and a former National Security Council official, jointly proposed that the U.S. president who replaces George W. Bush in January seek a "grand bargain" with Iran to settle all major outstanding differences.
"The next president needs to reorient U.S. policy toward Iran as fundamentally as President Nixon did with China in the 1970s," Flynt Leverett said. Richard Nixon, a political conservative, opened the U.S.-China relationship by among other things visiting the communist country.
Among provisions of the Leveretts' recommended new Iran policy: The United States would clarify that it is not seeking change in the nature of Iran's Islamic government but rather its policies, while Iran would agree to "certain limits" on its nuclear program.
Iran considers most of its neighbors as its enemies. Among incentives for improving U.S. relations, the Leveretts said, is they feel that Pakistan and Saudi Arabia would be less provocative with a friendlier U.S.-Iranian relationship.
VIDEO - For over 20 years of Iran’s Islamic revolution, Iranians had chanted ‘death to America’.
After 11 September 2001 however, Iran’s moderate President, Mohammad Khatami, ordered it to stop and instead the country mourned the victims of 9/11 along with the rest of the world.
Programme three
Part three of this series tells the story of Iran’s complex dealings and confrontation with the West over its nuclear ambitions over the years following 9/11.
Khatami saw the potential of the post 9/11 era as a time to build bridges with the US and transform relations between the two countries.
Secret diplomatic meetings were arranged and, amongst other things, a strategy for dealing with Afghanistan was discussed.
Then, on 29 January 2002 relations cooled dramatically.
President Bush closed the door to all discussion, claiming Iran was part of what he called an "axis of evil".
F6, how about 2003-2005 .. 2005 maybe the crunch year when the Bush administration refused to negotiate unless Iran stopped ALL enrichment. That, of course, one of those common, yet, INFAMOUS offers which the other side (other than the West) just COULD NOT accept. Give an offer that we know cannot be accepted. As we all know, there were a number of those totally DISINGENUOUS offers leading up to both Bush Iraq wars. No, that's not to absolve Saddam or any other on the other side of any guilt in the early path to war, it's just another thing we must never forget (as the Iran hardliner vs hardliner one) as it happens if for one side negotiations are dishonest window-dressing on the way to 'the war they are intent on having'. We know, the offers, the West KNOWS the other side CANNOT for all sorts of domestic, sovereignty reasons accept, are an old dishonest tactic used by those who want war for 'other' reasons.
Oops, back to the point .. i thought of 2005 from this one i've repeated maybe too often, but it fits again, so ..
"We often hear that Iran's ill-will, its refusal to negotiate seriously, left our countries no other choice but to drag it to the Security Council in 2006. Here also, things are not quite that clear.
Let us remember that in 2005 Iran was ready to discuss a ceiling limit for the number of its centrifuges and to maintain its rate of enrichment far below the high levels necessary for weapons. Tehran also expressed its readiness to put into force the additional protocol that it had signed with the IAEA allowing intrusive inspections throughout Iran, even in non-declared sites. But at that time, the Europeans and the Americans wanted to compel Iran to forsake its enrichment program entirely." .. http://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/read_msg.aspx?message_id=64150008 .. it's also linked in this one, .. http://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/read_msg.aspx?message_id=72955104 .. which includes a couple of others ..
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Seyed Hossein Mousavian: The West is pushing Iran in the wrong direction .. one bit ..
Vaez: The recent IAEA report on Iran's nuclear program bared a lot of details to the public about the possible military dimension of Tehran's nuclear activities. My reading of it was that it did not contain any new information. Nevertheless, Tehran's reaction was harsh, as Iranian leaders called the report "unbalanced" and "politically motivated" and accused Yukiya Amano, the director general of the IAEA, as a "pawn" of the West. Back in 2008, Iran addressed most of these allegations in a 117-page response to the IAEA. Wouldn't publication of this response be a more constructive move than taking umbrage at the IAEA?
Mousavian: The IAEA has, unfortunately, broken the rules of the game. Iran does not want to commit the same mistake. The issues between the agency and member states should remain confidential. Iran respects the rules and does not disclose its communications with the agency. Yet, the content of the IAEA reports on Iran are leaked to the media ahead of their distribution among the agency's member states. This is highly unprofessional and against the statute of the agency. Such behavior is highly damaging to the credibility of the IAEA, as an impartial international body. It also clearly demonstrates that the information is dictated to the agency from somewhere else in order to make the case for ratcheting up pressure on Iran. The publication of these allegations was a significant step backward. .. http://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/read_msg.aspx?message_id=72131835
we probably should have more of a look at that, too.
======== .. just got this one ..
Nuclear Negotiating Timeline
Timeline of Key Events in Iran Nuclear Negotiations (Feb. 2003 - June 2008)
This chronology covers the key events in Iran's negotiations with the west over its nuclear program during the critical period between the first revelation of Iran's secret nuclear activities in February 2003 and the tabling of the latest P5+1 offer in June 2008, rejection of which led to the current standoff.
It will be seen that Iran cooperated very extensively with the IAEA until the summer of 2005, when it became apparent to Iran that the west had no intention of aceepting any enrichment inside Iran for at least ten years. In March 2005, Iran tabled a "framework" for negotiations that contemplated Iran accepting very extensive, nationwide safeguards in exchange for western concessions including acceptance of limited enrichment of uranium in Iran.
Overview
The recent history of Iran nuclear negotiations can be divided into three main stages:
(1) Feb. - Oct. 2003: Iran's secret work is revealed, and Iran responds by covering up. Some information starts coming from Iran in August.
(2) Oct. 2003 - May 2005: Iran comes clean, tries to restore confidence and seeks a deal. Iran acknowledges and discloses its past and present nuclear materials processing activities (without disclosing or acknowledging any past weapons work) and accepts a strong package of enhanced safeguards (including full IAEA safeguards, the Additional Protocol,and the revised code of the Subsidiary Arrangement). Iran enters into talks with the West aimed at securing western acceptance of limited Iranian enrichment in exchange for Iran's acceptance of full (and indeed enhanced) safeguards to assure peaceful use.
(3) May 2005 - present: The deal collapses over enrichment and over questions about the past. The E3 powers table a proposal that contemplates no Iranian enrichment for at least ten years. Iran becomes disillusioned by the West's continuing refusal to contemplate any future that involves Iranian enrichment of uranium (even to low levels under safeguards), which Iran considers its right. Iran comes to conclusion that the West is exploiting Iran's suspension of enrichment by stalling for time, and in August 2005 announces its intention to resume enrichment.
The result is a downward spiral into a stalemate. The P5+1 responds by referring Iran's file to the Security Council for sanctions. Iran responds by suspending implementation of the Additional Protocol and the revised code of the Subsidiary Arrangement. The Security Council answers with three successive resolutions calling on Iran to resume implementing these extended safeguards and suspend implementation, and enacts a package of limited sanctions against Iran.
The United States declares that it will not talk to Iran about its nuclear program until Iran complies with the Security Council resolutions and suspends enrichment of uranium. The European powers, Russia and China offer a package of concessions to Iran that does not include a long-term right to enrich uranium. Their offer stipulates that serious negotiations cannot begin on this package until Iran first suspends enrichment.
Iran declares that suspension of enrichment is off the table and out of the question. Deadlock results.
On a parallel track, Iran continues to answer most but not all of the IAEA's verification-related questions about its nuclear program. Most IAEA concerns are resolved -- until late 2005 when new documents (the so-called "alleged studies") surface, offering new evidence of a concealed Iranian nuclear weapons program through 2003 at least. Iran declares the documents to be forgeries, but maintains that it cannot substantiate its forgery claim without seeing originals of the documents, which western intelligence will not permit.
Timeline of Events
Feb. 9, 2003 Iranian dissident group reveals secret Iranian uranium importing, prcessing and enrichment activities. Iran acknowledges that 2 enrichment plants are under construction but claims that it was not required to disclose designs for these plants until 180 days before introducing nuclear material into them. Iran signs the revised code of the "Subsidiary Arrangement" which henceforth will require notification of design information for nuclear facilities upon breaking ground for new construction.
Mar - Aug. 2003 Iran stalls, obfuscates and lies about its nuclear program. 1
May 2, 2003 Iran faxes a letter to the United States through Swiss diplomatic intermediaries offering to engage in a broad dialogue with the United States, including full cooperation on nuclear programs, acceptance of Israel and the termination of Iranian support for Palestinian militant groups. The United States does not respond to the letter.2
Sept. 2003 IAEA Board Resolution condemns Iran's concealment and obfuscation.
Oct 16. 2003 Iran announces decision to provide full information on its nuclear program.
Oct. 21, 2003 Iranian provides detailed letter with very substantial disclosures, a number of which implicitly acknowledge prior misstatements."3 Iran begins negotiations with the "P5+1" countries (the five Permanent Members of the Security Council plus Germany) on its nuclear program.
Nov. 2003 Iran agrees to suspend enrichment pending the outcome of talks on a permanent arrangement.
Dec. 18, 2003 Iran signs and begins voluntarily implementing the "Additional Protocol"to its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA.
Feb. 2oo4 On request of IAEA Iran extends the suspension of enrichment to include enrichment-related activities (e.g. centrifuge manufacture and testing) and uranium conversion activities as well (though Iran will soon rescind commitment on conversion).
Mar. - Nov. 2004 Talks between Iran and P5+1 proceed.
Nov. 15, 2004 Paris Agreement .. http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/proliferation/iran/eu-iran-nuclear-agreement.htm .. signed by Iran, three EU Member States (UK, Germany, France) and EU. It is basically an agreement to negotiate. Iran agrees to suspend all enrichment and enrichment-related activity "while negotiations on a long-term agreement are under way . . . The agreement will provide objective guarantees that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes." The E3/EU recognize that "this suspension is a voluntary confidence building measure and not a legal obligation."4
On the same day, IAEA issues a report detailing both Iran's failures of cooperation in the past, and its more recent record of much better cooperation. The Director General concludes: "Iran’s policy of concealment continued until October 2003, and has resulted in many breaches of its obligation to comply with that Agreement. Since that time, good progress has been made in Iran’s correction of those breaches and in the Agency’s ability to confirm certain aspects of Iran’s current declarations, which will be followed up as a routine safeguards implementation matter."{foonote}IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report by the Director General, .. http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-83.pdf .. GOV/2004/83, Nov. 29, 2004, paras. 89-105{/footnote}
March 23, 2005 Iran tables a detailed proposal .. http://www.isisnucleariran.org/assets/pdf/Iran_Proposal_Mar232005.pdf .. for resolving the nuclear dispute. It involves phasing in an series of Iranian commitments in exchange for reciprocal EU concessions. Iran's proposed commitments are to: (1) ratify the Additional Protocol, (2) forego plutonium reprocessing, (3) adopt a "Policy Declaration" limiting enrichment in Iran to an agreed amount that corresponds to low-enriched uranium, (4) store all LEU in the form of proliferation-resistant fuel rods, and (5) allow continuous, on-site presence of IAEA inspectors in Iranian nuclear facilities. In exchange, the EU will: commit to building nuclear reactors in Iran, offer a mechanism for assured fuel supply for these reactors, guarantee market access for Iran in the EU, launch an initiative to establish a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East and, most of all, accept the "assembly, installation and testing of 3000 centrifuges at Natanz" followed by the "Commencement of Phased Commissioning of Natanz."
Iran's offer will be rebuffed.5
April 2005 Iran tables a further proposal .. http://www.isisnucleariran.org/assets/pdf/Iran_Proposal_Apr292005.pdf .. for consideration in London negotiations. Iran says it is "prepared to continue and intensify negotiations in good faith." It offers to accomplish the Phase 1 commitments of its March proposal by May 2005. It proposes to limit its suspension to a six-month period while making "every effort in intensive negotiaions" to reach agreement, and during that time allow continuous on-site presence of IAEA inspectors at the Uranium Conversion Facility. This offer is also rebuffed.6
Aug. 1, 2005 Two days before Ahmadinejad takes office as President of Iran, Iran notes in a bitter demarche .. http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2005/infcirc648.pdf .. that it has gone far beyond legal requirements in seeking to restore confidence in its peaceful intentions. Iran notes that it also had suggested asking the IAEA to develop "technical, legal and monitoring modalities for Iran's enrichment program as objective guarantees to ensure that Iran's nuclear program will remain exclusively for peaceful purposes. However, after over three months of negotiations following the Paris Agreement, it became evident the E3/EU simply wanted prolonged and fruitless negotiations, thereby prejudicing the exercise of Iran's inalienable right to resume its legal enrichment activities." With that Iran announced that it was resuming uranium conversion at Isfahan and enrichment at Natanz.7
Aug. 8 2005 E3/EU letter .. http://www.basicint.org/countries/iran/IranIAEA20050808.pdf .. formally offers a number of "carrots" in exchange for Iran's acceptance of a 10-year moratorium on enrichment. Incentives are broad and vaguely worded and generally non-comittal: e.g., an "expert mission to help identify the requirement for a research reactor inn Iran", no impediment to "participation in open market tendering" of fuel-cycle related activity, "cooperation . . . in fields such as radio-isotope production", "develop with Iran a framework which would provide assurance" of "external supplies of fuel [for nuclear reactors]." The E3/EU hold out no prospect of recognizing Iran's right to enrich uranium in the foreseeable future, though they do offer a review of implementation of the agreement in ten years.8
Sept. 12, 2005 Iran submits a lengthy and angry letter .. http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2005/infcirc657.pdf .. defending its right and need to enrich, denouncing the "politicization" of the IAEA process, critiquing the Director General reports in detail for having failed to accurately reflect the level of Iranian cooperation with the IAEA [my emphasis], and generally defending Iran's stated intention to resume enrichment.
January 3, 2006 The International Atomic Energy Agency receives a Note Verbale from Iran stating that the country has decided to resume Research and Development on its peaceful nuclear energy program beginning January 9, 2006. Director General Statement. .. http://www.iranwatch.org/IAEAgovdocs/iran-iaea-resumption-010306.pdf
Feb. 4, 2006 IAEA Board refers Iran's nuclear file to the UN Security Council.
Feb. 14, 2006: Iran announces it is suspending implementation of the Additional Protocol in retaliation for the referral of its file to the UN Security Council. Henceforth, Iran will abide by the strict text of its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and nothing more. (Perhaps less, because the IAEA and Iran disagree on whether Iran can legally withdraw from the revised version of its Subsidiary Arrangement, as Iran has done, after having once signed it.)
Feb. 15, 2006: President Bush announces the establishment of the "Democracy Promotion" program in Iran, which many regard as a not-very disguised campaign to further a "Velvet Revoluation" in Iran.
May 31, 2006 The United States offers to join European-Iranian negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program provided that Iran first suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities, thereby formalizing the suspension precondition for talks.9
June 6, 2006 China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States (also known as the P5 + 1) offer Iran a new proposal. Although specifics are not revealed, the proposal requires Iran to suspend all of its enrichment related activities as a precondition of further, more detailed negotiations. However, the proposal does not preclude the future possibility that Iran could eventually develop indigenous enrichment capabilities once all outstanding questions have been resolved and international confidence has been restored in the peaceful nature of its nuclear program. In exchange, the proposal offers Iran a package of incentives. Iran issues a statement saying it will respond to the offer by August 22.
July 31 ,2006 UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1696 calling on Iran to suspend enrichment and resolve outstanding issues with the IAEA. It contains no sanctions, but notes that subsequent resolutions will be adopted under Art. 41 of the UN Charter that does provide for sanctions.
August 22, 2006 Iran submits 21-page response .. http://isis-online.org/publications/iran/responsetext.pdf .. to the June 56 proposal by the P5+1 (Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States + Germany). Iran's response points out the vagueness of many elements in the the P5+1 proposal, and particularly objects to the fact that the P5+1 proposal is "mute" on the issue of whether enrichment is included within the scope of peaceful uses of the atom that the P5+1 recognize as legitimate. Iran objects to the Security Resolutions as coercive measures that are inconsistent with the concept of negotiation, and to the vagueness and self-judging character of the west's insistence on "international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program." Iran nonetheless welcomes the prospect of new negotiations towards a comprehensive agreement that recognizes Iran's "inalienable" right to peaceful nuclear energy without discrimination, as acknowledged in the June 12 P5+1 proposal.10
October 3, 2006 Mohammad Saeedi, deputy chief of Iran's Atomic Energy Agency, proposes that France create a consortium to enrich Tehran's uranium, saying such an arrangement could satisfy international demands for outside oversight. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice suggests the international community will have no choice but to impose sanctions on Iran if it refuses to suspend its uranium-enrichment efforts.11
October 25, 2006 Iran expands its controversial nuclear work by starting a second cascade of centrifuges to enrich uranium. This second cascade of centrifuges, based in Natanz, doubles Tehran’s enrichment capacity. Iran says it plans to install 3,000 centrifuges at Natanz by the end of 2006.
December 23, 2006 UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1737, under Art. 41 of Chapter VII of UN Charter, calling on Iran to suspend enrichment. Bans exports to Iran of certain nuclear-related items, freezes funds of people and entities designated as involved in "proliferation sensitive activity" and names 12 individuals and 10 entities said to be associated with Iran's nuclear or ballistic missile program.
March 24, 2007 UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1747 under Art. 41 of UN Charter, re-affirming earlier resolutions and incrementally expanding sanctions.
March 3, 2008 UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1803, .. http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/unsc_res1803-2008.pdf .. acting under Article 41 of of the UN Charter. Res. 1803 reaffirms resolutions 1747, 1737 and 1696 in calling for suspension of enrichment, third resolution calling on Iran to suspend enrichment of uranium.13
March 26, 2008 Iran circulates a Note Verbale .. http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2008/infcirc724.pdf .. critiquing and attacking Resolution 1803 paragraph by paragraph. Among the key points: Iran denounces the Security Council resolution as politically motivated and illegal, because the Security Council had never found Iran's enrichment to be a threat to world peace under Art. 39 of the UN Charter, and therefore not binding on Iran (citing a 1971 ICJ Advisory Opinion). Iran denounces the transformation of what had been "voluntary" measures such as suspension of enrichment into mandatory measures under the Resolutions. Iran complains of the hypocrisy of the great powers in accusing Iran of violating UN Security Council resolutions when they themselves are in gross violation of their obligations under Articles I, IV and VI of the NPT to move towards universal disarmament and not aid other countries such as Israel in acquiring nuclear weapons. Iran claims that discriminatory treatment in that it is required to abide by the Additional Protocol even though, according to the IAEA, "121 states had not yet ratified the Additional Protocol as of 23 November 2007." Iran claims that the 2007 Workplan has been "fully implemented" through complete responses to IAEA queries, yet the IAEA refuses to close the file. Iran claims that its missile program is solely for defensive purposes and there is no law prohibiting states from developing conventionally-armed missiles for deterrent purposes.14
NOTE: MY EMPHASIS there, too .. for detail ..
May 13, 2008 Iran tables a Proposed Package for Constructive Negotiations. Iran offers (in vague and general terms) to enter into talks towards establishing mechanisms of cooperation across a range of political and security issues. On the nuclear issue, Iran expresses, inter alia, a willingness "to consider", inter alia, "establishing enrichment and nuclear fuel production consortiums in different parts of the world - including in Iran" along with ""improved supervision by the IAEA over the nuclear activities of different states."15
June 12, 2008 E3 (France, Germany, United Kingdom) table a third proposal, .. http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2008/infcirc729.pdf .. largely re-iterating past offers of talks towards cooperation across a range of areas, but again demanding that Iran suspend enrichment of uranium as precondition for detailed negotiations of a long-term settlement.16
June 16, 2008 Iran responds by re-iterating its "proposed package for constructive negotiations" circulated on May 13.
September 27, 2008 UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1835 .. http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/unsc_res1803-2008.pdf .. re-affirming prior resolutions, incrementally expanding sanctions, but also "noting the confirmation by these countries that once the confidence of the international community in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme is restored, it will be treated in the same manner as that of any Non-Nuclear Weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons."17
March 12, 2009 P5+1 parties submit a statement .. http://americanforeignpolicy.org/library/documents/20090312_P5Communication_to_IAEA.pdf .. calling on Iran to "meet without delay the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors and to implement the resolutions of the Security Council." They "note with serious concern" the "continued lack of progress in . . . [resolving] concerns about possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program" and call on Iran to "cooperate fully with the IAEA by providing the Agency such access and information as it requests to resolve the issues." They further call on Iran to "implement and ratify promptly the Additional Protocol and to implement all measures required by the Agency in order to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program." Finally, they note that they remain "firmly committed to a comprehensive diplomatic solution."18
June 17, 2009 Through Ambassador Soltanieh, Iran's permanent representative to the IAEA, Iran submits another statement .. http://americanforeignpolicy.org/library/documents/20090618_Iran_Communication_to_IAEA.pdf .. attacking the IAEA process, pointing to "the bitter fact that the issue is political and not technical any more"; that the "United States has not delivered the original document on the so-called alleged studies to the Agency [so that Iran could prove them forgeries]"; and that accusations have proliferated with each meeting of the IAEA Board, each one eventually proving baseless. Soltanieh insists that Iran will never surrender its "inalienable right [to] . . . enrichment" but that at the same time "it shall continue its full cooperation with the Agency in accordance with its obligation under the NPT comprehensive Safeguards Agreement."
In a thinly-veiled reference to the Obama Administration, Solatanieh advises "those who have declared a change in their foreign policy to translate their words into sincere action and seize the unique opportunity by choosing . . . dialogue rather than repeating their inefficient uncivilized provocative conducts and language of threats."
A written statement by the Iran delegation then notes that "having listened to the US Statetment, we are witnessing that there is no change in policies and actions vis a vis the IAEA." It points out that the IAEA has consistently declared that it has found "no evidence of diversion of nuclear material and activities to prohibited purposes in Iran. It declares the UN Security Council resolutions "unjust and with no legal basis" but promises that Iran will "continue its full cooperation with the Agency only in accord with its NPT safeguards obligations based on [its] Safeguards Agreement."19
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