"Proponents of the measure say that SOX has been a "godsend" for improving the confidence of fund managers and other investors with regard to the veracity of corporate financial statements."
Benefits to firms and investors Arping/Sautner (2010): This research paper analyzes whether SOX enhanced corporate transparency.[17] Looking at foreign firms that are cross-listed in the US, the paper indicates that, relative to a control sample of comparable firms that are not subject to SOX, cross-listed firms became significantly more transparent following SOX. Corporate transparency is measured based on the dispersion and accuracy of analyst earnings forecasts. Iliev (2007): This research paper indicated that SOX 404 indeed led to conservative reported earnings, but also reduced—rightly or wrongly—stock valuations of small firms.[18] Lower earnings often cause the share price to decrease. Skaife/Collins/Kinney/LaFond (2006): This research paper indicates that borrowing costs are lower for companies that improved their internal control, by between 50 and 150 basis points (.5 to 1.5 percentage points).[19] Lord & Benoit Report (2006): Do the Benefits of 404 Exceed the Cost? A study of a population of nearly 2,500 companies indicated that those with no material weaknesses in their internal controls, or companies that corrected them in a timely manner, experienced much greater increases in share prices than companies that did not.[20][21] The report indicated that the benefits to a compliant company in share price (10% above Russell 3000 index) were greater than their SOX Section 404 costs. Institute of Internal Auditors (2005): The research paper indicates that corporations have improved their internal controls and that financial statements are perceived to be more reliable.[22]
Effects on exchange listing choice of non-US companies Some have asserted that Sarbanes–Oxley legislation has helped displace business from New York to London, where the Financial Services Authority regulates the financial sector with a lighter touch. In the UK, the non-statutory Combined Code of Corporate Governance plays a somewhat similar role to SOX. See Howell E. Jackson & Mark J. Roe, “Public Enforcement of Securities Laws: Preliminary Evidence” (Working Paper January 16, 2007). The Alternative Investment Market claims that its spectacular growth in listings almost entirely coincided with the Sarbanes Oxley legislation. In December 2006 Michael Bloomberg, New York's mayor, and Charles Schumer, a US senator from New York, expressed their concern.[23] The Sarbanes–Oxley Act's effect on non-US companies cross-listed in the US is different on firms from developed and well regulated countries than on firms from less developed countries according to Kate Litvak.[24] Companies from badly regulated countries see benefits that are higher than the costs from better credit ratings by complying to regulations in a highly regulated country (USA), but companies from developed countries only incur the costs, since transparency is adequate in their home countries as well. On the other hand, the benefit of better credit rating also comes with listing on other stock exchanges such as the London Stock Exchange. Piotroski and Srinivasan (2008) examine a comprehensive sample of international companies that list onto U.S. and U.K. stock exchanges before and after the enactment of the Act in 2002. Using a sample of all listing events onto U.S. and U.K. exchanges from 1995–2006, they find that the listing preferences of large foreign firms choosing between U.S. exchanges and the LSE's Main Market did not change following SOX. In contrast, they find that the likelihood of a U.S. listing among small foreign firms choosing between the Nasdaq and LSE's Alternative Investment Market decreased following SOX. The negative effect among small firms is consistent with these companies being less able to absorb the incremental costs associated with SOX compliance. The screening of smaller firms with weaker governance attributes from U.S. exchanges is consistent with the heightened governance costs imposed by the Act increasing the bonding-related benefits of a U.S. listing.[25]
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