In Yemen, Saudi jets bomb civilian areas Sun, 27 Dec 2009
.. some little update ..
Houthi fighters in Yemen say Saudi warplanes have carried out several attacks on residential areas in the country's beleaguered north.
In a statement released on Sunday, the fighters said that Saudi jets launched over 30 airstrikes on villages in the northern parts of the country.
Saudi forces have also fired some 660 rockets and artillery rounds at civilian areas along the border, websites close to the fighters reported.
The warplanes reportedly fired more than 700 missiles overnight on the northern villages along the border with the kingdom on Saturday.
The raids continued with artillery bombardment, tank raids and mortar attacks on the areas, the Houthis reported.
Riyadh joined Yemen's offensive against the Houthi fighters in November and vowed to continue its raids until they move back from the frontier between Yemen and the kingdom.
The fighters accuse Riyadh of targeting civilian areas far from the Saudi-Yemeni border.
They also say the attacks have so far left scores of civilians killed and thousands of others displaced.
Iran: The False US Friends of the “Iranian People” (An Open Letter to Charles Krauthammer)
Mr Krauthammer,
I never thought I would open an letter to you with a word of thanks. To be honest, I have almost never agreed with your past quarter-century of syndicated polemic in US newspapers and magazines. I respect your right to hold an opinion and your skill in writing. However, I find that your analysis is more often propelled by rigid belief rather than evidence, whether that belief is a specific objective (the unbending advocacy of Israel, whatever the circumstances) or a general aspiration, such as your call for an American “unipolar era” in which all others would bow to the dominance of the United States.
Yet I must note that, in your column on Friday, “2009: The Year of Living Fecklessly”, you ostensibly recognised the post-election demonstrations in Iran as a “new birth of freedom”. I am not sure exactly what a “new birth” is — I have found that most Iranians with whom I communicate have a long-held desire for freedom — but any acknowledgement of the public calls for justice and rights is to be welcomed.
So, thank you. And now a request: Go Away.
Please go away now and do not return to Iran as the setting for your political assaults. For — and let this be acknowledged widely, if not by you than by others — the “Iranian people” whom you supposedly praise are merely pawn for your political games, which have little to do with their aspirations, their fears, and their contests.
Let us recognise that your column begins with an attack on the “feckless” Barack Obama. The Iranian case, and specifically the US negotiations with Tehran over its nuclear programme, is the platform for another front in your continuing assault on the President. So if I agree with you that the nuclear-first approach gives “affirmation” to an embattled Iranian Government — and I do — that agreement starts from a desire not to bolster President Ahmadinead in the current domestic crisis in Iran, rather than your own domestic crisis with an American leader from a political party you do not like.
Let us recognise that your own supposed defence of the Iranian people is propelled by your own nuclear conceptions, bolstered by your emphasis on Israel: “Iran will dominate 2010. Either there will be an Israeli attack or Iran will arrive at — or cross — the nuclear threshold.” For, if this piece was completely honest, you would have informed your readers, and the Iranian people, that you have supported Israeli airstrikes. In the columns offering that support, you made no reference to how “a new birth of freedom” would be affected by missiles fired upon Iran. Your frame of vision was limited, as if this was a journalistic smart bomb, to the target of the Iranian regime.
Let us recognise that, if there is a context for you beyond this nuclear arena, it is a supposed geopolitical struggle in which an “Iran” confronts the American presence in the Middle East and Central Asia and participates in the regional battle with Israel. Thus, your support of a “revolution” is not for what it brings Iran’s people — who, incidentally, may not be protesting for a “revolution” or, more specifically, a “counter-revolution” against all the ideals of 1979 — but for “ripple effects [which] would extend from Afghanistan to Iraq (in both conflicts, Iran actively supports insurgents who have long been killing Americans and their allies) to Lebanon and Gaza where Iran’s proxies, Hezbollah and Hamas, are arming for war”.
(Had I the time and patience to dissect your geopolitical construction, I might note that US officials have been quietly talking to Iran about co-operation in the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan — strange behaviour indeed if Iran is allied with the Taliban and the Sunni Al Qa’eda in Mesopotamia —- or that Hezbollah and Hamas cannot be reduced to puppets of Tehran masters. I know, however, that this would be logic falling on your stony ground of politics and ideology.)
Let us recognise, therefore, the slip of the pen in your sentences, when you refer to the apparent silence of Washington to the call of Iranian demonstrators, “Obama, Obama, you are either with us or with them”: “Such cool indifference is more than a betrayal of our values. It’s a strategic blunder of the first order.” The slip is not your implicit confession that it’s the “strategic” that really concerns you — if these protesters were far removed from your strategy for American power, you wouldn’t hear a word they were saying — but in “our values”.
Assertion of “our” values does not mean acceptance of “their” values; it ignores them or, at most, wedges them into the framework of power that you find acceptable. Simply putting out the word “freedom” as if it were a universal umbrella for any proposal that follows does nothing to acknowledge, let alone, consider the complex negotiation of religious, social, economic, and political beliefs that has propelled movement inside Iran not just for the last six months but for decades.
Let us recognise, therefore, that you can throw out supposed solutions for “them”, not because they are considered measures but because they fit a model of “regime change” which is yours, not necessarily “theirs”. You advocate, “Cutting off gasoline supplies”, even though that cut-off might do far more harm to the “Iranian people” than to the regime you are condemning. You merrily think of “covert support to assist dissident communication and circumvent censorship”, even though overt calls of covert support play into the hands of an Iranian Government invoking the spectre of “foreign intervention”. (Far better to be open, in the name of the values of freedom and communication, in proposing overt funding of anti-censorship and anti-filtering programmes, as well as the encouragement of unrestricted media.)
Let us recognise, indeed even find common ground on, “robust rhetorical and diplomatic support from the very highest level: full-throated denunciation of the regime’s savagery and persecution”. Let us do so, however, not because that denunciation supports your strategy of regime change for the sake of American power — just as your denunciation of Saddam Hussein merely propped up your campaign for years to extend a US economic, political, and military presence through the “liberation” of Iraq — but because that denunciation fulfils a morality and ethics beyond “your values”.
Let us recognise that I could have written this letter not only to you but to a legion of others who, in recent weeks, have embraced the “Iranian people” as their vehicle for regime change. Outlets like the Wall Street Journal and the Weekly Standard put forth former Bush Administration officials and former activists for the Iraq War who now see a new platform for a US power which was not fulfilled in the military ventures of 2001-2009. Let us recognise that, in those calls, the “Iranian people” serve as pawns in a game beyond their own concerns.
After all these recognitions, let me conclude by returning to my thanks to you. For — I am certain unwittingly — you have re-affirmed this central belief:
This is not “our” regime change, “our” revolution; “our” values. This is “their” movement.
Please respect it as such. If you cannot, move on. Thank you.
Yemen: Separatists swimming against the unitarianist tide Between Sanaa and Aden: smouldering rancours underlie political ends
Comment: While undoubtedly international forces are at play in Yemen, at least from the very complicated scenario outlined in this article, it seems to this, relatively uninformed observer, that, as the revolution in Iran was owned by the Iranian people, the great problems in Yemen are basically owned by the Yemeni people themselves.
By Faysal Jalloul .. 07 October 2009
Separatist movements in Yemen are not institutional movements with clear-cut demands or political reformist platforms. They seek to benefit from tough Yemeni economic conditions and the change in inter-Arab political relations and the international chaos around Bab el-Mendab strait to achieve political separatist goals.
What is happening in Yemen? And why now? Is the partitioning of the Yemeni soil a foreseeable prospect? These questions and others have kept recurring since the return of former Vice President Ali Salem al-Beid to the spotlight again, after a decade and a half of almost complete absence from public life.
Answers to the previous questions require a retrospective look at the past to contemplate the new developments in Yemeni affairs during the past five years.
It became known that Yemenis signed a unity agreement in November 1989. They wanted this agreement to be signed on the day of the British evacuation from the south of the country in 1967 after a colonization period which lasted for more than 128 years. The date also marked the collapse of the Cold War. The unity agreement was implemented amid wide popular pressure which accelerated the integration process without difficulties.
In that moment, it seems that unity was like a return of the dissenting troops to the mother brigade after a long migration and forced absence.
In all governorates, the Yemeni national only identified himself through history as having Yemeni traits. Yemenis did not disagree for a single day over their historical identity, contrary to the Lebanese people who have divided identities and conflicting ethnic groups.
The same applies to the Sudanese people who are divided into ethnicities, sects and religions. We can find the same pattern also in Mauritania where we have Baidan and Sudan. There are different sects and ethnicities in Iraq under the U.S. occupation. The differences, wars and rifts between Yemenis through their long history always remained within their own ranks.
It was like a certain party adopting a Marxist ideology and another party adopting political Islam, while a third party adheres to the theories of Baath, Nasser and Arab nationalism. However, this polarization did not lead to severing from the Yemeni theme. This is how the Yemeni unity was achieved, with great ease and alacrity and it was a historic day of overwhelming joy in this country. Parties to the agreement had to benefit from this overwhelming unity feeling and the blessings of the Arab League and international institutions to their unity. They needed to apply the terms of the agreement which unified them within months. Thus, they sought to form a central government, and abolished the southern currency.
They also integrated their diplomatic representation and formed a single parliament. Moreover, they adopted freedom of the press and parties and set a date for new parliamentary elections. The Yemenis shared the state on a 50-50 basis for each party, and every minister from Sanaa had a deputy minister from Aden and vice versa.
First signs of disagreement between the two sides emerged in the first year of unity. They were related to procedural problems arising from the integration of institutions in a single state. These problems were anticipated because of the nature of the two previous states. The first one was Marxist, totalitarian and represented the only employer to the population. Meanwhile the second state was semi-liberal which supported a large portion of Yemeni cadres. It was the same for the armies of the two states, the police and security apparatus.
But the differences were still under control until a surprise development happened: former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, and turned the Arab region's affairs upside down. As President Ali Abdullah Saleh was a member of the Arab Cooperation Council, which included Egypt, Iraq, Yemen and Jordan before unity, his country was subjected to collective punishment which led to the deportation of about one million Yemenis from the Gulf. Thus, it deprived Yemen of revenues worth more than 3 billion dollars.
The deportation also forced a heavy cost of re –integrating the deported Yemenis into the local labor market, alongside nearly one million southern employees from the administrative, military or retired categories Due to the unity, The southern state incurred insolvency after Soviet aid ceased in 1989 which was nearly the only economic source of the country. Not only this, but Gulf punishment extended to financing of southern Yemeni outcasts who wished to secede and return to the past.
Yemeni parties engaged in unity had to respond to the new challenge radically. Thus, President Ali Abdullah Saleh and Vice President Ali Salem al-Beid proposed to integrate the two central parties: the General Popular Congress and the Socialist Party so all Yemenis will be in the same boat.
But a large faction in the Socialist Party opposed the merger and this group was largely northerners who were skilled in fighting and the struggle against the rule of Sanaa. They assumed that the merger would deprive them of a traditional position that had enabled them to defend their interests. They also justified their opposition by the need to maintain the multi-party system, assuming that the merger would harm this unity achievement.
With the absence of radical response to merger difficulties whether, permanent or immediate, Yemenis lost control over existing difficulties and ventured to solve the crisis with non-political means. This came as one party wants to secede, citing difficulties involved in integration with the state and the labor market while the other party wants unity], assuming that secession would throw the whole country apart and cast Yemenis into the abyss.
Eventually, the war took place in 1994 during which Ali Salem Al-Beid declared a separatist government in Macla, Hadramout his hometown. But he could not defend this choice for more than two days as the unity military forces invaded separatist positions and put a quick end to their separatist movement.
The victorious unity trend had to race against time to obtain new economic resources to pay the costs of war (about 10 billion dollars), costs of the deported in the first Gulf War, and costs of integrating the bankrupt southern state.
This state was initially required to support more than one million Yemenis, as we noted before, but enemies of unity at home and abroad wanted something else for Yemen.
After months of victory over secession, Yemen faced a new war waged this time by Eritrea on the Yemeni archipelago of Hanish. The Yemeni side had to battle on the international arena for more than five years to reclaim the archipelago through peaceful means.
This trend had also to continue marking the border with Oman and Saudi Arabia to give Yemen the chance to benefit from its resources under the international law. This process has lasted for a valuable half a decade and ended in 2000.
After a single year, the U.S. started an unprecedented attack on the Middle East after the events of September 2001. Yemen was classified as a possible candidate for the U.S. invasion among other states. But President Ali Abdullah Saleh defused the situation and openly declared his cooperation with Washington in the fight against international terrorism, especially after Al-Qaeda chose his country as a prominent scene for its military operations.
This was manifested when Al-Qaeda destroyed the U.S. warship Cole in Aden and French oil tanker Limburg on the shores of Hadramout.As soon as Yemen survived the U.S. "creative chaos", it faced an armed sectarian rebellion in Saada which raised explicit Iranian slogans such as: "Death to America, Death to Israel) thousands of kilometers away from the frontline with Israel and the U.S. occupation of Iraq.
The rebels were never known to have a military presence on the two fronts and it was clear they were trying to draw a joint support from Iran and Libya (Colonel Gaddafi confirmed that he has a Hashimite link with Houthis) in a border region with Saudi Arabia. The rebels operate there in a political and religious environment which received a harsh defeat in the struggle between Republicans and monarchists in the 1970s.
They have chosen the date of the rebellion when Arab bonds grew tighter and Iran turned into an important player in the Arab world, not to mention that the insurgency coincided with a growing Yemeni involvement in the Gulf Cooperation Council.
Successive rounds of fighting in Saada have inflicted heavy losses on Yemen on every level. Extra cash resulting from rising oil prices has been consumed. The money could have been spent on construction operations in infrastructure projects in Eastern and Southern provinces. Perhaps its largest damage came as the separatist trend seized the opportunity to escalate its activities, benefiting from political mistakes.
The mistakes had to do with handling the legacy inherited from the former Marxist state and the surplus of employees, soldiers and officers who resigned or were dismissed from service since the war in 1994. They are estimated to be tens of thousands. Moreover, the coalition of official opposition parties intensified its pressure on the government, taking advantage of Saada events and the southern movement calls
Add to this cocktail of diverse movements al Qaeda's activities which have not ceased since the start of the millennium. The tense political map in this country has been completed and the global economic crisis emerged just to unravel it and place it at the forefront. At this time, Ali Salem al-Beid decided to resume his secessionist activities, taking advantage of the Yemeni-Qatari dispute over Gaza summit, and the wide Qatari media leverage. He also benefited from the "creative chaos" spread in Bab el-Mendab area. Some major powers look towards the Adan side of this strait.
On the opposite side of the strait, France keeps a military base, the largest in Africa, It hosts a U.S. garrison since which has been stationed there since U.S. President George W. Bush declared his famous war on terrorism.
Despite the multiplicity of tension sources in the Yemeni case, the southern state is still the central and only player on which you can bet in this country.
Secession schemes in Saada and some parts of the south reflect the hopes small groups of the population and do not address the vast majority of Yemenis. Moreover, separatists in both sides do not share the same interests, vision and foreign links. The rebellion in Saada does not raise economic demands and aspires to reclaim the upper hand.
Meanwhile the second party puts forward economic demands to reach separatist goals. Al-Qaeda is a casual foreign player insignificant to Yemeni political counts. What remain are the opposition parties which enjoy a large representation among Yemenis and practice their opposition on the borders of the state.
They also engaged in tactical manoeuvres close to rebels from both sides to gain sympathy and to pressure the government. However, they do not breach the unity ceiling and probably assume they can play a bigger role when solutions are found to the problems mentioned.
In short, separatist movements in Yemen are not institutional movements with clear demands or political reformist attitudes. They seek to benefit from tough Yemeni economic conditions and the change in inter-Arab political relations and the international chaos around Bab el-Mendab strait to achieve political separatist goals.
The central state is clearly aware of that and this was expressed by the huge and unprecedented military parade on the occasion of the 19 National Day as if the Yemeni president wants to remind all those concerned of the famous slogan: unity or death.
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