I don't know that any number you pick now could be anything other than a moving target... without knowing more than is knowable now about the market adoption curves being seen by T-Mobile... and all the others who are infringing.
The issue in value isn't just one of T-Mobile having taken some fixed value from CLYW for which a penalty will be assessed... it is one of the entire industry having crossed the line from exercising restraint, deliberately withholding full deployment of the technology, to instead having decided the risks inherent in infringement are more than compensated for by the scale of the opportunity...
They've already made that calculated decision to cross the line and deploy... which is good news for CLYW... but, now, we see a negotiation that is not only about the penalty that willful infringement by one infringer should have imposed, but also a negotiation that will pair future rewards for CLYW tied to the future uses of the patent... penalties... and future revenues.
I think it is a mistake to focus only on the potential in a number tied to penalties for one case of infringement by one company... rather than to focus more broadly on the value that results from validation. If the patent, and CLYW ownership of it, are not validated... there is nothing of value here. If the patent, and CLYW ownership of it, ARE validated... the value is still a function of damages to date, paired with future revenues from licensing, with future value tied to future market adoption curves... for many users, not just T-Mobile alone. That value, if proven, is likely to be large, even if limited by the structure of the outstanding obligations for a time... but, still large...
The risk structure is similar to that in wild cat oil exploration in that IF the first effort proves out to be valid... and not a dry hole... then you don't just get the potential from one oil well that produces revenue, instead of that from having a new find in one hole that is the discovery well for a new oil field. There are royalties to be paid and expenses to cover if it comes in... but, if it doesn't come in... the structure that exists if it does won't matter.
Three points of potential change in value result.
The first from the change in perspective re value tied to a shift from questionable ownership of a property of questionable value... to proven ownership of a property with proven value and great potential... some large bit of which will still be largely unproven potential.
The second in a transition from a focus on the potential value of the property with a single proven producer, to a focus on the proven value of a long term revenue stream from the property... a transition from pricing based on "the value of the asset", to price based on "a multiple applied to revenues and earnings".
The third in a transition from a focus on the value in and revenue from ownership of a single producing property... a single well... to a focus on the value and revenue from a long lived super-giant oil field with multiple producing wells. The patent has similar risk and potential for "multiple producers"... with the benefit and risk that the productive lifetime is known, but the value of the production in that lifetime isn't. There isn't depletion risk in the sense of having limits on what can be produced from a success... other than what the market is able to absorb.
Ultimately, IF the patent is proven, the future value will be a function of the tech proving to be important and successful in the market. It appears now that the companies fielding systems are betting that the market is going to like the tech and that will make the tech succeed... betting on that enough to go ahead and field systems knowing the patent is there as a risk in the effort... but, they could be wrong...
I've long been convinced that the patent is good, and that the market will prove it a success. Otherwise, there wouldn't be any reason to be here. The risks tied to the patent issues and the market acceptance of the tech aren't insubstantial, but those directing the choices that are being made here seem to make the business risks more substantive than the technical or market risks...
It is more important to do the right thing than to do it well... but, that isn't ever useful as an excuse if you are making what are clearly bad choices. You need to know what the right thing IS to be able to know if you are doing it. The risk here appears to be of that sort...
Large value in hand could be lost... only because of the problem of the hand in the cookie jar...
I expect the end result here will prove to be tied to the willingness of those involved in ALLOWING it to succeed... or in REQUIRING it to fail... all as a function of greed. Effort designed to take more than they should... WILL result in losing all of it.
My uncertainty, other than the obvious in not knowing better than anyone else how it will all come out, is that tied to whether the risks I see being posed here are being purposefully imposed in fact, or are only purposefully postured for limited purpose... or, if they are real, if they exist only as a function of gross incompetence and stupidity rather than nefarious purpose.
I've posted before that it appeared to me that there seemed to be a fair amount of bad advice being given and acted on here... and that the primary beneficiary of those efforts, thus far, appears to be T-Mobile...
I think by now there is likely to be some much improved clarity on a lot of that... showing that actions taken in "self interest" rather than "fiduciary interest" have been misguided... as improper actions will tend to be.
I don't know what that means, now, about where this goes next...
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