PenSec exactly!! ..."but sometimes I still wonder how much he really knew/knows when he started with this plan, whatever that plan might be. ..."
What i do know is to follow insider buying,this is what led me here a couple years ago.IMO insider buying is a type of play for people ,like myself ,that dont have the time to trade.It gives security that the insider wouldn't have purchased if he thought it was going to go down.
But they can be wrong also.Have been trying to figure a reason why he would try to control this company over a clean shell for sometime.
Have posted the link below on other threads, which is a study done on insider buying and their knowledge on future earnings ,and the like.It's a good read imo and made me think they know more of what is coming then i ever will.In general just need lots,and lots, of patience.
gl rw
=========================================================== Below is a link to a 2002 paper about::"What insiders know about future earnings and how they use it: evidence from insider trades". Cilck on download and choose a download site for the complete pdf. -------------------------------------------------------- Written by: Bin Ke Smeal College of Business Administration Pennsylvania State University Steven Huddart Smeal College of Business Administration Pennsylvania State University Kathy Petroni Eli Broad Graduate School of Management Michigan State University March, 2002 --------------------------------------------------------- Samples of the paper:: "This paper provides evidence that insiders possess, and trade upon, knowledge of specific and economically-significant forthcoming accounting disclosures as long as two years prior to the disclosure. Stock sales by insiders increase three to nine quarters prior to a break in a string of consecutive increases in quarterly earnings. Insider stock sales are greater for growth firms, before a longer period of declining earnings, and when the earnings decline at the break is greater. Consistent with avoiding an established legal jeopardy, there is little abnormal selling in the two quarters immediately prior to the break."
"Insider trade has previously been linked to managementÕs foreknowledge of corporate events, including bankruptcy (Seyhun and Bradley, 1997), dividend initiations (John and Lang,1991), seasoned equity offerings (Karpoff and Lee, 1991), stock repurchases (Lee, Mikkelson and Partch, 1992), and takeover bids (Seyhun, 1990). Taken together, these studies suggest insiders know of forthcoming price-relevant events months and even years before public disclosure of these events. Furthermore, abnormal trade by insiders generally is found to concentrate in the two quarters prior to the disclosure. In contrast, studies of the relationship between insider trading and subsequent earnings disclosures generally find either no or inconsistent evidence that insider trading is associated with subsequently-disclosed accounting earnings."
"This study improves our understanding of the specific nature of the private information that insiders possess, and the use insiders make of that information. It offers strong evidence that insiders anticipate earnings trends up to two years in the future and trade to profit from this information. Further, the evidence points to interactions between legal constraints on trade and the timing of insider trades."
"Noe (1999) documents a significant positive association between net insider purchases made within twenty days after a management earnings forecast and a measure of growth in earnings measured over the next three to five years. This result suggests that insiders base their trading decisions on forecasts of earnings a year or more in the future, rather than earnings to be announced in the next quarter. Beneish (1999) analyzes insider trades after announcements of earnings that subsequently are shown to be overstated by an SEC enforcement action. He finds that insiders sell more of their stock than expected in the period after the earnings announcement but prior to the discovery and public disclosure of the overstatement.9 This suggests an interesting and important interaction between earnings disclosures and stock trades by insiders in a position to influence those disclosures: at least in extreme cases, insiders manipulate earnings to postpone bad news, and profit from trades they make before the bad news is revealed. Evidence confirming this view is provided by Beneish, Press, and Vargus (2001), who conclude that insiders manage earnings to sell stock at higher prices and delay debt covenant default." --------------------------------------------------------- Click Download,then choose location : http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=278055
News 
Market Data 
Discover 
AI
