Al Qaeda’s Western Recruits
Summary
Al Qaeda is an international organization that constantly changes and adapts, seeking new ways to avoid detection and catch its opponents off guard. Rather than sending foreigners into other nations to carry out surveillance and strikes, the group has found it can achieve surprise and minimize exposure by recruiting native Western operatives. The examination of some Western al Qaeda operatives offers insights into the group’s recruitment methods and plans for operations in the United States, Britain, Australia and other Western nations.
Analysis
Al Qaeda remains a dynamic organization that leverages local expertise and resources in surveilling, planning and carrying out operations. To that end, the group seeks indigenous operatives to carry out pre-strike surveillance and attacks in several nations. An examination of some of these Western recruits provides insights into al Qaeda’s methods of recruiting, coordinating, planning and deploying resources.
There are many suspected American and other Western al Qaeda facilitators, operatives and sympathizers. High-profile cases that prove especially insightful include those of:
· Jose Padilla, an American known as the “Dirty Bomber”
· Richard Reid, a Briton known as the “Shoe Bomber”
· Jack Roche, Australia’s “Reluctant Militant,” who reportedly has ties to al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah
Drawing from the statements given to investigators, each of these cases has similarities and differences from the others—the most striking similarity being that they were all caught. Though a look at these three offers some insights into al Qaeda’s Western recruitment, it should not be assumed that these assessments include all of the group’s recruiting and training techniques. The very fact that these men were caught raises questions—and even suggests al Qaeda was fully cognizant of the potential for detection. The stories of those not yet caught could prove much more interesting and insightful.
Jose Padilla, the Dirty Bomber
Born in 1970 in New York, Padilla had a troubled childhood that led to gang involvement and run-ins with police in Chicago and Florida. In 1992, he was introduced to Islam—reportedly by his manager at a fast food restaurant in Florida—though some stories suggest that the introduction occurred while he was serving jail time. By 1993, Padilla had changed his name to Ibrahim and become involved with radical Islamists in the Ft. Lauderdale area.
In 1996, Padilla married and acquired a U.S. passport. Reports indicate that he and his wife lived in a gated community, despite neither having a job— suggesting that Padilla already was receiving some kind of stipend from the Islamic community. In 1998, he left his wife and traveled to Egypt. He stayed there for just more than a year, marrying an Egyptian woman before heading to Pakistan. Once again, he took a new name—Abdullah al-Muhajir (Abdullah the Immigrant).
While in Pakistan, Padilla met a Yemeni who introduced him to another al Qaeda recruiter. This acquaintance sponsored Padilla’s trip to Afghanistan for weapons training at a camp overseen by Abu Zubaida. There, he was given on-the-job training as a Taliban guard near Kabul—apparently a test of his loyalty. Afterward, Padilla was approached by Mohammed Atef, who began determining the Westerner’s commitment and possible use as an operative.
Padilla was chosen as a potential operative only after he had completed basic training in Afghanistan. This trend seems to follow that of most Western al Qaeda recruits. As will be seen with the case of Jack Roche, the direct recruitment of operatives in Western nations is difficult; waiting for disaffected or otherwise exploitable Westerners to make their way to al Qaeda is preferable.
What came next for Padilla appears to be another common trend in al Qaeda’s recruitment. He was sent to Pakistan, where he reported a lost passport and was issued a new one without stamps that tracked his previous travels. Padilla then went on an expense-paid trip back to Egypt to visit his wife - an obvious perk and attempt on al Qaeda’s part to continue the bond with the American al Qaeda recruit. Two months later, Padilla was back in Afghanistan to receive his first assignment: blowing up U.S. apartment buildings with a combination of natural gas leaks and detonators.
At this point, Padilla’s potential as an operative began to slip. He had a falling out with his assigned partner, Jafar al-Tayer. (Padilla later said that Jafar was probably an American.) After training for the operation, the two argued. Padilla then told his handlers that the operation was off, since he could not carry it out alone. This training occurred just before the Sept. 11 attacks in the United States. It is unclear whether the attacks affected the men’s decision to call off the gas explosion attacks.
Later in the year, as U.S. air strikes in Afghanistan began, Padilla fled to Pakistan. There, he and another militant attempted to sell the idea of detonating a nuclear bomb in America. The two told Abu Zubaida about instructions for building a nuclear device they had seen on the Internet. Abu Zubaida had doubts about this idea and assigned them to carry out the long-overdue apartment bombings instead. But by this time, it appears Padilla was no longer willing to listen.
The idea of detonating a nuclear weapon—or at least a radiological device -- was presented to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed by Padilla in March 2002. Again, it was rejected in favor of the apartment attacks. After several rounds of discussion, al Qaeda gave Padilla and an associate each $20,000 and sent them on their way. Two months later, Padilla was arrested while entering the United States; Abu Zubaida—by then in custody—had informed investigators of his activities.
After turning down the more easily carried out apartment attacks, Padilla became useless as an al Qaeda operative. But as a red herring for U.S. security forces to spend resources and time on, he served a purpose. He also represented a worst-case scenario—a converted Muslim militant who did not fit the racial profiling designed to weed out possible al Qaeda operatives.
Richard Reid, The Shoe Bomber
The son of a Jamaican father and an English mother, Richard Reid was born and raised in a London suburb. Reid’s father—reportedly also a convert to Islam—spent much of his time in jail. By the mid 1990s, Reid had also embarked on a life of crime and was incarcerated for a series of muggings. While serving time in the Feltham young offenders’ institute, he was introduced to, and embraced Islam.
Like Padilla, Reid came from an essentially fatherless home, became a juvenile petty criminal and turned to Islam while serving time. Islam provided a sense of belonging and purpose for both men; however, their apparent lack of self-discipline also opened them up to the influence of radicals.
Reid—who changed his name to Abdel Rahim—joined the Brixton Mosque, which helped to rehabilitate former criminals. His devotion to studying drew him to more radical members of the Islamic community. Reid began accusing mosque members and leaders of deviating from the truth and accepting Western influences. Before being expelled from the mosque, he met up with fellow disaffected worshiper Zacarias Moussaoui.
In late 1998, Reid stopped attending Brixton and moved to Pakistan. He then began training in Afghanistan and traveled to several countries—including Egypt, Israel, Turkey, Belgium, the Netherlands and France. During these flights, Reid was allegedly scouting the security procedures of American airlines; he also visited radical and militant Islamist communities. While in Afghanistan, Reid trained in a special camp for solo martyrs, learning bomb making and methods of avoiding detection. One of his supervisors was Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.
Before departing from Paris in December 2001, Reid acquired a new passport free of stamps from his previous travels. Like Padilla, he claimed to have lost his original passport. Reid was detained briefly for questioning at the Paris airport Dec. 21 -- the original date of his planned attack—but was allowed to fly the next day. He reportedly was unsuccessful in his attack only because the required fuses got wet in the rain.
Reid appeared to have better training than Padilla, who basically became a “blown agent” left on his own by al Qaeda. (If he had managed to pull off an attack, however, al Qaeda would not have complained.) Perhaps more importantly, Reid was more willing to die.
Despite these differences, Padilla and Reid followed a similar path to al Qaeda. Impressionable young men, they flirted with Islam in prison and gravitated toward those with the strongest convictions in their respective Islamic communities. Al Qaeda did not need to seek out these Western members. The group simply moved them in a natural progression through the training camps in Afghanistan to selection as operatives.
Jack Roche, Australia’s Reluctant Militant
Born in 1953 as Paul George Holland, Jack Roche’s case bears similarities and differences to those of Padilla and Reid. For one, he was much older upon his introduction to Islam. A native of Britain, Roche drifted to Germany and eventually to Australia, where he obtained citizenship in 1978. Though he had few if any problems with the law, Roche was a heavy drinker. He converted to Islam in 1993 as part of an effort to tackle his drinking problem.
As was the case with Padilla and Reid, Roche turned to Islam to fill a void and get on a more “correct” path. All three men proved susceptible to external influences in their newfound religion and lifestyle.
From 1993 to 1995, Roche lived in Indonesia, studying Islam and teaching English as a second language. He met Abdullah Sungkar—co-founder of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) -- while the latter was visiting a Sydney mosque in 1996. Roche then began to affiliate with the more radical Islamists and JI. In early 2000, he traveled to Afghanistan and joined the Taliban. Mohammad Atef and other senior al Qaeda members asked him to establish an al Qaeda cell in Australia, where he could stake out the Israeli Embassy and other potential targets.
The use and deployment of Roche then fell apart, apparently because of splits between and within JI and al Qaeda. Roche was sent to Malaysia in February 2000 to meet with Hambali, an operative for both al Qaeda and JI. Hambali told Roche to prepare for a trip to Afghanistan where he would meet a “sheikh.” Roche returned to Australia, flew back to Malaysia a month later, and then went on to Pakistan, where he was met by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. In April, Roche went to Afghanistan, where he met Osama bin Laden and undertook a two-week course in explosives.
Roche’s relationship with JI seems to have accelerated al Qaeda’s decision to take him in as a potential operative and cell leader. He discussed possible targets inside Australia with al Qaeda leaders, including Mohammed Atef and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. Roche was given more than $8,000 and was told to begin surveillance on the Israeli Embassy and other key Israeli diplomatic and economic targets. However, reports indicate his JI handlers were actually more interested in the Sydney Olympics.
After embarking on the surveillance work in June 2000, Roche became apprehensive about carrying out an actual operation; he was also experiencing little luck in recruiting new cell members. On July 14, Roche phoned the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO). He explained his connection with bin Laden and warned that a JI and al Qaeda cell existed in Australia. Roche called again five days later, after receiving no response to his first call.
Recognizing Roche’s growing reluctance, JI urged him Aug. 8 to carry on with the operation. Two days later, Roche again called the ASIO. Again, he received no response. A few days later, JI called off the attack plans. Roche was left on his own until his arrest more than two years later.
Though Roche’s mission was eventually called off, neither JI nor al Qaeda did anything—aside from issuing minor threats—to ensure he never talked. For an organization as security conscious as al Qaeda, this seems an anomaly. Perhaps the group wanted Roche to be caught as a means of spreading fear in Australia. On the other hand, al Qaeda might have had little concern over his capture; after all, ASIO failed to respond to his phone calls.
Common Denominators
The common denominators in these three cases are not socioeconomic conditions or age. Rather, they are a perceived need for belonging to something, a vulnerability and naivete that left the three men susceptible to radical teachings. Radical white hate groups and other cults also recruit members by tapping into these kinds of vulnerabilities.
Though many Westerners convert to Islam, only a small number of them are enticed by its radical teachings. A still smaller number actually act on these teachings, receiving training in places such as Pakistan, Afghanistan or Indonesia and transitioning from radicalism to militantism. Still fewer become al Qaeda operatives—a step that requires denouncing one’s own nation in favor of a broader ideology.
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