THE invocation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is unprecedented. It does not, however, at once enhance the military power that America will deploy in its war on terrorism. It merely makes it possible for Washington to call on its allies to lend assistance. What assistance will be given remains for each to decide.
The declaration does have the effect, however, of defining what will now be a theatre of war. It includes not only the territories of the member states, but also the North Atlantic "area" - the whole of the world north of the Tropic of Cancer. That line runs just under the mouth of the Gulf and below the southern coast of Iran. What may be presumed to be the primary target states, Afghanistan foremost, therefore lie within it.
It is also important that the invocation of Article 5 will not limit America's freedom to act unilaterally, which may prove vital if some or any of its partners jib at measures it decides to take.
As sympathy for its plight fades, together with revulsion at the atrocity, it is possible that states less resolute for armed action and more sympathetic to the Arab world will shuffle their feet. France comes immediately to mind, but Italy may also backslide, perhaps Germany as well.
Militarily that will not signify greatly because none of those states, except France, has worthwhile military forces to deploy. Nor do any of the continental European Nato states have bases to offer in the probable operational area. The over-flying and logistic facilities they could make available would be valuable; real force, however, will come from America's own resources and is being assembled urgently at this moment.
Britain, at least, can be counted on - as always. Tony Blair has already said the right things and will undoubtedly hold true to his words. He will be supported wholeheartedly by the British people, in whom the New York horror has reawoken that sense of Anglo-American solidarity that animated the United Kingdom during the Second World War.
Britain can actually lend something substantial to America's war effort. Small though our Armed Forces are, they are well balanced and of high quality, with particular skills in expeditionary and low-intensity operations that will prove useful. The American special forces have largely learnr their expertise from ours, which they admire, and they will be ready to call on their help without demur. Such help will be given fully.
What, however, will America do of its own accord? No obvious targets have yet been identified. The evil-doers have not declared themselves and there is a variety of culprits to be blamed. Islamic fundamentalist movements, it is generally agreed, are at the centre. Both supposed motivation - hatred of America, "the great Satan" - and methods of operation point to them.
Suicide attacks have, since the civil war in Lebanon that began 30 years ago, become the preferred method of Islamic protest, and the displaced peoples of that region, Palestinians foremost, provide candidates for martyrdom in profusion. Not only Palestinians, however; young men of many other Islamic nationalities, including Afghans, flocked to Lebanon while it was a base for operations against Israel, learnt suicide techniques there, imbibed the spirit of fanaticism and took it home.
The target is therefore diffuse. Because of the Islamic diaspora, there may now be suicide cells in many countries, throughout the Middle East and North Africa, of course, but also in western Europe. There are certainly potential suicide bombers in Britain.
The root of the evil, now clearly associated with Osama bin Laden's group, lies, however, in the Islamic world and probably in Afghanistan. The problem is how to strike at it.
Afghanistan is a remote country of difficult terrain, ruled by fanatics who do not fear retaliation. Moreover, taking war to the Afghans has a bad history. The British, in three wars, twice came off badly - in 1842 and 1919. The Russians came off very badly indeed in the last days of communism. Pessimists will, therefore, probably argue that an American campaign against Afghanistan, to root out terrorists who shelter there, is also doomed to failure.
It should be remembered, however, that, in 1878, the British did succeed in bringing the Afghans to heel. Lord Roberts's march from "Kabul to Kandahar" was one of the most celebrated of Victoria's wars. The Russians, moreover, foolishly did not try to punish rogue Afghans, as Roberts did, but to rule the country. Since Afghanistan is ungovernable, the failure of their effort was predictable.
The Americans should try to repeat Roberts's success. He, however, operated from a firm base within India. Modern India is unlikely to offer America such facilities. Where else might they be found?
Ironically, it seems possible that America may look to Russia. There are two reasons why President Putin might help. The first is that Russia is also plagued by the menace of Islamic terrorism that, in Chechnya, has inflicted humiliation on the successor to the once-great Soviet army. The second is that lending assistance to Nato might persuade the alliance to admit Russia to membership.
Since the collapse of communism, one of the main strands of Russian foreign policy has been to seek closer alignment with the West. Russia has been constantly rebuffed - it took particularly badly the sop of membership of the so-called Partnership for Peace, but perhaps there has - until now - been no substantial basis on which the leader of the former Warsaw Pact and Nato could have made common cause.
But the world changed on Tuesday. America and Russia may well now be able to agree a common cause in the war against nihilistic terrorism and to join in military alliance. For those who regard the combination of national humiliation and international ostracism that Russia has suffered since 1989 as dangerous and undesirable, an American-Russian reconciliation would be a wholly beneficial outcome of Tuesday's atrocity.
Given bases, America can undoubtedly wreak terrible vengeance on its new-found enemies. We may expect operations as improbable as Tuesday's itself. With appropriate logistic facilities, America's deployable ground-air forces, such as its two air-assault and airborne divisions, could move from the regions bordering Afghanistan's northern frontier with the former Soviet Union to inflict violent strikes on its Islamic enemies. America would not seek to change the regime, but simply attempt to find and kill terrorists. It would do so without pity.
There would be no more fear of the body-bags coming home. There are body-bags aplenty in Manhattan this week and young Americans will risk their lives, with a fervour as intense as any Islamic suicide killer, to do their duty to honour and country.
America, once roused, is a terrible enemy to fight, as Japan found on Okinawa and Iwo Jima. Those islands were captured, not by air power or naval bombardment, but because young GIs and marines were better and braver soldiers than their Japanese opponents.
There are other current movements of which to take note, as yet insubstantial but certain to gather concrete form. One is the retreat of human rights lawyers from the forefront of public life. America in a war mood will have no truck with tender concern for constitutional safeguards of the liberty of its enemies. The other, which ordinary Americans will have to learn to bear, is interference with their liberty of instant electronic access to friends and services.
The World Trade Centre outrage was co-ordinated on the internet, without question. If Washington is serious in its determination to eliminate terrorism, it will have to forbid internet providers to allow the transmission of encrypted messages - now encoded by public key ciphers that are unbreakable even by the National Security Agency's computers - and close down any provider that refuses to comply.
Uncompliant providers on foreign territory should expect their buildings to be destroyed by cruise missiles. Once the internet is implicated in the killing of Americans, its high-rolling days may be reckoned to be over.