1) Where did you get $38/share in #3? With Treasury exercising the warrants there would be 9B shares in total, for an implied FnF-combined market cap of $342B. That seems quite high considering that they make around $25B combined, and in this post you said the P/E will likely be in single digits upon release. A P/E of 9 would make for a share price of $25.
2) Your 1200% gain is extremely dependent on the values in #3 and #4. Lowering the values in #3 and #4 to $50k and $250k respectively (based on the $25/share above) lowers the overall gain to 750%.
3) Why did you not account for a capital raise or junior-to-common conversion in #3 or #4? That serves to push the per-share price down even more.
4) The juniors, by contrast, go to at least 100% of par in #3 and #4 (and perhaps more if they get converted to common) and at least 60% of par in #2, meaning they get 58% of par on average for a 750% gain from today's prices on the less liquid series.
Those things combined mean that the juniors and commons have similar upside, but the commons have a drastically higher variance of outcomes, depending on a 1% shot to have any hope of outperforming the juniors.
This situation is exactly why I think the juniors are a better investment than the commons: same upside, far less risk.
I agree that this kind of consideration should be seen as a net-zero, and as such it doesn't affect the math or the decision as to what mix of commons and juniors to own now.
I don't bash people, I bash bad arguments.
I don't understand what "riding out the risk" means, though. If you decide investment A is better than B, having held B for a long time shouldn't affect that decision. Especially since FnF are probably at least a year away from exiting conservatorship, meaning that swapping over now wouldn't cause any short-term vs long-term taxation problems.
You have totally misunderstood my metaphor. My point was that you have held me to an extremely stringent evidentiary standard, to the point of absurdity, and far more than anyone else on this board.
I gave you a direct quote from Mark Calabria, who related his negotiations with Treasury over a senior-to-common conversion and you have nitpicked it to the nth degree rather than accepting it.
On the other hand, you gave blanket agreement here in response to a post that was factually incorrect (FnF cannot pay down the seniors without Treasury's permission) without any questioning or pushback.