(I added bold): "More fundamentally, though, the district court’s analogy to contemporaneous
agency explanations makes no sense. Administrative agencies are required to
provide contemporaneous reasoned explanations for things they actually do. Here,
President Trump is explaining what he would have done in a counterfactual situation
made relevant for the first time by a Supreme Court decision that issued after he left
office. Under the district court’s reasoning, a sitting President would have to make
a public, contemporaneous statement for every action he would like to take but
cannot take because of some limitation on his authority. And here, President Trump
would have had to do so with no prior notice of that requirement. This would be an
exercise in absurdity, not a basis for denying relief for constitutional harms."
"Plaintiffs—or President Trump for that
matter—had no way of knowing that they needed to amass counterfactual evidence
before the Supreme Court established the counterfactual test."
"Second, the district court created and imposed on Plaintiffs new, heightened
evidentiary standards for stating a claim for a remedy under Collins. For example,
the district court held that Plaintiffs did not plausibly allege that the Trump
Administration had a “concrete plan” to end the conservatorships. ROA.1518–19.
But the requirement for proof of a “concrete plan” is found nowhere in the Supreme
Court’s decision in this case or in any other relevant authority. See also ROA.1519
(requiring Plaintiffs to show that the Administration had a “clear path” to its goals).
Notably, the Supreme Court’s example, which the Court said would “clearly” cause
compensable harm, consisted solely of a statement by a President. Collins, 141 S.
Ct. at 1789 (“Or suppose that the President had made a public statement expressing
displeasure with actions taken by a Director and had asserted that he would remove
the Director if the statute did not stand in the way. In [that] situation[], the statutory provision would clearly cause harm.”). The Supreme Court—unlike the district
court—did not impose an additional, heightened requirement for a “concrete plan”
or “clear path” to execute the President’s intent. ROA.1518–19."
"Third, the district court improperly based its analysis on a policy judgment
that Plaintiffs’ relief would be too sweeping or invasive to the current
Administration. "