I think Holden’s guarantee was a bit of intended hyperbole. No one knows for sure, but logically working backwards from our objective.
To privatize GSEs, you need to raise outside capital. To raise outside capital, we need a set goal post in terms of capital requirements and minimize/quantify litigation risk (that could be anywhere from donuts to the size of the aggregate outside raise). You can’t raise capital without taking out the litigation risk - you’re not going to maximize the capital raise because they will not subscribe to a low rate of return with material litigation risk unless it’s at a deep discount.
So who is the consortium that is sponsoring the plaintiffs? My information is a bit dated, but when a fund I knew were asked to “pitch in” to the direct claim suits, in the way back when, the parties involved were primarily institutional preferred holders. (No I will not say who is the consortium.) Those claims are now dismissed, but follow the trail.
Anecdotally and diverging a bit, there are articles and podcasts of former officials and “so-called” Industry experts, opponents mainly, that even said the prefs have standing but behind the taxpayers and new investors, and the commons have little to no legal standing for profits. Right or wrong, even they acknowledge the cap structure hierarchy that prefs get paid before the commons.
So there is a strong case that behind treasury, it’s the litigating shareholders who are in pole position right now and they are likely still mainly preferred shareholders. Hence the Holden Walker guarantee. Lol.