Don’t Believe the Hype. Russia Is Losing in the Middle East—and Around the World.
"Putin Moves to Heighten Russia’s Role After Suleimani Killing "Blowback: Iran abandons nuclear limits after US killing The blowback over the U.S. killing of a top Iranian general is mounting""
Putin’s apparent victories in spreading Russian influence are mirages, some of which have come at a great cost.
By Rajan Menon | November 18, 2019, 2:20 PM
Joan Wong illustration for Foreign Policy/Mikhail Svetlov/Getty Images
But such appraisals, some of which tend toward alarmism, don’t hold up under the bright light of evidence. For one, Russia’s GDP is just a little larger .. http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/countries-by-gdp/ .. than Spain’s—a country with a population less than a third of Russia’s. And Russia’s military budget .. https://www.globalfirepower.com/defense-spending-budget.asp .. is less than a 10th of the United States’, about a fifth of China’s, and smaller than Japan’s.
Seen against this background, Putin’s gambit in Syria had more to do with safeguarding a long-standing strategic investment that appeared imperiled than with outmaneuvering the United States. As he saw it .. https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/07/putins-russia-is-wedded-to-bashar-al-assad-syria-moscow/ , Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad’s fall would have resulted in either prolonged chaos or victory for radical Islamist groups, the strongest of Assad’s armed adversaries. Either outcome would have been a blow for Russia.
Even so, Russian air power alone couldn’t have enabled Assad to retake most of Syria; only ground forces can really conquer territory. And although Russian contract troops have fought—and died, some on account of U.S. airstrikes .. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/24/world/middleeast/american-commandos-russian-mercenaries-syria.html —in Syria, the foreign “boots on the ground” were provided mainly by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp and Hezbollah fighters from Lebanon.
Iran’s and Hezbollah’s decision to fight in Syria didn’t result from a Russian-designed division of labor; they backed Assad for reasons of their own. Their vision of Syria’s future doesn’t by any means mirror Russia’s. Nor, having shed so much blood, will they let Russia shape Syria’s politics singlehandedly.
In other words, Russia hasn’t really won Syria. And in any event, it wouldn’t be much of a prize.
- Russia hasn’t really won Syria. And in any event, it wouldn’t be much of a prize. -
Russian troops raise a flag while on patrol with Turkish forces in Syria’s northeastern Hasakah province on Nov. 1. Delil Souleiman/AFP/Getty Images
Russia’s diplomatic nimbleness in Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt has drawn much attention, and Putin has certainly played his cards well. When push comes to shove, though, all of these countries will continue to depend on, and be far more closely tied to, the United States. None would trade the American connection, despite its imperfections, for the Russian option.
Russia does a little better when it comes to arms sales ... https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/african-arms-imports-decreasing-sipri/ . In North Africa, it is the largest supplier for Algeria, although its market share fell from 90 percent in 2009-2013 to 66 percent in 2014-2018. Yet Morocco, the region’s other main arms buyer, looks to the United States and France for 98 percent of its needs. Russia fulfilled 28 percent of sub-Saharan Africa’s military purchases in 2014-2018 and 35 percent of arms exports to Nigeria, the region’s largest importer.
Even in its own backyard, Russia has come up short.
- Even in its own backyard, Russia has come up short. -
For example, Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and backing of insurgents in Ukraine’s east have turned the country—for Moscow by far historically the most strategically and culturally important of the post-Soviet states—into a sworn enemy. For now, Kyiv will be aligned with the West even if its dream of NATO membership proves elusive. Moreover, while contemporary Ukrainian nationalism has many facets, one is anti-Russian sentiment.
Of course, Russia matters. A country with 144 million people, thousands of nuclear warheads, a million active troops, vast oil and gas reserves, and a U.N. Security Council seat will always matter, and observers shouldn’t be surprised when it vigorously pursues its interests abroad and in ways that challenge the West.
That said, Moscow’s strategic acumen and tangible gains aren’t nearly as dazzling as the consensus suggests. Understanding that requires a clear-eyed look at both sides of the ledger.
Rajan Menon is the Anne and Bernard Spitzer chair in political science at the City College of New York/City University of New York and a senior research scholar at Columbia University’s Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies.