Replies to post #109749 on Sulja Bros. Building Supplies, Ltd (SLJB)

[ed53wa]

** Australian and New Zealand Dual Listing:
"According to Mark Coggins, general manager of Financial Training company, when companies get dual-listed in the mainland market and other international market, it could attract international and domestic companies to the same company, which will help to propel the mainland stock market toward maturity based on international investing concept."

** OTC & LSE DUAL listing:
"A spin-out from Netherlands-based Fuel Tech NV, the $1.6 million Stamford, Connecticut based company had most of its shareholders in the United Kingdom--where they were unable to easily trade on the U.S. over-the-counter market, on which Clean Diesel had listed in 1996. "When it came time to raise funds again," says Whitwell, "our investors asked us if we would move closer to them." While he was initially reluctant to take on the project, which meant finding a UK stock-transfer agent that could connect with the company's U.S. agent and amending his GAAP-compliant financials for some specific UK requirements (like audited forward-cash balances), Whitwell found the process to be more rewarding than he expected. Compared with the OTC, "the LSE is a broader exchange," notes Whitwell, and "we've had more volume." Besides the cash in the bank, the move garnered the company an additional 20 or so investors and a concession from preferred-stock holders to convert their shares to common stock, boosting Clean Diesel's market cap from $5.4 million to $22.5 million."

**1997 Dual listing analysis
"At the end of 1997, the foreign companies listed in the U.S. have a Tobin's q ratio that exceeds by 16.5% the q ratio of firms from the same country that are not listed in the U.S. The valuation difference is statistically significant and largest for exchange-listed firms, where it reaches 37%. The difference persists even after controlling for a number of firm and country characteristics. We propose a theory that explains this valuation difference. We hypothesize that controlling shareholders of firms listed in the U.S. cannot extract as many private benefits from control compared to controlling shareholders of firms not listed in the U.S., but that their firms are better able to take advantage of growth opportunities. Consequently, the cross-listed firms should be those firms where the interests of the controlling shareholder are better aligned with the interests of other shareholders. The growth opportunities of cross-listed firms will be more highly valued than those of firms not listed in the U.S. both because cross-listed firms are better able to take advantage of these opportunities and because a smaller fraction of the cash flow of these firms is expropriated by controlling shareholders."